Cato IV, concluded ...
Cato
November 8, 1787
(T)he direct prerogatives of the president, as springing from his political character, are among the following: It is necessary, in order to distinguish him from the rest of the community, and enable him to keep, and maintain his court, that the compensation for his services; or in other words, his revenue should be such as to enable him to appear with the splendor of a prince; he has the power of receiving ambassadors from, and a great influence on their appointments to foreign courts; as also to make treaties, leagues, and alliances with foreign states, assisted by the senate, which when made, become the supreme law of the land: he is a constituent part of the legislative power; for every bill which shall pass the house of representatives and senate, is to be presented to him for approbation; if he approves of it, he is to sign it, if he disapproves, he is to return it with objections, which in many cases will amount to a complete negative; and in this view he will have a great share in the power of making peace, coining money, etc. and all the various objects of legislation, expressed or implied in this Constitution: for though it may be asserted that the king of Great-Britain has the express power of making peace or war, yet he never thinks it prudent so to do without the advice of his parliament from whom he is to derive his support, and therefore these powers, in both president and king, are substantially the same: he is the generalissimo of the nation, and of course, has the command and control of the army, navy, and militia; he is the general conservator of the peace of the union — he may pardon all offences, except in cases of impeachment, and the principal fountain of all offices and employments.
Will not the exercise of these powers therefore tend either to the establishment of a vile and arbitrary aristocracy, or monarchy?
The safety of the people in a republic depends on the share or proportion they have in the government; but experience ought to teach you, that when a man is at the head of an elective government invested with great powers, and interested in his re-election, in what circle appointments will be made; by which means an imperfect aristocracy bordering on monarchy may be established.
You must, however, my countrymen, beware, that the advocates of this new system do not deceive you, by a fallacious resemblance between it and your own state government, which you so much prize; and if you examine, you will perceive that the chief of this state, is your immediate choice, controlled and checked by a just and full representation of the people, divested of the prerogative of influencing war and peace, making treaties, receiving and sending embassies, and commanding standing armies and navies, which belong to the power of the confederation, and will be convinced that this government is no more like a true picture of your own, that an Angel of darkness resembles an Angel of light.
Cato.
Study Questions
A. According to Cato, what will enhance the formal powers of the president?
What is wrong with the procedures for electing the president and vice-president?
What does he find fault with in the provision for a vice-president?
B. Do Cato and Publius (in The Federalist) have in mind the same kind of United States?
Were Cato’s concerns about the language of Article II misplaced?
Did he, for example, anticipate Senator Henry Clay’s critique of President Andrew Jackson (Speeches on the Removal Power), or the difficulties Congress in the twentieth century would face in holding on to the war power (Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyer and the War Powers Resolution)?
Footnotes
Cato imperfectly quotes Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, Book III, which lists the vices typical of a monarch’s courtiers.
Rather than “hope from the magistrate’s weakness,” Montesquieu notes the “fear of a prince’s virtue [and] hope from his [moral] weakness.”
Cato is referring to the contingency election in the House, whereby the House chooses from the top five candidates in the event no candidate receives an Electoral College majority.
The Twelfth Amendment reduces this number to three.
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/lib ... t/cato-iv/
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Cincinnatus II: To James Wilson, Esquire
Cincinnatus
November 8, 1787
Sir, I have proved, sir, that not only some power is given in the constitution to restrain, and even to subject the press, but that it is a power totally unlimited; and may certainly annihilate the freedom of the press, and convert it from being the palladium of liberty to become an engine of imposition and tyranny.
It is an easy step from restraining the press to making it place the worst actions of government in so favorable a light, that we may groan under tyranny and oppression without knowing from whence it comes.
But you comfort us by saying, ”there is no reason to suspect so popular a privilege will be neglected.”
The wolf, in the fable, said as much to the sheep, when he was persuading them to trust him as their protector, and to dismiss their guardian dogs.
Do you indeed suppose, Mr. Wilson, that if the people give up their privileges to these new rulers they will render them back again to the people?
Indeed, sir, you should not trifle upon a question so serious — You would not have us to suspect any ill.
If we throw away suspicion — to be sure, the thing will go smoothly enough, and we shall deserve to continue a free, respectable, and happy people.
Suspicion shackles rulers and prevents good government.
All great and honest politicians, like yourself, have reprobated it.
Lord Mansfield is a great authority against it, and has often treated it as the worst of libels.
But such men as Milton, Sidney, Locke, Montesquieu, and Trenchard, have thought it essential to the preservation of liberty against the artful and persevering encroachments of those with whom power is trusted.
You will pardon me, sir, if I pay some respect to these opinions, and wish that the freedom of the press may be previously secured as a constitutional and unalienable right, and not left to the precarious care of popular privileges which may or may not influence our new rulers.
You are fond of, and happy at, quaint expressions of this kind in your observation that a formal declaration would have done harm, by implying, that some degree of power was given when we undertook to define its extent.
This thought has really a brilliancy in it of the first water.
But permit me, sir, to ask, why any saving clause was admitted into this constitution, when you tell us, every thing is reserved that is not expressly given?
