Fabius II, continued ...
by John Dickinson
May 15, 1788
Allowing such an increase of population as, from experience and a variety of causes, may be expected, the representatives, in a short period, will amount to several hundreds, and most probably long before any change of manners for the worse, that might tempt or encourage our rulers to mal-administration, will take place on this continent.
That this house may always be kept full, without the interference of Congress, it is provided in the system, that when vacancies happen in any state, the executive authority thereof shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies.
But, it seems, the number of the federal officers is not only too small.
They are to hold their offices too long.
This objection surely applies not to the house of representatives, who are to be chosen every two years, especially if the extent of empire, and the vast variety and importance of their deliberations, be considered.
In that view, they and the senate will actually be not only legislative but also diplomatic bodies, perpetually engaged in the arduous task of reconciling, in their determinations, the interests of several sovereign states, not to insist on the necessity of a competent knowledge of foreign affairs, relative to the states.
They who desire the representatives to be chosen every year, should exceed Newton in calculations, if they attempt to evince, that the public business would, in that case, be better transacted, than when they are chosen every two years.
The idea, however, should be excused for the zeal that prompted it.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Fabius II, continued ...
by John Dickinson
May 15, 1788
Is monarchy or aristocracy to be produced, without the consent of the people, by a house of representatives, thus constituted?
It has been unanimously agreed by the friends of liberty, that FREQUENT ELECTIONS OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE, ARE THE MOST SOVEREIGN REMEDY OF ALL GRIEVANCES IN A FREE GOVERNMENT.
Let us pass on to the senate.
At the end of two years after the first election, one third is to be elected for six years.
Of the remaining thirds, one will constantly have but four years, and the other but two years to continue in office.
The whole number at first will amount but to twenty-six, must ever continue very small, will be regularly renovated by the biennial election of one third, and will be overlooked, and overawed by the house of representatives, nearly three times more numerous at the beginning, rapidly and vastly augmenting, and more enabled to overlook & overawe them, by holding their offices for two years, as thereby they will acquire better information, respecting national affairs.
These representatives will also command the public purse, as all bills for raising revenue, must originate in their house.
As in the Roman armies, when the Principes and Hastati had failed, there were still the Triarii, who generally put things to rights, so we shall be supplied with another resource.
We are to have a president, to superintend, and if he thinks the public weal requires it, to controul any act of the representatives and senate.
This president is to be chosen, not by the people at large, because it may not be possible, that all the freemen of the empire should always have the necessary information, for directing their choice of such an officer; nor by Congress, lest it should disturb the national councils; nor BY ANY ONE BODY WHATEVER, for fear of undue influence.
He is to be chosen in the following manner.
Each state shall appoint, as the legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors, equal to the whole number of senators and representatives, to which the state shall be entitled in Congress: but no senator or representative, or person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States, shall be appointed an elector.
As these electors are to be appointed, as the legislature of each state may direct, of course they will be appointed by the people of the state, if such be the pleasure of the people.
Thus, the fairest, freest opening is given, for each state to chuse such electors for this purpose, as shall be most signally qualified to fulfil the trust.
To guard against undue influence these electors, thus chosen, are to meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot; and still further to guard against it, Congress may determine the time of chusing the electors, and the day on which they shall give their votes — WHICH DAY SHALL BE THE SAME THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES.
All the votes from the several states are to be transmitted to Congress, and therein counted.
The president is to hold his office for four years.
When these electors meet in their respective states, utterly vain will be the unreasonable suggestions derived from partiality.
The electors may throw away their votes, mark, with public disappointment, some person improperly favoured by them, or justly revering the duties of their office, dedicate their votes to the best interests of their country.
This president will be no dictator - two thirds of the representatives and the senate may pass any law, notwithstanding his dissent; and he is re-movable and punishable for misbehavior.
Can the limitted, fluctuating senate, placed amidst such powers, if it should become willing, ever become able, to make America pass under its yoke?
The senators will generally be inhabitants of places very distant one from another.
They can scarcely be acquainted till they meet.
Few of them can ever act together for any length of time, unless their good conduct recommends them to a re-election; and then there will be frequent changes in a body dependent upon the choice of other bodies, the legislatures of the several states, that are altering every year.
Machiavel and Caesar Borgia together could not form a conspiracy in such a senate, dangerous to any but themselves and their accomplices.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by John Dickinson
May 15, 1788
Is monarchy or aristocracy to be produced, without the consent of the people, by a house of representatives, thus constituted?
It has been unanimously agreed by the friends of liberty, that FREQUENT ELECTIONS OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE, ARE THE MOST SOVEREIGN REMEDY OF ALL GRIEVANCES IN A FREE GOVERNMENT.
Let us pass on to the senate.
At the end of two years after the first election, one third is to be elected for six years.
Of the remaining thirds, one will constantly have but four years, and the other but two years to continue in office.
The whole number at first will amount but to twenty-six, must ever continue very small, will be regularly renovated by the biennial election of one third, and will be overlooked, and overawed by the house of representatives, nearly three times more numerous at the beginning, rapidly and vastly augmenting, and more enabled to overlook & overawe them, by holding their offices for two years, as thereby they will acquire better information, respecting national affairs.
These representatives will also command the public purse, as all bills for raising revenue, must originate in their house.
As in the Roman armies, when the Principes and Hastati had failed, there were still the Triarii, who generally put things to rights, so we shall be supplied with another resource.
We are to have a president, to superintend, and if he thinks the public weal requires it, to controul any act of the representatives and senate.
This president is to be chosen, not by the people at large, because it may not be possible, that all the freemen of the empire should always have the necessary information, for directing their choice of such an officer; nor by Congress, lest it should disturb the national councils; nor BY ANY ONE BODY WHATEVER, for fear of undue influence.
He is to be chosen in the following manner.
