A Landholder IX
December 31, 1787
To the Hon. GENTLEMEN chosen to serve in the STATE CONVENTION.
GENTLEMEN, When the deputies of a free people are met to deliberate on a Constitution for their country, they must find themselves in a solemn situation.
Few persons realize the greatness of this business, and none can certainly determine how it will terminate.
A love of liberty in which we have all been educated, and which your country expects on you to preserve sacred, will doubtless make you careful not to lay such foundations as will terminate in despotism.
Oppression and a loss of liberty arises from very different causes, and which at first blush appear totally different from another.
If you had only to guard against vesting an undue power in certain great officers of state your work would be comparatively easy.
This some times occasions a loss of liberty, but the history of nations teacheth us that for one instance from this cause, there are ten from the contrary; a want of necessary power in some public department to protect and to preserve the true interests of the people.
America is at this moment in tenfold greater danger of slavery than ever she was from the councils of a British monarchy, or the triumph of British arms.
She is in danger from herself and her own citizens, not from giving too much, but from denying all power to her rulers — not from a constitution on despotic principles, but from having no constitution at all.
Should this great effort to organize the empire prove abortive, heaven only knows the situation in which we shall find ourselves; but there is reason to fear it will be troublesome enough.
It is awful to meet the passions of a people who not only believe but feel themselves uncontrouled — who not finding from government, the expected protection of their interests, tho’ otherwise honest, become desperate, each man determining to share by the spoils of anarchy, what he would wish to acquire by industry under an efficient national protection.
It becomes the deputies of the people to consider what will be the consequence of a miscarriage in this business.
Ardent expectation is waiting for its issue — all allow something is necessary — thousands of sufferers have stifled their sighs in reverence to the public effort — the industrious classes of men are waiting with patience for better times, and should that be rejected on which they make dependance, will not the public convulsion be great.
Or if the civil state should survive the first effects of disappointment, what will be the consequences of slower operations.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
A Landholder IX, continued ...
December 31, 1787
To the Hon. GENTLEMEN chosen to serve in the STATE CONVENTION.
The men who have done their best to give relief, will despair of success, and gloomily determine that greater sufferings must open the eyes of the deluded — the men who oppose, tho’ they may claim a temporary triumph will find themselves totally unable to propose, and much less to adopt a better system — the narrowness of policy that they have pursued will instantly appear more ridiculous than at present, and the triumph will spoil that importance, which nature designed them to receive not by succeeding, but by impeding national councils.
These men cannot therefore be the saviours of their country.
While those who have been foremost in the political contention disappear either thro’ despondence or neglect, every man will do what is right in his own eyes and his hand will be against his neighbour — industry will cease — the states will be filled with jealousy — some opposing and others endeavouring to retaliate — a thousand existing factions, and acts of public injustice, thro’ the temporary influence of parties, will prepare the way for chance to erect a government, which might now be established by deliberate wisdom.
When government thus arises it carries an iron hand.
Should the states reject a union upon solid and efficient principles, there needs but some daring genious to step forth, and impose an authority which future deliberation never can correct.
Anarchy, or a want of such government as can protect the interests of the subjects, against foreign and domestic injustice, is the worst of all conditions.
It is a condition which mankind will not long endure.
To avoid its distress they will resort to any standard which is erected, and bless the ambitious usurper as a messenger sent by heaven to save a miserable people.
We must not depend too much on the enlightened state of the country, in deliberation this may preserve us; but when deliberation proves abortive, we are immediately to calculate on other principles, and enquire to what may the passions of men lead them, when they have deliberated to the utmost extent of patience, and been foiled in every measure, by a set of men who think their own emoluments more safe upon a partial system, than upon one which regards the national good.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
December 31, 1787
To the Hon. GENTLEMEN chosen to serve in the STATE CONVENTION.
The men who have done their best to give relief, will despair of success, and gloomily determine that greater sufferings must open the eyes of the deluded — the men who oppose, tho’ they may claim a temporary triumph will find themselves totally unable to propose, and much less to adopt a better system — the narrowness of policy that they have pursued will instantly appear more ridiculous than at present, and the triumph will spoil that importance, which nature designed them to receive not by succeeding, but by impeding national councils.
These men cannot therefore be the saviours of their country.
While those who have been foremost in the political contention disappear either thro’ despondence or neglect, every man will do what is right in his own eyes and his hand will be against his neighbour — industry will cease — the states will be filled with jealousy — some opposing and others endeavouring to retaliate — a thousand existing factions, and acts of public injustice, thro’ the temporary influence of parties, will prepare the way for chance to erect a government, which might now be established by deliberate wisdom.
When government thus arises it carries an iron hand.
Should the states reject a union upon solid and efficient principles, there needs but some daring genious to step forth, and impose an authority which future deliberation never can correct.
Anarchy, or a want of such government as can protect the interests of the subjects, against foreign and domestic injustice, is the worst of all conditions.
It is a condition which mankind will not long endure.
To avoid its distress they will resort to any standard which is erected, and bless the ambitious usurper as a messenger sent by heaven to save a miserable people.
We must not depend too much on the enlightened state of the country, in deliberation this may preserve us; but when deliberation proves abortive, we are immediately to calculate on other principles, and enquire to what may the passions of men lead them, when they have deliberated to the utmost extent of patience, and been foiled in every measure, by a set of men who think their own emoluments more safe upon a partial system, than upon one which regards the national good.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
A Landholder IX, concluded ...
December 31, 1787
Politics ought to be free from passion — we ought to have patience for a certain time with those who oppose a federal system.
But have they not been indulged until the state is on the brink of ruin and they appear stubborn in error?
Have they not been our scourge and the perplexers of our councils for many years?
Is it not thro’ their policy that the state of New—York draws an annual tribute of forty thousand pounds from the citizens of Connecticut?
Is it not by their means that our foreign trade is ruined, and the farmer unable to command a just price for his commodities?
The enlightened part of the people have long seen their measures to be destructive, and it is only the ignorant and jealous who give them support.
The men who oppose this constitution are the same who have been unfederal from the beginning.
They were as unfriendly to the old confederation, as to the system now proposed, but bore it with more patience because it was wholly inefficacious.
They talk of amendments — of dangerous articles which must be corrected — that they will heartily join in a safe plan of federal government; but when we look on their past conduct can we think them sincere — doubtless their design is to procrastinate, and by this carry their own measures; but the artifice must not succeed.
The people are now ripe for a government which will do justice to their interests, and if the honourable Convention deny them, they will despair of help.
They have shown a noble spirit in appointing their first citizens for this business — when convened you will constitute the most august assembly that were ever collected in the State, and your duty is the greatest that can be expected from men, the salvation of your country.
If coolness and magnanimity of mind attend your deliberations, all little objections will vanish, and the world will be more astonished by your political wisdom than they were by the victory of our arms.
December 31, 1787
Politics ought to be free from passion — we ought to have patience for a certain time with those who oppose a federal system.
But have they not been indulged until the state is on the brink of ruin and they appear stubborn in error?
Have they not been our scourge and the perplexers of our councils for many years?
Is it not thro’ their policy that the state of New—York draws an annual tribute of forty thousand pounds from the citizens of Connecticut?
Is it not by their means that our foreign trade is ruined, and the farmer unable to command a just price for his commodities?
The enlightened part of the people have long seen their measures to be destructive, and it is only the ignorant and jealous who give them support.
The men who oppose this constitution are the same who have been unfederal from the beginning.
They were as unfriendly to the old confederation, as to the system now proposed, but bore it with more patience because it was wholly inefficacious.
They talk of amendments — of dangerous articles which must be corrected — that they will heartily join in a safe plan of federal government; but when we look on their past conduct can we think them sincere — doubtless their design is to procrastinate, and by this carry their own measures; but the artifice must not succeed.
The people are now ripe for a government which will do justice to their interests, and if the honourable Convention deny them, they will despair of help.
They have shown a noble spirit in appointing their first citizens for this business — when convened you will constitute the most august assembly that were ever collected in the State, and your duty is the greatest that can be expected from men, the salvation of your country.
If coolness and magnanimity of mind attend your deliberations, all little objections will vanish, and the world will be more astonished by your political wisdom than they were by the victory of our arms.
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Debate Regarding the Legislature
by James Madison
1787
Source: Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 by James Madison, a Member, ed. Gordon Lloyd (Ashland: Ashbrook Center Press, 2014), 14-49.
Thursday, May 31
In the Committee of the Whole on Mr. RANDOLPH'S Resolutions:
The fourth Resolution, first clause, “that the members of the first branch of the National Legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several states,” being taken up:
Mr. SHERMAN opposed the election by the people, insisting that it ought to be by the State Legislatures.
The people, he said, immediately, should have as little to do as may be about the government.
They want information, and are constantly liable to be misled.
Mr. GERRY. The evils we experience flow from the excess of democracy.
The people do not want virtue, but are the dupes of pretended patriots.
In Massachusetts it had been fully confirmed by experience, that they are daily misled into the most baneful measures and opinions, by the false reports circulated by designing men, and which no one on the spot can refute.
