A Landholder VII
Oliver Ellsworth
December 17, 1787
To the Landholders and Farmers.
I have often admired the spirit of candour, liberality, and justice, with which the Convention began and completed the important object of their mission.
“In all our deliberations on this subject,” say they, “we kept steadily in our view, that which appears to us the greatest interest of every true American, the consolidation of our union, in which is involved our prosperity, felicity, safety, perhaps our national existence."
This important consideration, seriously and deeply impressed on our minds, led each state in the Convention to be less rigid on points of inferior magnitude, than might otherwise have been expected; and thus the Constitution which we now present, is the result of a spirit of amity, and of that mutual deference and concession, which the peculiarity of our political situation rendered indispensable.
Let us, my fellow citizens, take up this constitution with the same spirit of candour and liberality; consider it in all its parts; consider the important and advantages which may be derived from it, and the fatal consequences which will probably follow from rejecting it.
If any objections are made against it, let us obtain full information on the subject, and then weigh these objections in the balance of cool impartial reason.
Let us see, if they be not wholly groundless;
But if upon the whole they appear to have some weight, let us consider well, whether they be so important, that we ought on account of them to reject the whole constitution.
Perfection is not the lot of human institutions; that which has the most excellencies and the fewest faults, is the best that we can expect.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
A Landholder VII, continued ...
Oliver Ellsworth
December 17, 1787
Some very worthy persons, who have not had great advantages for information, have objected against that clause in the constitution which provides, that no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States.
They have been afraid that this clause is unfavorable to religion.
But my countrymen, the sole purpose and effect of it is to exclude persecution, and to secure to you the important right of religious liberty.
We are almost the only people in the world, who have a full enjoyment of this important right of human nature.
In our country every man has a right to worship God in that way which is most agreeable to his conscience.
If he be a good and peaceable person he is liable to no penalties or incapacities on account of his religious sentiments; or in other words, he is no subject to persecution.
But in other parts of the world, it has been, and still is, far different.
Systems of religious error have been adopted, in times of ignorance.
It has been the interest of tyrannical kings, popes, and prelates, to maintain these errors.
When the clouds of ignorance began to vanish, and the people grew more enlightened, there was no other way to keep them in error, but to prohibit their altering their religious opinions by severe persecuting laws.
In this way persecution became general throughout Europe.
It was the universal opinion that one religion must be established by law; and that all who differed in their religious opinions, must suffer the vengeance of persecution.
In pursuance of this opinion, when popery was abolished in England, and the Church of England was established in its stead, severe penalties were inflicted upon all who dissented from the established church.
In the time of the civil wars, in the reign of Charles I. the presbyterians got the upper hand, and inflicted legal penalties upon all who differed from them in their sentiments respecting religious doctrines and discipline.
When Charles II, was restored, the Church of England was likewise restored, and the presbyterians and other dissenters were laid under legal penalties and incapacities.
It was in this reign, that a religious test was established as a qualification for office; that is, a law was made requiring all officers civil and military (among other things) to receive the Sacrament of the Lord’s Supper, according to the usage of the Church of England, written six months after their admission to office under the penalty of and disability to hold the office.
And by another statute of the same reign, no person was capable of being elected to any office relating to the government of any city or corporation, unless, within a twelve month before, he had received the sacrament according to the rites of the Church of England.
The pretence for making these severe laws, by which all but churchmen were made incapable of any office civil or military, was to exclude the papists; but the real design was to exclude the protestant dissenters.
From this account of test-laws, there arises an unfavorable presumption against them.
But if we consider the nature of them and the effects which they are calculated to produce, we shall find that they are useless, tyrannical, and peculiarly unfit for the people of this country.
A religious test is an act to be done, or profession to be made, relating to religion (such as partaking of the sacrament according to certain rites and forms, or declaring one’s belief of certain doctrines,) for the purpose of determining whether his religious opinions are such, that he is admissible to a public office.
A test in favour of any one denomination of christians would be to the last degree absurd in the United States.
If it were in favour of either congregationalists, presbyterians, episcopalions, baptists, or quakers, it would incapacitate more than three-fourths of the American citizens for any publick office; and thus degrade them from the rank of freemen.
There need no argument to prove that the majority of our citizens would never submit to this indignity.
If any test-act were to be made, perhaps the least exceptionable would be one, requiring all persons appointed to office to declare at the time of their admission, their belief in the being of a God, and in the divine authority of the scriptures.
In favour of such a test, it may be said, that one who believes these great truths, will not be so likely to violate his obligations to his country, as one who disbelieves them; we may have greater confidence in his integrity.
But I answer: His making a declaration of such a belief is no security at all.
For suppose him to be an unprincipled man, who believes neither the word nor the being of God; and to be governed merely by selfish motives; how easy is it for him to dissemble!
How easy is it for him to make a public declaration of his belief in the creed which the law prescribes; and excuse himself by calling it a mere formality.
This is the case with the test-laws and creeds in England.
The most abandoned characters partake of the sacrament, in order to qualify themselves for public employments.
