Battle of Cannae, continued ...
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Aftermath
Never when the city was in safety was there so great a panic and confusion within the walls of Rome.
I shall therefore shrink from the task, and not attempt to relate what in describing I must make less than the reality.
The consul and his army having been lost at the Trasimenus the year before, it was not one wound upon another which was announced, but a multiplied disaster, the loss of two consular armies, together with the two consuls: and that now there was neither any Roman camp, nor general nor soldiery: that Apulia and Samnium, and now almost the whole of Italy, were in the possession of Hannibal.
No other nation surely would not have been overwhelmed by such an accumulation of misfortune.
— Livy, on the Roman Senate's reaction to the defeat
For a brief period, the Romans were in complete disarray.
Their best armies in the peninsula were destroyed, the few remnants severely demoralized, and the only remaining consul (Varro) completely discredited.
As the story goes, Rome declared a national day of mourning as there was not a single person who was not either related to or acquainted with a person who had died.
The Romans became so desperate that they resorted to human sacrifice, twice burying people alive at the Forum of Rome and abandoning an oversized baby in the Adriatic Sea (perhaps one of the last instances of human sacrifices by the Romans, apart from public executions of defeated enemies dedicated to Mars).
Within just three campaign seasons (20 months), Rome had lost one-fifth (150,000) of the entire population of male citizens over 17 years of age.
Furthermore, the morale effect of this victory was such that most of southern Italy joined Hannibal's cause.
After Cannae, the Hellenistic southern provinces of Arpi, Salapia, Herdonia, Uzentum, including the cities of Capua and Tarentum (two of the largest city-states in Italy) revoked their allegiance to Rome and pledged their loyalty to Hannibal.
As Livy noted, "How much more serious was the defeat of Cannae than those which preceded it, can be seen by the behavior of Rome's allies; before that fateful day, their loyalty remained unshaken, now it began to waver for the simple reason that they despaired of Roman power."
That the same year the Greek cities in Sicily were induced to revolt against Roman political control, while the Macedonian king, Philip V, pledged his support to Hannibal, initiating the First Macedonian War against Rome.
Hannibal also secured an alliance with the new King Hieronymus of Syracuse, the only independent king left in Sicily.
Livy illustrates the state of Roman morale with two vivid anecdotes.
The first concerns Hannibal's brother Mago, who had returned to Carthage with news of the victory.
He reported to their senate that in several engagements with the Romans Hannibal had killed over 200,000 soldiers and taken 50,000 prisoner; of six commanders, two consuls and a Master of horse had been slain; and a number of Roman allies had gone over to the Carthaginians.
Then Mago concluded his report by having a collection of golden rings poured upon the council floor in front of the assembled senators.
He explained that each ring belonged to one equites who had been slain in battle and had earned the ring through exceptional bravery.
Livy notes one unnamed authority stated the volume of jewelry amounted to three and one-half measures (Congius?), only to add "it is generally and more credibly held that there was not more than one measure of them".
The second concerns Lucius Caecilius Metellus and three other military tribunes, who had taken refuge at Canusium with other Roman refugees.
Demoralized at the defeat, they discussed the possibility of setting sail overseas and finding employment as mercenaries for some foreign prince.
Word of this meeting reached the young Publius Cornelius Scipio who, with only a few followers, strode to where the discussion was underway and burst into the chamber holding his naked sword over their heads.
Before the wavering men Scipio is reported to have cried:
I swear with all the passion in my heart that I will never desert our homeland, or permit any other citizen of Rome to leave her in the lurch.
If I willfully break my oath may Jupiter, Greatest and Best, bring me to a shameful death, with my house, my family, and all I possess!
Swear the same oath, Caecilius!
And the rest of you, swear it too.
If anyone refuse, against him this sword is drawn.
Following the battle, the commander of the Numidian cavalry, Maharbal, urged Hannibal to seize the opportunity and march immediately on Rome.
It is told that the latter's refusal caused Maharbal's exclamation: "Of a truth the gods have not bestowed all things upon the same person."
"You know how to conquer, Hannibal; but you do not know how to make use of your victory."
Hannibal had good reasons to judge the strategic situation after the battle differently from Maharbal.
As the historian Hans Delbrück pointed out, due to the high numbers of killed and wounded among its ranks, the Punic army was not in a condition to perform a direct assault on Rome.
It would have been a fruitless demonstration that would have nullified the psychological effect of Cannae on the Roman allies.
