JULIANA APPEAL

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KELSEY CASCADIA ROSE JULIANA; XIUHTEZCATL TONATIUH M., through his Guardian Tamara RoskeMartinez; ALEXANDER LOZNAK; JACOB LEBEL; ZEALAND B., through his Guardian Kimberly Pash-Bell; AVERY M., through her Guardian Holly McRae; SAHARA V., through her Guardian Toa Aguilar; KIRAN ISAAC OOMMEN; TIA MARIE HATTON; ISAAC V., through his Guardian Pamela Vergun; MIKO V., through her Guardian Pamel Vergun; HAZEL V., through her Guardian Margo Van Ummerson; SOPHIE K., through her Guardian Dr. James Hansen; JAIME B., through her Guardian Jamescita Peshlakai; JOURNEY Z., through his Guardian Erika Schneider; VICTORIA B., through her Guardian Daisy Calderon; NATHANIEL B., through his Guardian Sharon Baring; AJI P., through his Guardian Helaina Piper; LEVI D., through his Guardian Leigh-Ann Draheim; JAYDEN F., through her Guardian Cherri Foytlin; NICHOLAS V., through his Guardian Marie Venner; EARTH GUARDIANS, a nonprofit organization; FUTURE GENERATIONS, through their Guardian Dr. James Hansen, Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; MARY B. NEUMAYR, in her capacity as Chairman of Council on Environmental Quality; MICK MULVANEY, in his official capacity as Director of the Office of Management and the Budget; KELVIN K. DROEGEMEIR, in his official capacity as Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy; DAN BROUILLETTE, in his official capacity as Secretary of Energy; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR; DAVID L. BERNHARDT, in his official capacity as Secretary of Interior; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; ELAINE L. CHAO, in her official capacity as Secretary of Transportation; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE; SONNY PERDUE, in his official capacity as Secretary of Agriculture; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE; WILBUR ROSS, in his official capacity as Secretary of Commerce; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; MARK T. ESPER, in his official capacity as Secretary of Defense; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE; MICHAEL R. POMPEO, in his official capacity as Secretary of State; ANDREW WHEELER, in his official capacity as Administrator of the EPA; OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES; U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States, Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Ann L. Aiken, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted June 4, 2019 Portland, Oregon

Filed January 17, 2020

Before: Mary H. Murguia and Andrew D. Hurwitz, Circuit Judges, and Josephine L. Staton,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Hurwitz; Dissent by Judge Staton

* The Honorable Josephine L. Staton, United States District Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designation.

SUMMARY

Climate Change/Standing

The panel reversed the district court’s interlocutory orders in an action brought by an environmental organization and individual plaintiffs against the federal government, alleging climate-change related injuries to the plaintiffs caused by the federal government continuing to “permit, authorize, and subsidize” fossil fuel; and remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss for lack of Article III standing.

Some plaintiffs claimed psychological harms, others impairment to recreational interests, others exacerbated medical conditions, and others damage to property.

Plaintiffs alleged violations of their constitutional rights, and sought declaratory relief and an injunction ordering the government to implement a plan to “phase out fossil fuel emissions and draw down excess atmospheric [carbon dioxide].”

The panel held that: the record left little basis for denying that climate change was occurring at an increasingly rapid pace; copious expert evidence established that the unprecedented rise in atmospheric carbon dioxide levels stemmed from fossil fuel combustion and will wreak havoc on the Earth’s climate if unchecked; the record conclusively established that the federal government has long understood the risks of fossil fuel use and increasing carbon dioxide emissions; and the record established that the government’s contribution to climate change was not simply a result of inaction.

The panel rejected the government’s argument that plaintiffs’ claims must proceed, if at all, under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).

The panel held that because the APA only allows challenges to discrete agency decisions, the plaintiffs could not effectively pursue their constitutional claims – whatever their merits – under that statute.

The panel considered the three requirements for whether plaintiffs had Article III standing to pursue their constitutional claims.

First, the panel held that the district court correctly found that plaintiffs claimed concrete and particularized injuries.

Second, the panel held that the district court properly found the Article III causation requirement satisfied for purposes of summary judgment because there was at least a genuine factual dispute as to whether a host of federal policies were a “substantial factor” in causing the plaintiffs’ injuries.

Third, the panel held that plaintiffs’ claimed injuries were not redressable by an Article III court.

Specifically, the panel held that it was beyond the power of an Article III court to order, design, supervise, or implement the plaintiffs’ requested remedial plan where any effective plan would necessarily require a host of complex policy decisions entrusted to the wisdom and discretion of the executive and legislative branches.

The panel reluctantly concluded that the plaintiffs’ case must be made to the political branches or to the electorate at large.

District Judge Staton dissented, and would affirm the district court.

Judge Staton wrote that plaintiffs brought suit to enforce the most basic structural principal embedded in our system of liberty: that the Constitution does not condone the Nation’s willful destruction.

She would hold that plaintiffs have standing to challenge the government’s conduct, have articulated claims under the Constitution, and have presented sufficient evidence to press those claims at trial.

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COUNSEL

Jeffrey Bossert Clark (argued), Assistant Attorney General; Andrew C. Mergen, Sommer H. Engels, and Robert J. Lundman, Attorneys; Eric Grant, Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Environment and Natural Resources Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Defendants-Appellants.

Julia A. Olson (argued), Wild Earth Advocates, Eugene, Oregon; Philip L. Gregory, Gregory Law Group, Redwood City, California; Andrew K. Rodgers, Law Offices of Andrea K. Rodgers, Seattle, Washington; for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Theodore Hadzi-Antich and Ryan D. Walters, Texas Public Policy Foundation, Austin, Texas, for Amici Curiae Nuckels Oil Co., Inc. DBA Merit Oil Company; Libety Packing Company, LLC; Western States Trucking Association; and National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center.