One principal evil arises from the want of due provision for those employed in the administration of government.
It would seem to be a maxim of democracy to starve the public servants.
He mentioned the popular clamor in Massachusetts for the reduction of salaries, and the attack made on that of the Governor, though secured by the spirit of the Constitution itself.
He had, he said, been too republican heretofore: he was still, however, republican; but had been taught by experience the danger of the levelling spirit.
Mr. MASON argued strongly for an election of the larger branch by the people.
It was to be the grand depository of the democratic principle of the government.
It was, so to speak, to be our House of Commons.
It ought to know and sympathize with every part of the community; and ought therefore to be taken, not only from different parts of the whole republic, but also from different districts of the larger members of it; which had in several instances, particularly in Virginia, different interests and views arising from difference of produce, of habits, &c. &c.
He admitted that we had been too democratic, but was afraid we should incautiously run into the opposite extreme.
We ought to attend to the rights of every class of the people.
He had often wondered at the indifference of the superior classes of society to this dictate of humanity and policy; considering, that, however affluent their circumstances, or elevated their situations, might be, the course of a few years not only might, but certainly would, distribute their posterity throughout the lowest classes of society.
Every selfish motive, therefore, every family attachment, ought to recommend such a system of policy as would provide no less carefully for the rights and happiness of the lowest, than of the highest, order of citizens.
Mr. WILSON contended strenuously for drawing the most numerous branch of the Legislature immediately from the people.
He was for raising the federal pyramid to a considerable altitude, and for that reason wished to give it as broad a basis as possible.
No government could long subsist without the confidence of the people.
In a republican government, this confidence was peculiarly essential.
He also thought it wrong to increase the weight of the State Legislatures by making them the electors of the National Legislature.
All interference between the general and local governments should be obviated as much as possible.
On examination it would be found that the opposition of States to Federal measures had proceeded much more from the officers of the States than from the people at large.
Mr. MADISON considered the popular election of one branch of the National Legislature as essential to every plan of free government.
He observed, that in some of the States one branch of the Legislature was composed of men already removed from the people by an intervening body of electors.
That, if the first branch of the General Legislature should be elected by the State Legislatures, the second branch elected by the first, the Executive by the second together with the first, and other appointments again made for subordinate purposes by the Executive, the people would be lost sight of altogether; and the necessary sympathy between them and their rulers and officers too little felt.
He was an advocate for the policy of refining the popular appointments by successive filtrations, but thought it might be pushed too far.
He wished the expedient to be resorted to only in the appointment of the second branch of the Legislature, and in the Executive and Judiciary branches of the government.
He thought, too, that the great fabric to be raised would be more stable and durable, if it should rest on the solid foundation of the people themselves, than if it should stand merely on the pillars of the Legislatures.
On the question for an election of the first branch of the National Legislature by the people, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye — 6; New Jersey, South Carolina, no — 2; Connecticut, Delaware, divided.
The Committee proceeded to the fifth Resolution, that the second [or senatorial] branch of the National Legislature ought to be chosen by the first branch, out of persons nominated by the State Legislatures.
Mr. SPAIGHT contended, that the second branch ought to be chosen by the State Legislatures, and moved an amendment to that effect.
Mr. BUTLER apprehended that the taking so many powers out of the hands of the States as was proposed tended to destroy all that balance and security of interests among the States which it was necessary to preserve.
On the whole question for electing by the first branch out of nominations by the State Legislatures — Massachusetts, Virginia, South Carolina, aye — 3; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, North Carolina, Georgia, no — 7.
So the clause was disagreed to, and a chasm left in this part of the plan.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by James Madison
1787
Source: Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 by James Madison, a Member, ed. Gordon Lloyd (Ashland: Ashbrook Center Press, 2014), 14-49.
Thursday, May 31
In the Committee of the Whole on Mr. RANDOLPH'S Resolutions:
The fourth Resolution, first clause, “that the members of the first branch of the National Legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several states,” being taken up:
Mr. SHERMAN opposed the election by the people, insisting that it ought to be by the State Legislatures.
The people, he said, immediately, should have as little to do as may be about the government.
They want information, and are constantly liable to be misled.
Mr. GERRY. The evils we experience flow from the excess of democracy.
The people do not want virtue, but are the dupes of pretended patriots.
In Massachusetts it had been fully confirmed by experience, that they are daily misled into the most baneful measures and opinions, by the false reports circulated by designing men, and which no one on the spot can refute.
One principal evil arises from the want of due provision for those employed in the administration of government.
It would seem to be a maxim of democracy to starve the public servants.
He mentioned the popular clamor in Massachusetts for the reduction of salaries, and the attack made on that of the Governor, though secured by the spirit of the Constitution itself.
He had, he said, been too republican heretofore: he was still, however, republican; but had been taught by experience the danger of the levelling spirit.
Mr. MASON argued strongly for an election of the larger branch by the people.
It was to be the grand depository of the democratic principle of the government.
It was, so to speak, to be our House of Commons.
It ought to know and sympathize with every part of the community; and ought therefore to be taken, not only from different parts of the whole republic, but also from different districts of the larger members of it; which had in several instances, particularly in Virginia, different interests and views arising from difference of produce, of habits, &c. &c.
He admitted that we had been too democratic, but was afraid we should incautiously run into the opposite extreme.
We ought to attend to the rights of every class of the people.
He had often wondered at the indifference of the superior classes of society to this dictate of humanity and policy; considering, that, however affluent their circumstances, or elevated their situations, might be, the course of a few years not only might, but certainly would, distribute their posterity throughout the lowest classes of society.
Every selfish motive, therefore, every family attachment, ought to recommend such a system of policy as would provide no less carefully for the rights and happiness of the lowest, than of the highest, order of citizens.
Mr. WILSON contended strenuously for drawing the most numerous branch of the Legislature immediately from the people.
He was for raising the federal pyramid to a considerable altitude, and for that reason wished to give it as broad a basis as possible.
No government could long subsist without the confidence of the people.
In a republican government, this confidence was peculiarly essential.
He also thought it wrong to increase the weight of the State Legislatures by making them the electors of the National Legislature.
All interference between the general and local governments should be obviated as much as possible.
On examination it would be found that the opposition of States to Federal measures had proceeded much more from the officers of the States than from the people at large.
Mr. MADISON considered the popular election of one branch of the National Legislature as essential to every plan of free government.
He observed, that in some of the States one branch of the Legislature was composed of men already removed from the people by an intervening body of electors.
That, if the first branch of the General Legislature should be elected by the State Legislatures, the second branch elected by the first, the Executive by the second together with the first, and other appointments again made for subordinate purposes by the Executive, the people would be lost sight of altogether; and the necessary sympathy between them and their rulers and officers too little felt.
He was an advocate for the policy of refining the popular appointments by successive filtrations, but thought it might be pushed too far.
He wished the expedient to be resorted to only in the appointment of the second branch of the Legislature, and in the Executive and Judiciary branches of the government.
He thought, too, that the great fabric to be raised would be more stable and durable, if it should rest on the solid foundation of the people themselves, than if it should stand merely on the pillars of the Legislatures.
On the question for an election of the first branch of the National Legislature by the people, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye — 6; New Jersey, South Carolina, no — 2; Connecticut, Delaware, divided.
The Committee proceeded to the fifth Resolution, that the second [or senatorial] branch of the National Legislature ought to be chosen by the first branch, out of persons nominated by the State Legislatures.
Mr. SPAIGHT contended, that the second branch ought to be chosen by the State Legislatures, and moved an amendment to that effect.
Mr. BUTLER apprehended that the taking so many powers out of the hands of the States as was proposed tended to destroy all that balance and security of interests among the States which it was necessary to preserve.
On the whole question for electing by the first branch out of nominations by the State Legislatures — Massachusetts, Virginia, South Carolina, aye — 3; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, North Carolina, Georgia, no — 7.
So the clause was disagreed to, and a chasm left in this part of the plan.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Debate Regarding the Legislature, concluded ...
by James Madison
1787
Wednesday, June 6
In Committee of the Whole.
Mr. PINCKNEY, according to previous notice, and rule obtained, moved, “that the first branch of the National Legislature be elected by the State Legislatures, and not by the people;” contending that the people were less fit judges in such a case, and that the Legislatures would be less likely to promote the adoption of the new government if they were to be excluded from all share in it.
Mr. RUTLEDGE seconded the motion.
Mr. GERRY. Much depends on the mode of election.
In England the people will probably lose their liberty from the smallness of the proportion having a right of suffrage.
Our danger arises from the opposite extreme.
Hence in Massachusetts the worst men get into the Legislature.
Several members of that body had lately been convicted of infamous crimes.
Men of indigence, ignorance, and baseness, spare no pains, however dirty, to carry their point against men who are superior to the artifices practised.
He was not disposed to run into extremes.
He was as much principled as ever against aristocracy and monarchy.
It was necessary, on the one hand, that the people should appoint one branch of the government, in order to inspire them with the necessary confidence; but he wished the election, on the other, to be so modified as to secure more effectually a just preference of merit.
