A Landholder V, concluded ...
by Oliver Ellsworth
December 03, 1787
The vice-president is not an executive officer while the president is in discharge of his duty, and when he is called to preside his legislative voice ceases.
In no other instance is there even the shadow of blending or influence between the two departments.
We are further told “that the judicial departments, or those courts of law, to be instituted by Congress, will be oppressive.”
We allow it to be possible, but from whence arises the probability of this event?
State judges may be corrupt, and juries may be prejudiced and ignorant, but these instances are not common; and why shall we suppose they will be more frequent under a national appointment and influence, when the eyes of a whole empire are watching for their detection?
Their courts are not to intermeddle with your internal policy, and will have cognizance only of those subjects which are placed under the control of a national legislature.
It is as necessary there should be courts of law and executive officers, to carry into effect the laws of the nation, as that there be courts and officers to execute the laws made by your state assemblies.
There are many reasons why their decisions ought not to be left to courts instituted by particular states.
A perfect uniformity must be observed thro’ the whole union; or jealousy and unrighteousness will take place; and for a uniformity one judiciary must pervade the whole.
The inhabitants of one state will not have confidence in judges appointed by the legislature of another state, in which they have no voice.
Judges who owe their appointment and support to one state, will be unduly influenced, and not reverence the laws of the union.
It will at any time be in the power of the smallest state, by interdicting their own judiciary, to defeat the measures, defraud the revenue, and annul the most sacred laws of the whole empire.
A legislative power, without a judicial and executive under, their own control, is in the nature of things a nullity.
Congress under the old confederation had power to ordain and resolve, but having no judicial or executive of their own, their most solemn resolves were totally disregarded.
The little state of Rhode Island was purposely left by Heaven to its present madness, for a general conviction in the other states, that such a system as is now proposed is our only preservation from ruin.
What respect can any one think would be paid to national laws, by judicial and executive officers who are amenable only to the present assembly of Rhode Island?
The rebellion of Shays and the present measures of Rhode Island ought to convince us that a national legislature, judiciary and executive, must be united, or the whole is but a name; and that we must have these, or soon be hewers of wood and drawers of water for all other people.
In all these matters and powers given to Congress, their ordinances must be the supreme law of the land, or they are nothing.
They must have authority to enact any laws for executing their own powers, or those powers will be evaded by the artful and unjust, and the dishonest trader will defraud the public of its revenue.
As we have every reason to think this system was honestly planned, we ought to hope it may be honestly and justly executed.
I am sensible that speculation is always liable to error.
If there be any capital defects in this constitution, it is most probable that experience alone will discover them.
Provision is made for an alteration if, on trial, it be found necessary.
When your children see the candor and greatness of mind, with which you lay the foundation, they will be inspired with equity to furnish and adorn the superstructure.
A Landholder.
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/doc ... dholder-v/
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Letter to John Langdon
by Tobias Lear
December 03, 1787
Your obliging favor of the 3d Ulto.
Came to hand last week.
You will please to accept of my best thanks for the information contained in it.
I now, for once, feel proud of being a native of that part of America which discovers the wisdom of its inhabitants & a just idea of its true interest by receiving the proposed national constitution in so favourable a manner.
I think Colo. Mason must, by this time, wish that he had not handed forth his objections as so early a period, or at least that he had considered the matter a little more deliberately - he gave them in manuscript to persons in all parts of the country where he supposed they would make an impression, but avoided publishing them.
I waited for a long time in expectation that they would appear in the publick papers, but finding they did not, I conveyed a copy of them & am now answering the rest, but as it is under an assumed signature, it is not known, even to the General, by whom it is done.
I do not flatter myself that I am able to cope with a man of Colo. Mason’s abilities, on a subject which has been the chief business & study of his life, but my situation here gives me so good an opportunity of gaining information in all matters of publick & governmental concern, that, joined to the knowledge which I have acquired from reading will, I think enable me to accomplish the task which I have undertaken.
I can say nothing with certainty upon what will be the issue of the proposed Government in this State, it has many able opponents here, at the head of whom are Mr. Henry, Colo. Mason & Mr. R. H. Lee, I was very sorry to find the latter among the number because I think he is a worthy, honest character & opposes it from principle.
Mr. Henry’s conduct is somewhat unaccountable, he reprobates the present confederation; reviles the proposed constitution & yet points out nothing that is better; if I may be allowed to form an opinion, from his conduct, of what would be his wish, it is to divide the Southern States from the others.
Should that take place, Virginia would hold the first place among them, & he the first place in Virginia.
But this is conjecture.
I shall do myself the pleasure to communicate to you from time to time whatever may transpire here worthy of your attention.