Each state shall appoint, as the legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors, equal to the whole number of senators and representatives, to which the state shall be entitled in Congress: but no senator or representative, or person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States, shall be appointed an elector.
As these electors are to be appointed, as the legislature of each state may direct, of course they will be appointed by the people of the state, if such be the pleasure of the people.
Thus, the fairest, freest opening is given, for each state to chuse such electors for this purpose, as shall be most signally qualified to fulfil the trust.
To guard against undue influence these electors, thus chosen, are to meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot; and still further to guard against it, Congress may determine the time of chusing the electors, and the day on which they shall give their votes — WHICH DAY SHALL BE THE SAME THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES.
All the votes from the several states are to be transmitted to Congress, and therein counted.
The president is to hold his office for four years.
When these electors meet in their respective states, utterly vain will be the unreasonable suggestions derived from partiality.
The electors may throw away their votes, mark, with public disappointment, some person improperly favoured by them, or justly revering the duties of their office, dedicate their votes to the best interests of their country.
This president will be no dictator - two thirds of the representatives and the senate may pass any law, notwithstanding his dissent; and he is re-movable and punishable for misbehavior.
Can the limitted, fluctuating senate, placed amidst such powers, if it should become willing, ever become able, to make America pass under its yoke?
The senators will generally be inhabitants of places very distant one from another.
They can scarcely be acquainted till they meet.
Few of them can ever act together for any length of time, unless their good conduct recommends them to a re-election; and then there will be frequent changes in a body dependent upon the choice of other bodies, the legislatures of the several states, that are altering every year.
Machiavel and Caesar Borgia together could not form a conspiracy in such a senate, dangerous to any but themselves and their accomplices.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Fabius II, concluded ...
by John Dickinson
May 15, 1788
It is essential to every good government, that there should be some council, permanent enough to get a due knowledge of affairs internal and external; so constituted, that by some deaths or removals, the current of information should not be impeded or disturbed; and so regulated, as to be responsible to, and controulable by the people.
Where can the authority for combining these advantages, be more safely, beneficially or satisfactorily, lodged, than in the senate, to be formed according to the plan proposed?
Shall parts of the trust be committed to the president, with counselors who shall subscribe their advices?
If assaults upon liberty are to be guarded against, and surely they ought to be with sleepless vigilance, why should we depend more on the commander in chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, and on his counsellors, whom he may secretly influence, than on the senate to be appointed by the persons exercising, the sovereign authority of the several states?
In truth, the objections against the powers of the senate originated from a desire to have them, or at least some of them, vested in a body, in which the several states should be represented, in proportion to the number of inhabitants, as in the house of representatives.
This method is UNATTAINABLE, and the wish for it should be dismissed from every mind, that desires the existence of a confederation.
What assurance can be given, or what probability be assigned, that a board of councillors would continue honest, longer than the senate?
Or, that they would possess more useful information, respecting all the states, then the senators of all the states?
It appears needless to pursue this argument any further.
How varied, ballanced, concordant, and benign, is the system proposed to us?
To secure the freedom, and promote the happiness of these and future states, by giving THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE a decisive influence over the whole, and over all the parts, with what a comprehensive arrangement does it embrace different modes of representation, from an election by a county to an election by an empire?
What are the complicated ballot, and all the refined devices of Venice for maintaining her aristocracy, when compared with this plain dealing work for diffusing the blessings of equal liberty and common prosperity over myriads of the human race?
All the foundations before mentioned, of the federal government, are by the proposed system to be established, in the most clear, strong, positive, unequivocal expressions, of which our language is capable.
Magna charta, or any other law, never contained clauses more decisive and emphatic.
While the people of these states have sense, they will understand them; and while they have spirit, they will make them to be observed.
by John Dickinson
May 15, 1788
It is essential to every good government, that there should be some council, permanent enough to get a due knowledge of affairs internal and external; so constituted, that by some deaths or removals, the current of information should not be impeded or disturbed; and so regulated, as to be responsible to, and controulable by the people.
Where can the authority for combining these advantages, be more safely, beneficially or satisfactorily, lodged, than in the senate, to be formed according to the plan proposed?
Shall parts of the trust be committed to the president, with counselors who shall subscribe their advices?
If assaults upon liberty are to be guarded against, and surely they ought to be with sleepless vigilance, why should we depend more on the commander in chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, and on his counsellors, whom he may secretly influence, than on the senate to be appointed by the persons exercising, the sovereign authority of the several states?
In truth, the objections against the powers of the senate originated from a desire to have them, or at least some of them, vested in a body, in which the several states should be represented, in proportion to the number of inhabitants, as in the house of representatives.
This method is UNATTAINABLE, and the wish for it should be dismissed from every mind, that desires the existence of a confederation.
What assurance can be given, or what probability be assigned, that a board of councillors would continue honest, longer than the senate?
Or, that they would possess more useful information, respecting all the states, then the senators of all the states?
It appears needless to pursue this argument any further.
How varied, ballanced, concordant, and benign, is the system proposed to us?
To secure the freedom, and promote the happiness of these and future states, by giving THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE a decisive influence over the whole, and over all the parts, with what a comprehensive arrangement does it embrace different modes of representation, from an election by a county to an election by an empire?
What are the complicated ballot, and all the refined devices of Venice for maintaining her aristocracy, when compared with this plain dealing work for diffusing the blessings of equal liberty and common prosperity over myriads of the human race?
All the foundations before mentioned, of the federal government, are by the proposed system to be established, in the most clear, strong, positive, unequivocal expressions, of which our language is capable.
Magna charta, or any other law, never contained clauses more decisive and emphatic.
While the people of these states have sense, they will understand them; and while they have spirit, they will make them to be observed.
