“If we cannot secure all our rights, let us secure what we can”: Madison and Jefferson Discuss the Constitution, continued ...
by James Madison & Thomas Jefferson
October 17, 1788 - March 15, 1789
Madison to Jefferson: New York, October 17, 1788, concluded ...
Supposing a bill of rights to be proper, the articles which ought to compose it admit of much discussion.
I am inclined to think that absolute restrictions in cases that are doubtful, or where emergencies may overrule them, ought to be avoided.
The restrictions however strongly marked on paper will never be regarded when opposed to the decided sense of the public; and after repeated violations in extraordinary cases, they will lose even their ordinary efficacy.
Should a Rebellion or insurrection alarm the people as well as the Government, and a suspension of the Hab. Corp.3 be dictated by the alarm, no written prohibitions on earth would prevent the measure.
Should an army in time of peace be gradually established in our neighborhood by Britain or Spain, declarations on paper would have as little effect in preventing a standing force for the public safety.
The best security against these evils is to remove the pretext for them.
With regard to Monopolies, they are justly classed among the greatest nuisances in Government.
But is it clear that as encouragements to literary works and indigenous discoveries, they are not too valuable to be wholly renounced?
Would it not suffice to reserve in all cases a right to the public to abolish the privilege at a price to be specified in the grant of it?
Is there not also infinitely less danger of this abuse in our Governments than in most others?
Monopolies are sacrifices of the many to the few.
Where the power is in the few it is natural for them to sacrifice the many to their own partialities and corruptions.
Where the power, as with us, is in the many not in the few, the danger cannot be very great that the few will be thus favored.
It is much more to be dreaded that the few will be unnecessarily sacrificed to the many. . . .
TO BE CONTINUED ...
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
“If we cannot secure all our rights, let us secure what we can”: Madison and Jefferson Discuss the Constitution, concluded ...
by James Madison & Thomas Jefferson
October 17, 1788 - March 15, 1789
Jefferson to Madison: Paris, March 15, 1789
. . . The declaration of rights is, like all other human blessings, alloyed with some inconveniences, and not accomplishing fully its object.
But the good of this instance vastly overweighs the evil.
I cannot refrain from making short answers to the objections which your letter states to have been raised.
That the rights in question are reserved by the manner in which the federal powers are granted.
Answer: A constitutive act may, certainly, be so formed, as to need no declaration of rights.
The act itself has the force of a declaration, as far as it goes; and if it goes to all material points, nothing more is wanting.
In the draught4 of a constitution which I had once a thought of proposing in Virginia, and printed afterwards, I endeavored to reach all the great objects of public liberty, and did not mean to add a declaration of rights.
Probably the object was imperfectly executed; but the deficiencies would have been supplied by others, in the course of discussion.
But in a constitutive act which leaves some precious articles unnoticed, and raises implications against others, a declaration of rights becomes necessary, by way of supplement.
This is the case of our new federal Constitution.
This instrument forms us into one State, as to certain objects, and gives us a legislative and executive body for these objects.
It should, therefore, guard us against their abuses of power, within the field submitted to them.
A positive declaration of some essential rights could not be obtained in the requisite latitude.
Answer: Half a loaf is better than no bread.
If we cannot secure all our rights, let us secure what we can.
The limited powers of the federal government, and jealousy of the subordinate governments, afford a security which exists in no other instance.
Answer: The first member of this seems resolvable into the first objection before stated.
The jealousy of the subordinate governments is a precious reliance.
But observe that those governments are only agents.
They must have principles furnished them, whereon to found their opposition.
The declaration of rights will be the text, whereby they will try all the acts of the federal government.
In this view, it is necessary to the federal government also; as by the same text they may try the opposition of the subordinate governments.
Experience proves the inefficacy of a bill of rights.
True.
But though it is not absolutely efficacious under all circumstances, it is of great potency always, and rarely inefficacious.
A brace the more will often keep up the building which would have fallen with that brace the less.
There is a remarkable difference between the characters of the inconveniencies which attend a declaration of rights, and those which attend the want of it.
The inconveniences of the declaration are, that it may cramp government in its useful exertions.
But the evil of this is short-lived, moderate and reparable.
The inconveniencies of the want of a declaration are permanent, afflicting and irreparable.
They are in constant progression from bad to worse.
The executive, in our governments, is not the sole, it is scarcely the principal object of my jealousy.
The tyranny of the legislatures is the most formidable dread at present, and will be for many years.
That of the executive will come in its turn; but it will be at a remote period. . . .
FOOTNOTES
1. Edmund Randolph, The Ratifications of the New Federal Constitution, Together with the Amendments, Proposed by the Several States (Richmond, VA: Published by Augustine Davis, 1788).