I must beg of you, my dear Sir, to tell my friends in Portsmouth that I hold them in the most affectionate remembrance & that my not writing to them oftener does not proceed from a want of respect but from want of time — since the Genls. return from Philadelphia his correspondents from all parts of Europe & America have poured their letters upon him so fast that it requires my constant & unremitting attention to them, and to be candid with you, my dear Sir, you are more obliged to him for the trouble of this letter than to me, for as he was about to write to you himself he asked me if I should answer your letter at this time, I told him I did not think I should be able to do it, he replied “that it should be done.”
I was Therefore obliged to obey - though it will cost him half an hour of his own time to do what I should have been doing for him.
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/doc ... n-langdon/
by Tobias Lear
December 03, 1787
Your obliging favor of the 3d Ulto.
Came to hand last week.
You will please to accept of my best thanks for the information contained in it.
I now, for once, feel proud of being a native of that part of America which discovers the wisdom of its inhabitants & a just idea of its true interest by receiving the proposed national constitution in so favourable a manner.
I think Colo. Mason must, by this time, wish that he had not handed forth his objections as so early a period, or at least that he had considered the matter a little more deliberately - he gave them in manuscript to persons in all parts of the country where he supposed they would make an impression, but avoided publishing them.
I waited for a long time in expectation that they would appear in the publick papers, but finding they did not, I conveyed a copy of them & am now answering the rest, but as it is under an assumed signature, it is not known, even to the General, by whom it is done.
I do not flatter myself that I am able to cope with a man of Colo. Mason’s abilities, on a subject which has been the chief business & study of his life, but my situation here gives me so good an opportunity of gaining information in all matters of publick & governmental concern, that, joined to the knowledge which I have acquired from reading will, I think enable me to accomplish the task which I have undertaken.
I can say nothing with certainty upon what will be the issue of the proposed Government in this State, it has many able opponents here, at the head of whom are Mr. Henry, Colo. Mason & Mr. R. H. Lee, I was very sorry to find the latter among the number because I think he is a worthy, honest character & opposes it from principle.
Mr. Henry’s conduct is somewhat unaccountable, he reprobates the present confederation; reviles the proposed constitution & yet points out nothing that is better; if I may be allowed to form an opinion, from his conduct, of what would be his wish, it is to divide the Southern States from the others.
Should that take place, Virginia would hold the first place among them, & he the first place in Virginia.
But this is conjecture.
I shall do myself the pleasure to communicate to you from time to time whatever may transpire here worthy of your attention.
I must beg of you, my dear Sir, to tell my friends in Portsmouth that I hold them in the most affectionate remembrance & that my not writing to them oftener does not proceed from a want of respect but from want of time — since the Genls. return from Philadelphia his correspondents from all parts of Europe & America have poured their letters upon him so fast that it requires my constant & unremitting attention to them, and to be candid with you, my dear Sir, you are more obliged to him for the trouble of this letter than to me, for as he was about to write to you himself he asked me if I should answer your letter at this time, I told him I did not think I should be able to do it, he replied “that it should be done.”
I was Therefore obliged to obey - though it will cost him half an hour of his own time to do what I should have been doing for him.
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/doc ... n-langdon/
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Speech to the Pennsylvania Convention
by James Wilson
December 04, 1787
I shall take this opportunity of giving an answer to the objections already urged against the Constitution; I shall then point out some of those qualities that entitle it to the attention and approbation of this Convention; and, after having done this, I shall take a fit opportunity of stating the consequences which, I apprehend, will result from rejecting it, and those which will probably result from its adoption.
I have given the utmost attention to the debates, and the objections that, from time to time, have been made by the three gentlemen who speak in opposition.
I have reduced them to some order, perhaps not better than that in which they were introduced.
I will state them; they will be in the recollection of the house, and I will endeavor to give an answer to them: in that answer, I will interweave some remarks, that may tend to elucidate the subject.
A good deal has already been said concerning a bill of rights.
I have stated, according to the best of my recollection, all that passed in Convention relating to that business.
Since that time, I have spoken with a gentleman, who has not only his memory, but full notes that he had taken in that body, and he assures me that, upon this subject, no direct motion was ever made at all; and certainly, before we heard this so violently supported out of doors, some pains ought to have been taken to have tried its fate within; but the truth is, a bill of rights would, as I have mentioned already, have been not only unnecessary, but improper.
In some governments, it may come within the gentleman’s idea, when he says it can do no harm; but even in these governments, you find bills of rights do not uniformly obtain; and do those states complain who have them not?
Is it a maxim in forming governments, that not only all the powers which are given, but also that all those which are reserved, should be enumerated?
I apprehend that the powers given and reserved form the whole rights of the people, as men and as citizens.