His idea was, that the people should nominate certain persons, in certain districts, out of whom the State Legislatures should make the appointment.
Mr. WILSON. He wished for vigor in the government, but he wished that vigorous authority to flow immediately from the legitimate source of all authority.
The government ought to possess, not only, first, the force, but second, the mind or sense, of the people at large.
The Legislature ought to be the most exact transcript of the whole society.
Representation is made necessary only because it is impossible for the people to act collectively.
The opposition was to be expected, he said, from the governments, not from the citizens of the States.
The latter had parted, as was observed by Mr. KING, with all the necessary powers; and it was immaterial to them by whom they were exercised, if well exercised.
The State officers were to be the losers of power.
The people, he supposed, would be rather more attached to the National Government than to the State Governments, as being more important in itself, and more flattering to their pride.
There is no danger of improper elections, if made by large districts.
Bad elections proceed from the smallness of the districts, which give an opportunity to bad men to intrigue themselves into office.
Mr. SHERMAN. If it were in view to abolish the State Governments, the elections ought to be by the people.
If the State Governments are to be continued, it is necessary, in order to preserve harmony between the National and State Governments, that the elections to the former should be made by the latter.
The right of participating in the National Government would be sufficiently secured to the people by their election of the State Legislatures.
The objects of the Union, he thought were few, first, defence against foreign danger; secondly, against internal disputes, and a resort to force; thirdly, treaties with foreign nations; fourthly, regulating foreign commerce, and drawing revenue from it.
These, and perhaps a few lesser objects, alone rendered a confederation of the States necessary.
All other matters, civil and criminal, would be much better in the hands of the States.
The people are more happy in small than in large States.
States may, indeed, be too small, as Rhode Island, and thereby be too subject to faction.
Some others were, perhaps, too large, the powers of government not being able to pervade them.
He was for giving the General Government power to legislate and execute within a defined province.
Col. MASON. Under the existing Confederacy, Congress represent the States, and not the people of the States; their acts operate on the States, not on the individuals.
The case will be changed in the new plan of government.
The people will be represented; they ought therefore to choose the Representatives.
The requisites in actual representation are, that the representatives should sympathize with their constituents; should think as they think, and feel as they feel; and that for these purposes they should be residents among them.
Much, he said, had been alleged against democratic elections.
He admitted that much might be said; but it was to be considered that no government was free from imperfections and evils; and that improper elections in many instances were inseparable from republican governments.
But compare these with the advantage of this form, in favor of the rights of the people, in favor of human nature!
He was persuaded there was a better chance for proper elections by the people, if divided into large districts, than by the State Legislatures.
Paper money had been issued by the latter, when the former were against it.
Was it to be supposed, that the State Legislatures, then, would not send to the National Legislature patrons of such projects, if the choice depended on them?
Mr. MADISON considered an election of one branch, at least, of the Legislature by the people immediately, as a clear principle of free government; and that this mode, under proper regulations, had the additional advantage of securing better representatives, as well as of avoiding too great an agency of the State Governments in the general one.
He differed from the member from Connecticut, (Mr. SHERMAN,) in thinking the objects mentioned to be all the principal ones that required a national government.
Those were certainly important and necessary objects; but he combined with them the necessity of providing more effectually for the security of private rights, and the steady dispensation of justice.
Interferences with these were evils which had, more perhaps than any thing else, produced this Convention.
Was it to be supposed, that republican liberty could long exist under the abuses of it practised in some of the States?
The gentleman (Mr. SHERMAN) had admitted, that in a very small State faction and oppression would prevail.
It was to be inferred, then, that wherever these prevailed the State was too small.
Had they not prevailed in the largest as well as the smallest, though less than in the smallest?
And were we not thence admonished to enlarge the sphere as far as the nature of the government would admit?
This was the only defence against the inconveniences of democracy, consistent with the democratic form of government.
All civilized societies would be divided into different sects, factions, and interests, as they happened to consist of rich and poor, debtors and creditors, the landed, the manufacturing, the commercial interests, the inhabitants of this district or that district, the followers of this political leader or that political leader, the disciples of this religious sect or that religious sect.
In all cases where a majority are united by a common interest or passion, the rights of the minority are in danger.
What motives are to restrain them?
A prudent regard to the maxim, that honesty is the best policy, is found by experience to be as little regarded by bodies of men as by individuals.
Respect for character is always diminished in proportion to the number among whom the blame or praise is to be divided.
Conscience, the only remaining tie, is known to be inadequate in individuals; in large numbers, little is to be expected from it.
Besides, religion itself may become a motive to persecution and oppression.
These observations are verified by the histories of every country, ancient and modern.
In Greece and Rome the rich and poor, the creditors and debtors, as well as the patricians and plebeians, alternately oppressed each other with equal unmercifulness.
What a source of oppression was the relation between the parent cities of Rome, Athens, and Carthage, and their respective provinces; the former possessing the power, and the latter being sufficiently distinguished to be separate objects of it?
Why was America so justly apprehensive of parliamentary injustice?
Because Great Britain had a separate interest, real or supposed, and, if her authority had been admitted, could have pursued that interest at our expense.
We have seen the mere distinction of color made, in the most enlightened period of time, a ground of the most oppressive dominion ever exercised by man over man.
What has been the source of those unjust laws complained of among ourselves?
Has it not been the real or supposed interest of the major number?
Debtors have defrauded their creditors.
The landed interest has borne hard on the mercantile interest.
The holders of one species of property have thrown a disproportion of taxes on the holders of another species.
The lesson we are to draw from the whole is, that where a majority are united by a common sentiment, and have an opportunity, the rights of the minor party become insecure.
In a republican government, the majority, if united, have always an opportunity.
The only remedy is, to enlarge the sphere, and thereby divide the community into so great a number of interests and parties, that, in the first place, a majority will not be likely, at the same moment, to have a common interest separate from that of the whole, or of the minority; and, in the second place, that in case they should have such an interest, they may not be so apt to unite in the pursuit of it.
It was incumbent on us, then, to try this remedy, and, with that view, to frame a republican system on such a scale, and in such a form, as will control all the evils which have been experienced.
Mr. DICKINSON considered it essential, that one branch of the Legislature should be drawn immediately from the people; and expedient, that the other should be chosen by the Legislatures of the States.
This combination of the State Governments with the National Government was as politic as it was unavoidable.
General PINCKNEY wished to have a good National Government, and at the same time to leave a considerable share of power in the States.
An election of either branch by the people, scattered as they are in many States, particularly in South Carolina, was totally impracticable.
He differed from gentlemen who thought that a choice by the people would be a better guard against bad measures, than by the Legislatures.
A majority of the people in South Carolina were notoriously for paper-money, as a legal tender; the Legislature had refused to make it a legal tender.
The reason was, that the latter had some sense of character, and were restrained by that consideration.
The State Legislatures, also, he said, would be more jealous, and more ready to thwart the National Government, if excluded from a participation in it.
The idea of abolishing these Legislatures would never go down.
On the question for electing the first branch by the State Legislatures as moved by Mr. PINCKNEY, it was negatived, — Connecticut, New Jersey, South Carolina, aye — 3; Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, no — 8.
by James Madison
1787
Wednesday, June 6
In Committee of the Whole.
Mr. PINCKNEY, according to previous notice, and rule obtained, moved, “that the first branch of the National Legislature be elected by the State Legislatures, and not by the people;” contending that the people were less fit judges in such a case, and that the Legislatures would be less likely to promote the adoption of the new government if they were to be excluded from all share in it.
Mr. RUTLEDGE seconded the motion.
Mr. GERRY. Much depends on the mode of election.
In England the people will probably lose their liberty from the smallness of the proportion having a right of suffrage.
Our danger arises from the opposite extreme.
Hence in Massachusetts the worst men get into the Legislature.
Several members of that body had lately been convicted of infamous crimes.
Men of indigence, ignorance, and baseness, spare no pains, however dirty, to carry their point against men who are superior to the artifices practised.
He was not disposed to run into extremes.
He was as much principled as ever against aristocracy and monarchy.
It was necessary, on the one hand, that the people should appoint one branch of the government, in order to inspire them with the necessary confidence; but he wished the election, on the other, to be so modified as to secure more effectually a just preference of merit.
His idea was, that the people should nominate certain persons, in certain districts, out of whom the State Legislatures should make the appointment.
Mr. WILSON. He wished for vigor in the government, but he wished that vigorous authority to flow immediately from the legitimate source of all authority.
The government ought to possess, not only, first, the force, but second, the mind or sense, of the people at large.
The Legislature ought to be the most exact transcript of the whole society.
Representation is made necessary only because it is impossible for the people to act collectively.
The opposition was to be expected, he said, from the governments, not from the citizens of the States.
The latter had parted, as was observed by Mr. KING, with all the necessary powers; and it was immaterial to them by whom they were exercised, if well exercised.
The State officers were to be the losers of power.
The people, he supposed, would be rather more attached to the National Government than to the State Governments, as being more important in itself, and more flattering to their pride.
There is no danger of improper elections, if made by large districts.
Bad elections proceed from the smallness of the districts, which give an opportunity to bad men to intrigue themselves into office.
