Nikita Khrushchev Reference Archive
Speech to 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U., continued ...
Speech Delivered: February 24-25 1956;
Even more widely was the falsification of cases practiced in the provinces.
The NKVD headquarters of the Sverdlov Province “discovered” a so-called “Ural uprising staff” – an organ of the bloc of rightists, Trotskyites, Socialist Revolutionaries, and church leaders – whose chief supposedly was the Secretary of the Sverdlov Provincial Party Committee and member of the Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), [Ivan] Kabakov, who had been a Party member since 1914.
Investigative materials of that time show that in almost all regions, provinces and republics there supposedly existed “rightist Trotskyite, espionage-terror and diversionary-sabotage organizations and centers” and that the heads of such organizations as a rule – for no known reason – were First Secretaries of provincial or republican Communist Party committees or Central Committees.
Many thousands of honest and innocent Communists have died as a result of this monstrous falsification of such “cases,” as a result of the fact that all kinds of slanderous “confessions” were accepted, and as a result of the practice of forcing accusations against oneself and others.
In the same manner were fabricated the “cases” against eminent Party and state workers – [Stanislav] Kosior, [Vlas] Chubar, [Pavel] Postyshev, [Alexander] Kosarev, and others.
In those years repressions on a mass scale were applied which were based on nothing tangible and which resulted in heavy cadre losses to the Party.
The vicious practice was condoned of having the NKVD prepare lists of persons whose cases were under the jurisdiction of the Military Collegium and whose sentences were prepared in advance.
Yezhov would send these [execution] lists to Stalin personally for his approval of the proposed punishment.
In 1937-1938, 383 such lists containing the names of many thousands of Party, Soviet, Komsomol, Army, and economic workers were sent to Stalin.
He approved these lists.
A large part of these cases are being reviewed now.
A great many are being voided because they were baseless and falsified.
Suffice it to say that from 1954 to the present time the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court has rehabilitated 7,679 persons, many of whom have been rehabilitated posthumously.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
KRUSHCHEV SPEECH ON CULT OF PERSONALITY
Re: KRUSHCHEV SPEECH ON CULT OF PERSONALITY
Nikita Khrushchev Reference Archive
Speech to 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U., continued ...
Speech Delivered: February 24-25 1956;
Even more widely was the falsification of cases practiced in the provinces.
The NKVD headquarters of the Sverdlov Province “discovered” a so-called “Ural uprising staff” – an organ of the bloc of rightists, Trotskyites, Socialist Revolutionaries, and church leaders – whose chief supposedly was the Secretary of the Sverdlov Provincial Party Committee and member of the Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), [Ivan] Kabakov, who had been a Party member since 1914.
Investigative materials of that time show that in almost all regions, provinces and republics there supposedly existed “rightist Trotskyite, espionage-terror and diversionary-sabotage organizations and centers” and that the heads of such organizations as a rule – for no known reason – were First Secretaries of provincial or republican Communist Party committees or Central Committees.
Many thousands of honest and innocent Communists have died as a result of this monstrous falsification of such “cases,” as a result of the fact that all kinds of slanderous “confessions” were accepted, and as a result of the practice of forcing accusations against oneself and others.
In the same manner were fabricated the “cases” against eminent Party and state workers – [Stanislav] Kosior, [Vlas] Chubar, [Pavel] Postyshev, [Alexander] Kosarev, and others.
In those years repressions on a mass scale were applied which were based on nothing tangible and which resulted in heavy cadre losses to the Party.
The vicious practice was condoned of having the NKVD prepare lists of persons whose cases were under the jurisdiction of the Military Collegium and whose sentences were prepared in advance.
Yezhov would send these [execution] lists to Stalin personally for his approval of the proposed punishment.
In 1937-1938, 383 such lists containing the names of many thousands of Party, Soviet, Komsomol, Army, and economic workers were sent to Stalin.
He approved these lists.
A large part of these cases are being reviewed now.
A great many are being voided because they were baseless and falsified.
Suffice it to say that from 1954 to the present time the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court has rehabilitated 7,679 persons, many of whom have been rehabilitated posthumously.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Speech to 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U., continued ...
Speech Delivered: February 24-25 1956;
Even more widely was the falsification of cases practiced in the provinces.
The NKVD headquarters of the Sverdlov Province “discovered” a so-called “Ural uprising staff” – an organ of the bloc of rightists, Trotskyites, Socialist Revolutionaries, and church leaders – whose chief supposedly was the Secretary of the Sverdlov Provincial Party Committee and member of the Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), [Ivan] Kabakov, who had been a Party member since 1914.
Investigative materials of that time show that in almost all regions, provinces and republics there supposedly existed “rightist Trotskyite, espionage-terror and diversionary-sabotage organizations and centers” and that the heads of such organizations as a rule – for no known reason – were First Secretaries of provincial or republican Communist Party committees or Central Committees.
Many thousands of honest and innocent Communists have died as a result of this monstrous falsification of such “cases,” as a result of the fact that all kinds of slanderous “confessions” were accepted, and as a result of the practice of forcing accusations against oneself and others.