Why is it said in sec. 9th, “The migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by Congress, prior to the year, 1808.”
There is no power expressly given to the Congress to prohibit migrations and importations.
By your doctrine then they could have none, and it was, according to your own position, nugatory to declare they should not do it.
Which are we to believe, sir, you or the constitution?
The text, or the comment.
If the former, we must be persuaded, that in the contemplation of the framers of the constitution implied powers were given, otherwise the exception would have been an absurdity.
If we listen to you we must affirm it to be a distinctive characteristic of the constitution, that ”what is not expressly given is reserved.”
Such are the inconsistences into which men over ingenuous, like yourself, are betrayed in advocating a bad cause.
Perhaps four months more consideration of the subject, would have rendered you more guarded.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Cincinnatus
November 8, 1787
Sir, I have proved, sir, that not only some power is given in the constitution to restrain, and even to subject the press, but that it is a power totally unlimited; and may certainly annihilate the freedom of the press, and convert it from being the palladium of liberty to become an engine of imposition and tyranny.
It is an easy step from restraining the press to making it place the worst actions of government in so favorable a light, that we may groan under tyranny and oppression without knowing from whence it comes.
But you comfort us by saying, ”there is no reason to suspect so popular a privilege will be neglected.”
The wolf, in the fable, said as much to the sheep, when he was persuading them to trust him as their protector, and to dismiss their guardian dogs.
Do you indeed suppose, Mr. Wilson, that if the people give up their privileges to these new rulers they will render them back again to the people?
Indeed, sir, you should not trifle upon a question so serious — You would not have us to suspect any ill.
If we throw away suspicion — to be sure, the thing will go smoothly enough, and we shall deserve to continue a free, respectable, and happy people.
Suspicion shackles rulers and prevents good government.
All great and honest politicians, like yourself, have reprobated it.
Lord Mansfield is a great authority against it, and has often treated it as the worst of libels.
But such men as Milton, Sidney, Locke, Montesquieu, and Trenchard, have thought it essential to the preservation of liberty against the artful and persevering encroachments of those with whom power is trusted.
You will pardon me, sir, if I pay some respect to these opinions, and wish that the freedom of the press may be previously secured as a constitutional and unalienable right, and not left to the precarious care of popular privileges which may or may not influence our new rulers.
You are fond of, and happy at, quaint expressions of this kind in your observation that a formal declaration would have done harm, by implying, that some degree of power was given when we undertook to define its extent.
This thought has really a brilliancy in it of the first water.
But permit me, sir, to ask, why any saving clause was admitted into this constitution, when you tell us, every thing is reserved that is not expressly given?
Why is it said in sec. 9th, “The migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by Congress, prior to the year, 1808.”
There is no power expressly given to the Congress to prohibit migrations and importations.
By your doctrine then they could have none, and it was, according to your own position, nugatory to declare they should not do it.
Which are we to believe, sir, you or the constitution?
The text, or the comment.
If the former, we must be persuaded, that in the contemplation of the framers of the constitution implied powers were given, otherwise the exception would have been an absurdity.
If we listen to you we must affirm it to be a distinctive characteristic of the constitution, that ”what is not expressly given is reserved.”
Such are the inconsistences into which men over ingenuous, like yourself, are betrayed in advocating a bad cause.
Perhaps four months more consideration of the subject, would have rendered you more guarded.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Cincinnatus II: To James Wilson, Esquire, continued ...
Cincinnatus
November 8, 1787
I come now to the consideration of the trial by jury in civil cases.
And here you have, indeed, made use of your professional knowledge.
But you did not tell the people that your profession was always to advocate one side of a question — to place it in the most favorable, though false, light — to rail where you could not reason — to pervert where you could not refute - and to practice every fallacy on your hearers — to mislead the understanding and pervert judgment.
In right of this professional practice, you make a refutable objection of your own, and then triumphantly refute it.
The objection you impute to your opponents is — the trial by jury is abolished in civil cases.
This you call a disingenuous form — and truly it is very much so on your part and of your own fabrication.
The objection in its true form is, that trial by jury is not secured in civil cases.
To this objection, you could not possibly give an answer; you therefore ingenuously coined one to which you could make a plausible reply.
We expected, and we had a right to expect, that such an inestimable privilege as this would have been secured — that it would not have been less dependent on the arbitrary exposition of future judges, who, when it may suit the arbitrary views of the ruling powers will explain it away at pleasure.
We may expect Tressellians, Jeffrees’s, and Mansfield’s here, and if they should not be native with us, they may possibly be imported.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Cincinnatus
November 8, 1787
I come now to the consideration of the trial by jury in civil cases.
And here you have, indeed, made use of your professional knowledge.
But you did not tell the people that your profession was always to advocate one side of a question — to place it in the most favorable, though false, light — to rail where you could not reason — to pervert where you could not refute - and to practice every fallacy on your hearers — to mislead the understanding and pervert judgment.
In right of this professional practice, you make a refutable objection of your own, and then triumphantly refute it.