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Reasons for Dissent
by Consider Arms, Malachi Maynard & Samuel Field
May 16, 1788
Mr. PRINTER, We the Subscribers being of the number, who did not assent to the ratification of the Federal Constitution, under consideration in the late State Convention, held at Boston, to which we were called by the suffrages of the corporations to which we respectively belong - beg leave, through the channel of your paper, to lay before the public in general, and our constituents in particular, the reasons of our dissent, and the principles which governed us in our decision of this important question.
Fully convinced, ever since the late revolution, of the necessity of a firm, energetic government, we should have rejoiced in an opportunity to have given our assent to such an one; and should in the present case, most cordially have done it, could we at the same time [have] been happy to have seen the liberties of the people and the rights of mankind properly guarded and secured.
We conceive that the very notion of government carries along with it the idea of justice and equity, and that the whole design of instituting government in the world, was to preserve men’s properties from rapine, and their bodies from violence and bloodshed.
These propositions being established, we conceive must of necessity produce the following consequence, viz.
That every constitution or system, which does not quadrate with this original design, is not government, but in fact a subversion of it.
Having premised thus much, we proceed to mention some things in this constitution, to which we object, and to enter into an enquiry, whether, and how far they coincide with those simple and original notions of government beforementioned.
In the first place - as direct taxes are to be apportioned according to the numbers in each state, and as Massachusetts has none in it but what are declared freemen, so the whole, blacks as well as whites, must be numbered; this must therefore operate against us, as two fifths of the slaves in the southern states are to be left out of the numeration; consequently, three Massachusetts infants will increase the tax equal to five sturdy, full grown negroes of theirs, who work every day in the week for their masters, saving the Sabbath, upon which they are allowed to get something for their own support.
We can see no justice in this way of apportioning taxes; neither can we see any good reason why this was consented to on the part of our delegates.
We suppose it next to impossible that every individual in this vast continental union, should have his wish with regard to every single article, composing a frame of government; and therefore, although we think it more agreeable to the principles of republicanism, that elections should be annual; yet as the elections in our own state government are so, we did not view it so dangerous to the liberties of the people, that we should have rejected the constitution merely on account of the biennial elections of the representatives, had we been sure that the people have any security, even of this; but this we could [not] find.
For although it is said, that “the House of Representatives shall be chosen every second year, by the people of the several states,” &c. and that “the times, places and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof;” yet all this is wholly superseded by a subsequent provision, which empowers Congress at any time to enact a law, whereby such regulations may be altered, except as to the places of chusing senators.
Here we conceive the people may be very materially injured, and in time reduced to a state of as abject vassallage, as any people were under the controul of the most mercenary despot, that ever tarnished the pages of history.
The depravity of human nature, illustrated by examples from history, will warrant us to say, it may be possible, if not probable, that the Congress may be composed of men, who will wish to burthen and oppress the people.
In such case, will not their inventions be fruitful enough to devise occasions for postponing the elections?
And if they can do this once, they can twice - if they can twice they can thrice, so by degrees render themselves absolute and perpetual.
Or, if they choose, they have another expedient; they can alter the place of holding elections.
They can say, whatever the legislature of this state may order to the contrary, that all the elections of our representatives shall be made at Mechias, or at Williamstown; consequently, nine-tenths of the people will never vote.
And if this should be thought a measure favourable to their reelection, or the election of some tool for their mercenary purposes, we doubt not it will be thus ordered.
But says the advocates for the constitution, “it is not likely this will ever happen; we are not to expect our rulers will ever proceed to a wanton exercise of the powers given them.”
But what reason have we more than past ages, to expect that we shall be blessed with impeccable rulers?
We think not any.
Although it has been said that every generation grows wiser and wiser, yet we have no reason to think they grow better and better.
And therefore the probability lies upon the dark side.
Does not the experience of past ages teach, that men have generally exercised all the powers they had given them, and even have usurped upon them, in order to accomplish their own sinister and avaricious designs, whenever they thought they could do it with impunity?
This we presume will not be denied.
And it appeared to us that the arguments made use of by the favourers of the constitution, in the late Convention at Boston, proceeded upon the plan of righteousness in those who are to rule over us, by virtue of this new form of government.
But these arguments, we confess, could have no weight with us, whilst we judged them to be founded altogether upon a slippery perhaps.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Consider Arms, Malachi Maynard & Samuel Field
May 16, 1788
Mr. PRINTER, We the Subscribers being of the number, who did not assent to the ratification of the Federal Constitution, under consideration in the late State Convention, held at Boston, to which we were called by the suffrages of the corporations to which we respectively belong - beg leave, through the channel of your paper, to lay before the public in general, and our constituents in particular, the reasons of our dissent, and the principles which governed us in our decision of this important question.
Fully convinced, ever since the late revolution, of the necessity of a firm, energetic government, we should have rejoiced in an opportunity to have given our assent to such an one; and should in the present case, most cordially have done it, could we at the same time [have] been happy to have seen the liberties of the people and the rights of mankind properly guarded and secured.
We conceive that the very notion of government carries along with it the idea of justice and equity, and that the whole design of instituting government in the world, was to preserve men’s properties from rapine, and their bodies from violence and bloodshed.
These propositions being established, we conceive must of necessity produce the following consequence, viz.
That every constitution or system, which does not quadrate with this original design, is not government, but in fact a subversion of it.
Having premised thus much, we proceed to mention some things in this constitution, to which we object, and to enter into an enquiry, whether, and how far they coincide with those simple and original notions of government beforementioned.
In the first place - as direct taxes are to be apportioned according to the numbers in each state, and as Massachusetts has none in it but what are declared freemen, so the whole, blacks as well as whites, must be numbered; this must therefore operate against us, as two fifths of the slaves in the southern states are to be left out of the numeration; consequently, three Massachusetts infants will increase the tax equal to five sturdy, full grown negroes of theirs, who work every day in the week for their masters, saving the Sabbath, upon which they are allowed to get something for their own support.
