A Landholder XIII, concluded …
Oliver Ellsworth
March 24, 1788
Sheep are the most profitable part of our stock, and the breed is much sooner multiplied than horses or cattle.
Why do not our opulent farmers avail themselves of the profit?
An experience would soon convince them there is no better method of advancing property, and their country would thank them for the trial.
Sheep are found to thrive and the wool to be of good quality in every part of New England, but as this animal delights in grazing, and is made healthy by coming often to the earth, our sea coasts with the adjacent country, where snow is of short continuance, are particularly favourable to their propagation.
Our hilly coasts were designed by nature for this, and every part of the country that abounds in hills ought to make an experiment by which they will be enriched.
In Connecticut, the eastern and southern counties, with the highlands on Connecticut river towards the sea, ought to produce more wool than would cloath the inhabitants of the state.
At present the quantity falls short of what is needed by our own consumption; if a surplusage could be produced, it would find a ready market and the best pay.
The culture of flax, another principal material for manufacturing, affords great profit to the farmer.
The seed of this crop when it succeeds will pay the husbandman for his labour, and return a better ground-rent than many other crops which are cultivated.
The seed is one of our best articles for remittance and exportation abroad.
Dressing and preparing the flax for use is done in the most leisure part of the year, when labour is cheap, and we had better work for sixpence a day and become wealthy, than to be idle and poor.
It is not probable the market can be overstocked, or if it should chance for a single season to be the case, no article is more meliorated by time, or will better pay for keeping by an increase of quality.
A large flax crop is one most certain sign of a thrifty husbandman.
The present method of agriculture in a course of different crops is well calculated to give the husbandman a sufficiency of flax ground, as it is well known that this vegetable will not thrive when sown successively in the same place.
The nail manufacture might be another source of wealth to the northern states.
Why should we twice transport our own iron, and pay other nations for labour which our boys might perform as well.
The art of nail-making is easily acquired.
Remittances have actually been made from some parts of the state in this article; the example is laudable, and ought to be imitated.
The sources of wealth are open to us, and there needs but industry to become as rich as we are free.
A Landholder.
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/libr ... lder-xiii/
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Maryland Farmer Essay VII
April 11, 1788
Thus it is that barbarity — cruelty and blood which stain the history of religion, spring from the corruption of civil government, and from that never-dying hope and fondness for a state of equality, which constitutes an essential part of the soul of man.
A chaos of darkness obscures the downfall of empire, intermixed with gleams of light, which serve only to disclose scenes of desolation and horror.
From the last confusion springs order.
The bold spirits who pull down the ancient fabric — erect a new one, founded on the natural liberties of mankind, and where civil government is preserved free, there can be no religious tyranny.
The sparks of bigotry and enthusiasm may and will crackle, but can never light into a blaze.
The truth of these remarks appear from the histories of those two great revolutions of European government, which seem to have convulsed this earth to the centre of its orb, and of which we have compleat record — The Roman and the Gothic, or as it is more commonly called the feudal constitution.
In the infancy of the Roman republic, when enterprizing and free, their conquests were rapid, because beneficial to the conquered (who were admitted to a participation of their liberty) their religion, although devoid, was not only unstained by persecution, but censurably liberal.
They received without discrimination the Gods of the countries they subdued, into the list of their deities, until Olympus was covered with an army of demigods as numerous as the legions of Popish Saints; and we find the Grecian divinities adored with more sincere piety at Rome, than at Athens.
Rome was then in the zenith of her glory — in the days of her wretched decline — in the miserable reigns of Caracalla, Eliagabalus and Commodus.
Ammianus and others, inform us that the Christians were butchered like sheep, for reviving the old exploded doctrine of a future state, in which Emperors and Senators were to be placed on a level with the poorest and most abject of mankind.
And in the succeeding despotisms when Christianity became the established religion, it grew immediately as corrupt in its infancy, as ever it has proved at any period since — the most subtle disquisitions of a metaphysical nature became the universal rage — the more incomprehensible — the more obstinately were they maintained, and in fine, the canonized Austin or Ambrose, (I forget which) closed his laborious enquiries, with this holy position — that he believed, because it was impossible.
At length the great question, whether the three persons of the divinity, were three or one, became publickly agitated, and threw all mankind into a flame.
Councils after councils, composed of all the wisdom of the divines, were assembled, and at length the doctrine that three were one prevailed, and such would have been the determination had it been proposed that three were sixteen — because misery is the foundation, upon which error erects her tyranny over the vulgar mind.
After this determination the arm of the Magistrate was called in, and those poor misled Arians who were still so wicked as to imagine that three must be three, were not only declared guilty of a most abominable and damnable heresy, but were thenceforth exterminated by fire and sword.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
April 11, 1788
Thus it is that barbarity — cruelty and blood which stain the history of religion, spring from the corruption of civil government, and from that never-dying hope and fondness for a state of equality, which constitutes an essential part of the soul of man.
A chaos of darkness obscures the downfall of empire, intermixed with gleams of light, which serve only to disclose scenes of desolation and horror.
From the last confusion springs order.
The bold spirits who pull down the ancient fabric — erect a new one, founded on the natural liberties of mankind, and where civil government is preserved free, there can be no religious tyranny.
The sparks of bigotry and enthusiasm may and will crackle, but can never light into a blaze.
The truth of these remarks appear from the histories of those two great revolutions of European government, which seem to have convulsed this earth to the centre of its orb, and of which we have compleat record — The Roman and the Gothic, or as it is more commonly called the feudal constitution.