In the same manner were fabricated the “cases” against eminent Party and state workers – [Stanislav] Kosior, [Vlas] Chubar, [Pavel] Postyshev, [Alexander] Kosarev, and others.
In those years repressions on a mass scale were applied which were based on nothing tangible and which resulted in heavy cadre losses to the Party.
The vicious practice was condoned of having the NKVD prepare lists of persons whose cases were under the jurisdiction of the Military Collegium and whose sentences were prepared in advance.
Yezhov would send these [execution] lists to Stalin personally for his approval of the proposed punishment.
In 1937-1938, 383 such lists containing the names of many thousands of Party, Soviet, Komsomol, Army, and economic workers were sent to Stalin.
He approved these lists.
A large part of these cases are being reviewed now.
A great many are being voided because they were baseless and falsified.
Suffice it to say that from 1954 to the present time the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court has rehabilitated 7,679 persons, many of whom have been rehabilitated posthumously.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: KRUSHCHEV SPEECH ON CULT OF PERSONALITY
Nikita Khrushchev Reference Archive
Speech to 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U., continued ...
Speech Delivered: February 24-25 1956;
Mass arrests of Party, Soviet, economic and military workers caused tremendous harm to our country and to the cause of socialist advancement.
Mass repressions had a negative influence on the moral-political condition of the Party, created a situation of uncertainty, contributed to the spreading of unhealthy suspicion, and sowed distrust among Communists.
All sorts of slanderers and careerists were active.
Resolutions of the January, 1938 Central Committee Plenum brought some measure of improvement to Party organizations.
However, widespread repression also existed in 1938.
Only because our Party has at its disposal such great moral-political strength was it possible for it to survive the difficult events in 1937-1938 and to educate new cadres.
There is, however, no doubt that our march forward toward socialism and toward the preparation of the country’s defense would have been much more successful were it not for the tremendous loss in the cadres suffered as a result of the baseless and false mass repressions in 1937-1938.
We are accusing Yezhov justly for the degenerate practices of 1937.
But we have to answer these questions: Could Yezhov have arrested Kosior, for instance, without Stalin’s knowledge?
Was there an exchange of opinions or a Politbiuro decision concerning this?
No, there was not, as there was none regarding other cases of this type.
Could Yezhov have decided such important matters as the fate of such eminent Party figures?
No, it would be a display of naiveté to consider this the work of Yezhov alone.
It is clear that these matters were decided by Stalin, and that without his orders and his sanction Yezhov could not have done this.
We have examined these cases and have rehabilitated Kosior, Rudzutak, Postyshev, Kosarev and others.
For what causes were they arrested and sentenced?
Our review of evidence shows that there was no reason for this.
They, like many others, were arrested without prosecutorial knowledge.
In such a situation, there is no need for any sanction, for what sort of a sanction could there be when Stalin decided everything?
He was the chief prosecutor in these cases.
Stalin not only agreed to arrest orders but issued them on his own initiative.
We must say this so that the delegates to the Congress can clearly undertake and themselves assess this and draw the proper conclusions.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Speech to 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U., continued ...
Speech Delivered: February 24-25 1956;
Mass arrests of Party, Soviet, economic and military workers caused tremendous harm to our country and to the cause of socialist advancement.
Mass repressions had a negative influence on the moral-political condition of the Party, created a situation of uncertainty, contributed to the spreading of unhealthy suspicion, and sowed distrust among Communists.
All sorts of slanderers and careerists were active.
Resolutions of the January, 1938 Central Committee Plenum brought some measure of improvement to Party organizations.
However, widespread repression also existed in 1938.
Only because our Party has at its disposal such great moral-political strength was it possible for it to survive the difficult events in 1937-1938 and to educate new cadres.
There is, however, no doubt that our march forward toward socialism and toward the preparation of the country’s defense would have been much more successful were it not for the tremendous loss in the cadres suffered as a result of the baseless and false mass repressions in 1937-1938.
We are accusing Yezhov justly for the degenerate practices of 1937.
But we have to answer these questions: Could Yezhov have arrested Kosior, for instance, without Stalin’s knowledge?
Was there an exchange of opinions or a Politbiuro decision concerning this?
No, there was not, as there was none regarding other cases of this type.
Could Yezhov have decided such important matters as the fate of such eminent Party figures?
No, it would be a display of naiveté to consider this the work of Yezhov alone.
It is clear that these matters were decided by Stalin, and that without his orders and his sanction Yezhov could not have done this.
We have examined these cases and have rehabilitated Kosior, Rudzutak, Postyshev, Kosarev and others.
For what causes were they arrested and sentenced?
Our review of evidence shows that there was no reason for this.
They, like many others, were arrested without prosecutorial knowledge.
In such a situation, there is no need for any sanction, for what sort of a sanction could there be when Stalin decided everything?
He was the chief prosecutor in these cases.
Stalin not only agreed to arrest orders but issued them on his own initiative.