Mr. SHERMAN. If it were in view to abolish the State Governments, the elections ought to be by the people.
If the State Governments are to be continued, it is necessary, in order to preserve harmony between the National and State Governments, that the elections to the former should be made by the latter.
The right of participating in the National Government would be sufficiently secured to the people by their election of the State Legislatures.
The objects of the Union, he thought were few, first, defence against foreign danger; secondly, against internal disputes, and a resort to force; thirdly, treaties with foreign nations; fourthly, regulating foreign commerce, and drawing revenue from it.
These, and perhaps a few lesser objects, alone rendered a confederation of the States necessary.
All other matters, civil and criminal, would be much better in the hands of the States.
The people are more happy in small than in large States.
States may, indeed, be too small, as Rhode Island, and thereby be too subject to faction.
Some others were, perhaps, too large, the powers of government not being able to pervade them.
He was for giving the General Government power to legislate and execute within a defined province.
Col. MASON. Under the existing Confederacy, Congress represent the States, and not the people of the States; their acts operate on the States, not on the individuals.
The case will be changed in the new plan of government.
The people will be represented; they ought therefore to choose the Representatives.
The requisites in actual representation are, that the representatives should sympathize with their constituents; should think as they think, and feel as they feel; and that for these purposes they should be residents among them.
Much, he said, had been alleged against democratic elections.
He admitted that much might be said; but it was to be considered that no government was free from imperfections and evils; and that improper elections in many instances were inseparable from republican governments.
But compare these with the advantage of this form, in favor of the rights of the people, in favor of human nature!
He was persuaded there was a better chance for proper elections by the people, if divided into large districts, than by the State Legislatures.
Paper money had been issued by the latter, when the former were against it.
Was it to be supposed, that the State Legislatures, then, would not send to the National Legislature patrons of such projects, if the choice depended on them?
Mr. MADISON considered an election of one branch, at least, of the Legislature by the people immediately, as a clear principle of free government; and that this mode, under proper regulations, had the additional advantage of securing better representatives, as well as of avoiding too great an agency of the State Governments in the general one.
He differed from the member from Connecticut, (Mr. SHERMAN,) in thinking the objects mentioned to be all the principal ones that required a national government.
Those were certainly important and necessary objects; but he combined with them the necessity of providing more effectually for the security of private rights, and the steady dispensation of justice.
Interferences with these were evils which had, more perhaps than any thing else, produced this Convention.
Was it to be supposed, that republican liberty could long exist under the abuses of it practised in some of the States?
The gentleman (Mr. SHERMAN) had admitted, that in a very small State faction and oppression would prevail.
It was to be inferred, then, that wherever these prevailed the State was too small.
Had they not prevailed in the largest as well as the smallest, though less than in the smallest?
And were we not thence admonished to enlarge the sphere as far as the nature of the government would admit?
This was the only defence against the inconveniences of democracy, consistent with the democratic form of government.
All civilized societies would be divided into different sects, factions, and interests, as they happened to consist of rich and poor, debtors and creditors, the landed, the manufacturing, the commercial interests, the inhabitants of this district or that district, the followers of this political leader or that political leader, the disciples of this religious sect or that religious sect.
In all cases where a majority are united by a common interest or passion, the rights of the minority are in danger.
What motives are to restrain them?
A prudent regard to the maxim, that honesty is the best policy, is found by experience to be as little regarded by bodies of men as by individuals.
Respect for character is always diminished in proportion to the number among whom the blame or praise is to be divided.
Conscience, the only remaining tie, is known to be inadequate in individuals; in large numbers, little is to be expected from it.
Besides, religion itself may become a motive to persecution and oppression.
These observations are verified by the histories of every country, ancient and modern.
In Greece and Rome the rich and poor, the creditors and debtors, as well as the patricians and plebeians, alternately oppressed each other with equal unmercifulness.
What a source of oppression was the relation between the parent cities of Rome, Athens, and Carthage, and their respective provinces; the former possessing the power, and the latter being sufficiently distinguished to be separate objects of it?
Why was America so justly apprehensive of parliamentary injustice?
Because Great Britain had a separate interest, real or supposed, and, if her authority had been admitted, could have pursued that interest at our expense.
We have seen the mere distinction of color made, in the most enlightened period of time, a ground of the most oppressive dominion ever exercised by man over man.
What has been the source of those unjust laws complained of among ourselves?
Has it not been the real or supposed interest of the major number?
Debtors have defrauded their creditors.
The landed interest has borne hard on the mercantile interest.
The holders of one species of property have thrown a disproportion of taxes on the holders of another species.
The lesson we are to draw from the whole is, that where a majority are united by a common sentiment, and have an opportunity, the rights of the minor party become insecure.
In a republican government, the majority, if united, have always an opportunity.
The only remedy is, to enlarge the sphere, and thereby divide the community into so great a number of interests and parties, that, in the first place, a majority will not be likely, at the same moment, to have a common interest separate from that of the whole, or of the minority; and, in the second place, that in case they should have such an interest, they may not be so apt to unite in the pursuit of it.
It was incumbent on us, then, to try this remedy, and, with that view, to frame a republican system on such a scale, and in such a form, as will control all the evils which have been experienced.
Mr. DICKINSON considered it essential, that one branch of the Legislature should be drawn immediately from the people; and expedient, that the other should be chosen by the Legislatures of the States.
This combination of the State Governments with the National Government was as politic as it was unavoidable.
General PINCKNEY wished to have a good National Government, and at the same time to leave a considerable share of power in the States.
An election of either branch by the people, scattered as they are in many States, particularly in South Carolina, was totally impracticable.
He differed from gentlemen who thought that a choice by the people would be a better guard against bad measures, than by the Legislatures.
A majority of the people in South Carolina were notoriously for paper-money, as a legal tender; the Legislature had refused to make it a legal tender.
The reason was, that the latter had some sense of character, and were restrained by that consideration.
The State Legislatures, also, he said, would be more jealous, and more ready to thwart the National Government, if excluded from a participation in it.
The idea of abolishing these Legislatures would never go down.
On the question for electing the first branch by the State Legislatures as moved by Mr. PINCKNEY, it was negatived, — Connecticut, New Jersey, South Carolina, aye — 3; Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, no — 8.
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Debates on the Legislative Branch
by Constitutional Convention
December 31, 1787
EDITED AND INTRODUCED BY JOSEPH POSTELL
Introduction
The Constitutional Convention was held in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787, from May 25 to September 17 (celebrated today as “Constitution Day”).
Delegates from twelve of the thirteen original states (Rhode Island refused to participate) deliberated throughout the summer on numerous controversies surrounding the creation of the new national government.
These selections contain the Convention’s discussions on the direct election of members of the House of Representatives and Congress’s power to declare war.
In these discussions, the delegates debated the nature of a republican government, the proper relationship of representatives to the people, and the extent of control Congress ought to have over foreign relations and military affairs.
The themes that emerged in these discussions bear a striking resemblance to today’s discussions about the way Congress should respond to public opinion, and the debates over Congress’s power over foreign affairs indicate the Framers’ intention regarding the division of authority between Congress and the president in this area.
—Joseph Postell
Source: Gordon Lloyd, ed., Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 by James Madison, a Member (Ashland, Ohio: Ashbrook Center, 2014).
June 6, 1787
Mr. PINCKNEY [1] . . . moved “that the first branch of the National Legislature be elected by the state legislatures, and not by the people”; contending that the people were less fit judges in such a case, and that the Legislatures would be less likely to promote the adoption of the new government if they were to be excluded from all share in it.
Mr. GERRY. [2] Much depends on the mode of election.
In England the people will probably lose their liberty from the smallness of the proportion having a right of suffrage.
Our danger arises from the opposite extreme.
Hence in Massachusetts the worst men get into the Legislature. . . .
It was necessary, on the one hand, that the people should appoint one branch of the government, in order to inspire them with the necessary confidence; but he wished the election, on the other, to be so modified as to secure more effectually a just preference of merit.
His idea was, that the people should nominate certain persons, in certain districts, out of whom the state legislatures should make the appointment.
Mr. WILSON. [3] He wished for vigor in the government, but he wished that vigorous authority to flow immediately from the legitimate source of all authority.
The government ought to possess, not only, first, the force, but second, the mind or sense, of the people at large.
The Legislature ought to be the most exact transcript of the whole society.
Representation is made necessary only because it is impossible for the people to act collectively. . . .
There is no danger of improper elections, if made by large districts.
Bad elections proceed from the smallness of the districts, which give an opportunity to bad men to intrigue themselves into office.
Col. MASON. [4] Under the existing Confederacy, Congress represent the states, and not the people of the states; their acts operate on the states, not on the individuals.
The case will be changed in the new plan of government.
The people will be represented; they ought therefore to choose the representatives.
The requisites in actual representation are that the representatives should sympathize with their constituents; should think as they think, and feel as they feel; and that for these purposes they should be residents among them.
Much, he said, had been alleged against democratic elections.
He admitted that much might be said; but it was to be considered that no government was free from imperfections and evils; and that improper elections in many instances were inseparable from republican governments. . . .