The clergy are obliged by law to administer the ordinance unto them, and thus prostitute the most sacred office of religion, for it is a civil right in the party to receive the sacrament.
In that country, subscribing to the thirty-nine articles is a test for administration into holy orders.
And it is a fact, that many of the clergy do this, when at the same time they totally disbelieve several of the doctrines contained in them.
In short, test-laws are utterly ineffectual: they are no security at all; because men of loose principles will, by an external compliance, evade them.
If they exclude any persons, it will be honest men, men of principle, who will rather suffer an injury, than act contrary to the dictates of their consciences.
If we mean to have those appointed to public offices, who are sincere friends to religion, we, the people who appoint them, must take care to choose such characters; and not rely upon such cob-web barriers as test-laws are.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Oliver Ellsworth
December 17, 1787
Some very worthy persons, who have not had great advantages for information, have objected against that clause in the constitution which provides, that no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States.
They have been afraid that this clause is unfavorable to religion.
But my countrymen, the sole purpose and effect of it is to exclude persecution, and to secure to you the important right of religious liberty.
We are almost the only people in the world, who have a full enjoyment of this important right of human nature.
In our country every man has a right to worship God in that way which is most agreeable to his conscience.
If he be a good and peaceable person he is liable to no penalties or incapacities on account of his religious sentiments; or in other words, he is no subject to persecution.
But in other parts of the world, it has been, and still is, far different.
Systems of religious error have been adopted, in times of ignorance.
It has been the interest of tyrannical kings, popes, and prelates, to maintain these errors.
When the clouds of ignorance began to vanish, and the people grew more enlightened, there was no other way to keep them in error, but to prohibit their altering their religious opinions by severe persecuting laws.
In this way persecution became general throughout Europe.
It was the universal opinion that one religion must be established by law; and that all who differed in their religious opinions, must suffer the vengeance of persecution.
In pursuance of this opinion, when popery was abolished in England, and the Church of England was established in its stead, severe penalties were inflicted upon all who dissented from the established church.
In the time of the civil wars, in the reign of Charles I. the presbyterians got the upper hand, and inflicted legal penalties upon all who differed from them in their sentiments respecting religious doctrines and discipline.
When Charles II, was restored, the Church of England was likewise restored, and the presbyterians and other dissenters were laid under legal penalties and incapacities.
It was in this reign, that a religious test was established as a qualification for office; that is, a law was made requiring all officers civil and military (among other things) to receive the Sacrament of the Lord’s Supper, according to the usage of the Church of England, written six months after their admission to office under the penalty of and disability to hold the office.
And by another statute of the same reign, no person was capable of being elected to any office relating to the government of any city or corporation, unless, within a twelve month before, he had received the sacrament according to the rites of the Church of England.
The pretence for making these severe laws, by which all but churchmen were made incapable of any office civil or military, was to exclude the papists; but the real design was to exclude the protestant dissenters.
From this account of test-laws, there arises an unfavorable presumption against them.
But if we consider the nature of them and the effects which they are calculated to produce, we shall find that they are useless, tyrannical, and peculiarly unfit for the people of this country.
A religious test is an act to be done, or profession to be made, relating to religion (such as partaking of the sacrament according to certain rites and forms, or declaring one’s belief of certain doctrines,) for the purpose of determining whether his religious opinions are such, that he is admissible to a public office.
A test in favour of any one denomination of christians would be to the last degree absurd in the United States.
If it were in favour of either congregationalists, presbyterians, episcopalions, baptists, or quakers, it would incapacitate more than three-fourths of the American citizens for any publick office; and thus degrade them from the rank of freemen.
There need no argument to prove that the majority of our citizens would never submit to this indignity.
If any test-act were to be made, perhaps the least exceptionable would be one, requiring all persons appointed to office to declare at the time of their admission, their belief in the being of a God, and in the divine authority of the scriptures.
In favour of such a test, it may be said, that one who believes these great truths, will not be so likely to violate his obligations to his country, as one who disbelieves them; we may have greater confidence in his integrity.
But I answer: His making a declaration of such a belief is no security at all.
For suppose him to be an unprincipled man, who believes neither the word nor the being of God; and to be governed merely by selfish motives; how easy is it for him to dissemble!
How easy is it for him to make a public declaration of his belief in the creed which the law prescribes; and excuse himself by calling it a mere formality.
This is the case with the test-laws and creeds in England.
The most abandoned characters partake of the sacrament, in order to qualify themselves for public employments.
The clergy are obliged by law to administer the ordinance unto them, and thus prostitute the most sacred office of religion, for it is a civil right in the party to receive the sacrament.
In that country, subscribing to the thirty-nine articles is a test for administration into holy orders.
And it is a fact, that many of the clergy do this, when at the same time they totally disbelieve several of the doctrines contained in them.
In short, test-laws are utterly ineffectual: they are no security at all; because men of loose principles will, by an external compliance, evade them.
If they exclude any persons, it will be honest men, men of principle, who will rather suffer an injury, than act contrary to the dictates of their consciences.