We must say this so that the delegates to the Congress can clearly undertake and themselves assess this and draw the proper conclusions.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: KRUSHCHEV SPEECH ON CULT OF PERSONALITY
Nikita Khrushchev Reference Archive
Speech to 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U., continued ...
Speech Delivered: February 24-25 1956;
Facts prove that many abuses were made on Stalin’s orders without reckoning with any norms of Party and Soviet legality.
Stalin was a very distrustful man, sickly suspicious.
We know this from our work with him.
He could look at a man and say: “Why are your eyes so shifty today?” or “Why are you turning so much today and avoiding to look me directly in the eyes?”
The sickly suspicion created in him a general distrust even toward eminent Party workers whom he had known for years.
Everywhere and in everything he saw “enemies,” “two-facers” and “spies.”
Possessing unlimited power, he indulged in great willfulness and stifled people morally as well as physically.
A situation was created where one could not express one’s own volition.
When Stalin said that one or another should be arrested, it was necessary to accept on faith that he was an “enemy of the people.”
Meanwhile, Beria’s gang, which ran the organs of state security, outdid itself in proving the guilt of the arrested and the truth of materials which it falsified.
And what proofs were offered?
The confessions of the arrested, and the investigative judges accepted these “confessions.”
And how is it possible that a person confesses to crimes which he has not committed?
Only in one way – because of the application of physical methods of pressuring him, tortures, bringing him to a state of unconsciousness, deprivation of his judgment, taking away of his human dignity.
In this manner were “confessions” acquired.
The wave of mass arrests began to recede in 1939.
When the leaders of territorial Party organizations began to accuse NKVD workers of using methods of physical pressure on the arrested, Stalin dispatched a coded telegram on January 20, 1939 to the committee secretaries of provinces and regions, to the central committees of republican Communist parties, to the [republican] People’s Commissars of Internal Affairs and to the heads of NKVD organizations.
This telegram stated:
“The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) explains that the application of methods of physical pressure in NKVD practice is permissible from 1937 on in accordance with permission of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) ..."
"It is known that all bourgeois intelligence services use methods of physical influence against representatives of the socialist proletariat and that they use them in their most scandalous forms."
“The question arises as to why the socialist intelligence service should be more humanitarian against the mad agents of the bourgeoisie, against the deadly enemies of the working class and of kolkhoz workers."
"The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) considers that physical pressure should still be used obligatorily, as an exception applicable to known and obstinate enemies of the people, as a method both justifiable and appropriate.”
Thus, Stalin had sanctioned in the name of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) the most brutal violation of socialist legality, torture and oppression, which led as we have seen to the slandering and to the self-accusation of innocent people.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Speech to 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U., continued ...
Speech Delivered: February 24-25 1956;
Facts prove that many abuses were made on Stalin’s orders without reckoning with any norms of Party and Soviet legality.
Stalin was a very distrustful man, sickly suspicious.
We know this from our work with him.
He could look at a man and say: “Why are your eyes so shifty today?” or “Why are you turning so much today and avoiding to look me directly in the eyes?”
The sickly suspicion created in him a general distrust even toward eminent Party workers whom he had known for years.
Everywhere and in everything he saw “enemies,” “two-facers” and “spies.”
Possessing unlimited power, he indulged in great willfulness and stifled people morally as well as physically.
A situation was created where one could not express one’s own volition.
When Stalin said that one or another should be arrested, it was necessary to accept on faith that he was an “enemy of the people.”
Meanwhile, Beria’s gang, which ran the organs of state security, outdid itself in proving the guilt of the arrested and the truth of materials which it falsified.
And what proofs were offered?
The confessions of the arrested, and the investigative judges accepted these “confessions.”
And how is it possible that a person confesses to crimes which he has not committed?
Only in one way – because of the application of physical methods of pressuring him, tortures, bringing him to a state of unconsciousness, deprivation of his judgment, taking away of his human dignity.
In this manner were “confessions” acquired.
The wave of mass arrests began to recede in 1939.
When the leaders of territorial Party organizations began to accuse NKVD workers of using methods of physical pressure on the arrested, Stalin dispatched a coded telegram on January 20, 1939 to the committee secretaries of provinces and regions, to the central committees of republican Communist parties, to the [republican] People’s Commissars of Internal Affairs and to the heads of NKVD organizations.
This telegram stated:
“The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) explains that the application of methods of physical pressure in NKVD practice is permissible from 1937 on in accordance with permission of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) ..."
"It is known that all bourgeois intelligence services use methods of physical influence against representatives of the socialist proletariat and that they use them in their most scandalous forms."
“The question arises as to why the socialist intelligence service should be more humanitarian against the mad agents of the bourgeoisie, against the deadly enemies of the working class and of kolkhoz workers."
"The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) considers that physical pressure should still be used obligatorily, as an exception applicable to known and obstinate enemies of the people, as a method both justifiable and appropriate.”
