A Federal Republican: A Review of the Constitution, continued ...
November 28, 1787
Such a construction will certainly follow from the present indefinite mode of expression in this constitution.
There is a writer upon the subject who attempts to explain the intentions of the convention in constituting the powers of Congress.
He says that, “the first object of the constitution is to unite the states into one compact society for the purpose of government."
"If such union must exist or the states be exposed to foreign invasion, internal discord, reciprocal encroachments on each other’s property — to weakness and infamy, which no person will deny — what powers must be collected and lodged in the supreme head or legislature of these states?"
"The answer is easy."
"The legislature must have exclusive jurisdiction in all matters where the states have a mutual interest."
"There are some regulations in which all the states are equally concerned — there are others which in their operations are limited to one state."
"The former belong to Congress, the latter to the respective legislatures."
"No one state has a right to supreme control in any affair in which the other states have an interest; nor should Congress interfere in any affair which respects one state only."
"This is the general line of division which the convention have endeavoured to draw between the powers of Congress and the rights of individual states.”
The states in their seperate capacity cannot provide for their common defence, nay, in case of a civil war, one state cannot secure its existence.
The only question therefore is, whether it is necessary to unite and provide for the general welfare?
TO BE CONTINUED ...
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
A Federal Republican: A Review of the Constitution, continued ...
November 28, 1787
For this question being once answered in the affirmative, leaves no room to doubt the propriety of constituting a power over the United States, adequate to these general purposes.
This was spending time in vain, for it is known, and are invincibly acknowledged that the power of Congress should extend to every case where the interests of the United States are clearly found to be mutual.
But pray cannot Congress, after having ascertained this union of interests, and constituted proper powers in all cases to which it applies, proceed one step farther and form an over-ruled system of government in the country, in this compact situation?
Is there not a wide difference between just constituting powers adequate to general purposes, and proceeding regularly beyond it to the establishing of a supreme authority over the states in this collective view?
The distinction is wide and apparent.
Upon a candid examination it will be found that the combination of them both exists in the constitution.
It hath been said that the objection with respect to the freedom of the Press is not valid, because the power of controlling that is lodged with the several states.
A little consideration will show that this, though perhaps just in itself, is but a specious pretext.
Congress have power to lay all duties of what-ever kind, and although they could not perhaps directly bar the freedom of the Press, yet they can do it in the exercise of the powers that are expressly decreed to them.
Remember there are such things as stamp duties and that these will as effectually abolish the freedom of the press as any express declaration.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
November 28, 1787
For this question being once answered in the affirmative, leaves no room to doubt the propriety of constituting a power over the United States, adequate to these general purposes.
This was spending time in vain, for it is known, and are invincibly acknowledged that the power of Congress should extend to every case where the interests of the United States are clearly found to be mutual.
But pray cannot Congress, after having ascertained this union of interests, and constituted proper powers in all cases to which it applies, proceed one step farther and form an over-ruled system of government in the country, in this compact situation?
Is there not a wide difference between just constituting powers adequate to general purposes, and proceeding regularly beyond it to the establishing of a supreme authority over the states in this collective view?
The distinction is wide and apparent.
Upon a candid examination it will be found that the combination of them both exists in the constitution.
It hath been said that the objection with respect to the freedom of the Press is not valid, because the power of controlling that is lodged with the several states.
A little consideration will show that this, though perhaps just in itself, is but a specious pretext.
Congress have power to lay all duties of what-ever kind, and although they could not perhaps directly bar the freedom of the Press, yet they can do it in the exercise of the powers that are expressly decreed to them.
Remember there are such things as stamp duties and that these will as effectually abolish the freedom of the press as any express declaration.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
A Federal Republican: A Review of the Constitution, continued ...
November 28, 1787
It is said however, that the legislatures of the several states will not dwindle away, because they have the sole right of electing the senate.
This indeed is all, and such as it is, it will not last long.
“Ladislaus of Poland, who was elected emperor after the temporary reign of Sigismund, having relinquished the right of imposing taxes, called an assembly of prelates, barons, and military gentlemen, in their respective provinces, in order to obtain an additional tribute."