If we mean to have those appointed to public offices, who are sincere friends to religion, we, the people who appoint them, must take care to choose such characters; and not rely upon such cob-web barriers as test-laws are.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
A Landholder VII, concluded ...
Oliver Ellsworth
December 17, 1787
But to come to the true principle by which this question ought to be determined: The business of a civil government is to protect the citizen in his rights, to defend the community from hostile powers, and to promote the general welfare.
Civil government has no business to meddle with the private opinions of the people.
If I demean myself as a good citizen, I am accountable, not to man, but to God, for the religious opinions which I embrace, and the manner in which I worship the supreme being.
If such had been the universal sentiments of mankind, and they had acted accordingly, persecution, the bane of truth and nurse of error, with her bloody axe and flaming hand, would never have turned so great a part of the world into a field of blood.
But while I assert the rights of religious liberty, I would not deny that the civil power has a right, in some cases, to interfere in matters of religion.
It has a right to prohibit and punish gross immoralities and impieties; because the open practice of these is of evil example and detriment.
For this reason, I heartily approve of our laws against drunkenness, profane swearing, blasphemy, and professed atheism.
But in this state, we have never thought it expedient to adopt a test-law; and yet I sincerely believe we have as great a proportion of religion and morality, as they have in England, where every person who holds a public office, must either be a saint by law, or a hypocrite by practice.
A test-law is the parent of hypocrisy, and the offspring of error and the spirit of persecution.
Legislatures have no right to set up an inquisition, and examine into the private opinions of men.
Test-laws are useless and ineffectual, unjust and tyrannical; therefore the Convention have done wisely in excluding this engine of persecution, and providing that no religious test shall ever be required.
A Landholder
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/libr ... older-vii/
Oliver Ellsworth
December 17, 1787
But to come to the true principle by which this question ought to be determined: The business of a civil government is to protect the citizen in his rights, to defend the community from hostile powers, and to promote the general welfare.
Civil government has no business to meddle with the private opinions of the people.
If I demean myself as a good citizen, I am accountable, not to man, but to God, for the religious opinions which I embrace, and the manner in which I worship the supreme being.
If such had been the universal sentiments of mankind, and they had acted accordingly, persecution, the bane of truth and nurse of error, with her bloody axe and flaming hand, would never have turned so great a part of the world into a field of blood.
But while I assert the rights of religious liberty, I would not deny that the civil power has a right, in some cases, to interfere in matters of religion.
It has a right to prohibit and punish gross immoralities and impieties; because the open practice of these is of evil example and detriment.
For this reason, I heartily approve of our laws against drunkenness, profane swearing, blasphemy, and professed atheism.
But in this state, we have never thought it expedient to adopt a test-law; and yet I sincerely believe we have as great a proportion of religion and morality, as they have in England, where every person who holds a public office, must either be a saint by law, or a hypocrite by practice.
A test-law is the parent of hypocrisy, and the offspring of error and the spirit of persecution.
Legislatures have no right to set up an inquisition, and examine into the private opinions of men.
Test-laws are useless and ineffectual, unjust and tyrannical; therefore the Convention have done wisely in excluding this engine of persecution, and providing that no religious test shall ever be required.
A Landholder
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/libr ... older-vii/
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Anti-Cincinnatus
Northampton Hampshire Gazette
December 19, 1787
Mr. Printer, An antifederal piece, in No. 66, purporting to be an answer to Mr. Wilson, under the signature of Cincinnatus, “appears to me to abound” with misrepresentation, misconstruction “and sophistry, and so dangerous” to the uninformed and less discerning readers, as for their sakes and theirs only, “to require” reprehension and “refutation.”
“If we” reject “the new Constitution, let us understand it: whether it deserves to be” rejected “or not, we can determine only by a full” and honest “examination of it; so as truly and clearly to discern what it is we are so” warmly, and I may boldly “say, indescently called upon to” reject, and for what important reasons:
Such “examination,” so far as the objections and reasonings of said piece have the appearance of weight or force, is the “object” of the following paragraphs.
The introduction is filled with little else but sarcastical taunts liberally bestowed both upon the Constitution, and Mr. Wilson, one of its framers and advocates, which I shall pass without further notice, only requesting the reader to take the trouble in the issue to judge, whether, “the hope” of Cincinnatus “to avoid the censure of having industriously endeavoured to prevent and destroy” the Constitution “by insiduous and clandestine attempts,” is not founded on slippery ground.
His only objection to the Constitution (after, we may presume, a narrow and critical search for facts) is, “the omission of a declaration of rights;” which omission Mr. Wilson, and with him every man of common sense and candor, justifies, for this reason, viz. in the State Constitutions a bill of rights is necessary, because whatever is not reserved is given, but in this Congressional Constitution whatever is not given is reserved.