I consider that there are very few who understand the whole of these rights.
All the political writers, from Grotius and Puffendorf down to Vattel, have treated on this subject; but in no one of those books, nor in the aggregate of them all, can you find a complete enumeration of rights appertaining to the people as men and as citizens.
There are two kinds of government — that where general power is intended to be given to the legislature, and that where the powers are particularly enumerated.
In the last case, the implied result is, that nothing more is intended to be given than what is so enumerated, unless it results from the nature of the government itself.
On the other hand, when general legislative powers are given, then the people part with their authority, and, on the gentleman’s principle of government, retain nothing.
But in a government like the proposed one, there can be no necessity for a bill of rights, for, on my principle, the people never part with their power.
Enumerate all the rights of men!
I am sure, sir, that no gentleman in the late Convention would have attempted such a thing.
I believe the honorable speakers in opposition on this floor were members of the assembly which appointed delegates to that Convention; if it had been thought proper to have sent them into that body, how luminous would the dark conclave have been!
So the gentleman has been pleased to denominate that body.
Aristocrats as they were, they pretended not to define the rights of those who sent them there.
We ask, repeatedly, what harm could the addition of a bill of rights do?
If it can do no good, I think that a sufficient reason to refuse having any thing to do with it.
But to whom are we to report this bill of rights, if we should adopt it?
Have we authority from those who sent us here to make one?
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by James Wilson
December 04, 1787
I shall take this opportunity of giving an answer to the objections already urged against the Constitution; I shall then point out some of those qualities that entitle it to the attention and approbation of this Convention; and, after having done this, I shall take a fit opportunity of stating the consequences which, I apprehend, will result from rejecting it, and those which will probably result from its adoption.
I have given the utmost attention to the debates, and the objections that, from time to time, have been made by the three gentlemen who speak in opposition.
I have reduced them to some order, perhaps not better than that in which they were introduced.
I will state them; they will be in the recollection of the house, and I will endeavor to give an answer to them: in that answer, I will interweave some remarks, that may tend to elucidate the subject.
A good deal has already been said concerning a bill of rights.
I have stated, according to the best of my recollection, all that passed in Convention relating to that business.
Since that time, I have spoken with a gentleman, who has not only his memory, but full notes that he had taken in that body, and he assures me that, upon this subject, no direct motion was ever made at all; and certainly, before we heard this so violently supported out of doors, some pains ought to have been taken to have tried its fate within; but the truth is, a bill of rights would, as I have mentioned already, have been not only unnecessary, but improper.
In some governments, it may come within the gentleman’s idea, when he says it can do no harm; but even in these governments, you find bills of rights do not uniformly obtain; and do those states complain who have them not?
Is it a maxim in forming governments, that not only all the powers which are given, but also that all those which are reserved, should be enumerated?
I apprehend that the powers given and reserved form the whole rights of the people, as men and as citizens.
I consider that there are very few who understand the whole of these rights.
All the political writers, from Grotius and Puffendorf down to Vattel, have treated on this subject; but in no one of those books, nor in the aggregate of them all, can you find a complete enumeration of rights appertaining to the people as men and as citizens.
There are two kinds of government — that where general power is intended to be given to the legislature, and that where the powers are particularly enumerated.
In the last case, the implied result is, that nothing more is intended to be given than what is so enumerated, unless it results from the nature of the government itself.
On the other hand, when general legislative powers are given, then the people part with their authority, and, on the gentleman’s principle of government, retain nothing.
But in a government like the proposed one, there can be no necessity for a bill of rights, for, on my principle, the people never part with their power.
Enumerate all the rights of men!
I am sure, sir, that no gentleman in the late Convention would have attempted such a thing.
I believe the honorable speakers in opposition on this floor were members of the assembly which appointed delegates to that Convention; if it had been thought proper to have sent them into that body, how luminous would the dark conclave have been!
So the gentleman has been pleased to denominate that body.
Aristocrats as they were, they pretended not to define the rights of those who sent them there.
We ask, repeatedly, what harm could the addition of a bill of rights do?
If it can do no good, I think that a sufficient reason to refuse having any thing to do with it.
But to whom are we to report this bill of rights, if we should adopt it?
Have we authority from those who sent us here to make one?
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Speech to the Pennsylvania Convention, continued ...
by James Wilson
December 04, 1787
It is true, we may propose as well as any other private persons; but how shall we know the sentiments of the citizens of this state and of the other states?
Are we certain that any one of them will agree with our definitions and enumerations?
In the second place, we are told that there is no check upon the government but the people.
It is unfortunate, sir, if their superintending authority is allowed as a check; but I apprehend that, in the very construction of this government, there are numerous checks.