Richard K. Eichstaedt, University Legal Assistance, Spokane, Washington, for Amici Curiae Eco-Justice Ministries; Interfaith Moral Action on Climate; General Synod of the United Church of Christ; Temple Beth Israel of Eugene, Oregon; National Advocacy Center of the Sisters of the Good Shepherd; Leadership Counsel of the Sisters Servants of the Immaculate Heart of Mary of Monroe, Michigan; Sisters of Mercy of the Americas’ Institute Leadership Team; GreenFaith; Leadership Team of the Sisters of Providence of Saint-Mary-of-the-Woods Indiana; Leadership Conference of Women Religious; Climate Change Task Force of the Sisters of Providence of Saint Mary-of-the-Woods; Quaker Earthcare Witness; Colorado Interfaith Power and Light; and the Congregation of Our Lady of Charity of the Good Shepherd, U.S. Provinces.

Dr. Curtis FJ Doebbler, Law Office of Dr. Curtis FJ Doebbler, San Antonio, Texas; D. Inder Comar, Comar LLP, San Francisco, California; for Amici Curiae International Lawyers for International Law.

Wendy B. Jacobs, Director; Shaun A. Goho, Deputy Director; Emmett Environmental Law & Policy Clinic, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Massachusetts; for Amici Curiae Public Health Experts, Public Health Organizations, and Doctors.

David Bookbinder, Niskanen Center, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae Niskanen Center.

Courtney B. Johnson, Crag Law Center, Portland, Oregon, for Amici Curiae League of Women Voters of the United States and League of Women Voters of Oregon.

Oday Salim, Environmental Law & Sustainability Clinic; Julian D. Mortensen and David M. Uhlmann, Professors; Alexander Chafetz, law student; University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, Michigan; for Amicus Curiae Sunrise Movement Education Fund.

Zachary B. Corrigan, Food & Water Watch, Inc., Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae Food & Water Watch, Inc.; Friends of the Earth – US; and Greenpeace, Inc.

Patti Goldman, Earthjustice, Seattle, Washington; Sarah H. Burt, Earthjustice, San Francisco, California; for Amici Curiae EarthRights International, Center for Biological Diversity, Defenders of Wildlife, and Union of Concerned Scientists.

David Hunter and William John Snape III, American University, Washington College of Law, Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae International Environmental Law and Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide—US.

Timothy M. Bechtold, Bechtold Law Firm PLLC, Missoula, Montana, for Amici Curiae Members of the United States Congress.

Rachael Paschal Osborn, Vashon, Washington, for Amici Curiae Environmental History Professors.

Thomas J. Beers, Beers Law Offices, Seeley Lake, Montana; Irma S. Russell, Professor, and Edward A. Smith, Missouri Chair in Law, the Constitution, and Society, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law, Kansas City, Missouri; W. Warren H. Binford Professor or Law & Director, Clinical Law Program, Willamette University, Salem, Oregon; for Amicus Curiae Zero Hour on Behalf of Approximately 32,340 Children and Young People.

Helen H. Kang, Environmental Law and Justice Clinic, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, California; James R. May and Erin Daly, Dignity Rights Project, Delaware Law School, Wilmington, Delaware; for Amici Curiae Law Professors.

Toby J. Marshall, Terrell Marshall Law Group PLLC, Seattle, Washington, for Amici Curiae Guayaki Sustainable Rainforest Products, Inc.; Royal Blue Organics; Organically Grown Company; Bliss Unlimited, LLC, dba Coconut Bliss; Hummingbird Wholesale; Aspen Skiing Company, LLC; Protect Our Winters; National Ski Areas Association; Snowsports Industries America; and American Sustainable Business Council.

Alejandra Núñez and Andres Restrepo, Sierra Club, Washington, D.C.; Joanne Spalding, Sierra Club, Oakland, California; for Amicus Curiae Sierra Club.

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OPINION

HURWITZ, Circuit Judge:

In the mid-1960s, a popular song warned that we were “on the eve of destruction.”

The plaintiffs in this case have presented compelling evidence that climate change has brought that eve nearer.

A substantial evidentiary record documents that the federal government has long promoted fossil fuel use despite knowing that it can cause catastrophic climate change, and that failure to change existing policy may hasten an environmental apocalypse.

The plaintiffs claim that the government has violated their constitutional rights, including a claimed right under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to a “climate system capable of sustaining human life.”

The central issue before us is whether, even assuming such a broad constitutional right exists, an Article III court can provide the plaintiffs the redress they seek — an order requiring the government to develop a plan to “phase out fossil fuel emissions and draw down excess atmospheric CO2.”

Reluctantly, we conclude that such relief is beyond our constitutional power.

Rather, the plaintiffs’ impressive case for redress must be presented to the political branches of government.

1 Barry McGuire, Eve of Destruction, on Eve of Destruction (Dunhill Records, 1965).

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I. The plaintiffs are twenty-one young citizens, an environmental organization, and a “representative of future generations.”

Their original complaint named as defendants the President, the United States, and federal agencies (collectively, “the government”).

The operative complaint accuses the government of continuing to “permit, authorize, and subsidize” fossil fuel use despite long being aware of its risks, thereby causing various climate-change related injuries to the plaintiffs.

Some plaintiffs claim psychological harm, others impairment to recreational interests, others exacerbated medical conditions, and others damage to property.

The complaint asserts violations of: (1) the plaintiffs’ substantive rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment; (2) the plaintiffs’ rights under the Fifth Amendment to equal protection of the law; (3) the plaintiffs’ rights under the Ninth Amendment; and (4) the public trust doctrine.