2. By “the enumeration,” Madison means the powers explicitly given to the federal government by the Constitution.
3. habeas corpus
4. draft
by James Madison & Thomas Jefferson
October 17, 1788 - March 15, 1789
Jefferson to Madison: Paris, March 15, 1789
. . . The declaration of rights is, like all other human blessings, alloyed with some inconveniences, and not accomplishing fully its object.
But the good of this instance vastly overweighs the evil.
I cannot refrain from making short answers to the objections which your letter states to have been raised.
That the rights in question are reserved by the manner in which the federal powers are granted.
Answer: A constitutive act may, certainly, be so formed, as to need no declaration of rights.
The act itself has the force of a declaration, as far as it goes; and if it goes to all material points, nothing more is wanting.
In the draught4 of a constitution which I had once a thought of proposing in Virginia, and printed afterwards, I endeavored to reach all the great objects of public liberty, and did not mean to add a declaration of rights.
Probably the object was imperfectly executed; but the deficiencies would have been supplied by others, in the course of discussion.
But in a constitutive act which leaves some precious articles unnoticed, and raises implications against others, a declaration of rights becomes necessary, by way of supplement.
This is the case of our new federal Constitution.
This instrument forms us into one State, as to certain objects, and gives us a legislative and executive body for these objects.
It should, therefore, guard us against their abuses of power, within the field submitted to them.
A positive declaration of some essential rights could not be obtained in the requisite latitude.
Answer: Half a loaf is better than no bread.
If we cannot secure all our rights, let us secure what we can.
The limited powers of the federal government, and jealousy of the subordinate governments, afford a security which exists in no other instance.
Answer: The first member of this seems resolvable into the first objection before stated.
The jealousy of the subordinate governments is a precious reliance.
But observe that those governments are only agents.
They must have principles furnished them, whereon to found their opposition.
The declaration of rights will be the text, whereby they will try all the acts of the federal government.
In this view, it is necessary to the federal government also; as by the same text they may try the opposition of the subordinate governments.
Experience proves the inefficacy of a bill of rights.
True.
But though it is not absolutely efficacious under all circumstances, it is of great potency always, and rarely inefficacious.
A brace the more will often keep up the building which would have fallen with that brace the less.
There is a remarkable difference between the characters of the inconveniencies which attend a declaration of rights, and those which attend the want of it.
The inconveniences of the declaration are, that it may cramp government in its useful exertions.
But the evil of this is short-lived, moderate and reparable.
The inconveniencies of the want of a declaration are permanent, afflicting and irreparable.
They are in constant progression from bad to worse.
The executive, in our governments, is not the sole, it is scarcely the principal object of my jealousy.
The tyranny of the legislatures is the most formidable dread at present, and will be for many years.
That of the executive will come in its turn; but it will be at a remote period. . . .
FOOTNOTES
1. Edmund Randolph, The Ratifications of the New Federal Constitution, Together with the Amendments, Proposed by the Several States (Richmond, VA: Published by Augustine Davis, 1788).
2. By “the enumeration,” Madison means the powers explicitly given to the federal government by the Constitution.
3. habeas corpus
4. draft
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (1788): Bill of Rights
by James Madison
October 17, 1788
EDITED AND INTRODUCED BY GORDON LLOYD
Why did James Madison not view the absence of a bill of rights from the proposed Constitution “in an important light”?
How did Madison answer his own question: “What use then it may be asked can a bill of rights serve in popular governments”?
Compare James Madison’s less than enthusiastic support for a bill of rights with James Wilson’s State House Speech and Alexander Hamilton’s argument in Federalist 84.
(See James Wilson's "State House Speech" (1787) and Federalist 84 (1788).)
Introduction
James Madison responded to Thomas Jefferson’s challenges about the absence of a bill of rights in the newly signed and ratified Constitution by stating that he had always been in favor of a bill of rights.
Scholars have disagreed over Madison’s “apparent conversion” in favor a bill of rights.
Was Madison flip-flopping from the consistent Wilson-Hamilton line, in James Wilson’s Speech and Federalist 84, that a bill of rights was unnecessary and dangerous because he hoped to win a seat in the First Congress?
Or was he acknowledging the fact that many prominent leaders — including Jefferson — were both in favor of a bill of rights and the adoption of the Constitution?
It is reasonable to read Madison’s response, along with the “little pamphlet herewith enclosed,” as a first draft of his more famous and polished June 8, 1789 speech on behalf of a bill of rights.
—Gordon Lloyd
Source: From James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 17 October 1788 (Founders Online), https://goo.gl/4o765p. For ease of reading, we have added paragraph divisions.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by James Madison
October 17, 1788
EDITED AND INTRODUCED BY GORDON LLOYD
Why did James Madison not view the absence of a bill of rights from the proposed Constitution “in an important light”?
How did Madison answer his own question: “What use then it may be asked can a bill of rights serve in popular governments”?