The objection you impute to your opponents is — the trial by jury is abolished in civil cases.
This you call a disingenuous form — and truly it is very much so on your part and of your own fabrication.
The objection in its true form is, that trial by jury is not secured in civil cases.
To this objection, you could not possibly give an answer; you therefore ingenuously coined one to which you could make a plausible reply.
We expected, and we had a right to expect, that such an inestimable privilege as this would have been secured — that it would not have been less dependent on the arbitrary exposition of future judges, who, when it may suit the arbitrary views of the ruling powers will explain it away at pleasure.
We may expect Tressellians, Jeffrees’s, and Mansfield’s here, and if they should not be native with us, they may possibly be imported.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Cincinnatus II: To James Wilson, Esquire, concluded ...
Cincinnatus
November 8, 1787
But, if taken even on your own ground it is not so clearly tenable.
In point of legal construction, the trial by jury does seem to be taken away in civil cases.
It is a law maxim, that the expression of one part is an exclusion of the other.
In legal construction therefore, the reservation of trial by jury in criminal, is an exclusion of it in civil cases.
Why else should it be mentioned at all?
Either it followed of course in both cases, or it depended on being stipulated.
If the first, then the stipulation was nugatory — if the latter, then it was in part given up.
Therefore, either we must suppose the Convention did a nugatory thing; or that by the express mention of jury in criminal, they meant to exclude it in civil cases.
And that they did intend to exclude it, seems the more probable, as in the appeal they have taken special care to render the trial by jury of no effect by expressly making the court judges both of law and fact.
And though this is subjected to the future regulation of Congress, yet it would be absurd to suppose, that the regulation meant its annihilation.
We must therefore conclude, that in appeals the trial by jury is expressly taken away, and in original process it is by legal implication taken away in all civil cases.
Here then I must repeat — that you ought to have stated fairly to the people, that the trial by jury was not secured; that they might know what, it was they were to consent to; and if knowing it, they consented, the blame could not fall on you.
Before they decide, however, I will take leave to lay before them the opinion of that great and revered Judge Lord Camden, whose authority is, I hope, at least equal to that of Mr. Wilson.
”There is, says he, scarce any matter of challenge allowed to the judge, but several to the jurors, and many of them may be removed without any reason alledged."
"This seems to promise as much impartiality as human nature will admit, and absolute perfection is not attainable, I am afraid, either in judge or jury or any thing else."
"The trial by our country, is in my opinion, the great bulwark of freedom, and for certain, the admiration of all foreign writers and nations."
"The last writer of any distinguished note, upon the principles of government, the celebrated Montesquieu, is in raptures with this peculiar perfection in the English policy."
"From juries running riot, if I may say so, and acting wildly at particular seasons, I cannot conclude, like some Scottish Doctors of our law and constitutions, that their power should be lessened."
"This would, to use the words of the wise, learned, and intrepid Lord Chief Justice Vaughan, be — a strange newfangled conclusion, after a trial so celebrated for so many hundreds of years.”
Such are the opinions of Lord Camden and Vaughan, and multitudes of the first names, both English and other foreigners might be cited, who bestow unbounded approbation on this best of all human modes for protecting, life, liberty, and property.
I own then, it alarms me, when I see these Doctors of our constitutions cutting in twain this sacred shield of public liberty and justice.
Surely my countrymen will think a little before they resign this strong hold of freedom.
Our state constitutions have held it sacred in all its parts.
They have anxiously secured it.
But that these may not shield it from the intended destruction in the new constitution, it is therein as anxiously provided, that “this constitution, and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof; or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme laws of the land; and the judges in every state, shall be bound thereby; any thing in the constitution and laws of any state, to the contrary not-withstanding.”
Thus this new system, with one sweeping clause, bears down every constitution in the union, and establishes its arbitrary doctrines, supreme and paramount to all the bills and declarations of rights, in which we vainly put our trust, and on which we rested the security of our often declared, unalienable liberties.
But I trust the whole people of this country, will unite, in crying out, as did our sturdy ancestors of old — Nolumus leges anglicae mutari.
We will not part with our birthright.
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/lib ... n-esquire/
Cincinnatus
November 8, 1787
But, if taken even on your own ground it is not so clearly tenable.
In point of legal construction, the trial by jury does seem to be taken away in civil cases.
It is a law maxim, that the expression of one part is an exclusion of the other.
In legal construction therefore, the reservation of trial by jury in criminal, is an exclusion of it in civil cases.
Why else should it be mentioned at all?
Either it followed of course in both cases, or it depended on being stipulated.
If the first, then the stipulation was nugatory — if the latter, then it was in part given up.
Therefore, either we must suppose the Convention did a nugatory thing; or that by the express mention of jury in criminal, they meant to exclude it in civil cases.
And that they did intend to exclude it, seems the more probable, as in the appeal they have taken special care to render the trial by jury of no effect by expressly making the court judges both of law and fact.
And though this is subjected to the future regulation of Congress, yet it would be absurd to suppose, that the regulation meant its annihilation.