We can see no justice in this way of apportioning taxes; neither can we see any good reason why this was consented to on the part of our delegates.
We suppose it next to impossible that every individual in this vast continental union, should have his wish with regard to every single article, composing a frame of government; and therefore, although we think it more agreeable to the principles of republicanism, that elections should be annual; yet as the elections in our own state government are so, we did not view it so dangerous to the liberties of the people, that we should have rejected the constitution merely on account of the biennial elections of the representatives, had we been sure that the people have any security, even of this; but this we could [not] find.
For although it is said, that “the House of Representatives shall be chosen every second year, by the people of the several states,” &c. and that “the times, places and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof;” yet all this is wholly superseded by a subsequent provision, which empowers Congress at any time to enact a law, whereby such regulations may be altered, except as to the places of chusing senators.
Here we conceive the people may be very materially injured, and in time reduced to a state of as abject vassallage, as any people were under the controul of the most mercenary despot, that ever tarnished the pages of history.
The depravity of human nature, illustrated by examples from history, will warrant us to say, it may be possible, if not probable, that the Congress may be composed of men, who will wish to burthen and oppress the people.
In such case, will not their inventions be fruitful enough to devise occasions for postponing the elections?
And if they can do this once, they can twice - if they can twice they can thrice, so by degrees render themselves absolute and perpetual.
Or, if they choose, they have another expedient; they can alter the place of holding elections.
They can say, whatever the legislature of this state may order to the contrary, that all the elections of our representatives shall be made at Mechias, or at Williamstown; consequently, nine-tenths of the people will never vote.
And if this should be thought a measure favourable to their reelection, or the election of some tool for their mercenary purposes, we doubt not it will be thus ordered.
But says the advocates for the constitution, “it is not likely this will ever happen; we are not to expect our rulers will ever proceed to a wanton exercise of the powers given them.”
But what reason have we more than past ages, to expect that we shall be blessed with impeccable rulers?
We think not any.
Although it has been said that every generation grows wiser and wiser, yet we have no reason to think they grow better and better.
And therefore the probability lies upon the dark side.
Does not the experience of past ages teach, that men have generally exercised all the powers they had given them, and even have usurped upon them, in order to accomplish their own sinister and avaricious designs, whenever they thought they could do it with impunity?
This we presume will not be denied.
And it appeared to us that the arguments made use of by the favourers of the constitution, in the late Convention at Boston, proceeded upon the plan of righteousness in those who are to rule over us, by virtue of this new form of government.
But these arguments, we confess, could have no weight with us, whilst we judged them to be founded altogether upon a slippery perhaps.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Reasons for Dissent, continued ...
by Consider Arms, Malachi Maynard & Samuel Field
May 16, 1788
We are sensible, that in order to the due administration of government, it is necessary that certain powers should be delegated to the rulers, from the people.
At the same time we think they ought carefully to guard against giving so much as will enable those rulers, by that means, at once, or even in process of time, to render themselves absolute and despotic.
This we think is the case with the form of government lately submitted to our consideration.
We could not, therefore, acting uprightly, consulting our own good and the good of our constituents, give our assent unto it.
We could not then, we still cannot see, that because people are many times guilty of crimes, and deserving of punishment, that it from thence follows the authority ought to have power to punish them when they are not guilty, or to punish the innocent with the guilty without discrimination, which amounts to the same thing.
But this we think in fact to be the case as to this federal constitution.
For the Congress, whether they have provocation or not, can at any time order the elections in any or all the states, to be conducted in such manner as wholly to defeat and render entirely nugatory the intention of those elections, and convert that which was considered and intended to be the palladium of the liberties of the people - the grand bulwark against any invasion upon them, into a formidable engine, by which to overthrow them all, and thus involve them in the depth of misery and distress.
But it was pled by some of the ablest advocates of the constitution, that if Congress should exercise such powers to the prejudice of the people (and they did not deny but they could if they should be disposed) they (the people) would not suffer it.
They would have recourse to the ultima ratio the dernier resort of the oppressed - the sword.
But it appeared to us a piece of superlative incongruity indeed that the people, whilst in the full and indefensible possession of their liberties and privileges, should be so very profuse, so very liberal in the disposal of them, as consequently to place themselves in a predicament miserable to an extreme - so wretched indeed, that they may at once be reduced to the sad alternative of yielding themselves vassals into the hands of a venal and corrupt administration, whose only wish may be to aggrandize themselves and families - to wallow in luxury and every species of discipation, and riot upon the spoils of the community; or take up the sword and involve their country in all the horrors of a civil war - the consequence of which, we think, we may venture to augur will more firmly rivet their shackles, and end in the entailment of vassallage to their posterity.
We think this by no means can fall within the description of government beforementioned.
Neither can we think these suggestions merely chimerical, or that they proceed from an over heated enthusiasm in favour of republicanism; neither yet from an ill-placed detestation of aristocracy; but from the apparent danger the people are in by establishing this constitution.
When we take a forward view of the proposed Congress, seated in the federal city, ten miles square, fortified and replenished with all kinds of military stores, and every implement - with a navy at command on one side, and a land army on the other.
We say, when we view them, thus possessed of the sword in one hand and the purse-strings of the people in the other, we can see no security left for them in the enjoyment of their liberties, but what may proceed from the bare possibility, that this supreme authority of the nation may be possessed of virtue and integrity sufficient to influence them in the administration of equal justice and equity among those whom they shall govern.
But why should we voluntarily choose to trust our all upon so precarious a tenure as this?
We confess it gives us pain to anticipate the future scene: a scene presenting to view miseries so complicated and extreme, that it may be part of the charms of eloquence to extenuate, or the power of art to remove.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Consider Arms, Malachi Maynard & Samuel Field
May 16, 1788
We are sensible, that in order to the due administration of government, it is necessary that certain powers should be delegated to the rulers, from the people.