"The provincial assemblies gave birth to the dietines; which now no longer retain the power of raising money in their several districts, but only elect the nuncios or representatives for the diet.”
And is it expected that when the legislatures of the states are reduced to mere boards of electors, they will long continue so?
No, this last dreg of power will at length vanish.
Nominal power is always a disgrace unsupported by reality.
That our boasted republic will ere long wear the face of an aristocracy may easily be seen.
The foundation of the Venetian aristocracy is well known.
“The city was divided into six districts, called sestiers."
"The council of forty proposed that each of these partitions should name two electors, amounting to twelve in all, who should have the power of choosing from the whole city four hundred and twenty, who should have the whole power of the general assembly, and be called the grand council."
"The people were amused with fine promises and order of regularity, and consoled with assertions that their right of election still continued, and that those who should not be chosen one year, might be the next, and not perceiving that this law would be fatal to their power, suffered that aristocracy to be thus founded, which exists to this hour."
"The next proposal was that a committee of eleven should be appointed to name the doge."
"Though the design of reducing the people to nothing might have been easily seen in these manceuvres, yet the people wearied, irritated, and discouraged by eternal discords, agreed to both.”
Thus easy may be the gradation of these states.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
November 28, 1787
It is said however, that the legislatures of the several states will not dwindle away, because they have the sole right of electing the senate.
This indeed is all, and such as it is, it will not last long.
“Ladislaus of Poland, who was elected emperor after the temporary reign of Sigismund, having relinquished the right of imposing taxes, called an assembly of prelates, barons, and military gentlemen, in their respective provinces, in order to obtain an additional tribute."
"The provincial assemblies gave birth to the dietines; which now no longer retain the power of raising money in their several districts, but only elect the nuncios or representatives for the diet.”
And is it expected that when the legislatures of the states are reduced to mere boards of electors, they will long continue so?
No, this last dreg of power will at length vanish.
Nominal power is always a disgrace unsupported by reality.
That our boasted republic will ere long wear the face of an aristocracy may easily be seen.
The foundation of the Venetian aristocracy is well known.
“The city was divided into six districts, called sestiers."
"The council of forty proposed that each of these partitions should name two electors, amounting to twelve in all, who should have the power of choosing from the whole city four hundred and twenty, who should have the whole power of the general assembly, and be called the grand council."
"The people were amused with fine promises and order of regularity, and consoled with assertions that their right of election still continued, and that those who should not be chosen one year, might be the next, and not perceiving that this law would be fatal to their power, suffered that aristocracy to be thus founded, which exists to this hour."
"The next proposal was that a committee of eleven should be appointed to name the doge."
"Though the design of reducing the people to nothing might have been easily seen in these manceuvres, yet the people wearied, irritated, and discouraged by eternal discords, agreed to both.”
Thus easy may be the gradation of these states.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
A Federal Republican: A Review of the Constitution, continued ...
November 28, 1787
The proposed constitution is evidently not calculated to coalesce with human nature in another respect.
The executive, as vested in the president is too pointedly supreme.
The fears of the people will and ought easily to be agitated by such an extent of power in a single man; particularly, if the situation of that man be such as will easily permit any gratification of partiality or ambition.
Suppose we ask the question, whether it would not be better to substitute in the room of a single executive magistrate, a sovereign executive council, consisting of one counsellor chosen from each state by the executive thereof, with a president of such council, who should be only Primus inter pares to be chosen from among themselves by the joint ballot of the council and senate, or the former only?
This council to have the appointment of all officers under the federal government, instead of the senate and president, the former of which should have no executive or other powers whatever in that department; but should act merely in a legislative capacity, in conjunction with the house of representatives.
There is another idea to be suggested, that in just policy no money bill should be altered or amended in any way by the senate.
But the correction of one part is precluded by an error in another; for here the inequality of representation in the lower house rises into view, and prevents our observing any thing further.
Upon the whole, it is evident that this constitution carries in its figure the strongest features of political ambition, beneath the charming delusion of a fair complexion.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
November 28, 1787
The proposed constitution is evidently not calculated to coalesce with human nature in another respect.