We must therefore conclude, that in appeals the trial by jury is expressly taken away, and in original process it is by legal implication taken away in all civil cases.
Here then I must repeat — that you ought to have stated fairly to the people, that the trial by jury was not secured; that they might know what, it was they were to consent to; and if knowing it, they consented, the blame could not fall on you.
Before they decide, however, I will take leave to lay before them the opinion of that great and revered Judge Lord Camden, whose authority is, I hope, at least equal to that of Mr. Wilson.
”There is, says he, scarce any matter of challenge allowed to the judge, but several to the jurors, and many of them may be removed without any reason alledged."
"This seems to promise as much impartiality as human nature will admit, and absolute perfection is not attainable, I am afraid, either in judge or jury or any thing else."
"The trial by our country, is in my opinion, the great bulwark of freedom, and for certain, the admiration of all foreign writers and nations."
"The last writer of any distinguished note, upon the principles of government, the celebrated Montesquieu, is in raptures with this peculiar perfection in the English policy."
"From juries running riot, if I may say so, and acting wildly at particular seasons, I cannot conclude, like some Scottish Doctors of our law and constitutions, that their power should be lessened."
"This would, to use the words of the wise, learned, and intrepid Lord Chief Justice Vaughan, be — a strange newfangled conclusion, after a trial so celebrated for so many hundreds of years.”
Such are the opinions of Lord Camden and Vaughan, and multitudes of the first names, both English and other foreigners might be cited, who bestow unbounded approbation on this best of all human modes for protecting, life, liberty, and property.
I own then, it alarms me, when I see these Doctors of our constitutions cutting in twain this sacred shield of public liberty and justice.
Surely my countrymen will think a little before they resign this strong hold of freedom.
Our state constitutions have held it sacred in all its parts.
They have anxiously secured it.
But that these may not shield it from the intended destruction in the new constitution, it is therein as anxiously provided, that “this constitution, and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof; or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme laws of the land; and the judges in every state, shall be bound thereby; any thing in the constitution and laws of any state, to the contrary not-withstanding.”
Thus this new system, with one sweeping clause, bears down every constitution in the union, and establishes its arbitrary doctrines, supreme and paramount to all the bills and declarations of rights, in which we vainly put our trust, and on which we rested the security of our often declared, unalienable liberties.
But I trust the whole people of this country, will unite, in crying out, as did our sturdy ancestors of old — Nolumus leges anglicae mutari.
We will not part with our birthright.
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/lib ... n-esquire/
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Federal Farmer I
Federal Farmer
October 8, 1787
DEAR SIR,
MY letters to you last winter, on the subject of a well balanced national government for the United States, were the result of a free enquiry; when I passed from that subject to enquiries relative to our commerce, revenues, past administration, &c.
I anticipated the anxieties I feel, on carefully examining the plan of government proposed by the convention.
It appears to be a plan retaining some federal features; but to be the first important step, and to aim strongly at one consolidated government of the United States.
It leaves the powers of government, and the representation of the people, so unnaturally divided between the general and state governments, that the operations of our system must be very uncertain.
My uniform federal attachments, and the interest I have in the protection of property, and a steady execution of the laws, will convince you, that, if I am under any bias at all, it is in favor of any general system which shall promise those advantages.
The instability of our laws increases my wishes for firm and steady government; but then, I can consent to no government, which, in my opinion, is not calculated equally to preserve the rights of all orders of men in the community.
My object has been to join with those who have endeavored to supply the defects in the forms of our governments by a steady and proper administration of them.
Though I have long apprehended that fraudulent debtors, and embarrassed men, on the one hand, and men, on the other, unfriendly to republican equality, would produce an uneasiness among the people, and prepare the way, not for cool and deliberate reforms in the governments, but for changes calculated to promote the interests of particular orders of men.
Acquit me, sir, of any agency in the formation of the new system; I shall be satisfied with seeing, if it shall be adopted with a prudent administration.
Indeed I am so much convinced of the truth of Pope’s maxim, that “That which is best administered is best,” that I am much inclined to subscribe to it from experience.
I am not disposed to unreasonably contend about forms.
I know our situation is critical, and it behooves us to make the best of it.
A federal government of some sort is necessary.
We have suffered the present to languish; and whether the confederation was capable or not originally of answering any valuable purposes, it is now but of little importance.
I will pass by the men, and states, who have been particularly instrumental in preparing the way for a change, and perhaps, for governments not very favorable to the people at large.
A constitution is now presented which we may reject, or which we may accept with or without amendments, and to which point we ought to direct our exertions is the question.
To determine this question with propriety; we must attentively examine the system itself, and the probable consequences of either step.
This I shall endeavor to do, so far as I am able, with candor and fairness; and leave you to decide upon the propriety of my opinions, the weight of my reasons, and how far my conclusions are well drawn.
Whatever may be the conduct of others, on the present occasion, I do not mean hastily and positively to decide on the merits of the constitution proposed.
I shall be open to conviction and always disposed to adopt that which, all things considered, shall appear to me to be most for the happiness of the community.