Even if his army was at full strength, a successful siege of Rome would have required Hannibal to subdue a considerable part of the hinterland to cut the enemy's supplies and secure his own.
Even after the tremendous losses suffered at Cannae and the defection of a number of her allies, Rome still had abundant manpower to prevent this and maintain considerable forces in Iberia, Sicily, Sardinia and elsewhere despite Hannibal's presence in Italy.
Hannibal's conduct after the victories at Trasimene (217 BC) and Cannae, and the fact that he first attacked Rome only five years later, in 211 BC, suggests that his strategic aim was not the destruction of his foe but to dishearten the Romans by carnage on the battlefield and to wear them down to a moderate peace agreement by stripping them of their allies.
Immediately after Cannae, Hannibal sent a delegation led by Carthalo to negotiate a peace treaty with the Senate on moderate terms.
Despite the multiple catastrophes Rome had suffered, the Senate refused to parley.
Instead, they redoubled their efforts, declaring full mobilization of the male Roman population, and raised new legions, enlisting landless peasants and even slaves.
So firm were these measures that the word "peace" was prohibited, mourning was limited to only 30 days, and public tears were prohibited even to women.
For the remainder of the war in Italy, they did not amass such large forces under one command against Hannibal; they used several independent armies, still outnumbering the Punic forces in numbers of armies and soldiers.
The war still had occasional battles, but was focused on taking strongpoints and constant fighting according to the Fabian strategy.
This finally forced Hannibal with his shortage of manpower to retreat to Croton from where he was called to Africa for the battle of Zama, ending the war with a complete Roman victory.
TO BE CONTINUED …
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Cannae
MUSINGS ON THE SCHEME OF THINGS
Re: MUSINGS ON THE SCHEME OF THINGS
Battle of Cannae, continued ...
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Historical significance
Effects on Roman military doctrine
Cannae played a major role in shaping the military structure and tactical organization of the Roman Republican army.
At Cannae, the Roman infantry assumed a formation similar to the Greek phalanx.
This left them vulnerable to Hannibal's tactic of double envelopment since their inability to maneuver independently from the mass of the army made it impossible for them to counter the strategic encirclement used by the Carthaginian cavalry.
The laws of the Roman state requiring command to alternate between the two consuls restricted strategic consistency.
In the years following Cannae, striking reforms were introduced to address these deficiencies.
First, the Romans "articulated the phalanx, then divided it into columns, and finally split it up into a great number of small tactical bodies that were capable, now of closing together in a compact impenetrable union, now of changing the pattern with consummate flexibility, of separating one from the other and turning in this or that direction."
For instance, at Ilipa and Zama, the principes were formed up well to the rear of the hastate — a deployment that allowed a greater degree of mobility and maneuverability.
The culminating result of this change marked the transition from the traditional manipular system to the cohort under Gaius Marius, as the basic infantry unit of the Roman army.
In addition, a unified command came to be seen as a necessity.
After various political experiments, Scipio Africanus was made general-in-chief of the Roman armies in Africa, and was assured this role for the duration of the war.
This appointment may have violated the constitutional laws of the Roman Republic but, as Delbrück wrote, it "effected an internal transformation that increased her military potentiality enormously" while foreshadowing the decline of the Republic's political institutions.
Furthermore, the battle exposed the limits of a citizen-militia army.
Following Cannae, the Roman army gradually developed into a professional force: the nucleus of Scipio's army at Zama was composed of veterans who had been fighting the Carthaginians in Hispania for nearly sixteen years, and had been moulded into a superb fighting force.
TO BE CONTINUED …
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Cannae
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Historical significance
Effects on Roman military doctrine
Cannae played a major role in shaping the military structure and tactical organization of the Roman Republican army.
At Cannae, the Roman infantry assumed a formation similar to the Greek phalanx.
This left them vulnerable to Hannibal's tactic of double envelopment since their inability to maneuver independently from the mass of the army made it impossible for them to counter the strategic encirclement used by the Carthaginian cavalry.
The laws of the Roman state requiring command to alternate between the two consuls restricted strategic consistency.
In the years following Cannae, striking reforms were introduced to address these deficiencies.
First, the Romans "articulated the phalanx, then divided it into columns, and finally split it up into a great number of small tactical bodies that were capable, now of closing together in a compact impenetrable union, now of changing the pattern with consummate flexibility, of separating one from the other and turning in this or that direction."
For instance, at Ilipa and Zama, the principes were formed up well to the rear of the hastate — a deployment that allowed a greater degree of mobility and maneuverability.