The executive, as vested in the president is too pointedly supreme.
The fears of the people will and ought easily to be agitated by such an extent of power in a single man; particularly, if the situation of that man be such as will easily permit any gratification of partiality or ambition.
Suppose we ask the question, whether it would not be better to substitute in the room of a single executive magistrate, a sovereign executive council, consisting of one counsellor chosen from each state by the executive thereof, with a president of such council, who should be only Primus inter pares to be chosen from among themselves by the joint ballot of the council and senate, or the former only?
This council to have the appointment of all officers under the federal government, instead of the senate and president, the former of which should have no executive or other powers whatever in that department; but should act merely in a legislative capacity, in conjunction with the house of representatives.
There is another idea to be suggested, that in just policy no money bill should be altered or amended in any way by the senate.
But the correction of one part is precluded by an error in another; for here the inequality of representation in the lower house rises into view, and prevents our observing any thing further.
Upon the whole, it is evident that this constitution carries in its figure the strongest features of political ambition, beneath the charming delusion of a fair complexion.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
A Federal Republican: A Review of the Constitution, continued ...
November 28, 1787
It hath been made an objection to this constitution, that the legislative and executive are not kept perfectly distinct and seperate.
This, I think, is not valid.
The executive should have a check on the legislative for this simple reason — that the executive hath its own limits — but the legislative independent of it, would have none at all.
To make laws is unconfined and indefinite, but to execute them when made, is limited by their existence.
But from the executive’s having an undue influence over the legislative, I must confess, I have a great aversion.
The division among the senators is unintelligible.
The next thing that we come to speak of, is the mode of laying taxes.
All direct taxes are to be apportioned among the several states according to their respective numbers.
This is a great and a fundamental error.
Direct taxes should always be apportioned according to extent of territory.
In framing the present confederation in 1778, this was held to be an essential point.
Article 8th says, “all charges of war and other expences which shall be incurred for the common defence and general welfare, and allowed for by the United States in Congress assembled, shall be defrayed out of the common treasury, which shall be supplied by the several states in proportion to the value of land in each state, &c.”
The value of land in a country increases with its riches, and therefore forms a just criterion.
There are many reasons which might be offered to show that the number of inhabitants in any state is an improper measure of apportioning taxes.
The inhabitants of some states may be numerous and poor, and those of another, few and wealthy.
The truth is, the ratios both of inhabitants and wealth, conspire to shew that the extent of territory is the only proper measure in apportioning taxes among the several states.
Commerce creates wealth, but at the same time luxury and high life, and these again a decrease of inhabitants.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
November 28, 1787
It hath been made an objection to this constitution, that the legislative and executive are not kept perfectly distinct and seperate.
This, I think, is not valid.
The executive should have a check on the legislative for this simple reason — that the executive hath its own limits — but the legislative independent of it, would have none at all.
To make laws is unconfined and indefinite, but to execute them when made, is limited by their existence.
But from the executive’s having an undue influence over the legislative, I must confess, I have a great aversion.
The division among the senators is unintelligible.
The next thing that we come to speak of, is the mode of laying taxes.
All direct taxes are to be apportioned among the several states according to their respective numbers.
This is a great and a fundamental error.
Direct taxes should always be apportioned according to extent of territory.
In framing the present confederation in 1778, this was held to be an essential point.
Article 8th says, “all charges of war and other expences which shall be incurred for the common defence and general welfare, and allowed for by the United States in Congress assembled, shall be defrayed out of the common treasury, which shall be supplied by the several states in proportion to the value of land in each state, &c.”
The value of land in a country increases with its riches, and therefore forms a just criterion.
There are many reasons which might be offered to show that the number of inhabitants in any state is an improper measure of apportioning taxes.
The inhabitants of some states may be numerous and poor, and those of another, few and wealthy.
The truth is, the ratios both of inhabitants and wealth, conspire to shew that the extent of territory is the only proper measure in apportioning taxes among the several states.
Commerce creates wealth, but at the same time luxury and high life, and these again a decrease of inhabitants.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
A Federal Republican: A Review of the Constitution, continued ...