In the infancy of the Roman republic, when enterprizing and free, their conquests were rapid, because beneficial to the conquered (who were admitted to a participation of their liberty) their religion, although devoid, was not only unstained by persecution, but censurably liberal.
They received without discrimination the Gods of the countries they subdued, into the list of their deities, until Olympus was covered with an army of demigods as numerous as the legions of Popish Saints; and we find the Grecian divinities adored with more sincere piety at Rome, than at Athens.
Rome was then in the zenith of her glory — in the days of her wretched decline — in the miserable reigns of Caracalla, Eliagabalus and Commodus.
Ammianus and others, inform us that the Christians were butchered like sheep, for reviving the old exploded doctrine of a future state, in which Emperors and Senators were to be placed on a level with the poorest and most abject of mankind.
And in the succeeding despotisms when Christianity became the established religion, it grew immediately as corrupt in its infancy, as ever it has proved at any period since — the most subtle disquisitions of a metaphysical nature became the universal rage — the more incomprehensible — the more obstinately were they maintained, and in fine, the canonized Austin or Ambrose, (I forget which) closed his laborious enquiries, with this holy position — that he believed, because it was impossible.
At length the great question, whether the three persons of the divinity, were three or one, became publickly agitated, and threw all mankind into a flame.
Councils after councils, composed of all the wisdom of the divines, were assembled, and at length the doctrine that three were one prevailed, and such would have been the determination had it been proposed that three were sixteen — because misery is the foundation, upon which error erects her tyranny over the vulgar mind.
After this determination the arm of the Magistrate was called in, and those poor misled Arians who were still so wicked as to imagine that three must be three, were not only declared guilty of a most abominable and damnable heresy, but were thenceforth exterminated by fire and sword.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Maryland Farmer Essay VII, concluded …
April 11, 1788
In the first age of the Gothic government, those free and hardy adventurers, deserted their Idols and embraced the doctrines of Christianity with ardent sincerity.
The King and a large majority of a nation, would be converted and baptized with as much celerity as the ceremony could be performed — but still liberty in the temporal, secured freedom in the spiritual administration: Christians and Pagan citizens lived together in the utmost harmony.
Those bold and hardy conquerors would never listen to Bishops who advised persecution, and held in sovereign contempt all those metaphysical distinctions with which a pure religion has been disgraced, in order to cloak villainous designs and support artful usurpations of civil powers in feeble and turbulent governments.
The Gothic institutions were however much sooner corrupted from internal vices than the Roman, and the undeniable reason was, that in the former, government by representation was admitted almost coeval with their first inundations — whereas with the Romans, the democratic branch of power, exercised by the people personally, rendered them invinsible both in war and peace.
The virtue of this internal institution could only be subdued by the greatness of its external acquisition — extensive empire ruined this mighty fabric — a superstructure, which overshadowed the then known world, was too mighty for the foundation confined within the walls of a city — the wealth imported by the Scipios from Spain and Afric, and by Flaminius, Lucullus, Sylla and Pompey, from the East, enabled the few to corrupt the many — a case that can never exist but where the legislative power resides exclusively in the citizens of the town.
The Roman republic then became diseased at the heart, but as it was ages in forming, so it required ages of corruption to destroy a robust constitution where every atom was a nerve.
It was not so with the Gothic constitution, mortal disease soon made its appearance there.
Civil liberty was early destroyed by the insolence and oppressions of the great.
The temporal power availed itself of that spiritual influence which nature has given religion over the hearts of men.
A religion, the divinity of which is demonstrable by reason alone, unassisted by revelation became the corrupt instrument of usurpation.
Those who were the authors of the disorders which disgraced civil government, cut the reins of ecclesiastical persecution: And an universal and tyrannic confusion was mingled with absurdities that excite both ridicule and horror.
We see a Duke of Gandia (who was betrayed and assassinated by that monster of perfidy Caesar Borgia, the bastard of the infamous Pope Alexander the VIth) in the last moments of his existence, begging the cut throat son, that he would intercede with his father, the Pope, in favour of his poor soul, that it might not be kept long in purgatory, but dispatched as soon as possible to Heaven, to dispute the infallibility of those vice-regents of God, who generally patterned after the devil, was considered as an heresy more damnable than blaspheming the most high.
Religious tyranny continued in this state, during those convulsions which broke the aristocracies of Europe, and settled their governments into mixed monarchies.
A ray of light then beamed — but only for a moment — the turbulent state and quick corruption of mixed monarchy, opened a new scene of religious horror.
Pardons for all crimes committed and to be committed, were regulated by ecclesiastical law, with a mercantile exactitude, and a Christian knew what he must pay for murdering another better than he now does the price of a pair of boots.
At length some bold spirits began to doubt whether wheat flour, made into paste, could be actually human flesh, or whether the wine made in the last vintage could be the real blood of Christ, who had been crucified upwards of 1400 years.
Such was the origin of the Protestant reformation — at the bare mention of such heretical and dangerous doctrine, striking (as they said) at the root of all religion, the sword of power leaped from its scabbard, the smoke that arose from the flames, to which the most virtuous of mankind, were without mercy committed, darkened all Europe for ages; tribunals, armed with frightful tortures, were every where erected, to make men confess opinions, and then they were solemnly burned for confessing, whilst priest and people sang hymns around them; and the fires of persecution are scarcely yet extinguished.
Civil and religious liberty are inseparably interwoven — whilst government is pure and equal — religion will be uncontaminated.
The moment government becomes disordered, bigotry and fanaticism take root and grow.
They are soon converted to serve the purpose of usurpation, and finally, religious persecution reciprocally supports and is supported by the tyranny of the temporal powers.