The culminating result of this change marked the transition from the traditional manipular system to the cohort under Gaius Marius, as the basic infantry unit of the Roman army.
In addition, a unified command came to be seen as a necessity.
After various political experiments, Scipio Africanus was made general-in-chief of the Roman armies in Africa, and was assured this role for the duration of the war.
This appointment may have violated the constitutional laws of the Roman Republic but, as Delbrück wrote, it "effected an internal transformation that increased her military potentiality enormously" while foreshadowing the decline of the Republic's political institutions.
Furthermore, the battle exposed the limits of a citizen-militia army.
Following Cannae, the Roman army gradually developed into a professional force: the nucleus of Scipio's army at Zama was composed of veterans who had been fighting the Carthaginians in Hispania for nearly sixteen years, and had been moulded into a superb fighting force.
TO BE CONTINUED …
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Cannae
Re: MUSINGS ON THE SCHEME OF THINGS
Battle of Cannae, continued ...
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Historical significance
Status in military history
Cannae is as famous for Hannibal's tactics as it is for the role it played in Roman history.
Not only did Hannibal inflict a defeat on the Roman Republic in a manner unrepeated for over a century until the lesser-known Battle of Arausio, the battle has acquired a significant reputation in military history.
As military historian Theodore Ayrault Dodge wrote:
Few battles of ancient times are more marked by ability... than the battle of Cannae.
The position was such as to place every advantage on Hannibal's side.
The manner in which the far from perfect Hispanic and Gallic foot was advanced in a wedge in echelon... was first held there and then withdrawn step by step, until it had the reached the converse position... is a simple masterpiece of battle tactics.
The advance at the proper moment of the African infantry, and its wheel right and left upon the flanks of the disordered and crowded Roman legionaries, is far beyond praise.
The whole battle, from the Carthaginian standpoint, is a consummate piece of art, having no superior, few equal, examples in the history of war.
As Will Durant wrote, "It was a supreme example of generalship, never bettered in history... and it set the lines of military tactics for 2,000 years".
Hannibal's double envelopment at Cannae is often viewed as one of the greatest battlefield maneuvers in history, and is cited as the first successful use of the pincer movement within the Western world to be recorded in detail.
TO BE CONTINUED …
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Cannae
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Historical significance
Status in military history
Cannae is as famous for Hannibal's tactics as it is for the role it played in Roman history.
Not only did Hannibal inflict a defeat on the Roman Republic in a manner unrepeated for over a century until the lesser-known Battle of Arausio, the battle has acquired a significant reputation in military history.
As military historian Theodore Ayrault Dodge wrote:
Few battles of ancient times are more marked by ability... than the battle of Cannae.
The position was such as to place every advantage on Hannibal's side.
The manner in which the far from perfect Hispanic and Gallic foot was advanced in a wedge in echelon... was first held there and then withdrawn step by step, until it had the reached the converse position... is a simple masterpiece of battle tactics.
The advance at the proper moment of the African infantry, and its wheel right and left upon the flanks of the disordered and crowded Roman legionaries, is far beyond praise.
The whole battle, from the Carthaginian standpoint, is a consummate piece of art, having no superior, few equal, examples in the history of war.
As Will Durant wrote, "It was a supreme example of generalship, never bettered in history... and it set the lines of military tactics for 2,000 years".
Hannibal's double envelopment at Cannae is often viewed as one of the greatest battlefield maneuvers in history, and is cited as the first successful use of the pincer movement within the Western world to be recorded in detail.
TO BE CONTINUED …
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Cannae
Re: MUSINGS ON THE SCHEME OF THINGS
Battle of Cannae, continued ...
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Historical significance
"Cannae model"
Apart from being one of the greatest defeats inflicted on Roman arms, Cannae represents the archetypal battle of annihilation, a strategy whose successful implementation has been rare in modern history.
As Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force in World War II, wrote, "Every ground commander seeks the battle of annihilation; so far as conditions permit, he tries to duplicate in modern war the classic example of Cannae".
Furthermore, the totality of Hannibal's victory has made the name "Cannae" a byword for military success, and is studied in detail in military academies around the world.
The notion that an entire army could be encircled and annihilated within a single stroke led to a fascination among Western generals for centuries (including Frederick the Great and Helmuth von Moltke), who attempted to emulate its tactical paradigm of envelopment and re-create their own "Cannae".
Delbrück's seminal study of the battle had a profound influence on German military theorists, in particular the Chief of the German General Staff, Alfred von Schlieffen, whose eponymous "Schlieffen Plan" was inspired by Hannibal's double envelopment maneuver.