November 28, 1787
The luxury that is derived from commercial wealth always tends to stop population.
From this it clearly appears that the apportioning of taxes according to numbers is not just.
On the contrary, the state of agriculture is more favourable to population, but not to wealth.
Indeed land must, in the nature of things, afford a just measure.
It is true that the value of land is dependent on circumstances.
But the richer the country grows, the more valuable the land.
The extent of land in Massachusetts is small in proportion to its inhabitants, but yet it is more valuable — in Virginia it is very great in proportion to the inhabitants, but yet it is not so valuable.
Let direct taxes be apportioned according to the value of land in each state, and it must be just for this reason, that the value of land always increases in an exact proportion to the riches of the country.
Hitherto we have been considering the blemishes of the constitution as they statedly exist — other objects are derived from omission.
Among these the grand one, upon which is indeed suspended every other, is the omission of a bill of rights.
The remarker upon the address of the sixteen members has answered their objection with much force.
“I answer (says he) this is not true, it contains a declaration of many rights, and very important ones, i.e. that people shall be obliged to fulfil their contracts, and not avoid them by tenders of any thing less than the value stipulated — that no ex post facto laws shall be made, &c.”
The gentleman has here very wittily mistaken the sense of the two terms right and obligation.
They are correlative terms, and between two parties, whenever the former applies to the one, the latter of necessity applies to the other.
Whatever any one has a right to expect from me, I am obliged to render him.
He might as well have said that the constitution gave the people a right to submit to Congress in every thing, and that we have a right to pay the last farthing of compliance to their despotic whims.
What he mentions is the enforcing of obligation and not the declaring of right.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
November 28, 1787
The luxury that is derived from commercial wealth always tends to stop population.
From this it clearly appears that the apportioning of taxes according to numbers is not just.
On the contrary, the state of agriculture is more favourable to population, but not to wealth.
Indeed land must, in the nature of things, afford a just measure.
It is true that the value of land is dependent on circumstances.
But the richer the country grows, the more valuable the land.
The extent of land in Massachusetts is small in proportion to its inhabitants, but yet it is more valuable — in Virginia it is very great in proportion to the inhabitants, but yet it is not so valuable.
Let direct taxes be apportioned according to the value of land in each state, and it must be just for this reason, that the value of land always increases in an exact proportion to the riches of the country.
Hitherto we have been considering the blemishes of the constitution as they statedly exist — other objects are derived from omission.
Among these the grand one, upon which is indeed suspended every other, is the omission of a bill of rights.
The remarker upon the address of the sixteen members has answered their objection with much force.
“I answer (says he) this is not true, it contains a declaration of many rights, and very important ones, i.e. that people shall be obliged to fulfil their contracts, and not avoid them by tenders of any thing less than the value stipulated — that no ex post facto laws shall be made, &c.”
The gentleman has here very wittily mistaken the sense of the two terms right and obligation.
They are correlative terms, and between two parties, whenever the former applies to the one, the latter of necessity applies to the other.
Whatever any one has a right to expect from me, I am obliged to render him.
He might as well have said that the constitution gave the people a right to submit to Congress in every thing, and that we have a right to pay the last farthing of compliance to their despotic whims.
What he mentions is the enforcing of obligation and not the declaring of right.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
A Federal Republican: A Review of the Constitution, continued ...
November 28, 1787
One of the learned members of the late convention — the honorable Mr. Wilson observes in his speech, that all powers which are not by the constitution given up to Congress, are reserved for the disposition of the several states.
This observation is wise and true, because properly speaking it should be so.
In entering into the social compact, all rights which are not expressly given up to the governors are reserved to the people.
That it is so from a just construction it is easy to discover.
But notwithstanding, if the people are jealous of their rights, where will be the harm in declaring them?
If they be meant as they certainly are to be reserved to the people, what injury can arise from a positive declaration of it?
Although in reasoning it would appear to be unnecessary, yet if the people prefer having their rights stately defined, it is certainly reasonable, that it should be done.
I am well acquainted with the logical reason, that is general given for it.