This, says our author, “is a distinction without a difference, and has more the quaintness of a conundrum than the dignity of an argument;” and exerts himself briskly in the “play of words and quaintness of conundrums” to set aside the distinction: to all which it is sufficient to reply, that it must be obvious to the discerning and candid reader, that the new Constitution, although it contains not a declaration of the rights of the people; yet it contains a declaration of the powers given to rulers; intentionally with precision defines and limits them; thus firmly and stably fixeth the boundaries of their authority, beyond which they cannot pass, unless in violation of the Constitution:
To have made a formal declaration, that all the rights and powers not mentioned nor defined are reserved and not granted, would have been as great an afront to common sense, as if after having made a grant of a certain tract of land or other articles of property particularly specified and described in a deed or bill of sale, I should add a particular enumeration of my every other piece of land and article of property, with a declaration in form, that none of these are meant to be granted; for not being granted they are certainly reserved, as certainly without as with a declaration of it.
Common sense requires not a declaration that articles either of property or power not mentioned in the bill are not granted by the bill.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Northampton Hampshire Gazette
December 19, 1787
Mr. Printer, An antifederal piece, in No. 66, purporting to be an answer to Mr. Wilson, under the signature of Cincinnatus, “appears to me to abound” with misrepresentation, misconstruction “and sophistry, and so dangerous” to the uninformed and less discerning readers, as for their sakes and theirs only, “to require” reprehension and “refutation.”
“If we” reject “the new Constitution, let us understand it: whether it deserves to be” rejected “or not, we can determine only by a full” and honest “examination of it; so as truly and clearly to discern what it is we are so” warmly, and I may boldly “say, indescently called upon to” reject, and for what important reasons:
Such “examination,” so far as the objections and reasonings of said piece have the appearance of weight or force, is the “object” of the following paragraphs.
The introduction is filled with little else but sarcastical taunts liberally bestowed both upon the Constitution, and Mr. Wilson, one of its framers and advocates, which I shall pass without further notice, only requesting the reader to take the trouble in the issue to judge, whether, “the hope” of Cincinnatus “to avoid the censure of having industriously endeavoured to prevent and destroy” the Constitution “by insiduous and clandestine attempts,” is not founded on slippery ground.
His only objection to the Constitution (after, we may presume, a narrow and critical search for facts) is, “the omission of a declaration of rights;” which omission Mr. Wilson, and with him every man of common sense and candor, justifies, for this reason, viz. in the State Constitutions a bill of rights is necessary, because whatever is not reserved is given, but in this Congressional Constitution whatever is not given is reserved.
This, says our author, “is a distinction without a difference, and has more the quaintness of a conundrum than the dignity of an argument;” and exerts himself briskly in the “play of words and quaintness of conundrums” to set aside the distinction: to all which it is sufficient to reply, that it must be obvious to the discerning and candid reader, that the new Constitution, although it contains not a declaration of the rights of the people; yet it contains a declaration of the powers given to rulers; intentionally with precision defines and limits them; thus firmly and stably fixeth the boundaries of their authority, beyond which they cannot pass, unless in violation of the Constitution:
To have made a formal declaration, that all the rights and powers not mentioned nor defined are reserved and not granted, would have been as great an afront to common sense, as if after having made a grant of a certain tract of land or other articles of property particularly specified and described in a deed or bill of sale, I should add a particular enumeration of my every other piece of land and article of property, with a declaration in form, that none of these are meant to be granted; for not being granted they are certainly reserved, as certainly without as with a declaration of it.
Common sense requires not a declaration that articles either of property or power not mentioned in the bill are not granted by the bill.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Anti-Cincinnatus
Northampton Hampshire Gazette
December 19, 1787
To illucidate the danger arising from this omission of a bill of rights, and prove “that a dangerous aristocracy springing from it (the Constitution) must necessarily swallow up the democratic rights of the union, and sacrifice the liberties of the people to the power and dominion of a few,” he refers to the liberty of the press, as an instance taken by Mr. Wilson, to shew that a bill of rights is not necessary, because this remains safe and secure without it; for this reason, viz. “there is no express power granted to regulate literary publications."
The Constitution grants no power more nor less with respect to the liberty of the press; but leaves it just as it found it, in the hands of the several state constitutions: but to enervate this argument, my author sagely observes, “that where general powers are expressly granted, the particular ones comprehended within them must also be granted:” and with keen sagacity discovers a general power granted to Congress “to define and punish offences against the law of nations,” and after a plausible parade or inconclusive argumentation, assumes to have proved, “that the power of restraining the press is necessarily involved in the unlimited power of defining offences against the law of nations, or of making treaties, which are to be the supreme law of the land.”
To clear off the obscurity and confusion which involve the ideas and reasonings of this author, concerning the law of nations and public treaties, and set this matter in a clear convictive point of view, it is needless and would be to no purpose to pursue him through an intricate maze or winding in a pompous declamatory harangue; it is needful, to that end only to consider, that by the law of nations, is intended, those regulations and articles of agreement by which different nations, in their treaties, one with another, mutually bind themselves to regulate their conduct, one towards the other.
A violation of such articles is properly defined an offence against the law of nations: and there is and can be no other law of nations, which binds them with respect to their treatment one of another, but these articles of agreement contained in their public treaties and alliances.