Schlieffen taught that the "Cannae model" would continue to be applicable in maneuver warfare throughout the 20th century:
A battle of annihilation can be carried out today according to the same plan devised by Hannibal in long forgotten times.
The enemy front is not the goal of the principal attack.
The mass of the troops and the reserves should not be concentrated against the enemy front; the essential is that the flanks be crushed.
The wings should not be sought at the advanced points of the front but rather along the entire depth and extension of the enemy formation.
The annihilation is completed through an attack against the enemy's rear...
To bring about a decisive and annihilating victory requires an attack against the front and against one or both flanks...
Schlieffen later developed his own operational doctrine in a series of articles, many of which were translated and published in a work entitled Cannae.
In 1991, General Norman Schwarzkopf Jr., commander of coalition forces in the Gulf War, cited Hannibal's triumph at Cannae as inspiration for the rapid and successful coalition operations during the conflict.
TO BE CONTINUED …
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Cannae
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Historical significance
"Cannae model"
Apart from being one of the greatest defeats inflicted on Roman arms, Cannae represents the archetypal battle of annihilation, a strategy whose successful implementation has been rare in modern history.
As Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force in World War II, wrote, "Every ground commander seeks the battle of annihilation; so far as conditions permit, he tries to duplicate in modern war the classic example of Cannae".
Furthermore, the totality of Hannibal's victory has made the name "Cannae" a byword for military success, and is studied in detail in military academies around the world.
The notion that an entire army could be encircled and annihilated within a single stroke led to a fascination among Western generals for centuries (including Frederick the Great and Helmuth von Moltke), who attempted to emulate its tactical paradigm of envelopment and re-create their own "Cannae".
Delbrück's seminal study of the battle had a profound influence on German military theorists, in particular the Chief of the German General Staff, Alfred von Schlieffen, whose eponymous "Schlieffen Plan" was inspired by Hannibal's double envelopment maneuver.
Schlieffen taught that the "Cannae model" would continue to be applicable in maneuver warfare throughout the 20th century:
A battle of annihilation can be carried out today according to the same plan devised by Hannibal in long forgotten times.
The enemy front is not the goal of the principal attack.
The mass of the troops and the reserves should not be concentrated against the enemy front; the essential is that the flanks be crushed.
The wings should not be sought at the advanced points of the front but rather along the entire depth and extension of the enemy formation.
The annihilation is completed through an attack against the enemy's rear...
To bring about a decisive and annihilating victory requires an attack against the front and against one or both flanks...
Schlieffen later developed his own operational doctrine in a series of articles, many of which were translated and published in a work entitled Cannae.
In 1991, General Norman Schwarzkopf Jr., commander of coalition forces in the Gulf War, cited Hannibal's triumph at Cannae as inspiration for the rapid and successful coalition operations during the conflict.
TO BE CONTINUED …
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Cannae
Re: MUSINGS ON THE SCHEME OF THINGS
Battle of Cannae, concluded ...
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Historical sources
There are three main accounts of the battle, none of them contemporary.
The closest is Polybius, who wrote his account 50 years after the battle.
Livy wrote in the time of Augustus, and Appian later still.
Appian's account describes events that have no relation with those of Livy and Polybius.
Polybius portrays the battle as the ultimate nadir of Roman fortunes, functioning as a literary device such that the subsequent Roman recovery is more dramatic.
For example, some argue that his casualty figures are exaggerated — "more symbolic than factual".
Livy portrays the Senate in the role of hero and hence assigns blame for the Roman defeat to the low-born Varro.
Blaming Varro also serves to lift blame from the Roman soldiers, whom Livy has a tendency to idealize.
Scholars tend to discount Appian's account.
The verdict of Philip Sabin — "a worthless farrago" — is typical.
Historian Martin Samuels has questioned whether it was in fact Varro in command on the day on the grounds that Paullus may have been in command on the right.
The warm reception that Varro received after the battle from the Senate was in striking contrast to the savage criticism meted out to other commanders.
Samuels doubts whether Varro would have been received with such warmth had he been in command.
Gregory Daly notes that, in the Roman military, the right was always the place of command.
He suggests that at the Battle of Zama Hannibal was quoted saying that he had fought Paullus at Cannae and concludes that it is impossible to be sure who was in command on the day.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Cannae
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Historical sources
There are three main accounts of the battle, none of them contemporary.
The closest is Polybius, who wrote his account 50 years after the battle.