At the same time we think they ought carefully to guard against giving so much as will enable those rulers, by that means, at once, or even in process of time, to render themselves absolute and despotic.
This we think is the case with the form of government lately submitted to our consideration.
We could not, therefore, acting uprightly, consulting our own good and the good of our constituents, give our assent unto it.
We could not then, we still cannot see, that because people are many times guilty of crimes, and deserving of punishment, that it from thence follows the authority ought to have power to punish them when they are not guilty, or to punish the innocent with the guilty without discrimination, which amounts to the same thing.
But this we think in fact to be the case as to this federal constitution.
For the Congress, whether they have provocation or not, can at any time order the elections in any or all the states, to be conducted in such manner as wholly to defeat and render entirely nugatory the intention of those elections, and convert that which was considered and intended to be the palladium of the liberties of the people - the grand bulwark against any invasion upon them, into a formidable engine, by which to overthrow them all, and thus involve them in the depth of misery and distress.
But it was pled by some of the ablest advocates of the constitution, that if Congress should exercise such powers to the prejudice of the people (and they did not deny but they could if they should be disposed) they (the people) would not suffer it.
They would have recourse to the ultima ratio the dernier resort of the oppressed - the sword.
But it appeared to us a piece of superlative incongruity indeed that the people, whilst in the full and indefensible possession of their liberties and privileges, should be so very profuse, so very liberal in the disposal of them, as consequently to place themselves in a predicament miserable to an extreme - so wretched indeed, that they may at once be reduced to the sad alternative of yielding themselves vassals into the hands of a venal and corrupt administration, whose only wish may be to aggrandize themselves and families - to wallow in luxury and every species of discipation, and riot upon the spoils of the community; or take up the sword and involve their country in all the horrors of a civil war - the consequence of which, we think, we may venture to augur will more firmly rivet their shackles, and end in the entailment of vassallage to their posterity.
We think this by no means can fall within the description of government beforementioned.
Neither can we think these suggestions merely chimerical, or that they proceed from an over heated enthusiasm in favour of republicanism; neither yet from an ill-placed detestation of aristocracy; but from the apparent danger the people are in by establishing this constitution.
When we take a forward view of the proposed Congress, seated in the federal city, ten miles square, fortified and replenished with all kinds of military stores, and every implement - with a navy at command on one side, and a land army on the other.
We say, when we view them, thus possessed of the sword in one hand and the purse-strings of the people in the other, we can see no security left for them in the enjoyment of their liberties, but what may proceed from the bare possibility, that this supreme authority of the nation may be possessed of virtue and integrity sufficient to influence them in the administration of equal justice and equity among those whom they shall govern.
But why should we voluntarily choose to trust our all upon so precarious a tenure as this?
We confess it gives us pain to anticipate the future scene: a scene presenting to view miseries so complicated and extreme, that it may be part of the charms of eloquence to extenuate, or the power of art to remove.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Reasons for Dissent, continued ...
by Consider Arms, Malachi Maynard & Samuel Field
May 16, 1788
But we pass on to another thing, which (aside from every other consideration) was, and still is an insuperable objection in the way of our assent.
This we find in the 9th section under the head of restrictions upon Congress, viz. “The migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress, prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight,” &c.
It was not controverted in the Convention, but owned that this provision was made purely that the southern states might not be deprived of their profits arising from that most nefarious trade of enslaving the Africans.
The hon. Mr. King himself, who was an assistant in forming this constitution, in discoursing upon the slave trade, in the late Convention at Boston, was pleased to design it by this epithet, nefarious, which carries with it the idea of something peculiarly wicked and abominable: and indeed we think it deserving of this and every odious epithet which our language affords, descriptive of the iniquity of it.
This being the case, we were naturally led to enquire why we should establish a constitution, which gives licence to a measure of this sort.
How is it possible we could do it consistent with our ideas of government consistent with the principles and documents we endeavour to inculcate upon others?
It is a standing law in the kingdom of Heaven, “Do unto others as ye would have others do unto you.”
This is the royal law - this we often hear inculcated upon others.
But had we given our affirmative voice in this case, could we have claimed to ourselves that consistent line of conduct, which marks the path of every honest man?
Should we not rather have been guilty of a contumelious repugnancy, to what we profess to believe is equitable and just?
Let us for once bring the matter home to ourselves, and summons up our own feelings upon the occasion, and hear the simple sober verdict of our own hearts, were we in the place of those unhappy Africans - this is the test, the proper touch-stone by which to try the matter before us.
Where is the man, who under the influence of sober dispassionate reasoning, and not void of natural affection, can lay his hand upon his heart and say, I am willing my sons and my daughters should be torn from me and doomed to perpetual slavery?
We presume that man is not to be found amongst us.
And yet we think the consequence is fairly drawn, that this is what every man ought to be able to say, who voted for this constitution.
But we dare say this will never be the case here, so long as the country has power to repel force by force.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Consider Arms, Malachi Maynard & Samuel Field
May 16, 1788
But we pass on to another thing, which (aside from every other consideration) was, and still is an insuperable objection in the way of our assent.
This we find in the 9th section under the head of restrictions upon Congress, viz. “The migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress, prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight,” &c.
It was not controverted in the Convention, but owned that this provision was made purely that the southern states might not be deprived of their profits arising from that most nefarious trade of enslaving the Africans.
The hon. Mr. King himself, who was an assistant in forming this constitution, in discoursing upon the slave trade, in the late Convention at Boston, was pleased to design it by this epithet, nefarious, which carries with it the idea of something peculiarly wicked and abominable: and indeed we think it deserving of this and every odious epithet which our language affords, descriptive of the iniquity of it.