Thus, Stalin had sanctioned in the name of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) the most brutal violation of socialist legality, torture and oppression, which led as we have seen to the slandering and to the self-accusation of innocent people.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: KRUSHCHEV SPEECH ON CULT OF PERSONALITY
Nikita Khrushchev Reference Archive
Speech to 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U., continued ...
Speech Delivered: February 24-25 1956;
Not long ago – only several days before the present Congress – we called to the Central Committee Presidium session and interrogated the investigative judge Rodos, who in his time investigated and interrogated Kosior, Chubar and Kosarev.
He is a vile person, with the brain of a bird, and completely degenerate morally.
It was this man who was deciding the fate of prominent Party workers.
He also was making judgments concerning the politics in these matters, because, having established their “crime,” he thereby provided materials from which important political implications could be drawn.
The question arises whether a man with such an intellect could – by himelf – have conducted his investigations in a manner proving the guilt of people such as Kosior and others.
No, he could not have done it without proper directives.
At the Central Committee Presidium session he told us: “I was told that Kosior and Chubar were people’s enemies and for this reason I, as an investigative judge, had to make them confess that they were enemies.”
(Indignation in the hall.)
He would do this only through long tortures, which he did, receiving detailed instructions from Beria.
We must say that at the Central Committee Presidium session he cynically declared: “I thought that I was executing the orders of the Party.”
In this manner, Stalin’s orders concerning the use of methods of physical pressure against the arrested were carried out in practice.
These and many other facts show that all norms of correct Party solution of problems were [in]validated and that everything was dependent upon the willfulness of one man.
The power accumulated in the hands of one person, Stalin, led to serious consequences during the Great Patriotic War.
When we look at many of our novels, films and historical-scientific studies, the role of Stalin in the Patriotic War appears to be entirely improbable.
Stalin had foreseen everything.
The Soviet Army, on the basis of a strategic plan prepared by Stalin long before, used the tactics of so-called “active defense,” i.e., tactics which, as we know, allowed the Germans to come up to Moscow and Stalingrad.
Using such tactics, the Soviet Army, supposedly thanks only to Stalin’s genius, turned to the offensive and subdued the enemy.
The epic victory gained through the armed might of the land of the Soviets, through our heroic people, is ascribed in this type of novel, film and “scientific study” as being completely due to the strategic genius of Stalin.
We have to analyze this matter carefully because it has a tremendous significance not only from the historical, but especially from the political, educational and practical points of view.
What are the facts of this matter?
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Speech to 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U., continued ...
Speech Delivered: February 24-25 1956;
Not long ago – only several days before the present Congress – we called to the Central Committee Presidium session and interrogated the investigative judge Rodos, who in his time investigated and interrogated Kosior, Chubar and Kosarev.
He is a vile person, with the brain of a bird, and completely degenerate morally.
It was this man who was deciding the fate of prominent Party workers.
He also was making judgments concerning the politics in these matters, because, having established their “crime,” he thereby provided materials from which important political implications could be drawn.
The question arises whether a man with such an intellect could – by himelf – have conducted his investigations in a manner proving the guilt of people such as Kosior and others.
No, he could not have done it without proper directives.
At the Central Committee Presidium session he told us: “I was told that Kosior and Chubar were people’s enemies and for this reason I, as an investigative judge, had to make them confess that they were enemies.”
(Indignation in the hall.)
He would do this only through long tortures, which he did, receiving detailed instructions from Beria.
We must say that at the Central Committee Presidium session he cynically declared: “I thought that I was executing the orders of the Party.”
In this manner, Stalin’s orders concerning the use of methods of physical pressure against the arrested were carried out in practice.
These and many other facts show that all norms of correct Party solution of problems were [in]validated and that everything was dependent upon the willfulness of one man.
The power accumulated in the hands of one person, Stalin, led to serious consequences during the Great Patriotic War.
When we look at many of our novels, films and historical-scientific studies, the role of Stalin in the Patriotic War appears to be entirely improbable.
Stalin had foreseen everything.
The Soviet Army, on the basis of a strategic plan prepared by Stalin long before, used the tactics of so-called “active defense,” i.e., tactics which, as we know, allowed the Germans to come up to Moscow and Stalingrad.
Using such tactics, the Soviet Army, supposedly thanks only to Stalin’s genius, turned to the offensive and subdued the enemy.
The epic victory gained through the armed might of the land of the Soviets, through our heroic people, is ascribed in this type of novel, film and “scientific study” as being completely due to the strategic genius of Stalin.
We have to analyze this matter carefully because it has a tremendous significance not only from the historical, but especially from the political, educational and practical points of view.
What are the facts of this matter?
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: KRUSHCHEV SPEECH ON CULT OF PERSONALITY
Nikita Khrushchev Reference Archive
Speech to 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U., continued ...
Speech Delivered: February 24-25 1956;
Before the war, our press and all our political-educational work was characterized by its bragging tone: When an enemy violates the holy Soviet soil, then for every blow of the enemy we will answer with three, and we will battle the enemy on his soil and we will win without much harm to ourselves.