It is said that the insertion of a bill of rights, would be an argument against the present liberty of the people.
To have the rights of the people declared to them, would imply, that they had previously given them up, or were not in possession of them.
This indeed is a distinction of which the votaries of scholastic philosophy might be proud - but in the political world, where reason is not cultivated independently of action and experience, such futile distinctions ought not to be agitated.
In fact, it does not exist, for I should think, it is as rational to declare the right of the people to what they already possess, as to decree to them any new rights.
If the people do really possess them, there can be no harm in expressing what is meant to be understood.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
November 28, 1787
One of the learned members of the late convention — the honorable Mr. Wilson observes in his speech, that all powers which are not by the constitution given up to Congress, are reserved for the disposition of the several states.
This observation is wise and true, because properly speaking it should be so.
In entering into the social compact, all rights which are not expressly given up to the governors are reserved to the people.
That it is so from a just construction it is easy to discover.
But notwithstanding, if the people are jealous of their rights, where will be the harm in declaring them?
If they be meant as they certainly are to be reserved to the people, what injury can arise from a positive declaration of it?
Although in reasoning it would appear to be unnecessary, yet if the people prefer having their rights stately defined, it is certainly reasonable, that it should be done.
I am well acquainted with the logical reason, that is general given for it.
It is said that the insertion of a bill of rights, would be an argument against the present liberty of the people.
To have the rights of the people declared to them, would imply, that they had previously given them up, or were not in possession of them.
This indeed is a distinction of which the votaries of scholastic philosophy might be proud - but in the political world, where reason is not cultivated independently of action and experience, such futile distinctions ought not to be agitated.
In fact, it does not exist, for I should think, it is as rational to declare the right of the people to what they already possess, as to decree to them any new rights.
If the people do really possess them, there can be no harm in expressing what is meant to be understood.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
A Federal Republican: A Review of the Constitution, continued ...
November 28, 1787
A bill of rights should either be inserted, or a declaration made, that whatever is not decreed to Congress, is reserved to the several states for their own disposal.
In this particular, the articles of the present confederation have an evident advantage.
The second article says, that “each state retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this confederation expressly declared to United States in Congress assembled.”
This will appear the more proper, if we consider that these are rights in which all the states are concerned.
It is thought proper to delegate to Congress supreme power on all occasions where the natural interests of the states are concerned, and why not for the same reason grant and declare to the states a bill of those rights which are also mutual?
At any rate it is certain that no injury can arise from it, and to do it, would be satisfactory and wise.
On the whole, my fellow-citizens, this constitution was conceived in wisdom; the thanks of the United States are justly due to the members of the late convention.
But let their productions pass again through the furnace.
Do not give them even the opportunity of depriving you of your rights and privileges, and that without breaking over any restraint imposed by the constitution.
Because this once granted they will be fully enabled in the present age to lay the gentle foundation of despotic power, and after a temporary interval of seeming humanity between you and succeeding generations, to rivet upon them the chains of slavery beyond the possibility of a rupture.
To guard against this, I could wish to see the proposed constitution revised and corrected.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
November 28, 1787
A bill of rights should either be inserted, or a declaration made, that whatever is not decreed to Congress, is reserved to the several states for their own disposal.
In this particular, the articles of the present confederation have an evident advantage.
The second article says, that “each state retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this confederation expressly declared to United States in Congress assembled.”
This will appear the more proper, if we consider that these are rights in which all the states are concerned.
It is thought proper to delegate to Congress supreme power on all occasions where the natural interests of the states are concerned, and why not for the same reason grant and declare to the states a bill of those rights which are also mutual?
At any rate it is certain that no injury can arise from it, and to do it, would be satisfactory and wise.
On the whole, my fellow-citizens, this constitution was conceived in wisdom; the thanks of the United States are justly due to the members of the late convention.
But let their productions pass again through the furnace.
Do not give them even the opportunity of depriving you of your rights and privileges, and that without breaking over any restraint imposed by the constitution.
Because this once granted they will be fully enabled in the present age to lay the gentle foundation of despotic power, and after a temporary interval of seeming humanity between you and succeeding generations, to rivet upon them the chains of slavery beyond the possibility of a rupture.