This being the case, we were naturally led to enquire why we should establish a constitution, which gives licence to a measure of this sort.
How is it possible we could do it consistent with our ideas of government consistent with the principles and documents we endeavour to inculcate upon others?
It is a standing law in the kingdom of Heaven, “Do unto others as ye would have others do unto you.”
This is the royal law - this we often hear inculcated upon others.
But had we given our affirmative voice in this case, could we have claimed to ourselves that consistent line of conduct, which marks the path of every honest man?
Should we not rather have been guilty of a contumelious repugnancy, to what we profess to believe is equitable and just?
Let us for once bring the matter home to ourselves, and summons up our own feelings upon the occasion, and hear the simple sober verdict of our own hearts, were we in the place of those unhappy Africans - this is the test, the proper touch-stone by which to try the matter before us.
Where is the man, who under the influence of sober dispassionate reasoning, and not void of natural affection, can lay his hand upon his heart and say, I am willing my sons and my daughters should be torn from me and doomed to perpetual slavery?
We presume that man is not to be found amongst us.
And yet we think the consequence is fairly drawn, that this is what every man ought to be able to say, who voted for this constitution.
But we dare say this will never be the case here, so long as the country has power to repel force by force.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Reasons for Dissent, continued ...
by Consider Arms, Malachi Maynard & Samuel Field
May 16, 1788
Notwithstanding this we will practise this upon those who are destitute of the power of repulsion: from whence we conclude it is not the tincture of a skin, or any disparity of features that are necessarily connected with slavery, and possibly may therefore fall to the lot of some who voted it, to have the same measure measured unto them which they have measured unto others.
If we could once make it our own case, we should soon discover what distress & anxiety, what poignant feelings it would produce in our own breasts, to have our infants torn from the bosoms of their tender mothers - indeed our children of all ages, from infancy to manhood, arrested from us by a banditti of lawless ruffians, in defiance of all the laws of humanity, and carried to a country far distant, without any hopes of their return - attended likewise with the cutting reflection, that they were likely to undergo all those indignities, those miseries, which are the usual concomitants of slavery.
Indeed when we consider the depredations committed in Africa, the cruelties exercised towards the poor captivated inhabitants of that country on their passage to this - crowded by droves into the holds of ships, suffering what might naturally be expected would result from scanty provisions, and inelastic infectious air, and after their arrival, drove like brutes from market to market, branded on their naked bodies with hot irons, with the initial letters of their masters names - fed upon the entrails of beasts like swine in the slaughter-yard of a butcher; and many other barbarities, of which we have documents well authenticated: then put to the hardest of labour, and to perform the vilest of drudges - their master (or rather usurpers) by far less kind and benevolent to them, than to their horses and their hounds.
We say, when we consider these things (the recollection of which gives us pain) conscience applauds the dicision we have made, and we feel that satisfaction which arises from acting agreeable to its dictates.
When we hear those barbarities pled for - when we see them voted for, (as in the late Convention at Boston) when we see them practised by those who denominate themselves Christians, we are presented with something truely heterogeneous - something monstrous indeed!
Can we suppose this line of conduct keeps pace with the rule of right?
Do such practices coincide with the plain and simple ideas of government beforementioned?
By no means.
We could wish it might be kept in mind, that the very notion of government is to protect men in the enjoyment of those privileges to which they have a natural, therefore an indefeasible right; and not to be made an engine of rapine, robbery and murder.
This is but establishing inequity, by law founded on usurpation.
Establishing this constitution is, in our opinion, establishing the most ignominious kind of theft, man-stealing, and so heinous and agrivated was this crime considered, by ONE who cannot err, that under the Jewish theocracy it was punished with death.
Indeed what can shew men scarcely more hardened, than being guilty of this crime for there is nothing else they will stick at in order to perpetrate this.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Consider Arms, Malachi Maynard & Samuel Field
May 16, 1788
Notwithstanding this we will practise this upon those who are destitute of the power of repulsion: from whence we conclude it is not the tincture of a skin, or any disparity of features that are necessarily connected with slavery, and possibly may therefore fall to the lot of some who voted it, to have the same measure measured unto them which they have measured unto others.
If we could once make it our own case, we should soon discover what distress & anxiety, what poignant feelings it would produce in our own breasts, to have our infants torn from the bosoms of their tender mothers - indeed our children of all ages, from infancy to manhood, arrested from us by a banditti of lawless ruffians, in defiance of all the laws of humanity, and carried to a country far distant, without any hopes of their return - attended likewise with the cutting reflection, that they were likely to undergo all those indignities, those miseries, which are the usual concomitants of slavery.
Indeed when we consider the depredations committed in Africa, the cruelties exercised towards the poor captivated inhabitants of that country on their passage to this - crowded by droves into the holds of ships, suffering what might naturally be expected would result from scanty provisions, and inelastic infectious air, and after their arrival, drove like brutes from market to market, branded on their naked bodies with hot irons, with the initial letters of their masters names - fed upon the entrails of beasts like swine in the slaughter-yard of a butcher; and many other barbarities, of which we have documents well authenticated: then put to the hardest of labour, and to perform the vilest of drudges - their master (or rather usurpers) by far less kind and benevolent to them, than to their horses and their hounds.
We say, when we consider these things (the recollection of which gives us pain) conscience applauds the dicision we have made, and we feel that satisfaction which arises from acting agreeable to its dictates.
When we hear those barbarities pled for - when we see them voted for, (as in the late Convention at Boston) when we see them practised by those who denominate themselves Christians, we are presented with something truely heterogeneous - something monstrous indeed!
Can we suppose this line of conduct keeps pace with the rule of right?
Do such practices coincide with the plain and simple ideas of government beforementioned?
By no means.