But these positive statements were not based in all areas on concrete facts, which would actually guarantee the immunity of our borders.
During the war and after the war, Stalin advanced the thesis that the tragedy our nation experienced in the first part of the war was the result of an “unexpected” attack by the Germans against the Soviet Union.
But, comrades, this is completely untrue.
As soon as Hitler came to power in Germany he assigned to himself the task of liquidating Communism.
The fascists were saying this openly.
They did not hide their plans.
In order to attain this aggressive end, all sorts of pacts and blocs were created, such as the famous Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis.
Many facts from the prewar period clearly showed that Hitler was going all out to begin a war against the Soviet state, and that he had concentrated large armies, together with armored units, near the Soviet borders.
Documents which have now been published show that [as early as] April 3, 1941 Churchill, through his ambassador to the USSR, [Sir Stafford] Cripps, personally warned Stalin that the Germans had begun regrouping their armed units with the intent of attacking the Soviet Union.
It is self-evident that Churchill did not do this at all because of his friendly feeling toward the Soviet nation.
He had in this his own imperialistic goals – to bring Germany and the USSR into a bloody war and thereby to strengthen the position of the British Empire.
All the same, Churchill affirmed in his writings that he sought to “warn Stalin and call his attention to the danger which threatened him.”
Churchill stressed this repeatedly in his dispatches of April 18 and on the following days.
However, Stalin took no heed of these warnings.
What is more, Stalin ordered that no credence be given to information of this sort, so as not to provoke the initiation of military operations.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Speech to 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U., continued ...
Speech Delivered: February 24-25 1956;
Before the war, our press and all our political-educational work was characterized by its bragging tone: When an enemy violates the holy Soviet soil, then for every blow of the enemy we will answer with three, and we will battle the enemy on his soil and we will win without much harm to ourselves.
But these positive statements were not based in all areas on concrete facts, which would actually guarantee the immunity of our borders.
During the war and after the war, Stalin advanced the thesis that the tragedy our nation experienced in the first part of the war was the result of an “unexpected” attack by the Germans against the Soviet Union.
But, comrades, this is completely untrue.
As soon as Hitler came to power in Germany he assigned to himself the task of liquidating Communism.
The fascists were saying this openly.
They did not hide their plans.
In order to attain this aggressive end, all sorts of pacts and blocs were created, such as the famous Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis.
Many facts from the prewar period clearly showed that Hitler was going all out to begin a war against the Soviet state, and that he had concentrated large armies, together with armored units, near the Soviet borders.
Documents which have now been published show that [as early as] April 3, 1941 Churchill, through his ambassador to the USSR, [Sir Stafford] Cripps, personally warned Stalin that the Germans had begun regrouping their armed units with the intent of attacking the Soviet Union.
It is self-evident that Churchill did not do this at all because of his friendly feeling toward the Soviet nation.
He had in this his own imperialistic goals – to bring Germany and the USSR into a bloody war and thereby to strengthen the position of the British Empire.
All the same, Churchill affirmed in his writings that he sought to “warn Stalin and call his attention to the danger which threatened him.”
Churchill stressed this repeatedly in his dispatches of April 18 and on the following days.
However, Stalin took no heed of these warnings.
What is more, Stalin ordered that no credence be given to information of this sort, so as not to provoke the initiation of military operations.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: KRUSHCHEV SPEECH ON CULT OF PERSONALITY
Nikita Khrushchev Reference Archive
Speech to 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U., continued ...
Speech Delivered: February 24-25 1956;
We must assert that information of this sort concerning the threat of German armed invasion of Soviet territory was coming in also from our own military and diplomatic sources.
However, because the leadership was conditioned against such information, such data was dispatched with fear and assessed with reservation.
Thus, for instance, information sent from Berlin on May 6, 1941 by the Soviet military (sic) attaché, Captain (sic) Vorontsov, stated: “Soviet citizen Bozer ... communicated to the Deputy naval attaché that, according to a statement of a certain German officer from Hitler’s headquarters, Germany is preparing to invade the USSR on May 14 through Finland, the Baltic countries and Latvia."
"At the same time Moscow and Leningrad will be heavily raided and paratroopers landed in border cities....”
In his report of May 22, 1941, the Deputy Military Attaché in Berlin, Khlopov, communicated that “...the attack of the German Army is reportedly scheduled for June 15, but it is possible that it may begin in the first days of June...”
A cable from our London Embassy dated June 18, 1941 stated: “As of now Cripps is deeply convinced of the inevitability of armed conflict between Germany and the USSR, which will begin not later than the middle of June."
"According to Cripps, the Germans have presently concentrated 147 divisions (including air force and service units) along the Soviet borders....”
Despite these particularly grave warnings, the necessary steps were not taken to prepare the country properly for defense and to prevent it from being caught unawares.
Did we have time and the capabilities for such preparations?
Yes, we had the time and the capability.
Our industry was already so developed that it was capable of supplying fully the Soviet Army with everything that it needed.