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/libr ... say-vii-2/
April 11, 1788
In the first age of the Gothic government, those free and hardy adventurers, deserted their Idols and embraced the doctrines of Christianity with ardent sincerity.
The King and a large majority of a nation, would be converted and baptized with as much celerity as the ceremony could be performed — but still liberty in the temporal, secured freedom in the spiritual administration: Christians and Pagan citizens lived together in the utmost harmony.
Those bold and hardy conquerors would never listen to Bishops who advised persecution, and held in sovereign contempt all those metaphysical distinctions with which a pure religion has been disgraced, in order to cloak villainous designs and support artful usurpations of civil powers in feeble and turbulent governments.
The Gothic institutions were however much sooner corrupted from internal vices than the Roman, and the undeniable reason was, that in the former, government by representation was admitted almost coeval with their first inundations — whereas with the Romans, the democratic branch of power, exercised by the people personally, rendered them invinsible both in war and peace.
The virtue of this internal institution could only be subdued by the greatness of its external acquisition — extensive empire ruined this mighty fabric — a superstructure, which overshadowed the then known world, was too mighty for the foundation confined within the walls of a city — the wealth imported by the Scipios from Spain and Afric, and by Flaminius, Lucullus, Sylla and Pompey, from the East, enabled the few to corrupt the many — a case that can never exist but where the legislative power resides exclusively in the citizens of the town.
The Roman republic then became diseased at the heart, but as it was ages in forming, so it required ages of corruption to destroy a robust constitution where every atom was a nerve.
It was not so with the Gothic constitution, mortal disease soon made its appearance there.
Civil liberty was early destroyed by the insolence and oppressions of the great.
The temporal power availed itself of that spiritual influence which nature has given religion over the hearts of men.
A religion, the divinity of which is demonstrable by reason alone, unassisted by revelation became the corrupt instrument of usurpation.
Those who were the authors of the disorders which disgraced civil government, cut the reins of ecclesiastical persecution: And an universal and tyrannic confusion was mingled with absurdities that excite both ridicule and horror.
We see a Duke of Gandia (who was betrayed and assassinated by that monster of perfidy Caesar Borgia, the bastard of the infamous Pope Alexander the VIth) in the last moments of his existence, begging the cut throat son, that he would intercede with his father, the Pope, in favour of his poor soul, that it might not be kept long in purgatory, but dispatched as soon as possible to Heaven, to dispute the infallibility of those vice-regents of God, who generally patterned after the devil, was considered as an heresy more damnable than blaspheming the most high.
Religious tyranny continued in this state, during those convulsions which broke the aristocracies of Europe, and settled their governments into mixed monarchies.
A ray of light then beamed — but only for a moment — the turbulent state and quick corruption of mixed monarchy, opened a new scene of religious horror.
Pardons for all crimes committed and to be committed, were regulated by ecclesiastical law, with a mercantile exactitude, and a Christian knew what he must pay for murdering another better than he now does the price of a pair of boots.
At length some bold spirits began to doubt whether wheat flour, made into paste, could be actually human flesh, or whether the wine made in the last vintage could be the real blood of Christ, who had been crucified upwards of 1400 years.
Such was the origin of the Protestant reformation — at the bare mention of such heretical and dangerous doctrine, striking (as they said) at the root of all religion, the sword of power leaped from its scabbard, the smoke that arose from the flames, to which the most virtuous of mankind, were without mercy committed, darkened all Europe for ages; tribunals, armed with frightful tortures, were every where erected, to make men confess opinions, and then they were solemnly burned for confessing, whilst priest and people sang hymns around them; and the fires of persecution are scarcely yet extinguished.
Civil and religious liberty are inseparably interwoven — whilst government is pure and equal — religion will be uncontaminated.
The moment government becomes disordered, bigotry and fanaticism take root and grow.
They are soon converted to serve the purpose of usurpation, and finally, religious persecution reciprocally supports and is supported by the tyranny of the temporal powers.
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/libr ... say-vii-2/
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Fabius I
Fabius, John Dickinson
April 12, 1788
OBSERVATIONS on the CONSTITUTION proposed by the FEDERAL CONVENTION.
The Constitution proposed by the Federal Convention now engages the fixed attention of America.
Every person appears to be affected.
Those who wish the adoption of the plan, consider its rejection as the source of endless contests, confusions, and misfortunes; and they also consider a resolution to alter, without previously adopting it, as a rejection.
Those who oppose the plan, are influenced by different views.
Some of them are friends, others of them are enemies, to the United States.
The latter are of two classes; either men without principles or fortunes, who think they may have a chance to mend their circumstances, with impunity, under a weak government, or in public convulsions, but cannot make them worse even by the last – or men who have been always averse to the revolution; and though at first confounded by that event, yet, their hopes reviving with the declension of our affairs, have since persuaded themselves, that at length the people, tired out with their continued distresses, will return to their former connection with Great-Britain.
To argue with these opposers, would be vain.
The other opposers of the plan deserve the highest respect.
What concerns all, should be considered by all; and individuals may injure a whole society, by not declaring their sentiments.
It is therefore not only their right, but their duty, to declare them.
Weak advocates of a good cause or artful advocates of a bad one, may endeavour to stop such communications, or to discredit them by clamor and calumny.
This, however, is not the age for such tricks of controversy.
Men have suffered so severely by being deceived upon subjects of the highest import, those of religion and freedom, that truth becomes infinitely valuable to them, not as a matter of curious speculation, but of beneficial practice.
A spirit of enquiry is excited, information diffused, judgment strengthened.