The plaintiffs seek declaratory relief and an injunction ordering the government to implement a plan to “phase out fossil fuel emissions and draw down excess atmospheric [carbon dioxide].”

The district court denied the government’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiffs had standing to sue, raised justiciable questions, and stated a claim for infringement of a Fifth Amendment due process right to a “climate system capable of sustaining human life.”

The court defined that right as one to be free from catastrophic climate change that “will cause human deaths, shorten human lifespans, result in widespread damage to property, threaten human food sources, and dramatically alter the planet’s ecosystem.”

The court also concluded that the plaintiffs had stated a viable “danger-creation due process claim” arising from the government’s failure to regulate third-party emissions.

Finally, the court held that the plaintiffs had stated a public trust claim grounded in the Fifth and the Ninth Amendments.

The government unsuccessfully sought a writ of mandamus. In re United States, 884 F.3d 830, 837–38 (9th Cir. 2018).

Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court denied the government’s motion for a stay of proceedings. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Or., 139 S. Ct. 1 (2018).

Although finding the stay request “premature,” the Court noted that the “breadth of respondents’ claims is striking . . . and the justiciability of those claims presents substantial grounds for difference of opinion.” Id.

The government then moved for summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings.

The district court granted summary judgment on the Ninth Amendment claim, dismissed the President as a defendant, and dismissed the equal protection claim in part.

But the court otherwise denied the government’s motions, again holding that the plaintiffs had standing to sue and finding that they had presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment.

The court also rejected the government’s argument that the plaintiffs’ exclusive remedy was under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 702 et seq.

The district court initially declined the government’s request to certify those orders for interlocutory appeal.

But, while considering a second mandamus petition from the government, we invited the district court to revisit certification, noting the Supreme Court’s justiciability concerns. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Or., No. 18-73014, Dkt. 3; see In re United States, 139 S. Ct. 452, 453 (2018) (reiterating justiciability concerns in denying a subsequent stay application from the government).

The district court then reluctantly certified the orders denying the motions for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and stayed the proceedings, while “stand[ing] by its prior rulings . . . as well as its belief that this case would be better served by further factual development at trial.” Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-cv01517-AA, 2018 WL 6303774, at *3 (D. Or. Nov. 21, 2018).

2 The plaintiffs also assert that section 201 of the Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 201, 106 Stat. 2776, 2866 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 717b(c)), which requires expedited authorization for certain natural gas imports and exports “without modification or delay,” is unconstitutional on its face and as applied. The plaintiffs also challenge DOE/FE Order No. 3041, which authorizes exports of liquefied natural gas from the proposed Jordan Cove terminal in Coos Bay, Oregon.

3 The court found that age is not a suspect class, but allowed the equal protection claim to proceed on a fundamental rights theory.

We granted the government’s petition for permission to appeal.

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II. The plaintiffs have compiled an extensive record, which at this stage in the litigation we take in the light most favorable to their claims. See Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 768 (2014).

The record leaves little basis for denying that climate change is occurring at an increasingly rapid pace.

It documents that since the dawn of the Industrial Age, atmospheric carbon dioxide has skyrocketed to levels not seen for almost three million years.

For hundreds of thousands of years, average carbon concentration fluctuated between 180 and 280 parts per million.

Today, it is over 410 parts per million and climbing.

Although carbon levels rose gradually after the last Ice Age, the most recent surge has occurred more than 100 times faster; half of that increase has come in the last forty years.

Copious expert evidence establishes that this unprecedented rise stems from fossil fuel combustion and will wreak havoc on the Earth’s climate if unchecked.

Temperatures have already risen 0.9 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and may rise more than 6 degrees Celsius by the end of the century.

The hottest years on record all fall within this decade, and each year since 1997 has been hotter than the previous average.

This extreme heat is melting polar ice caps and may cause sea levels to rise 15 to 30 feet by 2100.

The problem is approaching “the point of no return.”

Absent some action, the destabilizing climate will bury cities, spawn life-threatening natural disasters, and jeopardize critical food and water supplies.

The record also conclusively establishes that the federal government has long understood the risks of fossil fuel use and increasing carbon dioxide emissions.

As early as 1965, the Johnson Administration cautioned that fossil fuel emissions threatened significant changes to climate, global temperatures, sea levels, and other stratospheric properties.

In 1983, an Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) report projected an increase of 2 degrees Celsius by 2040, warning that a “wait and see” carbon emissions policy was extremely risky.

And, in the 1990s, the EPA implored the government to act before it was too late.

Nonetheless, by 2014, U.S. fossil fuel emissions had climbed to 5.4 billion metric tons, up substantially from 1965.

This growth shows no signs of abating.

From 2008 to 2017, domestic petroleum and natural gas production increased by nearly 60%, and the country is now expanding oil and gas extraction four times faster than any other nation.

The record also establishes that the government’s contribution to climate change is not simply a result of inaction.

The government affirmatively promotes fossil fuel use in a host of ways, including beneficial tax provisions, permits for imports and exports, subsidies for domestic and overseas projects, and leases for fuel extraction on federal land.

A. The government by and large has not disputed the factual premises of the plaintiffs’ claims.

But it first argues that those claims must proceed, if at all, under the APA.

We reject that argument.

The plaintiffs do not claim that any individual agency action exceeds statutory authorization or, taken alone, is arbitrary and capricious. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C).

Rather, they contend that the totality of various government actions contributes to the deprivation of constitutionally protected rights.

Because the APA only allows challenges to discrete agency decisions, see Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 890–91 (1990), the plaintiffs cannot effectively pursue their constitutional claims — whatever their merits — under that statute.

The defendants argue that the APA’s “comprehensive remedial scheme” for challenging the constitutionality of agency actions implicitly bars the plaintiffs’ freestanding constitutional claims.