Compare James Madison’s less than enthusiastic support for a bill of rights with James Wilson’s State House Speech and Alexander Hamilton’s argument in Federalist 84.
(See James Wilson's "State House Speech" (1787) and Federalist 84 (1788).)
Introduction
James Madison responded to Thomas Jefferson’s challenges about the absence of a bill of rights in the newly signed and ratified Constitution by stating that he had always been in favor of a bill of rights.
Scholars have disagreed over Madison’s “apparent conversion” in favor a bill of rights.
Was Madison flip-flopping from the consistent Wilson-Hamilton line, in James Wilson’s Speech and Federalist 84, that a bill of rights was unnecessary and dangerous because he hoped to win a seat in the First Congress?
Or was he acknowledging the fact that many prominent leaders — including Jefferson — were both in favor of a bill of rights and the adoption of the Constitution?
It is reasonable to read Madison’s response, along with the “little pamphlet herewith enclosed,” as a first draft of his more famous and polished June 8, 1789 speech on behalf of a bill of rights.
—Gordon Lloyd
Source: From James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 17 October 1788 (Founders Online), https://goo.gl/4o765p. For ease of reading, we have added paragraph divisions.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (1788): Bill of Rights, continued ...
by James Madison
October 17, 1788
. . . The little pamphlet herewith enclosed will give you a collective view of the alterations which have been proposed for the new Constitution.[1]
Various and numerous as they appear they certainly omit many of the true grounds of opposition.
The articles relating to treaties, to paper money, and to contracts, created more enemies than all errors in the system positive and negative put together.
It is true nevertheless that not a few, particularly in Virginia have contended for the proposed alterations from the most honorable and patriotic motives; and that among the advocates for the Constitution there are some who wish for further guards to public liberty and individual rights.
As far as these may consist of a constitutional declaration of the most essential rights, it is probable they will be added; though there are many who think such addition unnecessary, and not a few who think it misplaced in such a Constitution.
There is scarce any point on which the party in opposition is so much divided as to its importance and its propriety.
My own opinion has always been in favor of a bill of rights; provided it be so framed as not to imply powers not meant to be included in the enumeration.
At the same time I have never thought the omission a material defect nor been anxious to supply it even by subsequent amendment, for any other reason than that it is anxiously desired by others.
I have favored it because I supposed it might be of use, and if properly executed could not be of disservice.
I have not viewed it in an important light.
Because I conceive that in a certain degree, though not in the extent argued by Mr. Wilson, the rights in question are reserved by the manner in which the federal powers are granted.
Because there is great reason to fear that a positive declaration of some of the most essential rights could not be obtained in the requisite latitude.
I am sure that the rights of conscience in particular, if submitted to the public definition would be narrowed much more than they are likely ever to be by an assumed power.
One of the objections in New England was that the Constitution by prohibiting religious tests opened a door for Jews, Turks and infidels.
Because the limited powers of the federal government and the jealousy of the subordinate governments, afford a security which has not existed in the case of the state governments, and exists in no other.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by James Madison
October 17, 1788
. . . The little pamphlet herewith enclosed will give you a collective view of the alterations which have been proposed for the new Constitution.[1]
Various and numerous as they appear they certainly omit many of the true grounds of opposition.
The articles relating to treaties, to paper money, and to contracts, created more enemies than all errors in the system positive and negative put together.
It is true nevertheless that not a few, particularly in Virginia have contended for the proposed alterations from the most honorable and patriotic motives; and that among the advocates for the Constitution there are some who wish for further guards to public liberty and individual rights.
As far as these may consist of a constitutional declaration of the most essential rights, it is probable they will be added; though there are many who think such addition unnecessary, and not a few who think it misplaced in such a Constitution.
There is scarce any point on which the party in opposition is so much divided as to its importance and its propriety.
My own opinion has always been in favor of a bill of rights; provided it be so framed as not to imply powers not meant to be included in the enumeration.
At the same time I have never thought the omission a material defect nor been anxious to supply it even by subsequent amendment, for any other reason than that it is anxiously desired by others.
I have favored it because I supposed it might be of use, and if properly executed could not be of disservice.
I have not viewed it in an important light.
Because I conceive that in a certain degree, though not in the extent argued by Mr. Wilson, the rights in question are reserved by the manner in which the federal powers are granted.
Because there is great reason to fear that a positive declaration of some of the most essential rights could not be obtained in the requisite latitude.
I am sure that the rights of conscience in particular, if submitted to the public definition would be narrowed much more than they are likely ever to be by an assumed power.
One of the objections in New England was that the Constitution by prohibiting religious tests opened a door for Jews, Turks and infidels.
Because the limited powers of the federal government and the jealousy of the subordinate governments, afford a security which has not existed in the case of the state governments, and exists in no other.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (1788): Bill of Rights, continued ...
by James Madison
October 17, 1788
Because experience proves the inefficacy of a bill of rights on those occasions when its control is most needed.