Before this tribunal, let every one freely speak, what he really thinks, but with so sincere a reverence for the cause he ventures to discuss as to use the utmost caution, lest he should lead into errors, upon a point of such sacred concern as the public happiness.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Fabius, John Dickinson
April 12, 1788
OBSERVATIONS on the CONSTITUTION proposed by the FEDERAL CONVENTION.
The Constitution proposed by the Federal Convention now engages the fixed attention of America.
Every person appears to be affected.
Those who wish the adoption of the plan, consider its rejection as the source of endless contests, confusions, and misfortunes; and they also consider a resolution to alter, without previously adopting it, as a rejection.
Those who oppose the plan, are influenced by different views.
Some of them are friends, others of them are enemies, to the United States.
The latter are of two classes; either men without principles or fortunes, who think they may have a chance to mend their circumstances, with impunity, under a weak government, or in public convulsions, but cannot make them worse even by the last – or men who have been always averse to the revolution; and though at first confounded by that event, yet, their hopes reviving with the declension of our affairs, have since persuaded themselves, that at length the people, tired out with their continued distresses, will return to their former connection with Great-Britain.
To argue with these opposers, would be vain.
The other opposers of the plan deserve the highest respect.
What concerns all, should be considered by all; and individuals may injure a whole society, by not declaring their sentiments.
It is therefore not only their right, but their duty, to declare them.
Weak advocates of a good cause or artful advocates of a bad one, may endeavour to stop such communications, or to discredit them by clamor and calumny.
This, however, is not the age for such tricks of controversy.
Men have suffered so severely by being deceived upon subjects of the highest import, those of religion and freedom, that truth becomes infinitely valuable to them, not as a matter of curious speculation, but of beneficial practice.
A spirit of enquiry is excited, information diffused, judgment strengthened.
Before this tribunal, let every one freely speak, what he really thinks, but with so sincere a reverence for the cause he ventures to discuss as to use the utmost caution, lest he should lead into errors, upon a point of such sacred concern as the public happiness.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Fabius I, concluded …
Fabius, John Dickinson
April 12, 1788
It is not the design of this address, to describe the present derangement of our affairs, the mischief that must ensue from its continuance, the horrors of a total dissolution of the union, or the division of it into partial confederacies.
Nor is it intended to describe the evils that will result from pursuing the plan of another Federal Convention; as if a better temper of conciliation, or a more satisfactory harmony of decisions, could be expected from men, after their minds are agitated with disgust and disappointments, than before they were thus disturbed; though from an uncontradicted assertion it appears, that without such provocations, the difficulty of reconciling the interests of the several states was so near to INSUPERABLE, in the late Convention, that after many weeks spent in the most faithful labors to promote concord, the members were upon the very point of dispersing in the utmost disorder, jealousy and resentment, and leaving the states exposed to all the tempests of passions, that have been so fatal to confederacies of democratical republics.
All these things have been laid before the public in a much better manner, than the writer of this address is capable of, and to repeat what has been said, he means not.
What he wishes, is to simplify the subject, so as to facilitate the enquiries of his fellow citizens.
Many are the objections made to the system proposed.
They should be distinguished.
Some may be called local, because they spring from the supposed interests of individual states.
Thus, for instance, some inhabitants of large states may desire the system to be so altered, that they may possess more authority in the decisions of the government; or some inhabitants of commercial states may desire it to be so altered, that the advantages of their trade may center almost wholly among themselves; and this predilection they may think compatible with the common welfare.
Their judgment being thus warped at the beginning of their deliberation, objections are accumulated as very important, that, without this prepossession, would never have obtained their approbation.
Certain it is, that strong understandings may be so influenced by this insulated patriotism, as to doubt, whether general benefits can be communicated by a general government.
Probably nothing would operate so much for the correction of these errors, as a perusal of the accounts transmitted to us by the ancients, of the calamities occasioned in Greece by a conduct founded on similar errors.
They are expressly ascribed to this cause – that each city meditated apart on its own profit and ends – insomuch that those who seemed to contend for union, could never relinquish their own interests and advancement, while they deliberated for the public.
Heaven grant that our countrymen may pause in time – duly estimate the present moment – and solemnly reflect – whether their measures may not tend to draw down the same distractions upon us, that desolated Greece.
They may now tolerably judge from the proceedings of the Federal Convention and of other Conventions, what are the sentiments of America upon her present and future prospects.
Let the voice of her distress be venerated – and adhering to the generous Virginian declaration, let them resolve to CLING TO UNION AS THE POLITICAL ROCK OF OUR SALVATION.
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/libr ... /fabius-i/
Fabius, John Dickinson
April 12, 1788
It is not the design of this address, to describe the present derangement of our affairs, the mischief that must ensue from its continuance, the horrors of a total dissolution of the union, or the division of it into partial confederacies.
Nor is it intended to describe the evils that will result from pursuing the plan of another Federal Convention; as if a better temper of conciliation, or a more satisfactory harmony of decisions, could be expected from men, after their minds are agitated with disgust and disappointments, than before they were thus disturbed; though from an uncontradicted assertion it appears, that without such provocations, the difficulty of reconciling the interests of the several states was so near to INSUPERABLE, in the late Convention, that after many weeks spent in the most faithful labors to promote concord, the members were upon the very point of dispersing in the utmost disorder, jealousy and resentment, and leaving the states exposed to all the tempests of passions, that have been so fatal to confederacies of democratical republics.
All these things have been laid before the public in a much better manner, than the writer of this address is capable of, and to repeat what has been said, he means not.
What he wishes, is to simplify the subject, so as to facilitate the enquiries of his fellow citizens.
Many are the objections made to the system proposed.
They should be distinguished.
Some may be called local, because they spring from the supposed interests of individual states.