But, even if some constitutional challenges to agency action must proceed through the APA, forcing all constitutional claims to follow its strictures would bar plaintiffs from challenging violations of constitutional rights in the absence of a discrete agency action that caused the violation. See Sierra Club v. Trump, 929 F.3d 670, 694, 696 (9th Cir. 2019) (stating that plaintiffs could “bring their challenge through an equitable action to enjoin unconstitutional official conduct, or under the judicial review provisions of the [APA]”); Navajo Nation v. Dep’t of the Interior, 876 F.3d 1144, 1172 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding “that the second sentence of § 702 waives sovereign immunity broadly for all causes of action that meet its terms, while § 704’s ‘final agency action’ limitation applies only to APA claims”).

Because denying “any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim” presents a “serious constitutional question,” Congress’s intent through a statute to do so must be clear. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (quoting Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12 (1986)); see also Allen v. Milas, 896 F.3d 1094, 1108 (9th Cir. 2018) (“After Webster, we have assumed that the courts will be open to review of constitutional claims, even if they are closed to other claims.”).

Nothing in the APA evinces such an intent.

Whatever the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims, they may proceed independently of the review procedures mandated by the APA. See Sierra Club, 929 F.3d at 698–99 (“Any constitutional challenge that Plaintiffs may advance under the APA would exist regardless of whether they could also assert an APA claim . . . .
(C)laims challenging agency actions — particularly constitutional claims — may exist wholly apart from the APA.”); Navajo Nation, 876 F.3d at 1170 (explaining that certain constitutional challenges to agency action are “not grounded in the APA”).

B. The government also argues that the plaintiffs lack Article III standing to pursue their constitutional claims.

To have standing under Article III, a plaintiff must have (1) a concrete and particularized injury that (2) is caused by the challenged conduct and (3) is likely redressable by a favorable judicial decision. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000); Jewel v. NSA, 673 F.3d 902, 908 (9th Cir. 2011).

A plaintiff need only establish a genuine dispute as to these requirements to survive summary judgment. See Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 947 (9th Cir. 2002).

1. The district court correctly found the injury requirement met.

At least some plaintiffs claim concrete and particularized injuries.

Jaime B., for example, claims that she was forced to leave her home because of water scarcity, separating her from relatives on the Navajo Reservation. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2416 (2018) (finding separation from relatives to be a concrete injury).

Levi D. had to evacuate his coastal home multiple times because of flooding. See Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1070– 71 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding diminution in home property value to be a concrete injury).

These injuries are not simply “‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical;’” at least some of the plaintiffs have presented evidence that climate change is affecting them now in concrete ways and will continue to do so unless checked. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)); cf. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 563 F.3d 466, 478 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (finding no standing because plaintiffs could “only aver that any significant adverse effects of climate change ‘may’ occur at some point in the future”).

The government argues that the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries are not particularized because climate change affects everyone.

But, “it does not matter how many persons have been injured” if the plaintiffs’ injuries are “concrete and personal.” Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring)); see also Novak v. United States, 795 F.3d 1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 2015) (“(T)he fact that a harm is widely shared does not necessarily render it a generalized grievance.”) (alteration in original) (quoting Jewel, 673 F.3d at 909).

And, the Article III injury requirement is met if only one plaintiff has suffered concrete harm. See Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2416; Town of Chester, N.Y. v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 (2017) (“At least one plaintiff must have standing to seek each form of relief requested in the complaint. . . . For all relief sought, there must be a litigant with standing.”).

2. The district court also correctly found the Article III causation requirement satisfied for purposes of summary judgment.

Causation can be established “even if there are multiple links in the chain,” Mendia v. Garcia, 768 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014), as long as the chain is not “hypothetical or tenuous,” Maya, 658 F.3d at 1070 (quoting Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, Inc. v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 849 (9th Cir. 2002), amended on denial of reh’g, 312 F.3d 416 (9th Cir. 2002)).

The causal chain here is sufficiently established.

4 The programs and policies identified by the plaintiffs include: (1) the Bureau of Land Management’s authorization of leases for 107 coal tracts and 95,000 oil and gas wells; (2) the Export-Import Bank’s provision of $14.8 billion for overseas petroleum projects; (3) the Department of Energy’s approval of over 2 million barrels of crude oil imports; (4) the Department of Agriculture’s approval of timber cutting on federal land; (5) the undervaluing of royalty rates for federal leasing; (6) tax subsidies for purchasing fuel-inefficient sport-utility vehicles; (7) the “intangible drilling costs” and “percentage depletion allowance” tax code provisions, 26 U.S.C. §§ 263(c), 613; and (8) the government’s use of fossil fuels to power its own buildings and vehicles.

5 The government relies upon Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 328–29 (2015), and Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74–76 (1996), both of which held that statutory remedial schemes implicitly barred freestanding equitable claims. Neither case, however, involved claims by the plaintiffs that the federal government was violating their constitutional rights. See Armstrong, 575 U.S. at 323–24 (claiming that state officials had violated a federal statute); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 51–52 (same).

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The plaintiffs’ alleged injuries are caused by carbon emissions from fossil fuel production, extraction, and transportation.

A significant portion of those emissions occur in this country; the United States accounted for over 25% of worldwide emissions from 1850 to 2012, and currently accounts for about 15%. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 524–25 (finding that emissions amounting to about 6% of the worldwide total showed cause of alleged injury “by any standard”).

And, the plaintiffs’ evidence shows that federal subsidies and leases have increased those emissions.

About 25% of fossil fuels extracted in the United States come from federal waters and lands, an activity that requires authorization from the federal government. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 181–196 (establishing legal framework governing the disposition of fossil fuels on federal land), § 201 (authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to lease land for coal mining).