These public treaties become the law of the land in that being made by constitutional authority, i.e. among us, by those whom the people themselves have authorized for that purpose, are in a proper sense their own agreements, and therefore as laws, bind the several states, as states, and their inhabitants, as individuals to take notice of and govern themselves according to the articles and rules which are defined and stipulated in them: as law of the land they bind to nothing but a performance of the engagements which they contain.
How then doth it appear “that a power to define offences against the law of nations, necessarily involves a power of restraining the liberty of the press?”
Have we the least possible ground of fear, that the United States in some future period will enter in their public treaties an article to injure the liberty of the press?
What concern have foreign nations with the liberty or restraint of the American press?
This writer seems to have been set to work with design (not his own) to yield his assistance to verify an observation, said to be made by Dr. Franklin, viz.
“That the goodness and excellency of the federal Constitution is evidenced more strongly by nothing, than the weakness and futility of the objections made against it.”
That our author had a design in the choice of a signature, to fasten a stigma on the worthy patriotic society, I can not assert.
Be assured this is by no means the wish of ANTI-CINCINNATUS.
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/libr ... ncinnatus/
Northampton Hampshire Gazette
December 19, 1787
To illucidate the danger arising from this omission of a bill of rights, and prove “that a dangerous aristocracy springing from it (the Constitution) must necessarily swallow up the democratic rights of the union, and sacrifice the liberties of the people to the power and dominion of a few,” he refers to the liberty of the press, as an instance taken by Mr. Wilson, to shew that a bill of rights is not necessary, because this remains safe and secure without it; for this reason, viz. “there is no express power granted to regulate literary publications."
The Constitution grants no power more nor less with respect to the liberty of the press; but leaves it just as it found it, in the hands of the several state constitutions: but to enervate this argument, my author sagely observes, “that where general powers are expressly granted, the particular ones comprehended within them must also be granted:” and with keen sagacity discovers a general power granted to Congress “to define and punish offences against the law of nations,” and after a plausible parade or inconclusive argumentation, assumes to have proved, “that the power of restraining the press is necessarily involved in the unlimited power of defining offences against the law of nations, or of making treaties, which are to be the supreme law of the land.”
To clear off the obscurity and confusion which involve the ideas and reasonings of this author, concerning the law of nations and public treaties, and set this matter in a clear convictive point of view, it is needless and would be to no purpose to pursue him through an intricate maze or winding in a pompous declamatory harangue; it is needful, to that end only to consider, that by the law of nations, is intended, those regulations and articles of agreement by which different nations, in their treaties, one with another, mutually bind themselves to regulate their conduct, one towards the other.
A violation of such articles is properly defined an offence against the law of nations: and there is and can be no other law of nations, which binds them with respect to their treatment one of another, but these articles of agreement contained in their public treaties and alliances.
These public treaties become the law of the land in that being made by constitutional authority, i.e. among us, by those whom the people themselves have authorized for that purpose, are in a proper sense their own agreements, and therefore as laws, bind the several states, as states, and their inhabitants, as individuals to take notice of and govern themselves according to the articles and rules which are defined and stipulated in them: as law of the land they bind to nothing but a performance of the engagements which they contain.
How then doth it appear “that a power to define offences against the law of nations, necessarily involves a power of restraining the liberty of the press?”
Have we the least possible ground of fear, that the United States in some future period will enter in their public treaties an article to injure the liberty of the press?
What concern have foreign nations with the liberty or restraint of the American press?
This writer seems to have been set to work with design (not his own) to yield his assistance to verify an observation, said to be made by Dr. Franklin, viz.
“That the goodness and excellency of the federal Constitution is evidenced more strongly by nothing, than the weakness and futility of the objections made against it.”
That our author had a design in the choice of a signature, to fasten a stigma on the worthy patriotic society, I can not assert.
Be assured this is by no means the wish of ANTI-CINCINNATUS.
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/libr ... ncinnatus/
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Atticus IV
December 22, 1787
LETTER IV
From a gentleman in the country, to his friend in town.
“But Heaven hath a hand in these events, To whose high will we bound our calm contence.”
– SHAKESPEARE
EVERY State, of any considerable magnitude, contains three classes of men.
Those who have small estates in land, and little money: those who have large estates in one, or both of these: and those who depend for their support, upon salaries, or wages given for personal service.
The influence of the first mentioned class, tends to a mere democracy; that of the second evidently to aristocracy; and, of the last, a monarch is the natural defender, and patron.
This latter class will always find, that great men will oppress them; men of small estates will pay them ill; but a monarch will defend them; for they are in turn the instruments of his power.
To make the citizens peaceable, the government of every country, of an considerable extent, should be mixed, and should consist of the combined influence of all these three classes of men.
It is certain that in a country like ours, mere democracy can never be the prevailing government.
That class of people who favour it, have no regular system of action.
Their force is exerted only by starts, and on sudden occasions.
Their domestic concerns soon call them back to their ordinary employments.
They cannot become soldiers themselves, unless they leave their families to perish, and they have not money to hire others to fight for them.
They cannot bring the rich down to their class, nor prevent the dependant sort from feeling the influence of money.