Besides those expressly enumerated, the two branches of the legislature are mutual checks upon each other.
But this subject will be more properly discussed when we come to consider the form of the government itself; and then I mean to show the reason why the right of habeas corpus was secured by a particular declaration in its favor.
In the third place, we are told that there is no security for the rights of conscience.
I ask the honorable gentleman, what part of this system puts it in the power of Congress to attack those rights?
When there is no power to attack, it is idle to prepare the means of defence.
After having mentioned, in a cursory manner, the foregoing objections, we now arrive at the leading ones against the proposed system.
The very manner of introducing this Constitution, by the recognition of the authority of the people, is said to change the principle of the present Confederation, and to introduce a consolidating and absorbing government.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by James Wilson
December 04, 1787
It is true, we may propose as well as any other private persons; but how shall we know the sentiments of the citizens of this state and of the other states?
Are we certain that any one of them will agree with our definitions and enumerations?
In the second place, we are told that there is no check upon the government but the people.
It is unfortunate, sir, if their superintending authority is allowed as a check; but I apprehend that, in the very construction of this government, there are numerous checks.
Besides those expressly enumerated, the two branches of the legislature are mutual checks upon each other.
But this subject will be more properly discussed when we come to consider the form of the government itself; and then I mean to show the reason why the right of habeas corpus was secured by a particular declaration in its favor.
In the third place, we are told that there is no security for the rights of conscience.
I ask the honorable gentleman, what part of this system puts it in the power of Congress to attack those rights?
When there is no power to attack, it is idle to prepare the means of defence.
After having mentioned, in a cursory manner, the foregoing objections, we now arrive at the leading ones against the proposed system.
The very manner of introducing this Constitution, by the recognition of the authority of the people, is said to change the principle of the present Confederation, and to introduce a consolidating and absorbing government.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Speech to the Pennsylvania Convention, continued ...
by James Wilson
December 04, 1787
In this confederated republic, the sovereignty of the states, it is said, is not preserved.
We are told that there cannot be two sovereign powers, and that a subordinate sovereignty is no sovereignty.
It will be worth while, Mr. President, to consider this objection at large.
When I had the honor of speaking formerly on this subject, I stated, in as concise a manner as possible, the leading ideas that occurred to me, to ascertain where the supreme and sovereign power resides.
It has not been, nor, I presume, will it be denied, that somewhere there is, and of necessity must be, a supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable authority.
This, I believe, may justly be termed the sovereign power; for, from that gentleman’s (Mr. Findley) account of the matter, it cannot be sovereign unless it is supreme; for, says he, a subordinate sovereignty is no sovereignty at all.
I had the honor of observing, that, if the question was asked, where the supreme power resided, different answers would be given by different writers.
I mentioned that Blackstone will tell you that, in Britain, it is lodged in the British Parliament; and I believe there is no writer on this subject, on the other side of the Atlantic, but supposed it to be vested in that body.
I stated, further, that, if the question was asked of some politician, who had not considered the subject with sufficient accuracy, where the supreme power resided in our governments, he would answer, that it was vested in the state constitutions.
This opinion approaches near the truth, but does not reach it; for the truth is, that the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable authority remains with the people.
I mentioned, also, that the practical recognition of this truth was reserved for the honor of this country.
I recollect no constitution founded on this principle; but we have witnessed the improvement, and enjoy the happiness of seeing it carried into practice.
The great and penetrating mind of Locke seems to be the only one that pointed towards even the theory of this great truth.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by James Wilson
December 04, 1787
In this confederated republic, the sovereignty of the states, it is said, is not preserved.
We are told that there cannot be two sovereign powers, and that a subordinate sovereignty is no sovereignty.
It will be worth while, Mr. President, to consider this objection at large.
When I had the honor of speaking formerly on this subject, I stated, in as concise a manner as possible, the leading ideas that occurred to me, to ascertain where the supreme and sovereign power resides.
It has not been, nor, I presume, will it be denied, that somewhere there is, and of necessity must be, a supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable authority.
This, I believe, may justly be termed the sovereign power; for, from that gentleman’s (Mr. Findley) account of the matter, it cannot be sovereign unless it is supreme; for, says he, a subordinate sovereignty is no sovereignty at all.
I had the honor of observing, that, if the question was asked, where the supreme power resided, different answers would be given by different writers.
I mentioned that Blackstone will tell you that, in Britain, it is lodged in the British Parliament; and I believe there is no writer on this subject, on the other side of the Atlantic, but supposed it to be vested in that body.
I stated, further, that, if the question was asked of some politician, who had not considered the subject with sufficient accuracy, where the supreme power resided in our governments, he would answer, that it was vested in the state constitutions.