Relying on Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1141–46 (9th Cir. 2013), the government argues that the causal chain is too attenuated because it depends in part on the independent actions of third parties.

Bellon held that the causal chain between local agencies’ failure to regulate five oil refineries and the plaintiffs’ climate-change related injuries was “too tenuous to support standing” because the refineries had a “scientifically indiscernible” impact on climate change. Id. at 1143–44.

But the plaintiffs here do not contend that their injuries were caused by a few isolated agency decisions.

Rather, they blame a host of federal policies, from subsidies to drilling permits, spanning “over 50 years,” and direct actions by the government.

There is at least a genuine factual dispute as to whether those policies were a “substantial factor” in causing the plaintiffs’ injuries. Mendia, 768 F.3d at 1013 (quoting Tozzi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 271 F.3d 301, 308 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).

3. The more difficult question is whether the plaintiffs’ claimed injuries are redressable by an Article III court.

In analyzing that question, we start by stressing what the plaintiffs do and do not assert.

They do not claim that the government has violated a statute or a regulation.

They do not assert the denial of a procedural right.

Nor do they seek damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq.

Rather, their sole claim is that the government has deprived them of a substantive constitutional right to a “climate system capable of sustaining human life,” and they seek remedial declaratory and injunctive relief.

Reasonable jurists can disagree about whether the asserted constitutional right exists. Compare Clean Air Council v. United States, 362 F. Supp. 3d 237, 250–53 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (finding no constitutional right), with Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1248–50; see also In re United States, 139 S. Ct. at 453 (reiterating “that the ‘striking’ breadth of plaintiffs’ below claims ‘presents substantial grounds for difference of opinion’”).

In analyzing redressability, however, we assume its existence. See M.S. v. Brown, 902 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2018).

But that merely begins our analysis, because “not all meritorious legal claims are redressable in federal court.” Id.

To establish Article III redressability, the plaintiffs must show that the relief they seek is both (1) substantially likely to redress their injuries; and (2) within the district court’s power to award. Id.

Redress need not be guaranteed, but it must be more than “merely speculative.” Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561).

The plaintiffs first seek a declaration that the government is violating the Constitution.

But that relief alone is not substantially likely to mitigate the plaintiffs’ asserted concrete injuries.

A declaration, although undoubtedly likely to benefit the plaintiffs psychologically, is unlikely by itself to remediate their alleged injuries absent further court action. See Clean Air Council, 362 F. Supp. 3d at 246, 249; Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998) (“By the mere bringing of his suit, every plaintiff demonstrates his belief that a favorable judgment will make him happier. But although a suitor may derive great comfort and joy from the fact that the United States Treasury is not cheated, that a wrongdoer gets his just deserts, or that the Nation’s laws are faithfully enforced, that psychic satisfaction is not an acceptable Article III remedy because it does not redress a cognizable Article III injury.”); see also Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 185 (“(A) plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought.”).

The crux of the plaintiffs’ requested remedy is an injunction requiring the government not only to cease permitting, authorizing, and subsidizing fossil fuel use, but also to prepare a plan subject to judicial approval to draw down harmful emissions.

The plaintiffs thus seek not only to enjoin the Executive from exercising discretionary authority expressly granted by Congress, see, e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 201 (authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to lease land for coal mining), but also to enjoin Congress from exercising power expressly granted by the Constitution over public lands, see U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.”).

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As an initial matter, we note that although the plaintiffs contended at oral argument that they challenge only affirmative activities by the government, an order simply enjoining those activities will not, according to their own experts’ opinions, suffice to stop catastrophic climate change or even ameliorate their injuries.

The plaintiffs’ experts opine that the federal government’s leases and subsidies have contributed to global carbon emissions.

But they do not show that even the total elimination of the challenged programs would halt the growth of carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere, let alone decrease that growth.

Nor does any expert contend that elimination of the challenged pro-carbon fuels programs would by itself prevent further injury to the plaintiffs.

Rather, the record shows that many of the emissions causing climate change happened decades ago or come from foreign and non-governmental sources.

Indeed, the plaintiffs’ experts make plain that reducing the global consequences of climate change demands much more than cessation of the government’s promotion of fossil fuels.

Rather, these experts opine that such a result calls for no less than a fundamental transformation of this country’s energy system, if not that of the industrialized world.

One expert opines that atmospheric carbon reductions must come “largely via reforestation,” and include rapid and immediate decreases in emissions from many sources.

“(L)eisurely reductions of one of two percent per year,” he explains, “will not suffice.”

Another expert has opined that although the required emissions reductions are “technically feasible,” they can be achieved only through a comprehensive plan for “nearly complete decarbonization” that includes both an “unprecedently rapid build out” of renewable energy and a “sustained commitment to infrastructure transformation over decades.”

And, that commitment, another expert emphasizes, must include everything from energy efficient lighting to improved public transportation to hydrogen-powered aircraft.

The plaintiffs concede that their requested relief will not alone solve global climate change, but they assert that their “injuries would be to some extent ameliorated.”

Relying on Massachusetts v. EPA, the district court apparently found the redressability requirement satisfied because the requested relief would likely slow or reduce emissions. See 549 U.S. at 525–26.

That case, however, involved a procedural right that the State of Massachusetts was allowed to assert “without meeting all the normal standards for redressability;” in that context, the Court found redressability because “there [was] some possibility that the requested relief [would] prompt the injury-causing party to reconsider the decision that allegedly harmed the litigant.” Id. at 517–18, 525–26 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7).

The plaintiffs here do not assert a procedural right, but rather a substantive due process claim.

We are therefore skeptical that the first redressability prong is satisfied.