We could wish it might be kept in mind, that the very notion of government is to protect men in the enjoyment of those privileges to which they have a natural, therefore an indefeasible right; and not to be made an engine of rapine, robbery and murder.
This is but establishing inequity, by law founded on usurpation.
Establishing this constitution is, in our opinion, establishing the most ignominious kind of theft, man-stealing, and so heinous and agrivated was this crime considered, by ONE who cannot err, that under the Jewish theocracy it was punished with death.
Indeed what can shew men scarcely more hardened, than being guilty of this crime for there is nothing else they will stick at in order to perpetrate this.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Reasons for Dissent, continued ...
by Consider Arms, Malachi Maynard & Samuel Field
May 16, 1788
The question therefore - Why should we vote for the establishment of this system recoils upon us armed with treple force - force which sets at defiance, the whole power of sophistry, employed for the defence of those, who by a “cursed thirst for gold,” are prompted on to actions, which cast an indelible stain upon the character of the human species - actions at which certain quadrupeds, were they possessed of Organs for the purpose, would discover a BLUSH.
But we were told by an honourable gentleman who was one of the framers of this Constitution, that the two southernmost states, absolutely refused to confederate at all, except they might be gratified in this article.
What then?
Was this an argument sufficient to induce us to give energy to this article, thus fraught with iniquity?
By no means.
But we were informed by that gentleman, further that those two states pled, that they had lost much of their property during the late war.
Their slaves being either taken from them by the British troops, or they themselves taking the liberty of absconding from them, and therefore they must import more, in order to make up their losses.
To this we say they lost no property, because they never had any in them, however much money they might have paid for them.
For we look upon it, every man is the sole proprietor of his own liberty, and no one but himself hath a right to convey it unless by some crime adequate to the punishment, it should be made forfeit, and so by that means becomes the property of government.
But this is by no means the case in the present instance.
And we cannot suppose a vendee, can acquire property in any thing, which at the time of purchase, he knew the vendor had no right to convey.
This is an acknowledgment we are constrained to make as a tribute due to justice and equity.
But suppose they had lost real property; so have we; and indeed where is the man, but will tell us he has been a great looser by means of the war?
And shall we from thence argue that we have a right to make inroads upon another nation, pilfer and rob them, in order to compensate ourselves for the losses we have sustained by means of a war, in which they had been utterly neutral?
Truly upon this plan of reasoning it is lawful thus to do, and had we voted the constitution as it stands, we must have given countenance to conduct equally criminal, and more so, if possible.
Such arguments as the above seem to be calculated and designed for idiotcy.
We however acknowledge, we think them rather an affront, even upon that.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Consider Arms, Malachi Maynard & Samuel Field
May 16, 1788
The question therefore - Why should we vote for the establishment of this system recoils upon us armed with treple force - force which sets at defiance, the whole power of sophistry, employed for the defence of those, who by a “cursed thirst for gold,” are prompted on to actions, which cast an indelible stain upon the character of the human species - actions at which certain quadrupeds, were they possessed of Organs for the purpose, would discover a BLUSH.
But we were told by an honourable gentleman who was one of the framers of this Constitution, that the two southernmost states, absolutely refused to confederate at all, except they might be gratified in this article.
What then?
Was this an argument sufficient to induce us to give energy to this article, thus fraught with iniquity?
By no means.
But we were informed by that gentleman, further that those two states pled, that they had lost much of their property during the late war.
Their slaves being either taken from them by the British troops, or they themselves taking the liberty of absconding from them, and therefore they must import more, in order to make up their losses.
To this we say they lost no property, because they never had any in them, however much money they might have paid for them.
For we look upon it, every man is the sole proprietor of his own liberty, and no one but himself hath a right to convey it unless by some crime adequate to the punishment, it should be made forfeit, and so by that means becomes the property of government.
But this is by no means the case in the present instance.
And we cannot suppose a vendee, can acquire property in any thing, which at the time of purchase, he knew the vendor had no right to convey.
This is an acknowledgment we are constrained to make as a tribute due to justice and equity.
But suppose they had lost real property; so have we; and indeed where is the man, but will tell us he has been a great looser by means of the war?
And shall we from thence argue that we have a right to make inroads upon another nation, pilfer and rob them, in order to compensate ourselves for the losses we have sustained by means of a war, in which they had been utterly neutral?
Truly upon this plan of reasoning it is lawful thus to do, and had we voted the constitution as it stands, we must have given countenance to conduct equally criminal, and more so, if possible.
Such arguments as the above seem to be calculated and designed for idiotcy.
We however acknowledge, we think them rather an affront, even upon that.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Reasons for Dissent, continued ...
by Consider Arms, Malachi Maynard & Samuel Field
May 16, 1788
The hon. Gentleman above named, was asked the question - What would be the consequence, suppose one or two states, upon any principle, should refuse confederating?
His answer was - “The consequence is plain and easy - they would be compelled to it; not by force of arms; but all commerce with them would be interdicted; their property would be seized in every port they should enter, and by law made forfeit: and this line of conduct would soon reduce them to order.”
This method of procedure perhaps no one would be disposed to reprehend; and if eleven, or even nine states were agreed, could they not, ought they not to take this method, rather than to make a compact with them, by which they give countenance, nay even bind themselves (as the case may be) to aid and assist them in sporting with the liberties of others, and accumulating to themselves fortunes, by making thousands of their fellow creatures miserable.
To animadvert upon the British manoeuvres at that time, would not fall within the compass of our present design.
But that the Africans had a right to depart, we must assert, and are able to prove it from the highest authority perhaps that this Commonwealth does or ever did afford.
In a printed pamphlet, published in Boston in the year 1772, said to be the report of a Committee, and unanimously voted by said town, and ordered to be sent to the several towns in the state for their consideration.