This is proven by the fact that, although during the war we lost almost half of our industry and important industrial and food-production areas as the result of enemy occupation of the Ukraine, Northern Caucasus and other western parts of the country, the Soviet nation was still able to organize the production of military equipment in the eastern parts of the country, to install there equipment taken from the western industrial areas, and to supply our armed forces with everything necessary to destroy the enemy.
Had our industry been mobilized properly and in time to supply the Army with the necessary materiel, our wartime losses would have been decidedly smaller.
However such mobilization had not been started in time.
And already in the first days of the war it became evident that our Army was badly armed.
We did not have enough artillery, tanks and planes to throw the enemy back.
Soviet science and technology produced excellent models of tanks and artillery pieces before the war.
But mass production of all this was not organized.
As a matter of fact, we started to modernize our military equipment only on the eve of the war.
As a result, when the enemy invaded Soviet territory we did not have sufficient quantities either of old machinery which was no longer used for armament production or of new machinery which we had planned to introduce into armament production.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Speech to 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U., continued ...
Speech Delivered: February 24-25 1956;
We must assert that information of this sort concerning the threat of German armed invasion of Soviet territory was coming in also from our own military and diplomatic sources.
However, because the leadership was conditioned against such information, such data was dispatched with fear and assessed with reservation.
Thus, for instance, information sent from Berlin on May 6, 1941 by the Soviet military (sic) attaché, Captain (sic) Vorontsov, stated: “Soviet citizen Bozer ... communicated to the Deputy naval attaché that, according to a statement of a certain German officer from Hitler’s headquarters, Germany is preparing to invade the USSR on May 14 through Finland, the Baltic countries and Latvia."
"At the same time Moscow and Leningrad will be heavily raided and paratroopers landed in border cities....”
In his report of May 22, 1941, the Deputy Military Attaché in Berlin, Khlopov, communicated that “...the attack of the German Army is reportedly scheduled for June 15, but it is possible that it may begin in the first days of June...”
A cable from our London Embassy dated June 18, 1941 stated: “As of now Cripps is deeply convinced of the inevitability of armed conflict between Germany and the USSR, which will begin not later than the middle of June."
"According to Cripps, the Germans have presently concentrated 147 divisions (including air force and service units) along the Soviet borders....”
Despite these particularly grave warnings, the necessary steps were not taken to prepare the country properly for defense and to prevent it from being caught unawares.
Did we have time and the capabilities for such preparations?
Yes, we had the time and the capability.
Our industry was already so developed that it was capable of supplying fully the Soviet Army with everything that it needed.
This is proven by the fact that, although during the war we lost almost half of our industry and important industrial and food-production areas as the result of enemy occupation of the Ukraine, Northern Caucasus and other western parts of the country, the Soviet nation was still able to organize the production of military equipment in the eastern parts of the country, to install there equipment taken from the western industrial areas, and to supply our armed forces with everything necessary to destroy the enemy.
Had our industry been mobilized properly and in time to supply the Army with the necessary materiel, our wartime losses would have been decidedly smaller.
However such mobilization had not been started in time.
And already in the first days of the war it became evident that our Army was badly armed.
We did not have enough artillery, tanks and planes to throw the enemy back.
Soviet science and technology produced excellent models of tanks and artillery pieces before the war.
But mass production of all this was not organized.
As a matter of fact, we started to modernize our military equipment only on the eve of the war.
As a result, when the enemy invaded Soviet territory we did not have sufficient quantities either of old machinery which was no longer used for armament production or of new machinery which we had planned to introduce into armament production.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: KRUSHCHEV SPEECH ON CULT OF PERSONALITY
Nikita Khrushchev Reference Archive
Speech to 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U., continued ...
Speech Delivered: February 24-25 1956;
The situation with anti-aircraft artillery was especially bad.
We did not organize the production of anti-tank ammunition.
Many fortified regions proved to be indefensible as soon as they were attacked, because their old arms had been withdrawn and new ones were not yet available there.
This pertained, alas, not only to tanks, artillery and planes.
At the outbreak of the war we did not even have sufficient numbers of rifles to arm the mobilized manpower.
I recall that in those days I telephoned from Kiev to comrade [Georgy] Malenkov and told him, “People have volunteered for the new Army [units] and are demanding weapons."
"You must send us arms.”
Malenkov answered me, “We cannot send you arms."
"We are sending all our rifles to Leningrad and you have to arm yourselves.”
(Movement in the hall.)
Such was the armament situation.
In this connection we cannot forget, for instance, the following fact: Shortly before the invasion of the Soviet Union by Hitler’s army, [Colonel-General M. P.] Kirponos, who was chief of the Kiev Special Military District (he was later killed at the front), wrote to Stalin that German armies were at the Bug River, were preparing for an attack and in the very near future would probably start their offensive.
In this connection, Kirponos proposed that a strong defense be organized, that 300,000 people be evacuated from the border areas and that several strong points be organized there: anti-tank ditches, trenches for the soldiers, etc.