Thus, for instance, some inhabitants of large states may desire the system to be so altered, that they may possess more authority in the decisions of the government; or some inhabitants of commercial states may desire it to be so altered, that the advantages of their trade may center almost wholly among themselves; and this predilection they may think compatible with the common welfare.
Their judgment being thus warped at the beginning of their deliberation, objections are accumulated as very important, that, without this prepossession, would never have obtained their approbation.
Certain it is, that strong understandings may be so influenced by this insulated patriotism, as to doubt, whether general benefits can be communicated by a general government.
Probably nothing would operate so much for the correction of these errors, as a perusal of the accounts transmitted to us by the ancients, of the calamities occasioned in Greece by a conduct founded on similar errors.
They are expressly ascribed to this cause – that each city meditated apart on its own profit and ends – insomuch that those who seemed to contend for union, could never relinquish their own interests and advancement, while they deliberated for the public.
Heaven grant that our countrymen may pause in time – duly estimate the present moment – and solemnly reflect – whether their measures may not tend to draw down the same distractions upon us, that desolated Greece.
They may now tolerably judge from the proceedings of the Federal Convention and of other Conventions, what are the sentiments of America upon her present and future prospects.
Let the voice of her distress be venerated – and adhering to the generous Virginian declaration, let them resolve to CLING TO UNION AS THE POLITICAL ROCK OF OUR SALVATION.
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/libr ... /fabius-i/
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Fabius II
Fabius, John Dickinson
April 15, 1788
OBSERVATIONS ON THE CONSTITUTION proposed by the FEDERAL CONVENTION.
But besides the objections originating from the before mentioned cause, that have been called local, there are other objections that are supposed to arise from the maxims of liberty and policy.
Hence it is inferred, that the proposed system has such inherent vices, as must necessarily produce a bad administration, and at length the oppression of a monarchy or an aristocracy in the federal officers.
The writer of this address being convinced by as exact an investigation as he could make, that such mistakes may lead to the perdition of his country, esteems it his indispensable duty, strenuously to contend, that — THE POWER OF THE PEOPLE pervading the proposed system, together with the STRONG CONFEDERATION OF THE STATES forms an adequate security against every danger that has been apprehended.
If this single assertion can be supported by facts and arguments, there will be reason to hope, that painful anxieties will be removed from the minds of some citizens, who are truely devoted to the interests of America, and who have been thrown into afflictive perplexities, by the never-ending mazes of multiplied, intricate, and contrariant disquisitions.
The objectors agree, that the confederation of the states will be strong, according to the system proposed, and so strong, that many of them loudly complain of that strength.
On this part of the assertion, there is no dispute.
But some of the objections that have been published, strike at another part of the principle assumed, and deny, that the system is sufficiently founded on the power of the people.
The course of regular enquiry demands, that these objections should be considered in the first place.
If they are removed, then all the rest of the objections, concerning unnecessary taxations, standing armies, the abolishment of trials by jury, the liberty of the press, the freedom of commerce, the judicial, executive, and legislative authorities of the several states, & the rights of citizens, and the other abuses of federal government, must, of consequence, be rejected, if the principle contains the salutary, purifying, and preserving qualities attributed to it.
The question then will be — Not what may be done, when the government shall be turned into a tyranny; but, how the government can be so turned?
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Fabius, John Dickinson
April 15, 1788
OBSERVATIONS ON THE CONSTITUTION proposed by the FEDERAL CONVENTION.
But besides the objections originating from the before mentioned cause, that have been called local, there are other objections that are supposed to arise from the maxims of liberty and policy.
Hence it is inferred, that the proposed system has such inherent vices, as must necessarily produce a bad administration, and at length the oppression of a monarchy or an aristocracy in the federal officers.
The writer of this address being convinced by as exact an investigation as he could make, that such mistakes may lead to the perdition of his country, esteems it his indispensable duty, strenuously to contend, that — THE POWER OF THE PEOPLE pervading the proposed system, together with the STRONG CONFEDERATION OF THE STATES forms an adequate security against every danger that has been apprehended.
If this single assertion can be supported by facts and arguments, there will be reason to hope, that painful anxieties will be removed from the minds of some citizens, who are truely devoted to the interests of America, and who have been thrown into afflictive perplexities, by the never-ending mazes of multiplied, intricate, and contrariant disquisitions.
The objectors agree, that the confederation of the states will be strong, according to the system proposed, and so strong, that many of them loudly complain of that strength.
On this part of the assertion, there is no dispute.
But some of the objections that have been published, strike at another part of the principle assumed, and deny, that the system is sufficiently founded on the power of the people.
The course of regular enquiry demands, that these objections should be considered in the first place.
If they are removed, then all the rest of the objections, concerning unnecessary taxations, standing armies, the abolishment of trials by jury, the liberty of the press, the freedom of commerce, the judicial, executive, and legislative authorities of the several states, & the rights of citizens, and the other abuses of federal government, must, of consequence, be rejected, if the principle contains the salutary, purifying, and preserving qualities attributed to it.
The question then will be — Not what may be done, when the government shall be turned into a tyranny; but, how the government can be so turned?
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Fabius II, continued …
Fabius, John Dickinson
April 15, 1788
Thus unembarrassed by subordinate discussions, we may come fairly to the contemplation of that superior point, and be better enabled to discover, whether our attention to it will afford any lights, whereby we may be conducted to peace, liberty, and safety.
The objections, denying that the system proposed is sufficiently founded on the power of the people, state, that the number of the federal trustees or officers, is too small, and that they are to hold their offices too long.
One would really have supposed, that smallness of number could not be termed a cause of danger, as influence must encrease with enlargement.