But even assuming that it is, the plaintiffs do not surmount the remaining hurdle — establishing that the specific relief they seek is within the power of an Article III court.

There is much to recommend the adoption of a comprehensive scheme to decrease fossil fuel emissions and combat climate change, both as a policy matter in general and a matter of national survival in particular.

But it is beyond the power of an Article III court to order, design, supervise, or implement the plaintiffs’ requested remedial plan.

As the opinions of their experts make plain, any effective plan would necessarily require a host of complex policy decisions entrusted, for better or worse, to the wisdom and discretion of the executive and legislative branches. See Brown, 902 F.3d at 1086 (finding the plaintiff’s requested declaration requiring the government to issue driver cards “incompatible with democratic principles embedded in the structure of the Constitution”).

These decisions range, for example, from determining how much to invest in public transit to how quickly to transition to renewable energy, and plainly require consideration of “competing social, political, and economic forces,” which must be made by the People’s “elected representatives, rather than by federal judges interpreting the basic charter of Government for the entire country.” Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128–29 (1992); see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559–60 (“(S)eparation of powers depends largely upon common understanding of what activities are appropriate to legislatures, to executives, and to courts.”).

6 The operative complaint, however, also seems to challenge the government’s inaction.

7 The dissent reads Massachusetts to hold that “a perceptible reduction in the advance of climate change is sufficient to redress a plaintiff’s climate change-induced harms.” Diss. at 47. But Massachusetts “permitted a State to challenge EPA’s refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions,” Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 420 (2011), finding that as a sovereign it was “entitled to special solicitude in [the] standing analysis,” Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2664 n.10 (2015) (quoting Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520). Here, in contrast, the plaintiffs are not sovereigns, and a substantive right, not a procedural one, is at issue. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 517–21, 525–26; see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7 (“There is this much truth to the assertion that ‘procedural rights’ are special: The person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy.”).

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The plaintiffs argue that the district court need not itself make policy decisions, because if their general request for a remedial plan is granted, the political branches can decide what policies will best “phase out fossil fuel emissions and draw down excess atmospheric CO2.”

To be sure, in some circumstances, courts may order broad injunctive relief while leaving the “details of implementation” to the government’s discretion. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 537–38 (2011).

But, even under such a scenario, the plaintiffs’ request for a remedial plan would subsequently require the judiciary to pass judgment on the sufficiency of the government’s response to the order, which necessarily would entail a broad range of policymaking.

And inevitably, this kind of plan will demand action not only by the Executive, but also by Congress.

Absent court intervention, the political branches might conclude — however inappropriately in the plaintiffs’ view — that economic or defense considerations called for continuation of the very programs challenged in this suit, or a less robust approach to addressing climate change than the plaintiffs believe is necessary.

“But we cannot substitute our own assessment for the Executive’s [or Legislature’s] predictive judgments on such matters, all of which ‘are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy.’” Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2421 (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)).

And, given the complexity and long-lasting nature of global climate change, the court would be required to supervise the government’s compliance with any suggested plan for many decades. See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 966 F.2d 1292, 1300 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Injunctive relief could involve extraordinary supervision by this court. . . . [and] may be inappropriate where it requires constant supervision.”).

As the Supreme Court recently explained, “a constitutional directive or legal standards” must guide the courts’ exercise of equitable power. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2508 (2019).

Rucho found partisan gerrymandering claims presented political questions beyond the reach of Article III courts. Id. at 2506–07.

The Court did not deny extreme partisan gerrymandering can violate the Constitution. See id. at 2506; id. at 2514–15 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

But, it concluded that there was no “limited and precise” standard discernible in the Constitution for redressing the asserted violation. Id. at 2500.

The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ proposed standard because unlike the one-person, one-vote rule in vote dilution cases, it was not “relatively easy to administer as a matter of math.” Id. at 2501.

Rucho reaffirmed that redressability questions implicate the separation of powers, noting that federal courts “have no commission to allocate political power and influence” without standards to guide in the exercise of such authority. See id. at 2506–07, 2508.

Absent those standards, federal judicial power could be “unlimited in scope and duration,” and would inject “the unelected and politically unaccountable branch of the Federal Government [into] assuming such an extraordinary and unprecedented role.” Id. at 2507; see also Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 125 (2014) (noting the “separation-of-powers principles underlying” standing doctrine); Brown, 902 F.3d at 1087 (stating that “in the context of Article III standing, . . . federal courts must respect their ‘proper — and properly limited — role . . . in a democratic society’” (quoting Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1929 (2018)).

Because “it is axiomatic that ‘the Constitution contemplates that democracy is the appropriate process for change,’” Brown, 902 F.3d at 1087 (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015)), some questions — even those existential in nature — are the province of the political branches.

The Court found in Rucho that a proposed standard involving a mathematical comparison to a baseline election map is too difficult for the judiciary to manage. See 139 S. Ct. at 2500–02.

It is impossible to reach a different conclusion here.

The plaintiffs’ experts opine that atmospheric carbon levels of 350 parts per million are necessary to stabilize the global climate.

But, even accepting those opinions as valid, they do not suggest how an order from this Court can achieve that level, other than by ordering the government to develop a plan.

Although the plaintiffs’ invitation to get the ball rolling by simply ordering the promulgation of a plan is beguiling, it ignores that an Article III court will thereafter be required to determine whether the plan is sufficient to remediate the claimed constitutional violation of the plaintiffs’ right to a “climate system capable of sustaining human life.”

We doubt that any such plan can be supervised or enforced by an Article III court.

And, in the end, any plan is only as good as the court’s power to enforce it.

C. Our dissenting colleague quite correctly notes the gravity of the plaintiffs’ evidence; we differ only as to whether an Article III court can provide their requested redress.