This opinion approaches near the truth, but does not reach it; for the truth is, that the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable authority remains with the people.
I mentioned, also, that the practical recognition of this truth was reserved for the honor of this country.
I recollect no constitution founded on this principle; but we have witnessed the improvement, and enjoy the happiness of seeing it carried into practice.
The great and penetrating mind of Locke seems to be the only one that pointed towards even the theory of this great truth.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Speech to the Pennsylvania Convention, continued ...
by James Wilson
December 04, 1787
When I made the observation that some politicians would say the supreme power was lodged in our state constitutions, I did not suspect that the honorable gentleman from Westmoreland (Mr. Findley) was included in that description; but I find myself disappointed; for I imagined his opposition would arise from another consideration.
His position is, that the supreme power resides in the states, as governments; and mine is, that it resides in the people, as the fountain of government; that the people have not — that the people meant not — and that the people ought not — to part with it to any government whatsoever.
In their hands it remains secure.
They can delegate it in such proportions, to such bodies, on such terms, and under such limitations, as they think proper.
I agree with the members in opposition, that there cannot be two sovereign powers on the same subject.
I consider the people of the United States as forming one great community; and I consider the people of the different states as forming communities, again, on a lesser scale.
From this great division of the people into distinct communities, it will be found necessary that different proportions of legislative powers should be given to the governments, according to the nature, number, and magnitude of their objects.
Unless the people are considered in these two views, we shall never be able to understand the principle on which this system was constructed.
I view the states as made for the people, as well as by them, and not the people as made for the states; the people, therefore, have a right, whilst enjoying (he undeniable powers of society, to form either a general government, or state governments, in what manner they please, or to accommodate them to one another, and by this means preserve them all.
This, I say, is the inherent and unalienable right of the people; and as an illustration of it, I beg to read a few words from the Declaration of Independence, made by the representatives of the United States, and recognized by the whole Union.
“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that, to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that, whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it, and institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such forms, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.”
This is the broad basis on which our independence was placed: on the same certain and solid foundation this system is erected.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by James Wilson
December 04, 1787
When I made the observation that some politicians would say the supreme power was lodged in our state constitutions, I did not suspect that the honorable gentleman from Westmoreland (Mr. Findley) was included in that description; but I find myself disappointed; for I imagined his opposition would arise from another consideration.
His position is, that the supreme power resides in the states, as governments; and mine is, that it resides in the people, as the fountain of government; that the people have not — that the people meant not — and that the people ought not — to part with it to any government whatsoever.
In their hands it remains secure.
They can delegate it in such proportions, to such bodies, on such terms, and under such limitations, as they think proper.
I agree with the members in opposition, that there cannot be two sovereign powers on the same subject.
I consider the people of the United States as forming one great community; and I consider the people of the different states as forming communities, again, on a lesser scale.
From this great division of the people into distinct communities, it will be found necessary that different proportions of legislative powers should be given to the governments, according to the nature, number, and magnitude of their objects.
Unless the people are considered in these two views, we shall never be able to understand the principle on which this system was constructed.
I view the states as made for the people, as well as by them, and not the people as made for the states; the people, therefore, have a right, whilst enjoying (he undeniable powers of society, to form either a general government, or state governments, in what manner they please, or to accommodate them to one another, and by this means preserve them all.
This, I say, is the inherent and unalienable right of the people; and as an illustration of it, I beg to read a few words from the Declaration of Independence, made by the representatives of the United States, and recognized by the whole Union.
“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that, to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that, whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it, and institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such forms, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.”
This is the broad basis on which our independence was placed: on the same certain and solid foundation this system is erected.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Speech to the Pennsylvania Convention, continued ...
by James Wilson
December 04, 1787
State sovereignty, as it is called, is far from being able to support its weight.
Nothing less than the authority of the people could either support it or give it efficacy.
I cannot pass over this subject without noticing the different conduct pursued by the late federal Convention, and that observed by the Convention which framed the Constitution of Pennsylvania.
On that occasion you find an attempt made to deprive the people of this right, so lately and so expressly asserted in the Declaration of Independence.
We are told, in the preamble to the declaration of rights, and frame of government, that we “do, by virtue of the authority vested in us, ordain, declare, and establish, the following declaration of rights and frame of government, to be the Constitution of this commonwealth, and to remain in force therein mattered, except in such articles as shall hereafter, on experience, be found to require improvement, and which shall, by the same authority of the people, fairly delegated as this frame of government directs.”
An honorable gentleman (Mr. Chambers) was well warranted in saying that all that could be done was done, to cut off the people from the right of amending; for it cannot be amended by any other mode than that which it directs; then, any number more than one third may control any number less than two thirds.