It must be granted, that if men hastily and blindly adopt a system of government, they will as hastily and as blindly be led to alter or abolish it; and changes must ensue, one after another, till the peaceable and better part of the community will grow weary with changes, tumults and disorders, and be disposed to accept any government however despotic, that shall promise stability and firmness.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Federal Farmer
October 8, 1787
DEAR SIR,
MY letters to you last winter, on the subject of a well balanced national government for the United States, were the result of a free enquiry; when I passed from that subject to enquiries relative to our commerce, revenues, past administration, &c.
I anticipated the anxieties I feel, on carefully examining the plan of government proposed by the convention.
It appears to be a plan retaining some federal features; but to be the first important step, and to aim strongly at one consolidated government of the United States.
It leaves the powers of government, and the representation of the people, so unnaturally divided between the general and state governments, that the operations of our system must be very uncertain.
My uniform federal attachments, and the interest I have in the protection of property, and a steady execution of the laws, will convince you, that, if I am under any bias at all, it is in favor of any general system which shall promise those advantages.
The instability of our laws increases my wishes for firm and steady government; but then, I can consent to no government, which, in my opinion, is not calculated equally to preserve the rights of all orders of men in the community.
My object has been to join with those who have endeavored to supply the defects in the forms of our governments by a steady and proper administration of them.
Though I have long apprehended that fraudulent debtors, and embarrassed men, on the one hand, and men, on the other, unfriendly to republican equality, would produce an uneasiness among the people, and prepare the way, not for cool and deliberate reforms in the governments, but for changes calculated to promote the interests of particular orders of men.
Acquit me, sir, of any agency in the formation of the new system; I shall be satisfied with seeing, if it shall be adopted with a prudent administration.
Indeed I am so much convinced of the truth of Pope’s maxim, that “That which is best administered is best,” that I am much inclined to subscribe to it from experience.
I am not disposed to unreasonably contend about forms.
I know our situation is critical, and it behooves us to make the best of it.
A federal government of some sort is necessary.
We have suffered the present to languish; and whether the confederation was capable or not originally of answering any valuable purposes, it is now but of little importance.
I will pass by the men, and states, who have been particularly instrumental in preparing the way for a change, and perhaps, for governments not very favorable to the people at large.
A constitution is now presented which we may reject, or which we may accept with or without amendments, and to which point we ought to direct our exertions is the question.
To determine this question with propriety; we must attentively examine the system itself, and the probable consequences of either step.
This I shall endeavor to do, so far as I am able, with candor and fairness; and leave you to decide upon the propriety of my opinions, the weight of my reasons, and how far my conclusions are well drawn.
Whatever may be the conduct of others, on the present occasion, I do not mean hastily and positively to decide on the merits of the constitution proposed.
I shall be open to conviction and always disposed to adopt that which, all things considered, shall appear to me to be most for the happiness of the community.
It must be granted, that if men hastily and blindly adopt a system of government, they will as hastily and as blindly be led to alter or abolish it; and changes must ensue, one after another, till the peaceable and better part of the community will grow weary with changes, tumults and disorders, and be disposed to accept any government however despotic, that shall promise stability and firmness.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Federal Farmer I, continued ...
Federal Farmer
October 8, 1787
The first principal question that occurs, is, Whether, considering our situation, we ought to precipitate the adoption of the proposed constitution?
If we remain cool and temperate, we are in no immediate danger of any commotions; we are in a state of perfect peace, and in no danger of invasions; the state governments are in the full exercise of their powers; and our governments answer all present exigencies, except the regulation of trade, securing credit, in some cases, and providing for the interest, in some instances, of the public debts; and whether we adopt a change three or nine months hence, can make but little odds with the private circumstances of individuals; their happiness and prosperity, after all, depend principally upon their own exertions.
We are hardly recovered from a long and distressing war: The farmers, fishermen, &c. have not fully repaired the waste made by it.
Industry and frugality are again assuming their proper station.
Private debts are lessened, and public debts incurred by the war have been, by various ways, diminished; and the public lands have now become a productive source for diminishing them much more.
I know uneasy men, who with very much to precipitate, do not admit all these facts; but they are facts well known to all men who are thoroughly informed in the affairs of this country.
It must, however, be admitted, that our federal system is defective, and that some of the state governments are not well administered; but, then, we impute to the defects in our governments many evils and embarrassments which are most clearly the result of the late war.
We must allow men to conduct on the present occasion, as on all similar one’s.
They will urge a thousand pretenses to answer their purposes on both sides.
When we want a man to change his condition, we describe it as wretched, miserable, and despised; and draw a pleasing picture of that which we would have him assume.
And when we wish the contrary, we reverse our descriptions.
Whenever a clamor is raised, and idle men get to work, it is highly necessary to examine facts carefully, and without unreasonably suspecting men of falsehood, to examine, and enquire attentively, under what impressions they act.
It is too often the case in political concerns that men state facts not as they are, but as they wish them to be; and almost every man, by calling to mind past scenes, will find this to be true.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Federal Farmer
October 8, 1787
The first principal question that occurs, is, Whether, considering our situation, we ought to precipitate the adoption of the proposed constitution?