They pay the learned professions ill, and particularly are apt to leave the clergy unsupported.
So that the influence of learning and of religious instruction, is against them.
This class is very apt to lose its patrons.
If they become eminent, they acquire riches, or power, and their ideas change.
If they are unfortunate, they wink into the dependant part of the community.
Were the people actually brought to an equality, you could not keep them so.
An entire massacre of all the great men (were it possible) once in seven years, would not effect the purpose.
So that in so large a territory as that of Massachusetts, whose inhabitants are so variously employed, and of such an active, ambitious and enterprising spirit, a pure democracy can never prevail.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
December 22, 1787
LETTER IV
From a gentleman in the country, to his friend in town.
“But Heaven hath a hand in these events, To whose high will we bound our calm contence.”
– SHAKESPEARE
EVERY State, of any considerable magnitude, contains three classes of men.
Those who have small estates in land, and little money: those who have large estates in one, or both of these: and those who depend for their support, upon salaries, or wages given for personal service.
The influence of the first mentioned class, tends to a mere democracy; that of the second evidently to aristocracy; and, of the last, a monarch is the natural defender, and patron.
This latter class will always find, that great men will oppress them; men of small estates will pay them ill; but a monarch will defend them; for they are in turn the instruments of his power.
To make the citizens peaceable, the government of every country, of an considerable extent, should be mixed, and should consist of the combined influence of all these three classes of men.
It is certain that in a country like ours, mere democracy can never be the prevailing government.
That class of people who favour it, have no regular system of action.
Their force is exerted only by starts, and on sudden occasions.
Their domestic concerns soon call them back to their ordinary employments.
They cannot become soldiers themselves, unless they leave their families to perish, and they have not money to hire others to fight for them.
They cannot bring the rich down to their class, nor prevent the dependant sort from feeling the influence of money.
They pay the learned professions ill, and particularly are apt to leave the clergy unsupported.
So that the influence of learning and of religious instruction, is against them.
This class is very apt to lose its patrons.
If they become eminent, they acquire riches, or power, and their ideas change.
If they are unfortunate, they wink into the dependant part of the community.
Were the people actually brought to an equality, you could not keep them so.
An entire massacre of all the great men (were it possible) once in seven years, would not effect the purpose.
So that in so large a territory as that of Massachusetts, whose inhabitants are so variously employed, and of such an active, ambitious and enterprising spirit, a pure democracy can never prevail.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Atticus IV, continued ...
December 22, 1787
There are also very great obstacles to the establishment of an aristocracy.
We have no intailed estates, no hereditary offices.
Our aristocracies are all, such as nature, personal merit, present office, and not standing laws have made.
Offices and estates are continually changing from man to man.
If the father of a family shall amass a large estate, it is soon divided thro’ a numerous family, or dissipated by some pamper’d heir.
There are only two supposeable cases, in which it is possible for an aristocracy to prevail.
Either the people must sink into a state of stupidity and total inattention to public affairs, which I conceive party-spirit must forbid; or they must by insurrections give occasion to the rich and politic to raise an army, and maintain it.
Otherwise an aristocracy cannot be established.
If the laws under our present Constitution, were allowed to have their full effect, it would forever be impossible.
Considering then, the natural obstacles there are to the prevalence of either party: Is not the force of the executive and judicial departments, sufficient to hold the balance between them?
Were our state not influenced by the policy of other states, I am certain it would be.
Any number of spirited citizens, with law, money, discipline, and experience on their side, would be equal to three times their number without them.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
December 22, 1787
There are also very great obstacles to the establishment of an aristocracy.
We have no intailed estates, no hereditary offices.
Our aristocracies are all, such as nature, personal merit, present office, and not standing laws have made.
Offices and estates are continually changing from man to man.
If the father of a family shall amass a large estate, it is soon divided thro’ a numerous family, or dissipated by some pamper’d heir.
There are only two supposeable cases, in which it is possible for an aristocracy to prevail.
Either the people must sink into a state of stupidity and total inattention to public affairs, which I conceive party-spirit must forbid; or they must by insurrections give occasion to the rich and politic to raise an army, and maintain it.
Otherwise an aristocracy cannot be established.
If the laws under our present Constitution, were allowed to have their full effect, it would forever be impossible.
Considering then, the natural obstacles there are to the prevalence of either party: Is not the force of the executive and judicial departments, sufficient to hold the balance between them?
Were our state not influenced by the policy of other states, I am certain it would be.
Any number of spirited citizens, with law, money, discipline, and experience on their side, would be equal to three times their number without them.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Atticus IV, continued ...
December 22, 1787
That Governour will scarcely be found, who will not dread, more than death, the infamy of having the state subverted when he is at the head.
Nor will his dependence on the people for his office utterly enervate the power of that motive for defending the state.
Thro’ inexperience of a new government, some of the dependant part of the community lost their places in a late grand contest but they will soon learn to range themselves under the banners of the executive power.
You will find most of the learned professions disposed to give strength to the monarchical principle.