But I return to my general reasoning.
My position is, sir, that, in this country, the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power resides in the people at large; that they have vested certain proportions of this power in the state governments; but that the fee-simple continues, resides, and remains, with the body of the people.
Under the practical influence of this great truth, we are now sitting and deliberating, and under its operation, we can sit as calmly and deliberate as coolly, in order to change a constitution, as a legislature can sit and deliberate under the power of a constitution, in order to alter or amend a law.
It is true, the exercise of this power will not probably be so frequent, nor resorted to on so many occasions, in one case as in the other; but the recognition of the principle cannot fail to establish it more firmly.
But, because this recognition is made in the proposed Constitution, an exception is taken to the whole of it; for we are told it is a violation of the present Confederation — a Confederation of sovereign states.
I shall not enter into an investigation of the present Confederation, but shall just remark that its principle is not the principle of free governments.
The people of the United States are not, as such, represented in the present Congress; and, considered even as the component parts of the several states, they are not represented in proportion to their numbers and importance.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by James Wilson
December 04, 1787
State sovereignty, as it is called, is far from being able to support its weight.
Nothing less than the authority of the people could either support it or give it efficacy.
I cannot pass over this subject without noticing the different conduct pursued by the late federal Convention, and that observed by the Convention which framed the Constitution of Pennsylvania.
On that occasion you find an attempt made to deprive the people of this right, so lately and so expressly asserted in the Declaration of Independence.
We are told, in the preamble to the declaration of rights, and frame of government, that we “do, by virtue of the authority vested in us, ordain, declare, and establish, the following declaration of rights and frame of government, to be the Constitution of this commonwealth, and to remain in force therein mattered, except in such articles as shall hereafter, on experience, be found to require improvement, and which shall, by the same authority of the people, fairly delegated as this frame of government directs.”
An honorable gentleman (Mr. Chambers) was well warranted in saying that all that could be done was done, to cut off the people from the right of amending; for it cannot be amended by any other mode than that which it directs; then, any number more than one third may control any number less than two thirds.
But I return to my general reasoning.
My position is, sir, that, in this country, the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power resides in the people at large; that they have vested certain proportions of this power in the state governments; but that the fee-simple continues, resides, and remains, with the body of the people.
Under the practical influence of this great truth, we are now sitting and deliberating, and under its operation, we can sit as calmly and deliberate as coolly, in order to change a constitution, as a legislature can sit and deliberate under the power of a constitution, in order to alter or amend a law.
It is true, the exercise of this power will not probably be so frequent, nor resorted to on so many occasions, in one case as in the other; but the recognition of the principle cannot fail to establish it more firmly.
But, because this recognition is made in the proposed Constitution, an exception is taken to the whole of it; for we are told it is a violation of the present Confederation — a Confederation of sovereign states.
I shall not enter into an investigation of the present Confederation, but shall just remark that its principle is not the principle of free governments.
The people of the United States are not, as such, represented in the present Congress; and, considered even as the component parts of the several states, they are not represented in proportion to their numbers and importance.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Speech to the Pennsylvania Convention, continued ...
by James Wilson
December 04, 1787
In this place I cannot help remarking on the general inconsistency which appears between one part of the gentleman’s objections and another.
Upon the principle we have now mentioned, the honorable gentleman contended that the powers ought to flow from the states; and that all the late Convention had to do, was to give additional powers to Congress.
What is the present form of Congress?
A single body, with some legislative, but little executive, and no effective judicial power.
What are these additional powers that are to be given?
In some cases, legislative are wanting; in others, judicial; and in others, executive.
These, it is said, ought to be allotted to the general government.
But the impropriety of delegating such extensive trust to one body of men is evident; yet in the same day, and perhaps in the same hour, we are told by honorable gentlemen that those three branches of government are not kept sufficiently distinct in this Constitution; we are told, also, that the Senate, possessing some executive power, as well as legislative, is such a monster. that it will swallow up and absorb every other body in the general government, after having destroyed those of the particular states.
Is this reasoning with consistency?
Is the Senate, under the proposed Constitution, so tremendous a body, when checked in their legislative capacity by the House of Representatives, and in their executive authority by the President of the United States?
Can this body be so tremendous as the present Congress, a single body of men, possessed of legislative, executive, and judicial powers?
To what purpose was Montesquieu read to show that this was a complete tyranny?
The application would have been more properly made, by the advocates of the proposed Constitution, against the patrons of the present Confederation.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by James Wilson
December 04, 1787
In this place I cannot help remarking on the general inconsistency which appears between one part of the gentleman’s objections and another.