Moscow answered this proposition with the assertions that this would be a provocation, that no preparatory defensive work should be undertaken at the borders, and that the Germans were not to be given any pretext for the initiation of military action against us.
Thus our borders were insufficiently prepared to repel the enemy.
When the fascist armies had actually invaded Soviet territory and military operations began, Moscow issued an order that German fire was not to be returned.
Why?
It was because Stalin, despite the self-evident facts, thought that the war had not yet started, that this was only a provocative action on the part of several undisciplined sections of the German Army, and that our reaction might serve as a reason for the Germans to begin the war.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Speech to 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U., continued ...
Speech Delivered: February 24-25 1956;
The situation with anti-aircraft artillery was especially bad.
We did not organize the production of anti-tank ammunition.
Many fortified regions proved to be indefensible as soon as they were attacked, because their old arms had been withdrawn and new ones were not yet available there.
This pertained, alas, not only to tanks, artillery and planes.
At the outbreak of the war we did not even have sufficient numbers of rifles to arm the mobilized manpower.
I recall that in those days I telephoned from Kiev to comrade [Georgy] Malenkov and told him, “People have volunteered for the new Army [units] and are demanding weapons."
"You must send us arms.”
Malenkov answered me, “We cannot send you arms."
"We are sending all our rifles to Leningrad and you have to arm yourselves.”
(Movement in the hall.)
Such was the armament situation.
In this connection we cannot forget, for instance, the following fact: Shortly before the invasion of the Soviet Union by Hitler’s army, [Colonel-General M. P.] Kirponos, who was chief of the Kiev Special Military District (he was later killed at the front), wrote to Stalin that German armies were at the Bug River, were preparing for an attack and in the very near future would probably start their offensive.
In this connection, Kirponos proposed that a strong defense be organized, that 300,000 people be evacuated from the border areas and that several strong points be organized there: anti-tank ditches, trenches for the soldiers, etc.
Moscow answered this proposition with the assertions that this would be a provocation, that no preparatory defensive work should be undertaken at the borders, and that the Germans were not to be given any pretext for the initiation of military action against us.
Thus our borders were insufficiently prepared to repel the enemy.
When the fascist armies had actually invaded Soviet territory and military operations began, Moscow issued an order that German fire was not to be returned.
Why?
It was because Stalin, despite the self-evident facts, thought that the war had not yet started, that this was only a provocative action on the part of several undisciplined sections of the German Army, and that our reaction might serve as a reason for the Germans to begin the war.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: KRUSHCHEV SPEECH ON CULT OF PERSONALITY
Nikita Khrushchev Reference Archive
Speech to 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U., continued ...
Speech Delivered: February 24-25 1956;
The following fact is also known: On the eve of the invasion of Soviet territory by Hitler’s army, a certain German citizen crossed our border and stated that the German armies had received orders to start [their] offensive against the Soviet Union on the night of June 22 at 3 o’clock.
Stalin was informed about this immediately, but even this warning was ignored.
As you see, everything was ignored: warnings of certain Army commanders, declarations of deserters from the enemy army, and even the open hostility of the enemy.
Is this an example of the alertness of the chief of the Party and of the state at this particularly significant historical moment?
And what were the results of this carefree attitude, this disregard of clear facts?
The result was that already in the first hours and days the enemy had destroyed in our border regions a large part of our Air Force, our artillery and other military equipment.
[Stalin] annihilated large numbers of our military cadres and disorganized our military leadership.
Consequently we could not prevent the enemy from marching deep into the country.
Very grievous consequences, especially with regard to the beginning of the war, followed Stalin’s annihilation of many military commanders and political workers during 1937-1941 because of his suspiciousness and through slanderous accusations.
During these years repressions were instituted against certain parts of our military cadres beginning literally at the company- and battalion-commander levels and extending to higher military centers.
During this time, the cadre of leaders who had gained military experience in Spain and in the Far East was almost completely liquidated.
The policy of large-scale repression against military cadres led also to undermined military discipline, because for several years officers of all ranks and even soldiers in Party and Komsomol cells were taught to “unmask” their superiors as hidden enemies.
(Movement in the hall.)
It is natural that this caused a negative influence on the state of military discipline in the initial stage of the war.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Speech to 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U., continued ...
Speech Delivered: February 24-25 1956;
The following fact is also known: On the eve of the invasion of Soviet territory by Hitler’s army, a certain German citizen crossed our border and stated that the German armies had received orders to start [their] offensive against the Soviet Union on the night of June 22 at 3 o’clock.
Stalin was informed about this immediately, but even this warning was ignored.
As you see, everything was ignored: warnings of certain Army commanders, declarations of deserters from the enemy army, and even the open hostility of the enemy.
Is this an example of the alertness of the chief of the Party and of the state at this particularly significant historical moment?
And what were the results of this carefree attitude, this disregard of clear facts?
The result was that already in the first hours and days the enemy had destroyed in our border regions a large part of our Air Force, our artillery and other military equipment.
[Stalin] annihilated large numbers of our military cadres and disorganized our military leadership.