Repeated violations of these parchment barriers have been committed by overbearing majorities in every State.
In Virginia I have seen the bill of rights violated in every instance where it has been opposed to a popular current.
Notwithstanding the explicit provision contained in that instrument for the rights of conscience it is well known that a religious establishment would have taken place and on narrower ground than was then proposed, notwithstanding the additional obstacle which the law has since created.
Wherever the real power in a government lies, there is the danger of oppression.
In our governments the real power lies in the majority of the community, and the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the government is the mere instrument of the majority of the constituents.
This is a truth of great importance, but not yet sufficiently attended to: and is probably more strongly impressed on my mind by facts, and reflections suggested by them, than on yours which has contemplated abuses of power issuing from a very different quarter.
Wherever there is an interest and power to do wrong, wrong will generally be done, and not less readily by a powerful and interested party than by a powerful and interested prince.
The difference, so far as it relates to the superiority of republics over monarchies, lies in the less degree of probability that interest may prompt abuses of power in the former than in the latter; and in the security in the former against oppression of more than the smaller part of the society, whereas in the former [that is, latter] it may be extended in a manner to the whole.
The difference so far as it relates to the point in question — the efficacy of a bill of rights in controlling abuses of power — lies in this: that in a monarchy the latent force of the nation is superior to that of the sovereign, and a solemn charter of popular rights must have a great effect, as a standard for trying the validity of public acts, and a signal for rousing and uniting the superior force of the community; whereas in a popular government, the political and physical power may be considered as vested in the same hands, that is in a majority of the people, and consequently the tyrannical will of the sovereign is not to be controlled by the dread of an appeal to any other force within the community.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by James Madison
October 17, 1788
Because experience proves the inefficacy of a bill of rights on those occasions when its control is most needed.
Repeated violations of these parchment barriers have been committed by overbearing majorities in every State.
In Virginia I have seen the bill of rights violated in every instance where it has been opposed to a popular current.
Notwithstanding the explicit provision contained in that instrument for the rights of conscience it is well known that a religious establishment would have taken place and on narrower ground than was then proposed, notwithstanding the additional obstacle which the law has since created.
Wherever the real power in a government lies, there is the danger of oppression.
In our governments the real power lies in the majority of the community, and the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the government is the mere instrument of the majority of the constituents.
This is a truth of great importance, but not yet sufficiently attended to: and is probably more strongly impressed on my mind by facts, and reflections suggested by them, than on yours which has contemplated abuses of power issuing from a very different quarter.
Wherever there is an interest and power to do wrong, wrong will generally be done, and not less readily by a powerful and interested party than by a powerful and interested prince.
The difference, so far as it relates to the superiority of republics over monarchies, lies in the less degree of probability that interest may prompt abuses of power in the former than in the latter; and in the security in the former against oppression of more than the smaller part of the society, whereas in the former [that is, latter] it may be extended in a manner to the whole.
The difference so far as it relates to the point in question — the efficacy of a bill of rights in controlling abuses of power — lies in this: that in a monarchy the latent force of the nation is superior to that of the sovereign, and a solemn charter of popular rights must have a great effect, as a standard for trying the validity of public acts, and a signal for rousing and uniting the superior force of the community; whereas in a popular government, the political and physical power may be considered as vested in the same hands, that is in a majority of the people, and consequently the tyrannical will of the sovereign is not to be controlled by the dread of an appeal to any other force within the community.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (1788): Bill of Rights, concluded ...
by James Madison
October 17, 1788
What use then it may be asked can a bill of rights serve in popular governments?
I answer the two following which though less essential than in other governments, sufficiently recommend the precaution.
The political truths declared that in solemn manner acquire by degrees the character of fundamental maxims of free government, and as they become incorporated with the national sentiment, counteract the impulses of interest and passion.
Although it be generally true as above stated that the danger of oppression lies in the interested majorities of the people rather than in usurped acts of the government, yet there may be occasions on which the evil may spring from the latter sources; and on such, a bill of rights will be a good ground for an appeal to the sense of the community.
Perhaps too there may be a certain degree of danger, that a succession of artful and ambitious rulers, may by gradual and well-timed advances, finally erect an independent government on the subversion of liberty.
Should this danger exist at all, it is prudent to guard against it, especially when the precaution can do no injury.
At the same time I must own that I see no tendency in our governments to danger on that side.
It has been remarked that there is a tendency in all governments to an augmentation of power at the expense of liberty.
But the remark as usually understood does not appear to me well founded.
Power when it has attained a certain degree of energy and independence goes on generally to further degrees.
But when below that degree, the direct tendency is to further degrees of relaxation, until the abuses of liberty beget a sudden transition to an undue degree of power.
With this explanation the remark may be true; and in the latter sense only is it in my opinion applicable to the governments in America.