Livy wrote in the time of Augustus, and Appian later still.
Appian's account describes events that have no relation with those of Livy and Polybius.
Polybius portrays the battle as the ultimate nadir of Roman fortunes, functioning as a literary device such that the subsequent Roman recovery is more dramatic.
For example, some argue that his casualty figures are exaggerated — "more symbolic than factual".
Livy portrays the Senate in the role of hero and hence assigns blame for the Roman defeat to the low-born Varro.
Blaming Varro also serves to lift blame from the Roman soldiers, whom Livy has a tendency to idealize.
Scholars tend to discount Appian's account.
The verdict of Philip Sabin — "a worthless farrago" — is typical.
Historian Martin Samuels has questioned whether it was in fact Varro in command on the day on the grounds that Paullus may have been in command on the right.
The warm reception that Varro received after the battle from the Senate was in striking contrast to the savage criticism meted out to other commanders.
Samuels doubts whether Varro would have been received with such warmth had he been in command.
Gregory Daly notes that, in the Roman military, the right was always the place of command.
He suggests that at the Battle of Zama Hannibal was quoted saying that he had fought Paullus at Cannae and concludes that it is impossible to be sure who was in command on the day.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Cannae
Re: MUSINGS ON THE SCHEME OF THINGS
Battle of Silva Litana
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The Battle of Silva Litana was an ambush during the Second Punic War that took place in a forest 75 miles northwest of the Roman city of Ariminum in 216 BC.
The Gallic Boii surprised and destroyed a Roman army of 25,000 men under the consul-elect Lucius Postumius Albinus.
Only ten men escaped the ambush, few prisoners were taken and Postumius was killed, decapitated and his skull covered with gold by the Boii.
News of the military disaster, coming either several days or months after the defeat at Cannae, triggered a renewed panic in Rome and the Romans postponed military operations against the Gauls until the conclusion of the Second Punic War.
Prelude
In 216 BC, the Romans elected Lucius Aemilius Paullus and Gaius Terentius Varro as consuls.
The consuls gave a legion to Lucius Postumius Albinus to punish the Gallic tribes in Cisalpine Gaul that had supplied troops to Hannibal's Carthaginian army.
After Hannibal's crushing victory at the Battle of Cannae, Postumius was elected Roman consul for the third time and in absentia, since he was in command of the Roman legion in Cisalpine Gaul.
Postumius' army strength was increased to two Roman legions and he raised allied troops along the Adriatic coast, raising the number of his soldiers to 25,000.
TO BE CONTINUED …
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Silva_Litana
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The Battle of Silva Litana was an ambush during the Second Punic War that took place in a forest 75 miles northwest of the Roman city of Ariminum in 216 BC.
The Gallic Boii surprised and destroyed a Roman army of 25,000 men under the consul-elect Lucius Postumius Albinus.
Only ten men escaped the ambush, few prisoners were taken and Postumius was killed, decapitated and his skull covered with gold by the Boii.
News of the military disaster, coming either several days or months after the defeat at Cannae, triggered a renewed panic in Rome and the Romans postponed military operations against the Gauls until the conclusion of the Second Punic War.
Prelude
In 216 BC, the Romans elected Lucius Aemilius Paullus and Gaius Terentius Varro as consuls.
The consuls gave a legion to Lucius Postumius Albinus to punish the Gallic tribes in Cisalpine Gaul that had supplied troops to Hannibal's Carthaginian army.
After Hannibal's crushing victory at the Battle of Cannae, Postumius was elected Roman consul for the third time and in absentia, since he was in command of the Roman legion in Cisalpine Gaul.
Postumius' army strength was increased to two Roman legions and he raised allied troops along the Adriatic coast, raising the number of his soldiers to 25,000.
TO BE CONTINUED …
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Silva_Litana
Re: MUSINGS ON THE SCHEME OF THINGS
Battle of Silva Litana, concluded ...
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Battle
Postumius' army marched through a large forest called Litana by the Gauls.
The Boii had cut the trees so that unsupported, they would remain standing, but if given a slight push would topple over.
As the Romans went along a road in the forest, the Boii secured a perimeter outside it and pushed over the trees on the outer edges.
The trees fell on each other and crashed onto the road from both sides, killing Roman soldiers and horses and destroying equipment.
Most of the soldiers died under the weight of the trees trunks and branches and the panicked survivors were slaughtered by the Boii waiting outside the forest.
A party of Romans tried to escape across a river, but were captured by the Boii who had already taken the bridge over it.