In said pamphlet we find the following axiom, which we will quote verbatim, page 2d - “All men have a right to remain in a state of nature as long as they please, and in case of intolerable oppression, civil or religious, to leave the society they belong to, and enter into another.”
If it can by any kind of reasoning be made to appear, that this authority is not pertinently adduced in the case before us, then we think it can by the same reasoning be investigated, that black is white and white is black - that oppression and freedom are exactly similar, and benevolence and malignity synonymous terms.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Consider Arms, Malachi Maynard & Samuel Field
May 16, 1788
The hon. Gentleman above named, was asked the question - What would be the consequence, suppose one or two states, upon any principle, should refuse confederating?
His answer was - “The consequence is plain and easy - they would be compelled to it; not by force of arms; but all commerce with them would be interdicted; their property would be seized in every port they should enter, and by law made forfeit: and this line of conduct would soon reduce them to order.”
This method of procedure perhaps no one would be disposed to reprehend; and if eleven, or even nine states were agreed, could they not, ought they not to take this method, rather than to make a compact with them, by which they give countenance, nay even bind themselves (as the case may be) to aid and assist them in sporting with the liberties of others, and accumulating to themselves fortunes, by making thousands of their fellow creatures miserable.
To animadvert upon the British manoeuvres at that time, would not fall within the compass of our present design.
But that the Africans had a right to depart, we must assert, and are able to prove it from the highest authority perhaps that this Commonwealth does or ever did afford.
In a printed pamphlet, published in Boston in the year 1772, said to be the report of a Committee, and unanimously voted by said town, and ordered to be sent to the several towns in the state for their consideration.
In said pamphlet we find the following axiom, which we will quote verbatim, page 2d - “All men have a right to remain in a state of nature as long as they please, and in case of intolerable oppression, civil or religious, to leave the society they belong to, and enter into another.”
If it can by any kind of reasoning be made to appear, that this authority is not pertinently adduced in the case before us, then we think it can by the same reasoning be investigated, that black is white and white is black - that oppression and freedom are exactly similar, and benevolence and malignity synonymous terms.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Reasons for Dissent, continued ...
by Consider Arms, Malachi Maynard & Samuel Field
May 16, 1788
The advocates for the constitution seemed to suppose, that this restriction being laid upon Congress only for a term of time, is the “fair dawning of liberty.”
That “it was a glorious acquisition towards the final abolition of slavery.”
But how much more glorious would the acquisition have been, was such abolition to take place the first moment the constitution should be established.
If we had said that after the expiration of a certain term the practice should cease, it would have appeared with a better grace; but this is not the case, for even after that, it is wholly optional with the Congress, whether they abolish it or not.
And by that time we presume the enslaving the Africans will be accounted by far less an inconsiderable affair than it is at present: therefore conclude from good reasons, that the “nefarious practice” will be continued and increased as the inhabitants of the country shall be found to increase.
This practice of enslaving mankind is in direct opposition to a fundamental maxim of truth, on which our state constitution is founded, viz. “All men are born free and equal.”
This is our motto.
We have said it - we cannot go back.
Indeed no man can justify himself in enslaving another, unless he can produce a commission under the broad seal of Heaven, purporting a licence therefor from him who created all men, and can therefore dispose of them at his pleasure.
We would not be thought to detract from the character of any person, but to us it is somewhat nearly paradoxical, that some of our leading characters in the law department (especially in the western counties) after having (to their honour be it spoken) exerted themselves to promote, and finally to effect the emancipation of slaves, should now turn directly about, and exhibit to the world principles diametrically opposite thereto: that they should now appear such strenuous advocates for the establishment of that diabolical trade of importing the Africans.
But said some, it is not we who do it - and compared it to entering into an alliance with another nation, for some particular purpose; but we think this by no means a parallel.
We are one nation, forming a constitution for the whole, and suppose the states are under obligation, whenever this constitution shall be established, reciprocally to aid each other in defence and support of every thing to which they are entitled thereby, right or wrong.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Consider Arms, Malachi Maynard & Samuel Field
May 16, 1788
The advocates for the constitution seemed to suppose, that this restriction being laid upon Congress only for a term of time, is the “fair dawning of liberty.”
That “it was a glorious acquisition towards the final abolition of slavery.”
But how much more glorious would the acquisition have been, was such abolition to take place the first moment the constitution should be established.
If we had said that after the expiration of a certain term the practice should cease, it would have appeared with a better grace; but this is not the case, for even after that, it is wholly optional with the Congress, whether they abolish it or not.
And by that time we presume the enslaving the Africans will be accounted by far less an inconsiderable affair than it is at present: therefore conclude from good reasons, that the “nefarious practice” will be continued and increased as the inhabitants of the country shall be found to increase.
This practice of enslaving mankind is in direct opposition to a fundamental maxim of truth, on which our state constitution is founded, viz. “All men are born free and equal.”
This is our motto.
We have said it - we cannot go back.
Indeed no man can justify himself in enslaving another, unless he can produce a commission under the broad seal of Heaven, purporting a licence therefor from him who created all men, and can therefore dispose of them at his pleasure.
We would not be thought to detract from the character of any person, but to us it is somewhat nearly paradoxical, that some of our leading characters in the law department (especially in the western counties) after having (to their honour be it spoken) exerted themselves to promote, and finally to effect the emancipation of slaves, should now turn directly about, and exhibit to the world principles diametrically opposite thereto: that they should now appear such strenuous advocates for the establishment of that diabolical trade of importing the Africans.
But said some, it is not we who do it - and compared it to entering into an alliance with another nation, for some particular purpose; but we think this by no means a parallel.
We are one nation, forming a constitution for the whole, and suppose the states are under obligation, whenever this constitution shall be established, reciprocally to aid each other in defence and support of every thing to which they are entitled thereby, right or wrong.
TO BE CONTINUED ...