On the question for electing the first branch by the state legislatures as moved by Mr. PINCKNEY, it was negatived, — Connecticut, New Jersey, South Carolina, aye — 3; Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, no — 8.
FOOTNOTES
1. Charles Cotesworth Pinckney (1746–1825) was a delegate from the state of South Carolina who was educated at Oxford and who was one of the leading members of the Convention. After the Constitution was ratified, he became a prominent member of the Federalist Party, serving as its nominee for president in 1804 and 1808.
2. Elbridge Gerry (1744–1814) was a Massachusetts delegate who resisted the efforts of the nationalists and refused to sign the Constitution. He served as a member of the House of Representatives and as James Madison’s vice president. The “Gerrymander” derives its name from him.
3. James Wilson (1742–1798) was a Pennsylvania delegate whose influence at the Convention was second only to James Madison’s. He was an ardent nationalist who supported popular election of both houses of Congress. After ratification, he served as associate justice of the Supreme Court.
4. George Mason (1725–1792) was a prominent member of the Constitutional Convention from Virginia. He refused to sign the Constitution and opposed its ratification in Virginia.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Constitutional Convention
December 31, 1787
EDITED AND INTRODUCED BY JOSEPH POSTELL
Introduction
The Constitutional Convention was held in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787, from May 25 to September 17 (celebrated today as “Constitution Day”).
Delegates from twelve of the thirteen original states (Rhode Island refused to participate) deliberated throughout the summer on numerous controversies surrounding the creation of the new national government.
These selections contain the Convention’s discussions on the direct election of members of the House of Representatives and Congress’s power to declare war.
In these discussions, the delegates debated the nature of a republican government, the proper relationship of representatives to the people, and the extent of control Congress ought to have over foreign relations and military affairs.
The themes that emerged in these discussions bear a striking resemblance to today’s discussions about the way Congress should respond to public opinion, and the debates over Congress’s power over foreign affairs indicate the Framers’ intention regarding the division of authority between Congress and the president in this area.
—Joseph Postell
Source: Gordon Lloyd, ed., Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 by James Madison, a Member (Ashland, Ohio: Ashbrook Center, 2014).
June 6, 1787
Mr. PINCKNEY [1] . . . moved “that the first branch of the National Legislature be elected by the state legislatures, and not by the people”; contending that the people were less fit judges in such a case, and that the Legislatures would be less likely to promote the adoption of the new government if they were to be excluded from all share in it.
Mr. GERRY. [2] Much depends on the mode of election.
In England the people will probably lose their liberty from the smallness of the proportion having a right of suffrage.
Our danger arises from the opposite extreme.
Hence in Massachusetts the worst men get into the Legislature. . . .
It was necessary, on the one hand, that the people should appoint one branch of the government, in order to inspire them with the necessary confidence; but he wished the election, on the other, to be so modified as to secure more effectually a just preference of merit.
His idea was, that the people should nominate certain persons, in certain districts, out of whom the state legislatures should make the appointment.
Mr. WILSON. [3] He wished for vigor in the government, but he wished that vigorous authority to flow immediately from the legitimate source of all authority.
The government ought to possess, not only, first, the force, but second, the mind or sense, of the people at large.
The Legislature ought to be the most exact transcript of the whole society.
Representation is made necessary only because it is impossible for the people to act collectively. . . .
There is no danger of improper elections, if made by large districts.
Bad elections proceed from the smallness of the districts, which give an opportunity to bad men to intrigue themselves into office.
Col. MASON. [4] Under the existing Confederacy, Congress represent the states, and not the people of the states; their acts operate on the states, not on the individuals.
The case will be changed in the new plan of government.
The people will be represented; they ought therefore to choose the representatives.
The requisites in actual representation are that the representatives should sympathize with their constituents; should think as they think, and feel as they feel; and that for these purposes they should be residents among them.
Much, he said, had been alleged against democratic elections.
He admitted that much might be said; but it was to be considered that no government was free from imperfections and evils; and that improper elections in many instances were inseparable from republican governments. . . .
On the question for electing the first branch by the state legislatures as moved by Mr. PINCKNEY, it was negatived, — Connecticut, New Jersey, South Carolina, aye — 3; Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, no — 8.
FOOTNOTES
1. Charles Cotesworth Pinckney (1746–1825) was a delegate from the state of South Carolina who was educated at Oxford and who was one of the leading members of the Convention. After the Constitution was ratified, he became a prominent member of the Federalist Party, serving as its nominee for president in 1804 and 1808.
2. Elbridge Gerry (1744–1814) was a Massachusetts delegate who resisted the efforts of the nationalists and refused to sign the Constitution. He served as a member of the House of Representatives and as James Madison’s vice president. The “Gerrymander” derives its name from him.
3. James Wilson (1742–1798) was a Pennsylvania delegate whose influence at the Convention was second only to James Madison’s. He was an ardent nationalist who supported popular election of both houses of Congress. After ratification, he served as associate justice of the Supreme Court.
4. George Mason (1725–1792) was a prominent member of the Constitutional Convention from Virginia. He refused to sign the Constitution and opposed its ratification in Virginia.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Debates on the Legislative Branch, continued ...
by Constitutional Convention
December 31, 1787
EDITED AND INTRODUCED BY JOSEPH POSTELL
June 21, 1787
[Direct election of the members of the House of Representatives considered]
General PINKNEY moved “that the 1st. branch, instead of being elected by the people, should be elected in such manner as the Legislature of each state should direct.”
He urged first, that this liberty would give more satisfaction, as the Legislatures could then accommodate the mode to the convenience and opinions of the people.
Secondly, that it would avoid the undue influence of large counties which would prevail if the elections were to be made in districts as must be the mode intended by the report of the committee. [5]
Thirdly, that otherwise disputed elections must be referred to the General Legislature which would be attended with intolerable expense and trouble to the distant parts of the republic.
Col. HAMILTON [6] considered the motion as intended manifestly to transfer the election from the people to the state legislatures, which would essentially vitiate the plan.
It would increase that state influence which could not be too watchfully guarded against.
All too must admit the possibility, in case the general government should maintain itself, that the state governments might gradually dwindle into nothing.
The system therefore should not be engrafted on what might possibly fail.
Mr. MASON urged the necessity of retaining the election by the people.
Whatever inconvenience may attend the democratic principle, it must actuate one part of the election.
It is the only security for the rights of the people.
Mr. SHERMAN, [7] would like an election by the Legislatures best, but is content with [the] plan as it stands.
Mr. RUTLEDGE [8] could not admit the solidity of the distinction between a mediate and immediate election by the people.
It was the same thing to act by oneself, and to act by another.
An election by the Legislature would be more refined than an election immediately by the people: and would be more likely to correspond with the sense of the whole community.
If this Convention had been chosen by the people in districts it is not to be supposed that such proper characters would have been preferred.
The delegates to Congress he thought had also been fitter men than would have been appointed by the people at large.
Mr. WILSON considered the election of the 1st branch by the people not only as the cornerstone, but as the foundation of the fabric: and that the difference between a mediate and immediate election was immense.
The difference was particularly worthy of notice in this respect: that the Legislatures are actuated not merely by the sentiment of the people; but have an official sentiment opposed to that of the general government and perhaps to that of the people themselves.
Mr. KING [9] enlarged on the same distinction.
He supposed the Legislatures would constantly choose men subservient to their own views as contrasted to the general interest; and that they might even devise modes of election that wd. be subversive of the end in view.
He remarked several instances in which the views of a state might be at variance with those of the general government: and mentioned particularly a competition between the national and state debts, for the most certain and productive funds.
General PINKNEY was for making the state government a part of the general system.
If they were to be abolished, or lose their agency, South Carolina and other states would have but a small share of the benefits of government.
On the question for Gen. Pinkney motion to substitute election of [the] 1st branch in such mode as the Legislatures should appoint, instead of its being elected by the people.
Mass. no. Conn. ay. N.Y. no. N.J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. divd. Va. no. N.C. no. S.C. ay Geo. no. [Motion fails, 4–6]
General PINKNEY then moved that the 1st branch be elected by the people in such mode as the Legislatures should direct; but waved it on its being hinted that such a provision might be more properly tried in the detail of the plan.
On the question for ye. election of the 1st. branch by the people.
Mass. ay. Conn. ay. N.Y. ay. N.J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. divd. Va. ay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay Geo. ay. [Motion passes, 9––1]
Election of the 1st. branch “for the term of three years,” considered
Mr. RANDOLPH [10] moved to strike out, “three years” and insert “two years” — he was sensible that annual elections were a source of great mischiefs in the states, yet it was the want of such checks against the popular intemperance as were now proposed, that rendered them so mischievous.
He would have preferred annual to biennial, but for the extent of the U.S. and the inconvenience which would result from them to the representatives of the extreme parts of the empire.
The people were attached to frequency of elections.
All the constitutions of the states except that of South Carolina, had established annual elections.
Mr. DICKINSON. [11] The idea of annual elections was borrowed from the ancient usage of England, a country much less extensive than ours.
He supposed biennial would be inconvenient.