Few Roman prisoners were taken and only ten men survived the disaster.
Postumius fought to avoid capture but was killed, decapitated and his head taken to a Boii sacred temple, where the skin was scraped off and the bare skull covered with gold.
It was used as a cup for drinking by the Boii high priest.
The Boii also took a vast amount of loot, with the Roman goods handily concentrated along the forest road.
Aftermath
A panic hit the city of Rome upon arrival of the news.
The Roman Senate ordered aediles to patrol the streets, open shops and disperse any sign of defeatism.
Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, master of horse and also consul-elect for 215 BC, consoled the Senate by emphasizing the importance of defeating Hannibal, with the Gauls only a secondary priority for Roman strategy.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Silva_Litana
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Battle
Postumius' army marched through a large forest called Litana by the Gauls.
The Boii had cut the trees so that unsupported, they would remain standing, but if given a slight push would topple over.
As the Romans went along a road in the forest, the Boii secured a perimeter outside it and pushed over the trees on the outer edges.
The trees fell on each other and crashed onto the road from both sides, killing Roman soldiers and horses and destroying equipment.
Most of the soldiers died under the weight of the trees trunks and branches and the panicked survivors were slaughtered by the Boii waiting outside the forest.
A party of Romans tried to escape across a river, but were captured by the Boii who had already taken the bridge over it.
Few Roman prisoners were taken and only ten men survived the disaster.
Postumius fought to avoid capture but was killed, decapitated and his head taken to a Boii sacred temple, where the skin was scraped off and the bare skull covered with gold.
It was used as a cup for drinking by the Boii high priest.
The Boii also took a vast amount of loot, with the Roman goods handily concentrated along the forest road.
Aftermath
A panic hit the city of Rome upon arrival of the news.
The Roman Senate ordered aediles to patrol the streets, open shops and disperse any sign of defeatism.
Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, master of horse and also consul-elect for 215 BC, consoled the Senate by emphasizing the importance of defeating Hannibal, with the Gauls only a secondary priority for Roman strategy.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Silva_Litana
Re: MUSINGS ON THE SCHEME OF THINGS
Battle of Decimomannu
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The Battle of Decimomannu or Caralis took place in Sardinia when a Carthaginian army sailed to the island to support a local revolt against Roman rule.
The army, led by Hasdrubal the Bald, fought a similar size Roman army under the Praetor Titus Manlius Torquatus in the Fall of 215 BC somewhere between Sestu and Decimomannu, just north of Caralis.
The Romans destroyed the Carthaginian army and then scattered their fleet in a sea battle south of Sardinia.
Strategic Situation
The Romans were hard pressed after the Battle of Cannae, with several South Italian cities deserting to Carthage.
Hannibal Barca and his army were active in Campania, while a second Carthaginian army under Hanno, son of Bomilcar had become active in Bruttium.
The Romans fielded several armies, which avoided attacking Hannibal but struck at his allies whenever possible.
In Iberia, Hasdrubal Barca, brother of Hannibal, had been fighting skirmishes with the Scipio brothers since his defeat in the Battle of Ebro River.
In 216 BC, the Carthaginian Senate sent him reinforcements with orders to march to Italy.
In Africa, Mago Barca was put in command of an army of 12,000 infantry, 1,500 horse, and 20 elephants with orders to join Hannibal.
The Romans had been fighting the native Sardinians from time to time, ever since they obtained Sardinia through blackmail in 237 BC.
By 216 BC, the situation on the island was ripe for revolt.
The single Roman legion posted there was understrength from sickness.
The praetor, Q. Mucius Scavola, was also sick.
Payment and provisions from Rome were irregular.
Hampsicora, a Punic-Sardinian landowner, asked for aid from Carthage.
Carthage sent an officer named Hanno to finance the revolt and then raised an army similar to that of Mago's for an expedition to Sardinia.
Hasdrubal the Bald and another Mago was in charge of the expedition.
Before the Carthaginian expedition sailed for Sardinia, the strategic situation changed.
Hanno the Elder was defeated by Titus Sempronius Longus in Lucania, and Hasdrubal Barca lost most of his field army in the Battle of Dertosa in Iberia.
The Carthaginian senate ordered Mago to Iberia, but the Sardinian expedition sailed as planned.
However, a storm blew the fleet off course to the Balearic islands, where many ships had to be hauled ashore and repaired (Livy xxiii 36, Lazenby J.F p96-98).
This delayed the Carthaginian arrival in Sardinia.