Upon the principle we have now mentioned, the honorable gentleman contended that the powers ought to flow from the states; and that all the late Convention had to do, was to give additional powers to Congress.
What is the present form of Congress?
A single body, with some legislative, but little executive, and no effective judicial power.
What are these additional powers that are to be given?
In some cases, legislative are wanting; in others, judicial; and in others, executive.
These, it is said, ought to be allotted to the general government.
But the impropriety of delegating such extensive trust to one body of men is evident; yet in the same day, and perhaps in the same hour, we are told by honorable gentlemen that those three branches of government are not kept sufficiently distinct in this Constitution; we are told, also, that the Senate, possessing some executive power, as well as legislative, is such a monster. that it will swallow up and absorb every other body in the general government, after having destroyed those of the particular states.
Is this reasoning with consistency?
Is the Senate, under the proposed Constitution, so tremendous a body, when checked in their legislative capacity by the House of Representatives, and in their executive authority by the President of the United States?
Can this body be so tremendous as the present Congress, a single body of men, possessed of legislative, executive, and judicial powers?
To what purpose was Montesquieu read to show that this was a complete tyranny?
The application would have been more properly made, by the advocates of the proposed Constitution, against the patrons of the present Confederation.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Speech to the Pennsylvania Convention, continued ...
by James Wilson
December 04, 1787
It is mentioned that this federal government will annihilate and absorb all the state governments.
I wish to save, as much as possible, the time of the house: I shall not, therefore, recapitulate what I had the honor of saying last week on this subject.
I hope it was then shown that, instead of being abolished, (as insinuated,) from the very nature of things, and from the organization of the system itself, the state governments must exist, or the general governments must fall amidst their ruins.
Indeed, so far as to the forms, it is admitted they may remain; but the gentlemen seem to think their power will be gone.
I shall have occasion to take notice of this power hereafter; and, I believe, if it was necessary, it could be shown that the state governments, as states, will enjoy as much power, and more dignity, happiness, and security, than they have hitherto done.
I admit, sir, that some of the powers will be taken from them by the system before you; but it is, I believe, allowed on all hands — at least it is not among us a disputed point — that the late Convention was appointed with a particular view to give more power to the government of the Union.
It is also acknowledged that the intention was to obtain the advantage of an efficient government over the United States.
Now, if power is to be given by that government, I apprehend it must be taken from some place.
If the state governments are to retain all the powers they held before, then, of consequence, every new power that is given to Congress must be taken from the people at large.
Is this the gentleman’s intention?
I believe a strict examination of this subject will justify me in asserting that the states, as governments, have assumed too much power to themselves, while they left little to the people.
Let not this be called cajoling the people — the elegant expression used by the honorable gentleman from Westmoreland, (Mr. Findley.)
It is hard to avoid censure on one side or the other.
At some time, it has been said that I have not been at the pains to conceal my contempt of the people; but when it suits a purpose better, it is asserted that I cajole them.
I do neither one nor the other.
The voice of approbation, sir, when I think that approbation well earned, I confess, is grateful to my ears; but I would disdain it, if it is to be purchased by a sacrifice of my duty or the dictates of my conscience.
No, sir; I go practically into this system; I have gone into it practically when the doors were shut, when it could not be alleged that I cajoled the people; and I now endeavor to show that the true and only safe principle for a free people, is a practical recognition of their original and supreme authority.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by James Wilson
December 04, 1787
It is mentioned that this federal government will annihilate and absorb all the state governments.
I wish to save, as much as possible, the time of the house: I shall not, therefore, recapitulate what I had the honor of saying last week on this subject.
I hope it was then shown that, instead of being abolished, (as insinuated,) from the very nature of things, and from the organization of the system itself, the state governments must exist, or the general governments must fall amidst their ruins.
Indeed, so far as to the forms, it is admitted they may remain; but the gentlemen seem to think their power will be gone.
I shall have occasion to take notice of this power hereafter; and, I believe, if it was necessary, it could be shown that the state governments, as states, will enjoy as much power, and more dignity, happiness, and security, than they have hitherto done.
I admit, sir, that some of the powers will be taken from them by the system before you; but it is, I believe, allowed on all hands — at least it is not among us a disputed point — that the late Convention was appointed with a particular view to give more power to the government of the Union.
It is also acknowledged that the intention was to obtain the advantage of an efficient government over the United States.
Now, if power is to be given by that government, I apprehend it must be taken from some place.
If the state governments are to retain all the powers they held before, then, of consequence, every new power that is given to Congress must be taken from the people at large.
Is this the gentleman’s intention?
I believe a strict examination of this subject will justify me in asserting that the states, as governments, have assumed too much power to themselves, while they left little to the people.