He preferred triennial: and in order to prevent the inconvenience of an entire change of the whole number at the same moment, suggested a rotation, by an annual election of one third. [12]
Mr. ELSEWORTH [13] was opposed to three years, supposing that even one year was preferable to two years.
The people were fond of frequent elections and might be safely indulged in one branch of the Legislature.
He moved for one year.
Mr. WILSON being for making the 1st branch an effectual representation of the people at large, preferred an annual election of it.
This frequency was most familiar and pleasing to the people.
It would not be more inconvenient to them, than triennial elections, as the people in all the states have annual meetings with which the election of the national representatives might be made to coincide.
He did not conceive that it would be necessary for the National Legislature to sit constantly; perhaps not half-perhaps not one fourth of the year.
Mr. MADISON [14] was persuaded that annual elections would be extremely inconvenient and apprehensive that biennial would be too much so: he did not mean inconvenient to the electors; but to the representatives.
They would have to travel seven or eight hundred miles from the distant parts of the Union; and would probably not be allowed even a reimbursement of their expenses.
Besides, none of those who wished to be re-elected would remain at the seat of government; confiding that their absence would not affect them.
The members of Congress had done this with few instances of disappointment.
But as the choice was here to be made by the people themselves who would be much less complaisant to individuals, and much more susceptible of impressions from the presence of a rival candidate, it must be supposed that the members from the most distant states would travel backwards and forwards at least as often as the elections should be repeated.
Much was to be said also on the time requisite for new members who would always form a large proportion, to acquire that knowledge of the affairs of the states in general without which their trust could not be usefully discharged.
Mr. SHERMAN preferred annual elections, but would be content with biennial.
He thought the representatives ought to return home and mix with the people.
By remaining at the seat of government they would acquire the habits of the place which might differ from those of their constituents.
Col. MASON observed that the states being differently situated such a rule ought to be formed as would put them as nearly as possible on a level.
If elections were annual the middle states would have a great advantage over the extreme ones.
He wished them to be biennial; and the rather as in that case they would coincide with the periodical elections of South Carolina as well of the other states.
Col. HAMILTON urged the necessity of three years.
There ought to be neither too much nor too little dependence, on the popular sentiments.
The checks in the other branches of government would be but feeble, and would need every auxiliary principle that could be interwoven.
The British House of Commons were elected septennially, yet the democratic spirit of [its] Constitution had not ceased.
Frequency of elections tended to make the people listless to them; and to facilitate the success of little cabals. [15]
This evil was complained of in all the states.
In Virginia it had been lately found necessary to force the attendance and voting of the people by severe regulations.
On the question for striking out “three years”
Mass. ay. Conn. ay. N.Y. no. N.J. divd. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay. [Motion passes, 7–3]
FOOTNOTES
5. Pinckney refers to the Committee of Detail, which wrote an early draft of the Constitution proposing direct election of members of the House, the provision under consideration here.
6. Alexander Hamilton (1757–1804) was a delegate from New York and one of the leading advocates of strengthening the national government. With James Madison and John Jay, he co-authored The Federalist Papers defending the Constitution. He served as America’s first secretary of the treasury.
7. Roger Sherman (1721–1793) was a delegate from Connecticut who was influential in passing the Connecticut Compromise, which set up proportional representation in the House of Representatives and equality of representation for each state in the Senate.
8. John Rutledge (1739–1800) was a delegate from South Carolina who supported ratification of the Constitution. He served as associate justice of the Supreme Court after ratification.
9. Rufus King (1755–1827) was a delegate from Massachusetts who was educated at Harvard and who supported a stronger national government. After ratification, he was a Federalist who served in the Senate and as the Federalist Party’s presidential candidate in 1816.
10. Edmund Randolph (1753–1813) was a Virginia delegate who introduced the Virginia Plan at the beginning of the Constitutional Convention. He refused to sign the Constitution but was persuaded to support it at the Virginia ratification convention. He served as the first attorney general of the United States and as secretary of state after Thomas Jefferson resigned.
11. John Dickinson (1732–1808) was a delegate from Delaware who was famous for his “Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania,” which criticized the British Parliament for taxing the American colonies without granting representation.
12. Dickinson’s proposal for “a rotation, by an annual election of one third” of members of the House, did not gain traction, but it was adopted for election of U.S. senators.
13. Oliver Ellsworth (1745–1807) was a Connecticut delegate who introduced the Connecticut Compromise. He defended ratification of the Constitution and served as Connecticut’s first senator, and then as chief justice of the Supreme Court.
14. James Madison (1751–1836) from Virginia is widely known as the “Father of the Constitution” due to his contributions at the Convention. He co-authored The Federalist Papers with Alexander Hamilton, and served as member of the House of Representatives, secretary of state, and the fourth president of the United States.
15. A “cabal” is a small, often secret faction that conspires to conduct political action.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Constitutional Convention
December 31, 1787
EDITED AND INTRODUCED BY JOSEPH POSTELL
June 21, 1787
[Direct election of the members of the House of Representatives considered]
General PINKNEY moved “that the 1st. branch, instead of being elected by the people, should be elected in such manner as the Legislature of each state should direct.”
He urged first, that this liberty would give more satisfaction, as the Legislatures could then accommodate the mode to the convenience and opinions of the people.
Secondly, that it would avoid the undue influence of large counties which would prevail if the elections were to be made in districts as must be the mode intended by the report of the committee. [5]
Thirdly, that otherwise disputed elections must be referred to the General Legislature which would be attended with intolerable expense and trouble to the distant parts of the republic.
Col. HAMILTON [6] considered the motion as intended manifestly to transfer the election from the people to the state legislatures, which would essentially vitiate the plan.
It would increase that state influence which could not be too watchfully guarded against.
All too must admit the possibility, in case the general government should maintain itself, that the state governments might gradually dwindle into nothing.
The system therefore should not be engrafted on what might possibly fail.
Mr. MASON urged the necessity of retaining the election by the people.
Whatever inconvenience may attend the democratic principle, it must actuate one part of the election.
It is the only security for the rights of the people.
Mr. SHERMAN, [7] would like an election by the Legislatures best, but is content with [the] plan as it stands.
Mr. RUTLEDGE [8] could not admit the solidity of the distinction between a mediate and immediate election by the people.
It was the same thing to act by oneself, and to act by another.
An election by the Legislature would be more refined than an election immediately by the people: and would be more likely to correspond with the sense of the whole community.
If this Convention had been chosen by the people in districts it is not to be supposed that such proper characters would have been preferred.
The delegates to Congress he thought had also been fitter men than would have been appointed by the people at large.
Mr. WILSON considered the election of the 1st branch by the people not only as the cornerstone, but as the foundation of the fabric: and that the difference between a mediate and immediate election was immense.
The difference was particularly worthy of notice in this respect: that the Legislatures are actuated not merely by the sentiment of the people; but have an official sentiment opposed to that of the general government and perhaps to that of the people themselves.
Mr. KING [9] enlarged on the same distinction.
He supposed the Legislatures would constantly choose men subservient to their own views as contrasted to the general interest; and that they might even devise modes of election that wd. be subversive of the end in view.
He remarked several instances in which the views of a state might be at variance with those of the general government: and mentioned particularly a competition between the national and state debts, for the most certain and productive funds.
General PINKNEY was for making the state government a part of the general system.
If they were to be abolished, or lose their agency, South Carolina and other states would have but a small share of the benefits of government.
On the question for Gen. Pinkney motion to substitute election of [the] 1st branch in such mode as the Legislatures should appoint, instead of its being elected by the people.
Mass. no. Conn. ay. N.Y. no. N.J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. divd. Va. no. N.C. no. S.C. ay Geo. no. [Motion fails, 4–6]
General PINKNEY then moved that the 1st branch be elected by the people in such mode as the Legislatures should direct; but waved it on its being hinted that such a provision might be more properly tried in the detail of the plan.
On the question for ye. election of the 1st. branch by the people.
Mass. ay. Conn. ay. N.Y. ay. N.J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. divd. Va. ay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay Geo. ay. [Motion passes, 9––1]
Election of the 1st. branch “for the term of three years,” considered
Mr. RANDOLPH [10] moved to strike out, “three years” and insert “two years” — he was sensible that annual elections were a source of great mischiefs in the states, yet it was the want of such checks against the popular intemperance as were now proposed, that rendered them so mischievous.
He would have preferred annual to biennial, but for the extent of the U.S. and the inconvenience which would result from them to the representatives of the extreme parts of the empire.
The people were attached to frequency of elections.
All the constitutions of the states except that of South Carolina, had established annual elections.
Mr. DICKINSON. [11] The idea of annual elections was borrowed from the ancient usage of England, a country much less extensive than ours.
He supposed biennial would be inconvenient.
He preferred triennial: and in order to prevent the inconvenience of an entire change of the whole number at the same moment, suggested a rotation, by an annual election of one third. [12]
Mr. ELSEWORTH [13] was opposed to three years, supposing that even one year was preferable to two years.
The people were fond of frequent elections and might be safely indulged in one branch of the Legislature.
He moved for one year.