If this is a fault, it will soon be corrected, as an addition will be often made to the number of the senators, and, almost every year, to that of the representatives; and in all probability much sooner, than we shall be able and willing to bear the expence of the addition.
As to the senate, it never can be, and it never ought to be large, if it is to possess the powers, which almost all the objectors seem inclined to allot to it, as will be evident to every intelligent person, who considers those powers.
Tho’ small, let it be remembered, that it is to be created by the sovereignties of the several states; that is, by the persons, whom the people of each state shall judge to be most worthy, and who, surely, will be religiously attentive to making a selection, in which the interest and honour of their state will be so extensively concerned.
It should be remembered too, that this is the same manner, in which the members of Congress are now appointed; and that herein the sovereignties of the states are so intimately involved, that however a renunciation of part of these powers may be desired by some of the states, it NEVER will be obtained from the rest of them.
Peaceable, fraternal, and benevolent as these are, they think, the concessions they have made, ought to satisfy all.
That the senate may always be kept full, without the interference of Congress, it is provided that if vacancies happen by resignation or otherwise, during the recess of the legislature of any state, the executive thereof may make temporary appointments, until the next meeting of the legislature, which shall then fill up such vacancies.
As to the house of representatives, it is to consist of a number of persons, not exceeding one for every thirty thousand.
Thus, every member of that house will be elected by a majority of the electors of a whole state; or, by a majority of electors, among thirty thousand persons.
These electors will reside, widely dispersed, over an extensive country.
Cabal and corruption will be as impracticable, as, on such occasions, human institutions can render them.
The will of freemen, thus circumstanced, will give the fiat.
The purity of election thus obtained, will amply compensate for the supposed defect of representation; and the members, thus chosen, will be most apt to harmonize in their proceedings, with the general interests, feelings, and sentiments of the people.
Allowing such an increase of population as, from experience and a variety of causes, may be expected, the representatives, in a short period, will amount to several hundreds, and most probably long before any change of manners for the worse, that might tempt or encourage our rulers to mal-administration, will take place on this continent.
That this house may always be kept full, without the interference of Congress, it is provided in the system, that when vacancies happen in any state, the executive authority thereof shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Fabius, John Dickinson
April 15, 1788
Thus unembarrassed by subordinate discussions, we may come fairly to the contemplation of that superior point, and be better enabled to discover, whether our attention to it will afford any lights, whereby we may be conducted to peace, liberty, and safety.
The objections, denying that the system proposed is sufficiently founded on the power of the people, state, that the number of the federal trustees or officers, is too small, and that they are to hold their offices too long.
One would really have supposed, that smallness of number could not be termed a cause of danger, as influence must encrease with enlargement.
If this is a fault, it will soon be corrected, as an addition will be often made to the number of the senators, and, almost every year, to that of the representatives; and in all probability much sooner, than we shall be able and willing to bear the expence of the addition.
As to the senate, it never can be, and it never ought to be large, if it is to possess the powers, which almost all the objectors seem inclined to allot to it, as will be evident to every intelligent person, who considers those powers.
Tho’ small, let it be remembered, that it is to be created by the sovereignties of the several states; that is, by the persons, whom the people of each state shall judge to be most worthy, and who, surely, will be religiously attentive to making a selection, in which the interest and honour of their state will be so extensively concerned.
It should be remembered too, that this is the same manner, in which the members of Congress are now appointed; and that herein the sovereignties of the states are so intimately involved, that however a renunciation of part of these powers may be desired by some of the states, it NEVER will be obtained from the rest of them.
Peaceable, fraternal, and benevolent as these are, they think, the concessions they have made, ought to satisfy all.
That the senate may always be kept full, without the interference of Congress, it is provided that if vacancies happen by resignation or otherwise, during the recess of the legislature of any state, the executive thereof may make temporary appointments, until the next meeting of the legislature, which shall then fill up such vacancies.
As to the house of representatives, it is to consist of a number of persons, not exceeding one for every thirty thousand.
Thus, every member of that house will be elected by a majority of the electors of a whole state; or, by a majority of electors, among thirty thousand persons.
These electors will reside, widely dispersed, over an extensive country.
Cabal and corruption will be as impracticable, as, on such occasions, human institutions can render them.
The will of freemen, thus circumstanced, will give the fiat.
The purity of election thus obtained, will amply compensate for the supposed defect of representation; and the members, thus chosen, will be most apt to harmonize in their proceedings, with the general interests, feelings, and sentiments of the people.
Allowing such an increase of population as, from experience and a variety of causes, may be expected, the representatives, in a short period, will amount to several hundreds, and most probably long before any change of manners for the worse, that might tempt or encourage our rulers to mal-administration, will take place on this continent.
That this house may always be kept full, without the interference of Congress, it is provided in the system, that when vacancies happen in any state, the executive authority thereof shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Fabius II, continued ...
Fabius, John Dickinson
April 15, 1788
But, it seems, the number of the federal officers is not only too small: They are to hold their offices too long.
This objection surely applies not to the house of representatives, who are to be chosen every two years, especially if the extent of empire, and the vast variety and importance of their deliberations, be considered.
In that view, they and the senate will actually be not only legislative but also diplomatic bodies, perpetually engaged in the arduous task of reconciling, in their determinations, the interests of several sovereign states, not to insist on the necessity of a competent knowledge of foreign affairs, relative to the states.
They who desire the representatives to be chosen every year, should exceed Newton in calculations, if they attempt to evince, that the public business would, in that case, be better transacted, than when they are chosen every two years.
The idea, however, should be excused for the zeal that prompted it.