It is a melancholy reflection that liberty should be equally exposed to danger whether the government have too much or too little power; and that the line which divides these extremes should be so inaccurately defined by experience.
Supposing a bill of rights to be proper the articles which ought to compose it, admit of much discussion.
I am inclined to think that absolute restrictions in cases that are doubtful, or where emergencies may overrule them, ought to be avoided.
The restrictions however strongly marked on paper will never be regarded when opposed to the decided sense of the public; and after repeated violations in extraordinary cases, they will lose even their ordinary efficacy.
Should a rebellion or insurrection alarm the people as well as the government, and a suspension of the habeas corpus be dictated by the alarm, no written prohibitions on earth would prevent the measure.
Should an army in time of peace be gradually established in our neighborhood by Britain or Spain, declarations on paper would have as little effect in preventing a standing force for the public safety.
The best security against these evils is to remove the pretext for them.
With regard to monopolies they are justly classed among the greatest nuisances in government.
But is it clear that as encouragements to literary works and indigenous discoveries, they are not too valuable to be wholly renounced?
Would it not suffice to reserve in all cases a right to the public to abolish the privilege at a price to be specified in the grant of it?
Is there not also infinitely less danger of this abuse in our governments than in most others?
Monopolies are sacrifices of the many to the few.
Where the power is in the few it is natural for them to sacrifice the many to their own partialities and corruptions.
Where the power, as with us, is in the many not in the few, the danger cannot be very great that the few will be thus favored.
It is much more to be dreaded that the few will be unnecessarily sacrificed to the many.
FOOTNOTES
1. The Ratifications of the New Federal Constitution, Together with the Amendments, Proposed by the Several States (Richmond, 1788).
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/doc ... fferson-9/
by James Madison
October 17, 1788
What use then it may be asked can a bill of rights serve in popular governments?
I answer the two following which though less essential than in other governments, sufficiently recommend the precaution.
The political truths declared that in solemn manner acquire by degrees the character of fundamental maxims of free government, and as they become incorporated with the national sentiment, counteract the impulses of interest and passion.
Although it be generally true as above stated that the danger of oppression lies in the interested majorities of the people rather than in usurped acts of the government, yet there may be occasions on which the evil may spring from the latter sources; and on such, a bill of rights will be a good ground for an appeal to the sense of the community.
Perhaps too there may be a certain degree of danger, that a succession of artful and ambitious rulers, may by gradual and well-timed advances, finally erect an independent government on the subversion of liberty.
Should this danger exist at all, it is prudent to guard against it, especially when the precaution can do no injury.
At the same time I must own that I see no tendency in our governments to danger on that side.
It has been remarked that there is a tendency in all governments to an augmentation of power at the expense of liberty.
But the remark as usually understood does not appear to me well founded.
Power when it has attained a certain degree of energy and independence goes on generally to further degrees.
But when below that degree, the direct tendency is to further degrees of relaxation, until the abuses of liberty beget a sudden transition to an undue degree of power.
With this explanation the remark may be true; and in the latter sense only is it in my opinion applicable to the governments in America.
It is a melancholy reflection that liberty should be equally exposed to danger whether the government have too much or too little power; and that the line which divides these extremes should be so inaccurately defined by experience.
Supposing a bill of rights to be proper the articles which ought to compose it, admit of much discussion.
I am inclined to think that absolute restrictions in cases that are doubtful, or where emergencies may overrule them, ought to be avoided.
The restrictions however strongly marked on paper will never be regarded when opposed to the decided sense of the public; and after repeated violations in extraordinary cases, they will lose even their ordinary efficacy.
Should a rebellion or insurrection alarm the people as well as the government, and a suspension of the habeas corpus be dictated by the alarm, no written prohibitions on earth would prevent the measure.
Should an army in time of peace be gradually established in our neighborhood by Britain or Spain, declarations on paper would have as little effect in preventing a standing force for the public safety.
The best security against these evils is to remove the pretext for them.
With regard to monopolies they are justly classed among the greatest nuisances in government.
But is it clear that as encouragements to literary works and indigenous discoveries, they are not too valuable to be wholly renounced?
Would it not suffice to reserve in all cases a right to the public to abolish the privilege at a price to be specified in the grant of it?
Is there not also infinitely less danger of this abuse in our governments than in most others?
Monopolies are sacrifices of the many to the few.
Where the power is in the few it is natural for them to sacrifice the many to their own partialities and corruptions.
Where the power, as with us, is in the many not in the few, the danger cannot be very great that the few will be thus favored.
It is much more to be dreaded that the few will be unnecessarily sacrificed to the many.
FOOTNOTES
1. The Ratifications of the New Federal Constitution, Together with the Amendments, Proposed by the Several States (Richmond, 1788).
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/doc ... fferson-9/
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (1788)
by James Madison
December 8, 1788
Dear Sir
This will be handed to you by Mr. Governeur Morris who will embark in a few days for Havre, from whence he will proceed immediately to Paris.