In suggesting that we can, the dissent reframes the plaintiffs’ claimed constitutional right variously as an entitlement to “the country’s perpetuity,” Diss. at 35–37, 39, or as one to freedom from “the amount of fossil-fuel emissions that will irreparably devastate our Nation,” id. at 57.

But if such broad constitutional rights exist, we doubt that the plaintiffs would have Article III standing to enforce them.

Their alleged individual injuries do not flow from a violation of these claimed rights.

Indeed, any injury from the dissolution of the Republic would be felt by all citizens equally, and thus would not constitute the kind of discrete and particularized injury necessary for Article III standing. See Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180-81.

8 However belatedly, the political branches are currently debating such action. Many resolutions and plans have been introduced in Congress, ranging from discrete measures to encourage clean energy innovation to the “Green New Deal” and comprehensive proposals for taxing carbon and transitioning all sectors of the economy away from fossil fuels. See, e.g., H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong. (2019); S.J. Res. 8, 116th Cong. (2019); Enhancing Fossil Fuel Energy Carbon Technology Act, S. 1201, 116th Cong. (2019); Climate Action Now Act, H.R. 9, 116th Cong. (2019); Methane Waste Prevention Act, H.R. 2711, 116th Cong. (2019); Clean Energy Standard Act, S. 1359, 116th Cong. (2019); National Climate Bank Act, S. 2057, 116th Cong. (2019); Carbon Pollution Transparency Act, S. 1745, 116th Cong. (2019); Leading Infrastructure for Tomorrow’s America Act, H.R. 2741, 116th Cong. (2019); Buy Clean Transparency Act, S. 1864, 116th Cong. (2019); Carbon Capture Modernization Act, H.R. 1796, 116th Cong. (2019); Challenges & Prizes for Climate Act, H.R. 3100, 116th Cong. (2019); Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Act, H.R. 763, 116th Cong. (2019); Climate Risk Disclosure Act, S. 2075, 116th Cong. (2019); Clean Energy for America Act, S. 1288, 116th Cong. (2019). The proposed legislation, consistent with the opinions of the plaintiffs’ experts, envisions that tackling this global problem involves the exercise of discretion, trade-offs, international cooperation, private-sector partnerships, and other value judgments ill-suited for an Article III court.

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A suit for a violation of these reframed rights, like one for a violation of the Guarantee Clause, would also plainly be nonjusticiable. See, e.g., Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506 (“This Court has several times concluded, however, that the Guarantee Clause does not provide the basis for a justiciable claim.”) (citing Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 149 (1912)); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 36–37, 39 (1849).

More importantly, the dissent offers no metrics for judicial determination of the level of climate change that would cause “the willful dissolution of the Republic,” Diss. at 40, nor for measuring a constitutionally acceptable “perceptible reduction in the advance of climate change,” id. at 47.

Contrary to the dissent, we cannot find Article III redressability requirements satisfied simply because a court order might “postpone[] the day when remedial measures become insufficiently effective.” Id. at 46; see Brown, 902 F.3d at 1083 (“If, however, a favorable judicial decision would not require the defendant to redress the plaintiff’s claimed injury, the plaintiff cannot demonstrate redressability[.]”).

Indeed, as the dissent recognizes, a guarantee against government conduct that might threaten the Union — whether from political gerrymandering, nuclear proliferation, Executive misconduct, or climate change — has traditionally been viewed by Article III courts as “not separately enforceable.” Id. at 39.

Nor has the Supreme Court recognized “the perpetuity principle” as a basis for interjecting the judicial branch into the policy-making purview of the political branches. See id. at 42.

Contrary to the dissent, we do not “throw up [our] hands” by concluding that the plaintiffs’ claims are nonjusticiable. Id. at 33.

Rather, we recognize that “Article III protects liberty not only through its role in implementing the separation of powers, but also by specifying the defining characteristics of Article III judges.” Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 483 (2011).

Not every problem posing a threat — even a clear and present danger — to the American Experiment can be solved by federal judges.

As Judge Cardozo once aptly warned, a judicial commission does not confer the power of “a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness;” rather, we are bound “to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system.’” Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 141 (1921).

The dissent correctly notes that the political branches of government have to date been largely deaf to the pleas of the plaintiffs and other similarly situated individuals.

But, although inaction by the Executive and Congress may affect the form of judicial relief ordered when there is Article III standing, it cannot bring otherwise nonjusticiable claims within the province of federal courts. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507–08; Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1929 (“‘Failure of political will does not justify unconstitutional remedies.’ . . . Our power as judges . . . rests not on the default of politically accountable officers, but is instead grounded in and limited by the necessity of resolving, according to legal principles, a plaintiff’s particular claim of legal right.” (quoting Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 449 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring))); Brown, 902 F.3d at 1087 (“The absence of a law, however, has never been held to constitute a ‘substantive result’ subject to judicial review[.]”).

The plaintiffs have made a compelling case that action is needed; it will be increasingly difficult in light of that record for the political branches to deny that climate change is occurring, that the government has had a role in causing it, and that our elected officials have a moral responsibility to seek solutions.

We do not dispute that the broad judicial relief the plaintiffs seek could well goad the political branches into action. Diss. at 45–46, 49–50, 57–61.

We reluctantly conclude, however, that the plaintiffs’ case must be made to the political branches or to the electorate at large, the latter of which can change the composition of the political branches through the ballot box.

That the other branches may have abdicated their responsibility to remediate the problem does not confer on Article III courts, no matter how well-intentioned, the ability to step into their shoes.

III. For the reasons above, we reverse the certified orders of the district court and remand this case to the district court with instructions to dismiss for lack of Article III standing.

REVERSED.