Consequently we could not prevent the enemy from marching deep into the country.
Very grievous consequences, especially with regard to the beginning of the war, followed Stalin’s annihilation of many military commanders and political workers during 1937-1941 because of his suspiciousness and through slanderous accusations.
During these years repressions were instituted against certain parts of our military cadres beginning literally at the company- and battalion-commander levels and extending to higher military centers.
During this time, the cadre of leaders who had gained military experience in Spain and in the Far East was almost completely liquidated.
The policy of large-scale repression against military cadres led also to undermined military discipline, because for several years officers of all ranks and even soldiers in Party and Komsomol cells were taught to “unmask” their superiors as hidden enemies.
(Movement in the hall.)
It is natural that this caused a negative influence on the state of military discipline in the initial stage of the war.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: KRUSHCHEV SPEECH ON CULT OF PERSONALITY
Nikita Khrushchev Reference Archive
Speech to 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U., continued ...
Speech Delivered: February 24-25 1956;
And, as you know, we had before the war excellent military cadres which were unquestionably loyal to the Party and to the Fatherland.
Suffice it to say that those of them who managed to survive, despite severe tortures to which they were subjected in the prisons, have from the first war days shown themselves real patriots and heroically fought for the glory of the Fatherland.
I have here in mind such [generals] as: [Konstantin] Rokossovsky (who, as you know, had been jailed); [Alexander] Gorbatov; [Kiril] Meretskov (who is a delegate at the present Congress); [K. P.] Podlas (he was an excellent commander who perished at the front); and many, many others.
However, many such commanders perished in the camps and the jails and the Army saw them no more.
All this brought about a situation at the beginning of the war that was a great threat to our Fatherland.
It would be wrong to forget that, after [our] severe initial disaster(s) and defeat(s) at the front, Stalin thought that it was the end.
In one of his [declarations] in those days he said: “Lenin left us a great legacy and we’ve lost it forever.”
After this Stalin for a long time actually did not direct military operations and ceased to do anything whatsoever.
He returned to active leadership only when a Politbiuro delegation visited him and told him that steps needed to be taken immediately so as to improve the situation at the front.
Therefore, the threatening danger which hung over our Fatherland in the initial period of the war was largely due to Stalin’s very own faulty methods of directing the nation and the Party.
However, we speak not only about the moment when the war began, which led to our Army’s serious disorganization and brought us severe losses.
Even after the war began, the nervousness and hysteria which Stalin demonstrated while interfering with actual military operations caused our Army serious damage.
Stalin was very far from understanding the real situation that was developing at the front.
This was natural because, during the whole Patriotic War, he never visited any section of the front or any liberated city except for one short ride on the Mozhaisk highway during a stabilized situation at the front.
To this incident were dedicated many literary works full of fantasies of all sorts and so many paintings.
Simultaneously, Stalin was interfering with operations and issuing orders which did not take into consideration the real situation at a given section of the front and which could not help but result in huge personnel losses.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Speech to 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U., continued ...
Speech Delivered: February 24-25 1956;
And, as you know, we had before the war excellent military cadres which were unquestionably loyal to the Party and to the Fatherland.
Suffice it to say that those of them who managed to survive, despite severe tortures to which they were subjected in the prisons, have from the first war days shown themselves real patriots and heroically fought for the glory of the Fatherland.
I have here in mind such [generals] as: [Konstantin] Rokossovsky (who, as you know, had been jailed); [Alexander] Gorbatov; [Kiril] Meretskov (who is a delegate at the present Congress); [K. P.] Podlas (he was an excellent commander who perished at the front); and many, many others.
However, many such commanders perished in the camps and the jails and the Army saw them no more.
All this brought about a situation at the beginning of the war that was a great threat to our Fatherland.
It would be wrong to forget that, after [our] severe initial disaster(s) and defeat(s) at the front, Stalin thought that it was the end.
In one of his [declarations] in those days he said: “Lenin left us a great legacy and we’ve lost it forever.”
After this Stalin for a long time actually did not direct military operations and ceased to do anything whatsoever.
He returned to active leadership only when a Politbiuro delegation visited him and told him that steps needed to be taken immediately so as to improve the situation at the front.
Therefore, the threatening danger which hung over our Fatherland in the initial period of the war was largely due to Stalin’s very own faulty methods of directing the nation and the Party.
However, we speak not only about the moment when the war began, which led to our Army’s serious disorganization and brought us severe losses.
Even after the war began, the nervousness and hysteria which Stalin demonstrated while interfering with actual military operations caused our Army serious damage.
Stalin was very far from understanding the real situation that was developing at the front.
This was natural because, during the whole Patriotic War, he never visited any section of the front or any liberated city except for one short ride on the Mozhaisk highway during a stabilized situation at the front.
To this incident were dedicated many literary works full of fantasies of all sorts and so many paintings.
Simultaneously, Stalin was interfering with operations and issuing orders which did not take into consideration the real situation at a given section of the front and which could not help but result in huge personnel losses.
TO BE CONTINUED ...