He is already well known to you by character; and as far as there may be a defect of personal acquaintance I beg leave to supply it by this introduction.
My two last were of Ocr. 8. & 17th.
They furnished a State of our affairs as they then stood.
I shall here add the particulars of most consequence, which have since taken place, remembering however that many details will be most conveniently gathered from the conversation of Mr. Morris who is thoroughly possessed of American transactions.
Notwithstanding the formidable opposition made to the New federal Government, first in order to prevent its adoption, and since in order to place its administration in the hands of disaffected men, there is now both a certainty of its peaceable commencement in March next, and a flattering prospect that it will be administered by men who will give it a fair trial.
General Washington will certainly be called to the Executive department.
Mr. Adams, who is pledged to support him will probably be the vice president.
The enemies to the Government, at the head & the most inveterate, of whom, is Mr. Henry, are laying a train for the election of Governour Clinton, but it cannot succeed unless the federal votes be more dispersed than can well happen.
Of the seven States which have appointed their Senators, Virginia alone will have antifederal members in that branch.
Those of N. Hampshire are President Langdon & Judge Bartlett — of Massachusetts Mr. Strong and Mr. Dalton — of Connecticut Docr. Johnson and Mr. Elesworth — of N. Jersey Mr. Patterson and Mr. Elmer — of Penna. Mr. R. Morris and Mr. McClay — of Delaware Mr. Geo: Reed and Mr. Bassett — of Virginia Mr. R. H. Lee and Col. Grayson.
Here is already a majority of the ratifying States on the side of the Constitution.
And it is not doubted that it will be reinforced by the appointments of Maryland, S. Carolina and Georgia.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by James Madison
December 8, 1788
Dear Sir
This will be handed to you by Mr. Governeur Morris who will embark in a few days for Havre, from whence he will proceed immediately to Paris.
He is already well known to you by character; and as far as there may be a defect of personal acquaintance I beg leave to supply it by this introduction.
My two last were of Ocr. 8. & 17th.
They furnished a State of our affairs as they then stood.
I shall here add the particulars of most consequence, which have since taken place, remembering however that many details will be most conveniently gathered from the conversation of Mr. Morris who is thoroughly possessed of American transactions.
Notwithstanding the formidable opposition made to the New federal Government, first in order to prevent its adoption, and since in order to place its administration in the hands of disaffected men, there is now both a certainty of its peaceable commencement in March next, and a flattering prospect that it will be administered by men who will give it a fair trial.
General Washington will certainly be called to the Executive department.
Mr. Adams, who is pledged to support him will probably be the vice president.
The enemies to the Government, at the head & the most inveterate, of whom, is Mr. Henry, are laying a train for the election of Governour Clinton, but it cannot succeed unless the federal votes be more dispersed than can well happen.
Of the seven States which have appointed their Senators, Virginia alone will have antifederal members in that branch.
Those of N. Hampshire are President Langdon & Judge Bartlett — of Massachusetts Mr. Strong and Mr. Dalton — of Connecticut Docr. Johnson and Mr. Elesworth — of N. Jersey Mr. Patterson and Mr. Elmer — of Penna. Mr. R. Morris and Mr. McClay — of Delaware Mr. Geo: Reed and Mr. Bassett — of Virginia Mr. R. H. Lee and Col. Grayson.
Here is already a majority of the ratifying States on the side of the Constitution.
And it is not doubted that it will be reinforced by the appointments of Maryland, S. Carolina and Georgia.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (1788), continued ...
by James Madison
December 8, 1788
As one branch of the Legislature of N. York is attached to the Constitution, it is not improbable that one of the Senators from that State also will be added to the majority.
In the House of Representatives the proportion of antifederal members will of course be greater, but can not, if present appearances are to be trusted, amount to a majority, or even a very formidable minority.
The election for this branch has taken place as yet no where except in Penna. and here the returns are not yet come in from all the Counties.
It is certain however that seven out of the eight, and probable that the whole eight representatives will bear the federal stamp.
Even in Virginia where the enemies to the Government form 2/3 of the legislature* it is computed that more than half the number of Representatives, who will be elected by the people**, formed into districts for the purpose, will be of the same stamp.
By some it is computed that 7 out of the 10, allotted to that State, will be opposed to the politics of the present Legislature.
The questions which divide the public at present relate 1. to the extent of the amendments that ought to be made to the Constitution. 2. to the mode in which they ought to be made.
The friends of the Constitution, some from an approbation of particular amendments, others from a spirit of conciliation, are generally agreed that the System should be revised.
But they wish the revisal to be carried no farther than to supply additional guards for liberty, without abridging the sum of power transferred from the States to the general Government or altering previous to trial the particular structure of the latter, and are fixed in opposition to the risk of another Convention, whilst the purpose can be as well answered, by the other mode provided for introducing amendments.