Mr. WILSON being for making the 1st branch an effectual representation of the people at large, preferred an annual election of it.
This frequency was most familiar and pleasing to the people.
It would not be more inconvenient to them, than triennial elections, as the people in all the states have annual meetings with which the election of the national representatives might be made to coincide.
He did not conceive that it would be necessary for the National Legislature to sit constantly; perhaps not half-perhaps not one fourth of the year.
Mr. MADISON [14] was persuaded that annual elections would be extremely inconvenient and apprehensive that biennial would be too much so: he did not mean inconvenient to the electors; but to the representatives.
They would have to travel seven or eight hundred miles from the distant parts of the Union; and would probably not be allowed even a reimbursement of their expenses.
Besides, none of those who wished to be re-elected would remain at the seat of government; confiding that their absence would not affect them.
The members of Congress had done this with few instances of disappointment.
But as the choice was here to be made by the people themselves who would be much less complaisant to individuals, and much more susceptible of impressions from the presence of a rival candidate, it must be supposed that the members from the most distant states would travel backwards and forwards at least as often as the elections should be repeated.
Much was to be said also on the time requisite for new members who would always form a large proportion, to acquire that knowledge of the affairs of the states in general without which their trust could not be usefully discharged.
Mr. SHERMAN preferred annual elections, but would be content with biennial.
He thought the representatives ought to return home and mix with the people.
By remaining at the seat of government they would acquire the habits of the place which might differ from those of their constituents.
Col. MASON observed that the states being differently situated such a rule ought to be formed as would put them as nearly as possible on a level.
If elections were annual the middle states would have a great advantage over the extreme ones.
He wished them to be biennial; and the rather as in that case they would coincide with the periodical elections of South Carolina as well of the other states.
Col. HAMILTON urged the necessity of three years.
There ought to be neither too much nor too little dependence, on the popular sentiments.
The checks in the other branches of government would be but feeble, and would need every auxiliary principle that could be interwoven.
The British House of Commons were elected septennially, yet the democratic spirit of [its] Constitution had not ceased.
Frequency of elections tended to make the people listless to them; and to facilitate the success of little cabals. [15]
This evil was complained of in all the states.
In Virginia it had been lately found necessary to force the attendance and voting of the people by severe regulations.
On the question for striking out “three years”
Mass. ay. Conn. ay. N.Y. no. N.J. divd. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay. [Motion passes, 7–3]
FOOTNOTES
5. Pinckney refers to the Committee of Detail, which wrote an early draft of the Constitution proposing direct election of members of the House, the provision under consideration here.
6. Alexander Hamilton (1757–1804) was a delegate from New York and one of the leading advocates of strengthening the national government. With James Madison and John Jay, he co-authored The Federalist Papers defending the Constitution. He served as America’s first secretary of the treasury.
7. Roger Sherman (1721–1793) was a delegate from Connecticut who was influential in passing the Connecticut Compromise, which set up proportional representation in the House of Representatives and equality of representation for each state in the Senate.
8. John Rutledge (1739–1800) was a delegate from South Carolina who supported ratification of the Constitution. He served as associate justice of the Supreme Court after ratification.
9. Rufus King (1755–1827) was a delegate from Massachusetts who was educated at Harvard and who supported a stronger national government. After ratification, he was a Federalist who served in the Senate and as the Federalist Party’s presidential candidate in 1816.
10. Edmund Randolph (1753–1813) was a Virginia delegate who introduced the Virginia Plan at the beginning of the Constitutional Convention. He refused to sign the Constitution but was persuaded to support it at the Virginia ratification convention. He served as the first attorney general of the United States and as secretary of state after Thomas Jefferson resigned.
11. John Dickinson (1732–1808) was a delegate from Delaware who was famous for his “Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania,” which criticized the British Parliament for taxing the American colonies without granting representation.
12. Dickinson’s proposal for “a rotation, by an annual election of one third” of members of the House, did not gain traction, but it was adopted for election of U.S. senators.
13. Oliver Ellsworth (1745–1807) was a Connecticut delegate who introduced the Connecticut Compromise. He defended ratification of the Constitution and served as Connecticut’s first senator, and then as chief justice of the Supreme Court.
14. James Madison (1751–1836) from Virginia is widely known as the “Father of the Constitution” due to his contributions at the Convention. He co-authored The Federalist Papers with Alexander Hamilton, and served as member of the House of Representatives, secretary of state, and the fourth president of the United States.
15. A “cabal” is a small, often secret faction that conspires to conduct political action.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Debates on the Legislative Branch, concluded ...
by Constitutional Convention
December 31, 1787
EDITED AND INTRODUCED BY JOSEPH POSTELL
August 17, 1787
Consideration of the clause granting Congress the power “To make war”
Mr. PINKNEY opposed the vesting this power in the Legislature.
Its proceedings were too slow.
It would meet but once a year.
The House of Representatives would be too numerous for such deliberations.
The Senate would be the best depositary, being more acquainted with foreign affairs, and most capable of proper resolutions.
If the states are equally represented in [the] Senate, so as to give no advantage to [the] large states, the power will notwithstanding be safe, as the small have their all at stake in such cases as well as the large states.
It would be singular for one authority to make war, and another peace.
Mr. BUTLER. [16] The objections against the Legislature lie in a great degree against the Senate.
He was for vesting the power in the president, who will have all the requisite qualities, and will not make war but when the nation will support it.
Mr. MADISON and Mr. GERRY moved to insert “declare,” striking out “make” war; leaving to the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks.
Mr. SHERMAN thought it stood very well.
The Executive should be able to repel and not to commence war.
“Make” [is] better than “declare” the latter narrowing the power too much.
Mr. GERRY [17] never expected to hear in a republic a motion to empower the Executive alone to declare war.
Mr. ELSWORTH. there is a material difference between the cases of making war and making peace.
It should be more easy to get out of war, than into it.
War also is a simple and overt declaration.
Peace attended with intricate and secret negotiations.
Mr. MASON was against giving the power of war to the Executive, because not safely to be trusted with it; or to the Senate, because not so constructed as to be entitled to it.
He was for clogging rather than facilitating war; but for facilitating peace.
He preferred “declare” to “make.”
On the motion to insert declare in place of make, it was agreed to.
N.H. no. Mass. abst. Conn. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay. [Motion passes, 8–1]
Mr. PINKNEY’S motion to strike out [the] whole clause, disagreed to without call of states.
Mr. BUTLER moved to give the Legislature [the] power of peace, as they were to have that of war.
Mr. GERRY 2ds. him.
8 Senators may possibly exercise the power if vested in that body, and 14 if all should be present; and may consequently give up part of the United States.
The Senate are more liable to be corrupted by an Enemy than the whole Legislature.
On the motion for adding “and peace” after “war” N.H. no. Mass. no. Conn. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N.C. no S.C. no. Geo. no. [Motion fails unanimously.]
FOOTNOTES
16. Pierce Butler (1744–1822) was a delegate from South Carolina who was an outspoken nationalist. He was born in Ireland and immigrated to the American colonies in 1771. After ratification he served in the Senate.
17. Elbridge Gerry (1744–1814) was a Massachusetts delegate who resisted the efforts of the nationalists and refused to sign the Constitution. He served as a member of the House of Representatives and as James Madison’s vice president. The “Gerrymander” derives its name from him.
by Constitutional Convention
December 31, 1787
EDITED AND INTRODUCED BY JOSEPH POSTELL
August 17, 1787
Consideration of the clause granting Congress the power “To make war”
Mr. PINKNEY opposed the vesting this power in the Legislature.
Its proceedings were too slow.
It would meet but once a year.
The House of Representatives would be too numerous for such deliberations.
The Senate would be the best depositary, being more acquainted with foreign affairs, and most capable of proper resolutions.
If the states are equally represented in [the] Senate, so as to give no advantage to [the] large states, the power will notwithstanding be safe, as the small have their all at stake in such cases as well as the large states.
It would be singular for one authority to make war, and another peace.
Mr. BUTLER. [16] The objections against the Legislature lie in a great degree against the Senate.
He was for vesting the power in the president, who will have all the requisite qualities, and will not make war but when the nation will support it.
Mr. MADISON and Mr. GERRY moved to insert “declare,” striking out “make” war; leaving to the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks.
Mr. SHERMAN thought it stood very well.
The Executive should be able to repel and not to commence war.
“Make” [is] better than “declare” the latter narrowing the power too much.
Mr. GERRY [17] never expected to hear in a republic a motion to empower the Executive alone to declare war.
Mr. ELSWORTH. there is a material difference between the cases of making war and making peace.
It should be more easy to get out of war, than into it.
War also is a simple and overt declaration.
Peace attended with intricate and secret negotiations.
Mr. MASON was against giving the power of war to the Executive, because not safely to be trusted with it; or to the Senate, because not so constructed as to be entitled to it.
He was for clogging rather than facilitating war; but for facilitating peace.
He preferred “declare” to “make.”
On the motion to insert declare in place of make, it was agreed to.