Is monarchy or aristocracy to be produced, without the consent of the people, by a house of representatives, thus constituted?
It has been unanimously agreed by the friends of liberty, that FREQUENT ELECTIONS OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE, ARE THE MOST SOVEREIGN REMEDY OF ALL GRIEVANCES IN A FREE GOVERNMENT.
Let us pass on to the senate.
At the end of two years after the first election, one third is to be elected for six years.
Of the remaining thirds, one will constantly have but four years, and the other but two years to continue in office.
The whole number at first will amount but to twenty-six, must ever continue very small, will be regularly renovated by the biennial election of one third, and will be overlooked, and overawed by the house of representatives, nearly three times more numerous at the beginning, rapidly and vastly augmenting, and more enabled to overlook & overawe them, by holding their offices for two years, as thereby they will acquire better information, respecting national affairs.
These representatives will also command the public purse, as all bills for raising revenue, must originate in their house.
As in the Roman armies, when the Principes and Hastati had failed, there were still the Triarii, who generally put things to rights, so we shall be supplied with another resource.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Fabius, John Dickinson
April 15, 1788
But, it seems, the number of the federal officers is not only too small: They are to hold their offices too long.
This objection surely applies not to the house of representatives, who are to be chosen every two years, especially if the extent of empire, and the vast variety and importance of their deliberations, be considered.
In that view, they and the senate will actually be not only legislative but also diplomatic bodies, perpetually engaged in the arduous task of reconciling, in their determinations, the interests of several sovereign states, not to insist on the necessity of a competent knowledge of foreign affairs, relative to the states.
They who desire the representatives to be chosen every year, should exceed Newton in calculations, if they attempt to evince, that the public business would, in that case, be better transacted, than when they are chosen every two years.
The idea, however, should be excused for the zeal that prompted it.
Is monarchy or aristocracy to be produced, without the consent of the people, by a house of representatives, thus constituted?
It has been unanimously agreed by the friends of liberty, that FREQUENT ELECTIONS OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE, ARE THE MOST SOVEREIGN REMEDY OF ALL GRIEVANCES IN A FREE GOVERNMENT.
Let us pass on to the senate.
At the end of two years after the first election, one third is to be elected for six years.
Of the remaining thirds, one will constantly have but four years, and the other but two years to continue in office.
The whole number at first will amount but to twenty-six, must ever continue very small, will be regularly renovated by the biennial election of one third, and will be overlooked, and overawed by the house of representatives, nearly three times more numerous at the beginning, rapidly and vastly augmenting, and more enabled to overlook & overawe them, by holding their offices for two years, as thereby they will acquire better information, respecting national affairs.
These representatives will also command the public purse, as all bills for raising revenue, must originate in their house.
As in the Roman armies, when the Principes and Hastati had failed, there were still the Triarii, who generally put things to rights, so we shall be supplied with another resource.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Fabius II, continued …
Fabius, John Dickinson
April 15, 1788
We are to have a president, to superintend, and if he thinks the public weal requires it, to controul any act of the representatives and senate.
This president is to be chosen, not by the people at large, because it may not be possible, that all the freemen of the empire should always have the necessary information, for directing their choice of such an officer; nor by Congress, lest it should disturb the national councils; nor BY ANY ONE BODY WHATEVER, for fear of undue influence.
He is to be chosen in the following manner.
Each state shall appoint, as the legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors, equal to the whole number of senators and representatives, to which the state shall be entitled in Congress: but no senator or representative, or person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States, shall be appointed an elector.
As these electors are to be appointed, as the legislature of each state may direct, of course they will be appointed by the people of the state, if such be the pleasure of the people.
Thus, the fairest, freest opening is given, for each state to chuse such electors for this purpose, as shall be most signally qualified to fulfil the trust.
To guard against undue influence these electors, thus chosen, are to meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot; and still further to guard against it, Congress may determine the time of chusing the electors, and the day on which they shall give their votes — WHICH DAY SHALL BE THE SAME THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES.
All the votes from the several states are to be transmitted to Congress, and therein counted.
The president is to hold his office for four years.
When these electors meet in their respective states, utterly vain will be the unreasonable suggestions derived from partiality.
The electors may throw away their votes, mark, with public disappointment, some person improperly favoured by them, or justly revering the duties of their office, dedicate their votes to the best interests of their country.
This president will be no dictator: two thirds of the representatives and the senate may pass any law, notwithstanding his dissent; and he is re-movable and punishable for misbehavior.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Fabius, John Dickinson
April 15, 1788
We are to have a president, to superintend, and if he thinks the public weal requires it, to controul any act of the representatives and senate.
This president is to be chosen, not by the people at large, because it may not be possible, that all the freemen of the empire should always have the necessary information, for directing their choice of such an officer; nor by Congress, lest it should disturb the national councils; nor BY ANY ONE BODY WHATEVER, for fear of undue influence.
He is to be chosen in the following manner.
Each state shall appoint, as the legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors, equal to the whole number of senators and representatives, to which the state shall be entitled in Congress: but no senator or representative, or person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States, shall be appointed an elector.
As these electors are to be appointed, as the legislature of each state may direct, of course they will be appointed by the people of the state, if such be the pleasure of the people.
Thus, the fairest, freest opening is given, for each state to chuse such electors for this purpose, as shall be most signally qualified to fulfil the trust.
To guard against undue influence these electors, thus chosen, are to meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot; and still further to guard against it, Congress may determine the time of chusing the electors, and the day on which they shall give their votes — WHICH DAY SHALL BE THE SAME THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES.
All the votes from the several states are to be transmitted to Congress, and therein counted.