And by a most natural connection, the kingdom and the priesthood always go together.
Did we consider these principles of reasoning only, we should be ready to pronounce, that our constitution was a most happy one, and calculated for a long duration.
But we are in a kind of ambiguous connection with twelve other republics; whose separate interests will often lead them to measures injurious to us.
If we enact laws, seemingly wise and wholesome, to prevent unnecessary importations; to oblige our rivals in trade to deal with us on equal footing; to relieve the public wants and establish the state’s credit, by duties and excises; the neighbouring states are sure to counteract us, and take advantage of our laws for their own emolument.
Then an artificial scarcity of money is created; lands depreciate, every kind of business is stagnated, and taxes which compared with estates are not heavy, yet are too severely felt in the collection.
All public and private credit is lost.
The people at large not seeing whence their evils arise, charge them on the government and laws.
They clamor for tender-acts, paper-money, and all the engines of fraud.
Harpy speculators join the din of complaint.
The democratic party are aroused to arms, and proceed to open rebellion.
But here they find themselves weak, being destitute of discipline, and resources for war.
They are defeated.
But on the field of election they have better success; turn out their former representatives, and executive officers, and choose new ones; and perhaps seem appeased for a while.
They find out the weak side of government, and will keep it always in view at their annual elections, and prevent it from ever rising to strength and respectability.
Nor do I conceive that it is possible, without a government over the whole thirteen States, invested with the powers to transact all concerns, which are properly national, with Judicial Courts and all the apparatus of civil power, ever to remedy the contentions in particular States, between the great men and the adverse party.
But we must be tossing from one wretched measure, and expedient to another; continually quarrelling, and making laws which discourage arts and industry, and discountenance honesty itself; till we, being sick of our boasted equal liberty, shall gladly embrace the offer of some hero, of plausible character, to give us a good government, and establish it by the sword.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
December 22, 1787
That Governour will scarcely be found, who will not dread, more than death, the infamy of having the state subverted when he is at the head.
Nor will his dependence on the people for his office utterly enervate the power of that motive for defending the state.
Thro’ inexperience of a new government, some of the dependant part of the community lost their places in a late grand contest but they will soon learn to range themselves under the banners of the executive power.
You will find most of the learned professions disposed to give strength to the monarchical principle.
And by a most natural connection, the kingdom and the priesthood always go together.
Did we consider these principles of reasoning only, we should be ready to pronounce, that our constitution was a most happy one, and calculated for a long duration.
But we are in a kind of ambiguous connection with twelve other republics; whose separate interests will often lead them to measures injurious to us.
If we enact laws, seemingly wise and wholesome, to prevent unnecessary importations; to oblige our rivals in trade to deal with us on equal footing; to relieve the public wants and establish the state’s credit, by duties and excises; the neighbouring states are sure to counteract us, and take advantage of our laws for their own emolument.
Then an artificial scarcity of money is created; lands depreciate, every kind of business is stagnated, and taxes which compared with estates are not heavy, yet are too severely felt in the collection.
All public and private credit is lost.
The people at large not seeing whence their evils arise, charge them on the government and laws.
They clamor for tender-acts, paper-money, and all the engines of fraud.
Harpy speculators join the din of complaint.
The democratic party are aroused to arms, and proceed to open rebellion.
But here they find themselves weak, being destitute of discipline, and resources for war.
They are defeated.
But on the field of election they have better success; turn out their former representatives, and executive officers, and choose new ones; and perhaps seem appeased for a while.
They find out the weak side of government, and will keep it always in view at their annual elections, and prevent it from ever rising to strength and respectability.
Nor do I conceive that it is possible, without a government over the whole thirteen States, invested with the powers to transact all concerns, which are properly national, with Judicial Courts and all the apparatus of civil power, ever to remedy the contentions in particular States, between the great men and the adverse party.
But we must be tossing from one wretched measure, and expedient to another; continually quarrelling, and making laws which discourage arts and industry, and discountenance honesty itself; till we, being sick of our boasted equal liberty, shall gladly embrace the offer of some hero, of plausible character, to give us a good government, and establish it by the sword.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Atticus IV, continued ...
December 22, 1787
The Americans are of quick understanding, lively and enterprising:
They possess great means of information:
They will not therefore be long in finding out that government which shall be a balance to their passions:
Under that, and that only, will they rest:
From this, I am almost confident that the government, proposed by the Federal Convention, will take place:
They who think that it will bear to be much relaxed, or amended, may be honest; but they are short-sighted men.
Powers must be adequate to their end.
And let any man judge from facts that have already appeared, whether any linsey-woolsey, half formed expedients, will deliver us from the wretched perplexity of our affairs.
If this does not take place, I am about as certain as I can be of any thing, short of fact and demonstration, that in less than ten years, perhaps in less than five, a bold push will be made to establish a monarchy.
And it may succeed to the loss of thousands of lives, and of the liberties of the people.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
December 22, 1787
The Americans are of quick understanding, lively and enterprising:
They possess great means of information:
They will not therefore be long in finding out that government which shall be a balance to their passions:
Under that, and that only, will they rest:
From this, I am almost confident that the government, proposed by the Federal Convention, will take place:
They who think that it will bear to be much relaxed, or amended, may be honest; but they are short-sighted men.