Those who have opposed the Constitution, are on the other hand, zealous for a second Convention, and for a revisal, which may either not be restrained at all, or extend at least as far as alterations have been proposed by any State.
Some of this class, are, no doubt, friends to an effective Government, and even to the substance of the particular Government in question.
It is equally certain that there are others, who urge a second Convention with the insidious hope, of throwing all things into confusion, and of subverting the fabric just established, if not the Union itself.
If the first Congress embrace the policy which circumstances mark out, they will not fail to propose of themselves, every desireable safeguard for popular rights; and by thus separating the well meaning from the designing opponents, fix on the latter their true character, and give to the Government its due popularity and stability.
* Underlined by JM
** Italicized words, unless otherwise noted, are those encoded by JM using the code Jeferson sent him on 11 May 1785. Decoded interlinearly by Jefferson
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by James Madison
December 8, 1788
As one branch of the Legislature of N. York is attached to the Constitution, it is not improbable that one of the Senators from that State also will be added to the majority.
In the House of Representatives the proportion of antifederal members will of course be greater, but can not, if present appearances are to be trusted, amount to a majority, or even a very formidable minority.
The election for this branch has taken place as yet no where except in Penna. and here the returns are not yet come in from all the Counties.
It is certain however that seven out of the eight, and probable that the whole eight representatives will bear the federal stamp.
Even in Virginia where the enemies to the Government form 2/3 of the legislature* it is computed that more than half the number of Representatives, who will be elected by the people**, formed into districts for the purpose, will be of the same stamp.
By some it is computed that 7 out of the 10, allotted to that State, will be opposed to the politics of the present Legislature.
The questions which divide the public at present relate 1. to the extent of the amendments that ought to be made to the Constitution. 2. to the mode in which they ought to be made.
The friends of the Constitution, some from an approbation of particular amendments, others from a spirit of conciliation, are generally agreed that the System should be revised.
But they wish the revisal to be carried no farther than to supply additional guards for liberty, without abridging the sum of power transferred from the States to the general Government or altering previous to trial the particular structure of the latter, and are fixed in opposition to the risk of another Convention, whilst the purpose can be as well answered, by the other mode provided for introducing amendments.
Those who have opposed the Constitution, are on the other hand, zealous for a second Convention, and for a revisal, which may either not be restrained at all, or extend at least as far as alterations have been proposed by any State.
Some of this class, are, no doubt, friends to an effective Government, and even to the substance of the particular Government in question.
It is equally certain that there are others, who urge a second Convention with the insidious hope, of throwing all things into confusion, and of subverting the fabric just established, if not the Union itself.
If the first Congress embrace the policy which circumstances mark out, they will not fail to propose of themselves, every desireable safeguard for popular rights; and by thus separating the well meaning from the designing opponents, fix on the latter their true character, and give to the Government its due popularity and stability.
* Underlined by JM
** Italicized words, unless otherwise noted, are those encoded by JM using the code Jeferson sent him on 11 May 1785. Decoded interlinearly by Jefferson
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (1788), continued ...
by James Madison
December 8, 1788
Moustier proves a most unlucky appointment.
He is unsocial proud and niggardly and betrays a sort of fastidiousness toward this country.
He suffers also from his illicit connection with Madame de Brehan which is universally known and offensive to American manners — she is perfectly soured toward this country.
The ladies of New York (a few within the official circle excepted) have for some time withdrawn their attentions from her.
She knows the cause is deeply stung by it views every thing thro the medium of rancor and conveys her impressions to her paramour over whom she exercises despotic sway.
Latterly their time has been cheifly spent in.
The first visit was to an Indian treaty at Fort Schuyler and thence to the Oneida town.
The next to Boston and thence to New Hampshire.
The last to Mount Vernon from which they but lately returned.
On their journeys it is said they often neglect the most obvious precautions for veiling their intimacy — at Boston he imprudently suffered etiquette to prevent even an interview with Governor Hancock.
The inhabitants taking part with the governor neither visited nor invited the count.
They were the less apprehensive of a misinterpretation of the neglect as the most cordial intercourse had just preceded between the town and the French squadron.
Both the count and the marchioness are particularly unpopular amon their countrymen here.
Such of them as are not under restraint make very free remarks and are anxious for a new diplomatic arrangement.
It is but right to add to these particulars that there is reason to believe that unlucky impressions were made on the count at his first probably by de la Forest the Consul a cunning disciple I take it of Marbois’s politics and by something in his communications with Jay which he considered as the effect of coldness and sourness toward France.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by James Madison
December 8, 1788
Moustier proves a most unlucky appointment.
He is unsocial proud and niggardly and betrays a sort of fastidiousness toward this country.
He suffers also from his illicit connection with Madame de Brehan which is universally known and offensive to American manners — she is perfectly soured toward this country.