The president is to hold his office for four years.
When these electors meet in their respective states, utterly vain will be the unreasonable suggestions derived from partiality.
The electors may throw away their votes, mark, with public disappointment, some person improperly favoured by them, or justly revering the duties of their office, dedicate their votes to the best interests of their country.
This president will be no dictator: two thirds of the representatives and the senate may pass any law, notwithstanding his dissent; and he is re-movable and punishable for misbehavior.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Fabius II, concluded …
Fabius, John Dickinson
April 15, 1788
Can the limitted, fluctuating senate, placed amidst such powers, if it should become willing, ever become able, to make America pass under its yoke?
The senators will generally be inhabitants of places very distant one from another.
They can scarcely be acquainted till they meet.
Few of them can ever act together for any length of time, unless their good conduct recommends them to a re-election; and then there will be frequent changes in a body dependent upon the choice of other bodies, the legislatures of the several states, that are altering every year.
Machiavel and Caesar Borgia together could not form a conspiracy in such a senate, dangerous to any but themselves and their accomplices.
It is essential to every good government, that there should be some council, permanent enough to get a due knowledge of affairs internal and external; so constituted, that by some deaths or removals, the current of information should not be impeded or disturbed; and so regulated, as to be responsible to, and controulable by the people.
Where can the authority for combining these advantages, be more safely, beneficially or satisfactorily, lodged, than in the senate, to be formed according to the plan proposed?
Shall parts of the trust be committed to the president, with counselors who shall subscribe their advices?
If assaults upon liberty are to be guarded against, and surely they ought to be with sleepless vigilance, why should we depend more on the commander in chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, and on his counsellors, whom he may secretly influence, than on the senate to be appointed by the persons exercising the sovereign authority of the several states?
In truth, the objections against the powers of the senate originated from a desire to have them, or at least some of them, vested in a body, in which the several states should be represented, in proportion to the number of inhabitants, as in the house of representatives.
This method is UNATTAINABLE, and the wish for it should be dismissed from every mind, that desires the existence of a confederation.
What assurance can be given, or what probability be assigned, that a board of councillors would continue honest, longer than the senate?
Or, that they would possess more useful information, respecting all the states, then the senators of all the states?
It appears needless to pursue this argument any further.
How varied, ballanced, concordant, and benign, is the system proposed to us?
To secure the freedom, and promote the happiness of these and future states, by giving THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE a decisive influence over the whole, and over all the parts, with what a comprehensive arrangement does it embrace different modes of representation, from an election by a county to an election by an empire?
What are the complicated ballot, and all the refined devices of Venice for maintaining her aristocracy, when compared with this plain dealing work for diffusing the blessings of equal liberty and common prosperity over myriads of the human race?
All the foundations before mentioned, of the federal government, are by the proposed system to be established, in the most clear, strong, positive, unequivocal expressions, of which our language is capable.
Magna charta, or any other law, never contained clauses more decisive and emphatic.
While the people of these states have sense, they will understand them; and while they have spirit, they will make them to be observed.
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/libr ... fabius-ii/
Fabius, John Dickinson
April 15, 1788
Can the limitted, fluctuating senate, placed amidst such powers, if it should become willing, ever become able, to make America pass under its yoke?
The senators will generally be inhabitants of places very distant one from another.
They can scarcely be acquainted till they meet.
Few of them can ever act together for any length of time, unless their good conduct recommends them to a re-election; and then there will be frequent changes in a body dependent upon the choice of other bodies, the legislatures of the several states, that are altering every year.
Machiavel and Caesar Borgia together could not form a conspiracy in such a senate, dangerous to any but themselves and their accomplices.
It is essential to every good government, that there should be some council, permanent enough to get a due knowledge of affairs internal and external; so constituted, that by some deaths or removals, the current of information should not be impeded or disturbed; and so regulated, as to be responsible to, and controulable by the people.
Where can the authority for combining these advantages, be more safely, beneficially or satisfactorily, lodged, than in the senate, to be formed according to the plan proposed?
Shall parts of the trust be committed to the president, with counselors who shall subscribe their advices?
If assaults upon liberty are to be guarded against, and surely they ought to be with sleepless vigilance, why should we depend more on the commander in chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, and on his counsellors, whom he may secretly influence, than on the senate to be appointed by the persons exercising the sovereign authority of the several states?
In truth, the objections against the powers of the senate originated from a desire to have them, or at least some of them, vested in a body, in which the several states should be represented, in proportion to the number of inhabitants, as in the house of representatives.
This method is UNATTAINABLE, and the wish for it should be dismissed from every mind, that desires the existence of a confederation.
What assurance can be given, or what probability be assigned, that a board of councillors would continue honest, longer than the senate?
Or, that they would possess more useful information, respecting all the states, then the senators of all the states?
It appears needless to pursue this argument any further.
How varied, ballanced, concordant, and benign, is the system proposed to us?
To secure the freedom, and promote the happiness of these and future states, by giving THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE a decisive influence over the whole, and over all the parts, with what a comprehensive arrangement does it embrace different modes of representation, from an election by a county to an election by an empire?
What are the complicated ballot, and all the refined devices of Venice for maintaining her aristocracy, when compared with this plain dealing work for diffusing the blessings of equal liberty and common prosperity over myriads of the human race?
All the foundations before mentioned, of the federal government, are by the proposed system to be established, in the most clear, strong, positive, unequivocal expressions, of which our language is capable.
Magna charta, or any other law, never contained clauses more decisive and emphatic.
While the people of these states have sense, they will understand them; and while they have spirit, they will make them to be observed.
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/libr ... fabius-ii/