9 Contrary to the dissent, we do not find this to be a political question, although that doctrine’s factors often overlap with redressability concerns. Diss. at 51–61; Republic of Marshall Islands v. United States, 865 F.3d 1187, 1192 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Whether examined under the . . . the redressability prong of standing, or the political question doctrine, the analysis stems from the same separation-of-powers principle — enforcement of this treaty provision is not committed to the judicial branch. Although these are distinct doctrines . . . there is significant overlap.”).

10 The plaintiffs’ motion for an injunction pending appeal, Dkt. 21, is DENIED. Their motions for judicial notice, Dkts. 134, 149, are GRANTED.

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STATON, District Judge, dissenting:

In these proceedings, the government accepts as fact that the United States has reached a tipping point crying out for a concerted response — yet presses ahead toward calamity.

It is as if an asteroid were barreling toward Earth and the government decided to shut down our only defenses.

Seeking to quash this suit, the government bluntly insists that it has the absolute and unreviewable power to destroy the Nation.

My colleagues throw up their hands, concluding that this case presents nothing fit for the Judiciary.

On a fundamental point, we agree: No case can singlehandedly prevent the catastrophic effects of climate change predicted by the government and scientists.

But a federal court need not manage all of the delicate foreign relations and regulatory minutiae implicated by climate change to offer real relief, and the mere fact that this suit cannot alone halt climate change does not mean that it presents no claim suitable for judicial resolution.

Plaintiffs bring suit to enforce the most basic structural principle embedded in our system of ordered liberty: that the Constitution does not condone the Nation’s willful destruction.

So viewed, plaintiffs’ claims adhere to a judicially administrable standard.

And considering plaintiffs seek no less than to forestall the Nation’s demise, even a partial and temporary reprieve would constitute meaningful redress.

Such relief, much like the desegregation orders and statewide prison injunctions the Supreme Court has sanctioned, would vindicate plaintiffs’ constitutional rights without exceeding the Judiciary’s province.

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

I. As the majority recognizes, and the government does not contest, carbon dioxide (“CO2”) and other greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions created by burning fossil fuels are devastating the planet. Maj. Op. at 14–15.

According to one of plaintiffs’ experts, the inevitable result, absent immediate action, is “an inhospitable future . . . marked by rising seas, coastal city functionality loss, mass migrations, resource wars, food shortages, heat waves, mega-storms, soil depletion and desiccation, freshwater shortage, public health system collapse, and the extinction of increasing numbers of species.”

Even government scientists project that, given current warming trends, sea levels will rise two feet by 2050, nearly four feet by 2070, over eight feet by 2100, 18 feet by 2150, and over 31 feet by 2200.

To put that in perspective, a three-foot sea level rise will make two million American homes uninhabitable; a rise of approximately 20 feet will result in the total loss of Miami, New Orleans, and other coastal cities.

So, as described by plaintiffs’ experts, the injuries experienced by plaintiffs are the first small wave in an oncoming tsunami — now visible on the horizon of the not-so-distant future — that will destroy the United States as we currently know it.

What sets this harm apart from all others is not just its magnitude, but its irreversibility.

The devastation might look and feel somewhat different if future generations could simply pick up the pieces and restore the Nation.

But plaintiffs’ experts speak of a certain level of global warming as “locking in” this catastrophic damage.

Put more starkly by plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Harold R. Wanless,
“(a)tmospheric warming will continue for some 30 years after we stop putting more greenhouse gasses into the atmosphere."

"But that warmed atmosphere will continue warming the ocean for centuries, and the accumulating heat in the oceans will persist for millennia” (emphasis added).

Indeed, another of plaintiffs’ experts echoes, “(t)he fact that GHGs dissipate very slowly from the atmosphere . . . and that the costs of taking CO2 out of the atmosphere through non-biological carbon capture and storage are very high means that the consequences of GHG emissions should be viewed as effectively irreversible” (emphasis added).

In other words, “(g)iven the self-reinforcing nature of climate change,” the tipping point may well have arrived, and we may be rapidly approaching the point of no return.

Despite countless studies over the last half century warning of the catastrophic consequences of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, many of which the government conducted, the government not only failed to act but also “affirmatively promote(d) fossil fuel use in a host of ways.” Maj. Op. at 15.

According to plaintiffs’ evidence, our nation is crumbling — at our government’s own hand — into a wasteland.

In short, the government has directly facilitated an existential crisis to the country’s perpetuity.

II. In tossing this suit for want of standing, the majority concedes that the children and young adults who brought suit have presented enough to proceed to trial on the first two aspects of the inquiry (injury in fact and traceability).

But the majority provides two-and-a-half reasons for concluding that plaintiffs’ injuries are not redressable.

After detailing its “skeptic[ism]” that the relief sought could “suffice to stop catastrophic climate change or even ameliorate [plaintiffs’] injuries[,]” Maj. Op. at 23–25, the majority concludes that, at any rate, a court would lack any power to award it.

In the majority’s view, the relief sought is too great and unsusceptible to a judicially administrable standard.

To explain why I disagree, I first step back to define the interest at issue.

While standing operates as a threshold issue distinct from the merits of the claim, “it often turns on the nature and source of the claim asserted.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).

And, unlike the majority, I believe the government has more than just a nebulous “moral responsibility” to preserve the Nation. Maj. Op. at 31–32.

1 I agree with the majority that plaintiffs need not bring their claims under the APA. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 801 (1992); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603–04 (1988).

2 NOAA, Technical Rep. NOS CO-OPS 083, Global and Regional Sea Level Rise Scenarios for the United States 23 (Jan. 2017).

3 My asteroid analogy would therefore be more accurate if I posited a scenario in which the government itself accelerated the asteroid towards the earth before shutting down our defenses.

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