The ladies of New York (a few within the official circle excepted) have for some time withdrawn their attentions from her.
She knows the cause is deeply stung by it views every thing thro the medium of rancor and conveys her impressions to her paramour over whom she exercises despotic sway.
Latterly their time has been cheifly spent in.
The first visit was to an Indian treaty at Fort Schuyler and thence to the Oneida town.
The next to Boston and thence to New Hampshire.
The last to Mount Vernon from which they but lately returned.
On their journeys it is said they often neglect the most obvious precautions for veiling their intimacy — at Boston he imprudently suffered etiquette to prevent even an interview with Governor Hancock.
The inhabitants taking part with the governor neither visited nor invited the count.
They were the less apprehensive of a misinterpretation of the neglect as the most cordial intercourse had just preceded between the town and the French squadron.
Both the count and the marchioness are particularly unpopular amon their countrymen here.
Such of them as are not under restraint make very free remarks and are anxious for a new diplomatic arrangement.
It is but right to add to these particulars that there is reason to believe that unlucky impressions were made on the count at his first probably by de la Forest the Consul a cunning disciple I take it of Marbois’s politics and by something in his communications with Jay which he considered as the effect of coldness and sourness toward France.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (1788), continued ...
by James Madison
December 8, 1788
I am a stranger to the errand on which G. Morris goes to Europe.
It relates I presume to the affairs of R. Morris which are still much deranged.
I have received and paid the draught in favor of Docr. Ramsay; I had before paid the order in favor of Mr. Thomson, immediately on the receipt of your letter.
About 220 dollars of the balance due on the last state of our account, were left in Virginia for the use of your Nephews.
There are a few lesser sums which stand on my side of the account which I shall take credit for, when you can find leisure to forward another statement of your friendly advances for me.
I shall leave this place in a day or two for Virga. where my friends who wish me to co-operate in putting our political machine into activity as a member of the House of Representatives, press me to attend.
They made me a candidate for the Senate, for which I had not allotted my pretensions.
The attempt was defeated by Mr. Henry who is omnipotent in the present legislature and who added to the expedients common on such occasions, a public philippic agst. my federal principles.
He has taken equal pains in forming the Counties into districts for the election of Reps. to associate with Orange such as are most devoted to his politics, and most likely to be swayed by the prejudices excited agst. me.
From the best information I have of the prevailing temper of the district, I conclude that my going to Virga. will answer no other purpose than to satisfy the Opinions and intreaties of my friends.
The trip is in itself very disagreeable both on account of its electioneering appearance, and the sacrifice of the winter for which I had assigned a task which the intermission of Congressional business would have made convenient at New York.
With the Sincerst affection & the highest esteem I am Dear Sir yrs.
Js. Madison Jr.
The letter herewith inclosed for Mr. Gordon is from Mr. Cyrus Griffin.
The other from Mr. Macarty An American Citizen settled in France, but at present here on business.
He appears to be a very worthy man & I have promised to recommend his letter to your care, as a certain channel of conveyance.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by James Madison
December 8, 1788
I am a stranger to the errand on which G. Morris goes to Europe.
It relates I presume to the affairs of R. Morris which are still much deranged.
I have received and paid the draught in favor of Docr. Ramsay; I had before paid the order in favor of Mr. Thomson, immediately on the receipt of your letter.
About 220 dollars of the balance due on the last state of our account, were left in Virginia for the use of your Nephews.
There are a few lesser sums which stand on my side of the account which I shall take credit for, when you can find leisure to forward another statement of your friendly advances for me.
I shall leave this place in a day or two for Virga. where my friends who wish me to co-operate in putting our political machine into activity as a member of the House of Representatives, press me to attend.
They made me a candidate for the Senate, for which I had not allotted my pretensions.
The attempt was defeated by Mr. Henry who is omnipotent in the present legislature and who added to the expedients common on such occasions, a public philippic agst. my federal principles.
He has taken equal pains in forming the Counties into districts for the election of Reps. to associate with Orange such as are most devoted to his politics, and most likely to be swayed by the prejudices excited agst. me.
From the best information I have of the prevailing temper of the district, I conclude that my going to Virga. will answer no other purpose than to satisfy the Opinions and intreaties of my friends.
The trip is in itself very disagreeable both on account of its electioneering appearance, and the sacrifice of the winter for which I had assigned a task which the intermission of Congressional business would have made convenient at New York.
With the Sincerst affection & the highest esteem I am Dear Sir yrs.
Js. Madison Jr.
The letter herewith inclosed for Mr. Gordon is from Mr. Cyrus Griffin.
The other from Mr. Macarty An American Citizen settled in France, but at present here on business.
He appears to be a very worthy man & I have promised to recommend his letter to your care, as a certain channel of conveyance.
TO BE CONTINUED ...