If we remain cool and temperate, we are in no immediate danger of any commotions; we are in a state of perfect peace, and in no danger of invasions; the state governments are in the full exercise of their powers; and our governments answer all present exigencies, except the regulation of trade, securing credit, in some cases, and providing for the interest, in some instances, of the public debts; and whether we adopt a change three or nine months hence, can make but little odds with the private circumstances of individuals; their happiness and prosperity, after all, depend principally upon their own exertions.
We are hardly recovered from a long and distressing war: The farmers, fishermen, &c. have not fully repaired the waste made by it.
Industry and frugality are again assuming their proper station.
Private debts are lessened, and public debts incurred by the war have been, by various ways, diminished; and the public lands have now become a productive source for diminishing them much more.
I know uneasy men, who with very much to precipitate, do not admit all these facts; but they are facts well known to all men who are thoroughly informed in the affairs of this country.
It must, however, be admitted, that our federal system is defective, and that some of the state governments are not well administered; but, then, we impute to the defects in our governments many evils and embarrassments which are most clearly the result of the late war.
We must allow men to conduct on the present occasion, as on all similar one’s.
They will urge a thousand pretenses to answer their purposes on both sides.
When we want a man to change his condition, we describe it as wretched, miserable, and despised; and draw a pleasing picture of that which we would have him assume.
And when we wish the contrary, we reverse our descriptions.
Whenever a clamor is raised, and idle men get to work, it is highly necessary to examine facts carefully, and without unreasonably suspecting men of falsehood, to examine, and enquire attentively, under what impressions they act.
It is too often the case in political concerns that men state facts not as they are, but as they wish them to be; and almost every man, by calling to mind past scenes, will find this to be true.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Federal Farmer I, continued ...
Federal Farmer
October 8, 1787
Nothing but the passions of ambitious, impatient, or disorderly men, I conceive, will plunge us into commotions, if time should be taken fully to examine and consider the system proposed.
Men who feel easy in their circumstances, and such as are not sanguine in their expectations relative to the consequences of the proposed change, will remain quiet under the existing governments.
Many commercial and monied men, who are uneasy, not without just cause, ought to be respected; and by no means, unreasonably disappointed in their expectations and hopes; but as to those who expect employments under the new constitution; as to those weak and ardent men who always expect to be gainers by revolutions, and whose lot it generally is to get out of one difficulty into another, they are very little to be regarded; and as to those who designedly avail themselves of this weakness and ardor, they are to be despised.
It is natural for men, who wish to hasten the adoption of a measure, to tell us, now is the crisis - now is the critical moment which must be seized or all will be lost; and to shut the door against free enquiry, whenever conscious the thing presented has defects in it, which time and investigation will probably discover.
This has been the custom of tyrants, and their dependents in all ages.
If it is true, what has been so often said, that the people of this country cannot change their condition for the worse, I presume it still behooves them to endeavor deliberately to change it for the better.
The fickle and ardent, in any community are the proper tools for establishing despotic government.
But it is deliberate and thinking men, who must establish and secure governments on free principles.
Before they decide on the plan proposed, they will enquire whether it will probably be a blessing or a curse to this people.
The present moment discovers a new face in our affairs.
Our object has been all along, to reform our federal system and to strengthen our governments - to establish peace, order and justice in the community - but a new object now presents.
The plan of government now proposed is evidently calculated totally to change, in time, our condition as a people.
Instead of being thirteen republics, under a federal head, it is clearly designed to make us one consolidated government.
Of this, I think, I shall fully convince you, in my following letters on this subject.
This consolidation of the states has been the object of several men in this country for some time past.
Whether such a change can ever be effected, in any manner; whether it can be effected without convulsions and civil wars; whether such a change will not totally destroy the liberties of this country - time only can determine.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Federal Farmer
October 8, 1787
Nothing but the passions of ambitious, impatient, or disorderly men, I conceive, will plunge us into commotions, if time should be taken fully to examine and consider the system proposed.
Men who feel easy in their circumstances, and such as are not sanguine in their expectations relative to the consequences of the proposed change, will remain quiet under the existing governments.
Many commercial and monied men, who are uneasy, not without just cause, ought to be respected; and by no means, unreasonably disappointed in their expectations and hopes; but as to those who expect employments under the new constitution; as to those weak and ardent men who always expect to be gainers by revolutions, and whose lot it generally is to get out of one difficulty into another, they are very little to be regarded; and as to those who designedly avail themselves of this weakness and ardor, they are to be despised.
It is natural for men, who wish to hasten the adoption of a measure, to tell us, now is the crisis - now is the critical moment which must be seized or all will be lost; and to shut the door against free enquiry, whenever conscious the thing presented has defects in it, which time and investigation will probably discover.
This has been the custom of tyrants, and their dependents in all ages.
If it is true, what has been so often said, that the people of this country cannot change their condition for the worse, I presume it still behooves them to endeavor deliberately to change it for the better.
The fickle and ardent, in any community are the proper tools for establishing despotic government.