To guard against this, I could wish to see the proposed constitution revised and corrected.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
A Federal Republican: A Review of the Constitution, continued ...
November 28, 1787
If the States are not to be confederated, let them be reduced to one compact body.
And if a perfect consolidation of the States is to take place, if the people are to become the source of power, and if Congress is to represent them as the head of this grand body politic, in the name of all that is dear to freemen, permit not the veins through which the life of government itself is to flow from the heart to the head, be any way obstructed - let the passages be free & open that vital heat may animate every limb.
That if all the States were to offer their objections, the constitution would be reduced to nothing, is an ill founded idea.
The good natured simularity which the citizen of America discovered between this constitution and a piece of painting, is perfectly erroneous.
All painting is addressed to the sense and relished by taste which is various and fluctuating — but this constitution is addressed to the understanding, and judged of by reason which is fixed and true.
The constitution is for the most part good, and perhaps many of the objections which have been made to it, arise from our not being able to discern clearly the collective interest of the states.
Some of them however, in all probability exist beyond contradiction.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
November 28, 1787
If the States are not to be confederated, let them be reduced to one compact body.
And if a perfect consolidation of the States is to take place, if the people are to become the source of power, and if Congress is to represent them as the head of this grand body politic, in the name of all that is dear to freemen, permit not the veins through which the life of government itself is to flow from the heart to the head, be any way obstructed - let the passages be free & open that vital heat may animate every limb.
That if all the States were to offer their objections, the constitution would be reduced to nothing, is an ill founded idea.
The good natured simularity which the citizen of America discovered between this constitution and a piece of painting, is perfectly erroneous.
All painting is addressed to the sense and relished by taste which is various and fluctuating — but this constitution is addressed to the understanding, and judged of by reason which is fixed and true.
The constitution is for the most part good, and perhaps many of the objections which have been made to it, arise from our not being able to discern clearly the collective interest of the states.
Some of them however, in all probability exist beyond contradiction.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
A Federal Republican: A Review of the Constitution, concluded ...
November 28, 1787
Let the convention of each State make its exceptions, then let a future and general one receive them all, and reconcile them with as much wisdom as possible.
This would certainly be some refinement.
It could do no harm, but might do much good.
To conclude, my friends and fellow-citizens, have the proposed constitution revised, corrected and amended — have every dubious expression be made plain and clear — have every power accurately defined and well understood, and your own rights and privileges clearly stated, or a declaration made that all powers that are not by this constitution delegated to Congress, are reserved for your own disposal.
Then and not till then, will impartial justice rule over our land, and America become the theatre of equity and wisdom, as she has already been the field of patriotism and bravery.
This once obtained, we shall be happy and free, and having enjoyed the blessings of peace and plenty under the ample shade of the tree of liberty, we shall deliver them down unimpaired by the corrosive influence of time to the latest posterity.
V.P.
“Quod bonum, faustumque sit nobis patricrque nostrce, sic enim nos perpetuam felicitatem Reipublica, precari existimamus.”
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/lib ... stitution/
November 28, 1787
Let the convention of each State make its exceptions, then let a future and general one receive them all, and reconcile them with as much wisdom as possible.
This would certainly be some refinement.
It could do no harm, but might do much good.
To conclude, my friends and fellow-citizens, have the proposed constitution revised, corrected and amended — have every dubious expression be made plain and clear — have every power accurately defined and well understood, and your own rights and privileges clearly stated, or a declaration made that all powers that are not by this constitution delegated to Congress, are reserved for your own disposal.
Then and not till then, will impartial justice rule over our land, and America become the theatre of equity and wisdom, as she has already been the field of patriotism and bravery.
This once obtained, we shall be happy and free, and having enjoyed the blessings of peace and plenty under the ample shade of the tree of liberty, we shall deliver them down unimpaired by the corrosive influence of time to the latest posterity.
V.P.
“Quod bonum, faustumque sit nobis patricrque nostrce, sic enim nos perpetuam felicitatem Reipublica, precari existimamus.”
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/lib ... stitution/