TO BE CONTINUED …
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Decimomannu
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The Battle of Decimomannu or Caralis took place in Sardinia when a Carthaginian army sailed to the island to support a local revolt against Roman rule.
The army, led by Hasdrubal the Bald, fought a similar size Roman army under the Praetor Titus Manlius Torquatus in the Fall of 215 BC somewhere between Sestu and Decimomannu, just north of Caralis.
The Romans destroyed the Carthaginian army and then scattered their fleet in a sea battle south of Sardinia.
Strategic Situation
The Romans were hard pressed after the Battle of Cannae, with several South Italian cities deserting to Carthage.
Hannibal Barca and his army were active in Campania, while a second Carthaginian army under Hanno, son of Bomilcar had become active in Bruttium.
The Romans fielded several armies, which avoided attacking Hannibal but struck at his allies whenever possible.
In Iberia, Hasdrubal Barca, brother of Hannibal, had been fighting skirmishes with the Scipio brothers since his defeat in the Battle of Ebro River.
In 216 BC, the Carthaginian Senate sent him reinforcements with orders to march to Italy.
In Africa, Mago Barca was put in command of an army of 12,000 infantry, 1,500 horse, and 20 elephants with orders to join Hannibal.
The Romans had been fighting the native Sardinians from time to time, ever since they obtained Sardinia through blackmail in 237 BC.
By 216 BC, the situation on the island was ripe for revolt.
The single Roman legion posted there was understrength from sickness.
The praetor, Q. Mucius Scavola, was also sick.
Payment and provisions from Rome were irregular.
Hampsicora, a Punic-Sardinian landowner, asked for aid from Carthage.
Carthage sent an officer named Hanno to finance the revolt and then raised an army similar to that of Mago's for an expedition to Sardinia.
Hasdrubal the Bald and another Mago was in charge of the expedition.
Before the Carthaginian expedition sailed for Sardinia, the strategic situation changed.
Hanno the Elder was defeated by Titus Sempronius Longus in Lucania, and Hasdrubal Barca lost most of his field army in the Battle of Dertosa in Iberia.
The Carthaginian senate ordered Mago to Iberia, but the Sardinian expedition sailed as planned.
However, a storm blew the fleet off course to the Balearic islands, where many ships had to be hauled ashore and repaired (Livy xxiii 36, Lazenby J.F p96-98).
This delayed the Carthaginian arrival in Sardinia.
TO BE CONTINUED …
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Decimomannu
Re: MUSINGS ON THE SCHEME OF THINGS
Battle of Decimomannu, continued ...
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Prelude
Hampsicora was busy raising an army and collecting provisions near the city of Cornus (near Cuglieri on the western coast of Sardinia).
The Carthaginian delay gave the Romans the opportunity to send fresh forces under the praetor Titus Manlius Torquatus, who had served as consul in Sardinia in 235 BC.
Total Roman forces in Sardinia rose to 20,000 infantry and 1,200 horse with his arrival.
Manlius managed to draw Hiostus, Hampsicora's son, into a rash attack on the Romans while Hampsicora was away on a recruiting mission.
In the ensuing battle, 5,700 Sardinians were killed and the rebel army was scattered.
Hasdrubal the Bald arrived in Sardinia in the fall of 215.
He landed at Tharros, and gathered what Sardinian forces he could find, and marched towards Caralis.
In response, Manlius marched out with the army.
The battle of Decimomannu
The opponents did not immediately engage with each other.
They encamped close to each other and spent some days skirmishing.
When neither side gained any advantage, the respective commanders decided on battle.
The armies formed up traditionally, with cavalry on the wings and infantry in the centre.
It is not known if the Carthaginians had elephants with them.
The battle was hotly contested for four hours, with neither side gaining an advantage.
The decisive moment came when the Roman detachment facing the Sardinians on one of the wings of the Carthaginian line managed to drive them from the field.
The victorious Roman wing then wheeled inward and attacked the Carthaginian line, which gave way and was slaughtered.
Hasdrubal, Mago, and Hanno were captured and Hiostus killed.
Hampsicora fled the field, and then committed suicide.
The survivors took refuge in Cornus, which was taken by assault a few days later as a result of a battle fought in a plateau known as Su campu de Corra ("Horns field").
The Punic fleet managed to extricate some of the survivors.
TO BE CONTINUED …
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Decimomannu
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Prelude
Hampsicora was busy raising an army and collecting provisions near the city of Cornus (near Cuglieri on the western coast of Sardinia).