But it is deliberate and thinking men, who must establish and secure governments on free principles.
Before they decide on the plan proposed, they will enquire whether it will probably be a blessing or a curse to this people.
The present moment discovers a new face in our affairs.
Our object has been all along, to reform our federal system and to strengthen our governments - to establish peace, order and justice in the community - but a new object now presents.
The plan of government now proposed is evidently calculated totally to change, in time, our condition as a people.
Instead of being thirteen republics, under a federal head, it is clearly designed to make us one consolidated government.
Of this, I think, I shall fully convince you, in my following letters on this subject.
This consolidation of the states has been the object of several men in this country for some time past.
Whether such a change can ever be effected, in any manner; whether it can be effected without convulsions and civil wars; whether such a change will not totally destroy the liberties of this country - time only can determine.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Federal Farmer I, continued ...
Federal Farmer
October 8, 1787
To have a just idea of the government before us, and to show that a consolidated one is the object in view, it is necessary not only to examine the plan, but also its history, and the politics of its particular friends.
The confederation was formed when great confidence was placed in the voluntary exertions of individuals, and of the respective states; and the framers of it, to guard against usurpation, so limited, and checked the powers, that, in many respects, they are inadequate to the exigencies of the union.
We find, therefore, members of congress urging alterations in the federal system almost as soon as it was adopted.
It was early proposed to vest congress with powers to levy an impost, to regulate trade, &c. but such was known to be the caution of the states in parting with power, that the vestment even of these, was proposed to be under several checks and limitations.
During the war, the general confusion, and the introduction of paper money, infused in the minds of people vague ideas respecting government and credit.
We expected too much from the return of peace, and of course we have been disappointed.
Our governments have been new and unsettled; and several legislatures, by making tender, suspension, and paper money laws, have given just cause of uneasiness to creditors.
By these and other causes, several orders of men in the community have been prepared, by degrees, for a change of government; and this very abuse of power in the legislatures, which in some cases has been charged upon the democratic part of the community, has furnished aristocratical men with those very weapons, and those very means, with which, in great measure, they are rapidly effecting their favorite object.
And should an oppressive government be the consequence of the proposed change, prosperity may reproach not only a few overbearing, unprincipled men, but those parties in the states which have misused their powers.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Federal Farmer
October 8, 1787
To have a just idea of the government before us, and to show that a consolidated one is the object in view, it is necessary not only to examine the plan, but also its history, and the politics of its particular friends.
The confederation was formed when great confidence was placed in the voluntary exertions of individuals, and of the respective states; and the framers of it, to guard against usurpation, so limited, and checked the powers, that, in many respects, they are inadequate to the exigencies of the union.
We find, therefore, members of congress urging alterations in the federal system almost as soon as it was adopted.
It was early proposed to vest congress with powers to levy an impost, to regulate trade, &c. but such was known to be the caution of the states in parting with power, that the vestment even of these, was proposed to be under several checks and limitations.
During the war, the general confusion, and the introduction of paper money, infused in the minds of people vague ideas respecting government and credit.
We expected too much from the return of peace, and of course we have been disappointed.
Our governments have been new and unsettled; and several legislatures, by making tender, suspension, and paper money laws, have given just cause of uneasiness to creditors.
By these and other causes, several orders of men in the community have been prepared, by degrees, for a change of government; and this very abuse of power in the legislatures, which in some cases has been charged upon the democratic part of the community, has furnished aristocratical men with those very weapons, and those very means, with which, in great measure, they are rapidly effecting their favorite object.
And should an oppressive government be the consequence of the proposed change, prosperity may reproach not only a few overbearing, unprincipled men, but those parties in the states which have misused their powers.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Federal Farmer I, continued ...
Federal Farmer
October 8, 1787
The conduct of several legislatures, touching paper money, and tender laws, has prepared many honest men for changes in government, which otherwise they would not have thought of - when by the evils, on the one hand, and by the secret instigations of artful men, on the other, the minds of men were become sufficiently uneasy, a bold step was taken, which is usually followed by a revolution, or a civil war.
A general convention for mere commercial purposes was moved for - the authors of this measure saw that the people’s attention was turned solely to the amendment of the federal system; and that, had the idea of a total change been started, probably no state would have appointed members to the convention.
The idea of destroying ultimately, the state government, and forming one consolidated system, could not have been admitted - a convention, therefore, merely for vesting in congress power to regulate trade was proposed.
This was pleasing to the commercial towns; and the landed people had little or no concern about it.
September, 1786, a few men from the middle states met at Annapolis, and hastily proposed a convention to be held in May, 1787, for the purpose, generally, of amending the confederation - this was done before the delegates of Massachusetts, and of the other states arrived - still not a word was said about destroying the old constitution, and making a new one.
The states still unsuspecting, and not aware that they were passing the Rubicon, appointed members to the new convention, for the sole and express purpose of revising and amending the confederation - and, probably, not one man in ten thousand in the United States, till within these ten or twelve days, had an idea that the old ship was to be destroyed, and he put to the alternative of embarking in the new ship presented, or of being left in danger of sinking.