Powers must be adequate to their end.
And let any man judge from facts that have already appeared, whether any linsey-woolsey, half formed expedients, will deliver us from the wretched perplexity of our affairs.
If this does not take place, I am about as certain as I can be of any thing, short of fact and demonstration, that in less than ten years, perhaps in less than five, a bold push will be made to establish a monarchy.
And it may succeed to the loss of thousands of lives, and of the liberties of the people.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Atticus IV, concluded ...
December 22, 1787
I rather think that a government; either the federal or one very like it, will take place:
Or that the states will divide, and the northern establish a mixed government; and the southern a monarchy, or else go to perdition.
You seem to be anxious, my friend, lest we should lose all government:
Never fear it, we shall have an efficient government, and that very soon:
The great first cause has constructed the universe, better than you imagine.
He has inserted in it principles which will give us government; and the rage of parties, will only quicken their operation:
My fears are, lest we reject the milder government, and be obliged to receive the more severe.
The principles, which of late have appeared, are productive of the most efficient governments.
The hand of the Supreme is in all these things, and we can do nothing against his established laws.
Your love to your country, my friend, must needs be tender, since every trifle alarms you:
A Mason, angry at being left almost alone in a favourite opinion; and pleading in one breath for a bill of rights, and in the next for expost-facto laws, (which are destructive of all right) alarms you.
A plausible and artful Brutus alarms you:
But pay a little attention to his argument, and you will see it flatly contradicts itself.
In one part of his argument, the Federal government is so enormously powerful, that it swallows up all before it, the State governments with all their appurtenances!
In the other part it is so weak, that it cannot command the obedience of the people:
But if it proves anything, it proves, that we ought to establish a royal government:
For I presume this will not be denied, that these States, as governments, utterly connected with each other, cannot subsist.
We shall become the prey of every invader.
From this proceeds Brutus, and says, We cannot subsist as a national republican government; because the people, in different States differ in climate, manners, interest, &c.
But for a much stronger reason, we cannot subsist, as confederated sovereign States, differing as we do, in climate, manners, interest, &c.
Therefore we cannot subsist as republic governments at all.
And I have known several persons, who oppose the federal Constitution, do it in order to compel us at least to submit to a monarchy.
I wish that they and all other politicians were more honest.
Of this, however, I am secure, that we shall soon have an effective government.
The rich, the wise, the brave, the industrious, and enterprising, I am sure, will not be content to lie at the mercy of the idle, and licentious; and be the prey of harpy speculators.
But as to the precise method of bringing it to pass, I cheerfully submit to the power that rules the Globe.
Adieu, remember your friend, ATTICUS.
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/libr ... nt/atticus
December 22, 1787
I rather think that a government; either the federal or one very like it, will take place:
Or that the states will divide, and the northern establish a mixed government; and the southern a monarchy, or else go to perdition.
You seem to be anxious, my friend, lest we should lose all government:
Never fear it, we shall have an efficient government, and that very soon:
The great first cause has constructed the universe, better than you imagine.
He has inserted in it principles which will give us government; and the rage of parties, will only quicken their operation:
My fears are, lest we reject the milder government, and be obliged to receive the more severe.
The principles, which of late have appeared, are productive of the most efficient governments.
The hand of the Supreme is in all these things, and we can do nothing against his established laws.
Your love to your country, my friend, must needs be tender, since every trifle alarms you:
A Mason, angry at being left almost alone in a favourite opinion; and pleading in one breath for a bill of rights, and in the next for expost-facto laws, (which are destructive of all right) alarms you.
A plausible and artful Brutus alarms you:
But pay a little attention to his argument, and you will see it flatly contradicts itself.
In one part of his argument, the Federal government is so enormously powerful, that it swallows up all before it, the State governments with all their appurtenances!
In the other part it is so weak, that it cannot command the obedience of the people:
But if it proves anything, it proves, that we ought to establish a royal government:
For I presume this will not be denied, that these States, as governments, utterly connected with each other, cannot subsist.
We shall become the prey of every invader.
From this proceeds Brutus, and says, We cannot subsist as a national republican government; because the people, in different States differ in climate, manners, interest, &c.
But for a much stronger reason, we cannot subsist, as confederated sovereign States, differing as we do, in climate, manners, interest, &c.
Therefore we cannot subsist as republic governments at all.
And I have known several persons, who oppose the federal Constitution, do it in order to compel us at least to submit to a monarchy.
I wish that they and all other politicians were more honest.
Of this, however, I am secure, that we shall soon have an effective government.
The rich, the wise, the brave, the industrious, and enterprising, I am sure, will not be content to lie at the mercy of the idle, and licentious; and be the prey of harpy speculators.
But as to the precise method of bringing it to pass, I cheerfully submit to the power that rules the Globe.
Adieu, remember your friend, ATTICUS.
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/libr ... nt/atticus