N.H. no. Mass. abst. Conn. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay. [Motion passes, 8–1]
Mr. PINKNEY’S motion to strike out [the] whole clause, disagreed to without call of states.
Mr. BUTLER moved to give the Legislature [the] power of peace, as they were to have that of war.
Mr. GERRY 2ds. him.
8 Senators may possibly exercise the power if vested in that body, and 14 if all should be present; and may consequently give up part of the United States.
The Senate are more liable to be corrupted by an Enemy than the whole Legislature.
On the motion for adding “and peace” after “war” N.H. no. Mass. no. Conn. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N.C. no S.C. no. Geo. no. [Motion fails unanimously.]
FOOTNOTES
16. Pierce Butler (1744–1822) was a delegate from South Carolina who was an outspoken nationalist. He was born in Ireland and immigrated to the American colonies in 1771. After ratification he served in the Senate.
17. Elbridge Gerry (1744–1814) was a Massachusetts delegate who resisted the efforts of the nationalists and refused to sign the Constitution. He served as a member of the House of Representatives and as James Madison’s vice president. The “Gerrymander” derives its name from him.
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Federal Farmer 7
December 31, 1787
EDITED AND INTRODUCED BY JOSEPH POSTELL
Introduction
Originally published by the New York Journal in November of 1787, “Letter from the Federal Farmer” was the first in a series of critiques levied against the proposed Constitution written by the pseudonymous “Federal Farmer.”
The author of the papers written by the Federal Farmer is still unknown.
In this paper, Federal Farmer argues that the scheme of congressional representation, as detailed in the Constitution, will exacerbate the influence of special interest groups during legislation, and ultimately degrade the relationship between the citizens and the laws that govern them.
He argues that governments can secure obedience through one of two methods: force or voluntary persuasion.
Governments should, in his view, rely on persuasion, so that the people follow the law by their own choice.
To secure persuasion, the people should think that the government follows their wishes, but this will not happen, he predicts, if Congress has too few representatives to seem responsive to their will.
Today, these concerns are frequently invoked, since the ratio of members of Congress to their constituents has increased dramatically over time.
—Joseph Postell
Source: Empire and Nation: Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania (John Dickinson). Letters from the Federal Farmer (Richard Henry Lee), ed. Forrest McDonald (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund 1999).
In viewing the various governments instituted by mankind, we see their whole force reducible to two principles — the important springs which alone move the machines, and give them their intended influence and control, are force and persuasion: by the former men are compelled, by the latter they are drawn.
We denominate a government despotic or free, as the one or other principle prevails in it.
Perhaps it is not possible for a government to be so despotic, as not to operate persuasively on some of its subjects; nor is it, in the nature of things, I conceive, for a government to be so free, or so supported by voluntary consent, as never to want force to compel obedience to the laws.
In despotic governments one man, or a few men, independent of the people, generally make the laws, command obedience, and enforce it by the sword: one-fourth part of the people are armed, and obliged to endure the fatigues of soldiers, to oppress the others and keep them subject to the laws.
In free governments the people, or their representatives, make the laws; their execution is principally the effect of voluntary consent and aid; the people respect the magistrate, follow their private pursuits, and enjoy the fruits of their labor with very small deductions for the public use.
The body of the people must evidently prefer the latter species of government; and it can be only those few, who may be well paid for the part they take in enforcing despotism, that can, for a moment, prefer the former.
Our true object is to give full efficacy to one principle, to arm persuasion on every side, and to render force as little necessary as possible.
Persuasion is never dangerous not even in despotic governments; but military force, if often applied internally, can never fail to destroy the love and confidence, and break the spirits, of the people; and to render it totally impracticable and unnatural for him or them who govern, and yield to this force against the people, to hold their places by the peoples’ elections.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
December 31, 1787
EDITED AND INTRODUCED BY JOSEPH POSTELL
Introduction
Originally published by the New York Journal in November of 1787, “Letter from the Federal Farmer” was the first in a series of critiques levied against the proposed Constitution written by the pseudonymous “Federal Farmer.”
The author of the papers written by the Federal Farmer is still unknown.
In this paper, Federal Farmer argues that the scheme of congressional representation, as detailed in the Constitution, will exacerbate the influence of special interest groups during legislation, and ultimately degrade the relationship between the citizens and the laws that govern them.
He argues that governments can secure obedience through one of two methods: force or voluntary persuasion.
Governments should, in his view, rely on persuasion, so that the people follow the law by their own choice.
To secure persuasion, the people should think that the government follows their wishes, but this will not happen, he predicts, if Congress has too few representatives to seem responsive to their will.
Today, these concerns are frequently invoked, since the ratio of members of Congress to their constituents has increased dramatically over time.
—Joseph Postell
Source: Empire and Nation: Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania (John Dickinson). Letters from the Federal Farmer (Richard Henry Lee), ed. Forrest McDonald (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund 1999).
In viewing the various governments instituted by mankind, we see their whole force reducible to two principles — the important springs which alone move the machines, and give them their intended influence and control, are force and persuasion: by the former men are compelled, by the latter they are drawn.
We denominate a government despotic or free, as the one or other principle prevails in it.
Perhaps it is not possible for a government to be so despotic, as not to operate persuasively on some of its subjects; nor is it, in the nature of things, I conceive, for a government to be so free, or so supported by voluntary consent, as never to want force to compel obedience to the laws.
In despotic governments one man, or a few men, independent of the people, generally make the laws, command obedience, and enforce it by the sword: one-fourth part of the people are armed, and obliged to endure the fatigues of soldiers, to oppress the others and keep them subject to the laws.
In free governments the people, or their representatives, make the laws; their execution is principally the effect of voluntary consent and aid; the people respect the magistrate, follow their private pursuits, and enjoy the fruits of their labor with very small deductions for the public use.
The body of the people must evidently prefer the latter species of government; and it can be only those few, who may be well paid for the part they take in enforcing despotism, that can, for a moment, prefer the former.
Our true object is to give full efficacy to one principle, to arm persuasion on every side, and to render force as little necessary as possible.
Persuasion is never dangerous not even in despotic governments; but military force, if often applied internally, can never fail to destroy the love and confidence, and break the spirits, of the people; and to render it totally impracticable and unnatural for him or them who govern, and yield to this force against the people, to hold their places by the peoples’ elections.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Federal Farmer 7, continued ...
December 31, 1787
I repeat my observation, that the plan proposed will have a doubtful operation between the two principles; and whether it will preponderate towards persuasion or force is uncertain.
Government must exist — if the persuasive principle be feeble, force is infallibly the next resort.
The moment the laws of congress shall be disregarded they must languish, and the whole system be convulsed — that moment we must have recourse to this next resort, and all freedom vanish.
It being impracticable for the people to assemble to make laws, they must elect legislators, and assign men to the different departments of the government.
In the representative branch we must expect chiefly to collect the confidence of the people, and in it to find almost entirely the force of persuasion.
In forming this branch, therefore, several important considerations must be attended to.
It must possess abilities to discern the situation of the people and of public affairs, a disposition to sympathize with the people, and a capacity and inclination to make laws congenial to their circumstances and condition: it must afford security against interested combinations, corruption and influence; it must possess the confidence, and have the voluntary support of the people.
I think these positions will not be controverted, nor the one I formerly advanced, that a fair and equal representation is that in which the interests, feelings, opinions and views of the people are collected, in such manner as they would be were the people all assembled.
Having made these general observations, I shall proceed to consider further my principal position, viz. that there is no substantial representation of the people provided for in a government, in which the most essential powers, even as to the internal police of the country, are proposed to be lodged; and to propose certain amendments as to the representative branch: 1st, That there ought to be an increase of the numbers of representatives: And, 2dly, That the elections of them ought to be better secured.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
December 31, 1787
I repeat my observation, that the plan proposed will have a doubtful operation between the two principles; and whether it will preponderate towards persuasion or force is uncertain.
Government must exist — if the persuasive principle be feeble, force is infallibly the next resort.
The moment the laws of congress shall be disregarded they must languish, and the whole system be convulsed — that moment we must have recourse to this next resort, and all freedom vanish.
It being impracticable for the people to assemble to make laws, they must elect legislators, and assign men to the different departments of the government.
In the representative branch we must expect chiefly to collect the confidence of the people, and in it to find almost entirely the force of persuasion.
In forming this branch, therefore, several important considerations must be attended to.
It must possess abilities to discern the situation of the people and of public affairs, a disposition to sympathize with the people, and a capacity and inclination to make laws congenial to their circumstances and condition: it must afford security against interested combinations, corruption and influence; it must possess the confidence, and have the voluntary support of the people.
I think these positions will not be controverted, nor the one I formerly advanced, that a fair and equal representation is that in which the interests, feelings, opinions and views of the people are collected, in such manner as they would be were the people all assembled.
Having made these general observations, I shall proceed to consider further my principal position, viz. that there is no substantial representation of the people provided for in a government, in which the most essential powers, even as to the internal police of the country, are proposed to be lodged; and to propose certain amendments as to the representative branch: 1st, That there ought to be an increase of the numbers of representatives: And, 2dly, That the elections of them ought to be better secured.
TO BE CONTINUED ...