The States, I believe, universally supposed the convention would report alterations in the confederation, which would pass an examination in congress, and after being agreed to there, would be confirmed by all the legislatures, or be rejected.
Virginia made a very respectable appointment, and placed at the head of it the first man in America.
In this appointment there was a mixture of political characters; but Pennsylvania appointed principally those men who are esteemed aristocratical.
Here the favorite moment for changing the government was evidently discerned by a few men, who seized it with address.
Ten other states appointed, and tho- they chose men principally connected with commerce and the judicial department yet they appointed many good republican characters - had they all attended we should now see, I am persuaded, a better system presented.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Federal Farmer
October 8, 1787
The conduct of several legislatures, touching paper money, and tender laws, has prepared many honest men for changes in government, which otherwise they would not have thought of - when by the evils, on the one hand, and by the secret instigations of artful men, on the other, the minds of men were become sufficiently uneasy, a bold step was taken, which is usually followed by a revolution, or a civil war.
A general convention for mere commercial purposes was moved for - the authors of this measure saw that the people’s attention was turned solely to the amendment of the federal system; and that, had the idea of a total change been started, probably no state would have appointed members to the convention.
The idea of destroying ultimately, the state government, and forming one consolidated system, could not have been admitted - a convention, therefore, merely for vesting in congress power to regulate trade was proposed.
This was pleasing to the commercial towns; and the landed people had little or no concern about it.
September, 1786, a few men from the middle states met at Annapolis, and hastily proposed a convention to be held in May, 1787, for the purpose, generally, of amending the confederation - this was done before the delegates of Massachusetts, and of the other states arrived - still not a word was said about destroying the old constitution, and making a new one.
The states still unsuspecting, and not aware that they were passing the Rubicon, appointed members to the new convention, for the sole and express purpose of revising and amending the confederation - and, probably, not one man in ten thousand in the United States, till within these ten or twelve days, had an idea that the old ship was to be destroyed, and he put to the alternative of embarking in the new ship presented, or of being left in danger of sinking.
The States, I believe, universally supposed the convention would report alterations in the confederation, which would pass an examination in congress, and after being agreed to there, would be confirmed by all the legislatures, or be rejected.
Virginia made a very respectable appointment, and placed at the head of it the first man in America.
In this appointment there was a mixture of political characters; but Pennsylvania appointed principally those men who are esteemed aristocratical.
Here the favorite moment for changing the government was evidently discerned by a few men, who seized it with address.
Ten other states appointed, and tho- they chose men principally connected with commerce and the judicial department yet they appointed many good republican characters - had they all attended we should now see, I am persuaded, a better system presented.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Federal Farmer I, continued ...
Federal Farmer
October 8, 1787
The non-attendance of eight or nine men, who were appointed members of the convention, I shall ever consider as a very unfortunate event to the United States.
Had they attended, I am pretty clear that the result of the convention would not have had that strong tendency to aristocracy now discernable in every part of the plan.
There would not have been so great an accumulation of powers, especially as to the internal police of this country in a few hands as the constitution reported proposes to vest in them - the young visionary men, and the consolidating aristocracy, would have been more restrained than they have been.
Eleven states met in the convention, and after four months close attention presented the new constitution, to be adopted or rejected by the people.
The uneasy and fickle part of the community may be prepared to receive any form of government; but I presume the enlightened and substantial part will give any constitution presented for their adoption a candid and thorough examination; and silence those designing or empty men, who weakly and rashly attempt to precipitate the adoption of a system of so much importance.
We shall view the convention with proper respect - and, at the same time, that we reflect there were men of abilities and integrity in it, we must recollect how disproportionately the democratic and aristocratic parts of the community were represented.
Perhaps the judicious friends and opposers of the new constitution will agree, that it is best to let it rely solely on its own merits, or be condemned for its own defects.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Federal Farmer
October 8, 1787
The non-attendance of eight or nine men, who were appointed members of the convention, I shall ever consider as a very unfortunate event to the United States.
Had they attended, I am pretty clear that the result of the convention would not have had that strong tendency to aristocracy now discernable in every part of the plan.
There would not have been so great an accumulation of powers, especially as to the internal police of this country in a few hands as the constitution reported proposes to vest in them - the young visionary men, and the consolidating aristocracy, would have been more restrained than they have been.
Eleven states met in the convention, and after four months close attention presented the new constitution, to be adopted or rejected by the people.
The uneasy and fickle part of the community may be prepared to receive any form of government; but I presume the enlightened and substantial part will give any constitution presented for their adoption a candid and thorough examination; and silence those designing or empty men, who weakly and rashly attempt to precipitate the adoption of a system of so much importance.
We shall view the convention with proper respect - and, at the same time, that we reflect there were men of abilities and integrity in it, we must recollect how disproportionately the democratic and aristocratic parts of the community were represented.
Perhaps the judicious friends and opposers of the new constitution will agree, that it is best to let it rely solely on its own merits, or be condemned for its own defects.
TO BE CONTINUED ...