The Carthaginian delay gave the Romans the opportunity to send fresh forces under the praetor Titus Manlius Torquatus, who had served as consul in Sardinia in 235 BC.
Total Roman forces in Sardinia rose to 20,000 infantry and 1,200 horse with his arrival.
Manlius managed to draw Hiostus, Hampsicora's son, into a rash attack on the Romans while Hampsicora was away on a recruiting mission.
In the ensuing battle, 5,700 Sardinians were killed and the rebel army was scattered.
Hasdrubal the Bald arrived in Sardinia in the fall of 215.
He landed at Tharros, and gathered what Sardinian forces he could find, and marched towards Caralis.
In response, Manlius marched out with the army.
The battle of Decimomannu
The opponents did not immediately engage with each other.
They encamped close to each other and spent some days skirmishing.
When neither side gained any advantage, the respective commanders decided on battle.
The armies formed up traditionally, with cavalry on the wings and infantry in the centre.
It is not known if the Carthaginians had elephants with them.
The battle was hotly contested for four hours, with neither side gaining an advantage.
The decisive moment came when the Roman detachment facing the Sardinians on one of the wings of the Carthaginian line managed to drive them from the field.
The victorious Roman wing then wheeled inward and attacked the Carthaginian line, which gave way and was slaughtered.
Hasdrubal, Mago, and Hanno were captured and Hiostus killed.
Hampsicora fled the field, and then committed suicide.
The survivors took refuge in Cornus, which was taken by assault a few days later as a result of a battle fought in a plateau known as Su campu de Corra ("Horns field").
The Punic fleet managed to extricate some of the survivors.
TO BE CONTINUED …
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Decimomannu
Re: MUSINGS ON THE SCHEME OF THINGS
Battle of Decimomannu, concluded ...
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Battle of Sardinia Sea
The expedition was carried by an unknown number of transports and escorted by 60 quinqueremes.
These took the remnants of the expedition and sailed to Africa.
On the way, they encountered the Sicilian contingent of the Roman fleet returning from a raiding mission in Africa.
The Roman fleet, 100 quinquereme strong and commanded by Titus Ocatilius Crassus, attacked and captured seven Carthaginian ships, while the rest scattered and made for Africa.
Roman losses are not known (Livy xiii 46).
Aftermath and Importance
The Sardinian rebel cities surrendered to the Romans, enabling Manlius to send part of the Roman forces back to Italy.
The grain supply from Sardinia remained uninterrupted and the Carthaginian navy was denied bases nearer to Italy.
With the damage to Roman agriculture, the protection of the overseas grain supply was crucial.
Aside from naval raids on Sardinia in 210 BC, Carthage did not threaten Roman domination in Sardinia again.
While the Sicilian contingent of the Roman fleet was busy off Sardinia, the admiral of the main Punic fleet, Bomilcar, managed to sail to Locri in Bruttium and land a force of 4,000 Numidian horse and 40 elephants for Hannibal.
Given the fact that the lack of proper support from Carthage was one of the reasons for Hannibal’s failure, the impact of this reinforcement has not been properly explained (Lazenby, J.F, “Hannibal’s War”, p98).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Decimomannu
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Battle of Sardinia Sea
The expedition was carried by an unknown number of transports and escorted by 60 quinqueremes.
These took the remnants of the expedition and sailed to Africa.
On the way, they encountered the Sicilian contingent of the Roman fleet returning from a raiding mission in Africa.
The Roman fleet, 100 quinquereme strong and commanded by Titus Ocatilius Crassus, attacked and captured seven Carthaginian ships, while the rest scattered and made for Africa.
Roman losses are not known (Livy xiii 46).
Aftermath and Importance
The Sardinian rebel cities surrendered to the Romans, enabling Manlius to send part of the Roman forces back to Italy.
The grain supply from Sardinia remained uninterrupted and the Carthaginian navy was denied bases nearer to Italy.
With the damage to Roman agriculture, the protection of the overseas grain supply was crucial.
Aside from naval raids on Sardinia in 210 BC, Carthage did not threaten Roman domination in Sardinia again.
While the Sicilian contingent of the Roman fleet was busy off Sardinia, the admiral of the main Punic fleet, Bomilcar, managed to sail to Locri in Bruttium and land a force of 4,000 Numidian horse and 40 elephants for Hannibal.
Given the fact that the lack of proper support from Carthage was one of the reasons for Hannibal’s failure, the impact of this reinforcement has not been properly explained (Lazenby, J.F, “Hannibal’s War”, p98).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Decimomannu