Let not this be called cajoling the people — the elegant expression used by the honorable gentleman from Westmoreland, (Mr. Findley.)
It is hard to avoid censure on one side or the other.
At some time, it has been said that I have not been at the pains to conceal my contempt of the people; but when it suits a purpose better, it is asserted that I cajole them.
I do neither one nor the other.
The voice of approbation, sir, when I think that approbation well earned, I confess, is grateful to my ears; but I would disdain it, if it is to be purchased by a sacrifice of my duty or the dictates of my conscience.
No, sir; I go practically into this system; I have gone into it practically when the doors were shut, when it could not be alleged that I cajoled the people; and I now endeavor to show that the true and only safe principle for a free people, is a practical recognition of their original and supreme authority.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Speech to the Pennsylvania Convention, continued ...
by James Wilson
December 04, 1787
I say, sir, that it was the design of this system to take some power from the state governments, and to place it in the general government.
It was also the design that the people should be admitted to the exercise of some powers which they did not exercise under the present federation.
It was thought proper that the citizens, as well as the states, should be represented.
How far the representation in the Senate is a representation of states, we shall see by and by, when we come to consider that branch of the federal government.
This system, it is said, “unhinges and eradicates the state governments, and was systematically intended so to do.”
To establish the intention, an argument is drawn from art. 1st, sect. 4th, on the subject of elections.
I have already had occasion to remark upon this, and shall therefore pass on to the next objection:
That the last clause of the 8th section of the 1st article, gives the power of self-preservation to the general government, independent of the states; for, in case of their abolition, it will be alleged, in behalf of the general government, that self-preservation is the first law, and necessary to the exercise of all other powers.
Now, let us see what this objection amounts to.
Who are to have this self-preserving power?
The Congress.
Who are Congress?
It is a body that will consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.
Who compose this Senate?
Those who are elected by the legislature of the different states?
Who are the electors of the House of Representatives?
Those who are qualified to vote for the most numerous branch of the legislature in the separate states.
Suppose the state legislatures annihilated; where is the criterion to ascertain the qualification of electors? and unless this be ascertained, they cannot be admitted to vote; if a state legislature is not elected, there can be no Senate, because the senators are to be chosen by the legislatures only.
This is a plain and simple deduction from the Constitution; and yet the objection is stated as conclusive upon an argument expressly drawn from the last clause of this section.
It is repeated with confidence, “that this is not a federal government, but a complete one, with legislative, executive, and judicial powers: it is a consolidating government.”
I have already mentioned the misuse of the term; I wish the gentleman would indulge us with his definition of the word.
If, when he says it is a consolidation, he means so far as relates to the general objects of the Union, so far it was intended to be a consolidation, and on such a consolidation, perhaps, our very existence, as a nation, depends.
If, on the other hand, (as something which has been said seems to indicate,) he (Mr. Findley) means that it will absorb the governments of the individual states, so far is this position from being admitted, that it is unanswerably controverted.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by James Wilson
December 04, 1787
I say, sir, that it was the design of this system to take some power from the state governments, and to place it in the general government.
It was also the design that the people should be admitted to the exercise of some powers which they did not exercise under the present federation.
It was thought proper that the citizens, as well as the states, should be represented.
How far the representation in the Senate is a representation of states, we shall see by and by, when we come to consider that branch of the federal government.
This system, it is said, “unhinges and eradicates the state governments, and was systematically intended so to do.”
To establish the intention, an argument is drawn from art. 1st, sect. 4th, on the subject of elections.
I have already had occasion to remark upon this, and shall therefore pass on to the next objection:
That the last clause of the 8th section of the 1st article, gives the power of self-preservation to the general government, independent of the states; for, in case of their abolition, it will be alleged, in behalf of the general government, that self-preservation is the first law, and necessary to the exercise of all other powers.
Now, let us see what this objection amounts to.
Who are to have this self-preserving power?
The Congress.
Who are Congress?
It is a body that will consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.
Who compose this Senate?
Those who are elected by the legislature of the different states?
Who are the electors of the House of Representatives?
Those who are qualified to vote for the most numerous branch of the legislature in the separate states.
Suppose the state legislatures annihilated; where is the criterion to ascertain the qualification of electors? and unless this be ascertained, they cannot be admitted to vote; if a state legislature is not elected, there can be no Senate, because the senators are to be chosen by the legislatures only.
This is a plain and simple deduction from the Constitution; and yet the objection is stated as conclusive upon an argument expressly drawn from the last clause of this section.
It is repeated with confidence, “that this is not a federal government, but a complete one, with legislative, executive, and judicial powers: it is a consolidating government.”
I have already mentioned the misuse of the term; I wish the gentleman would indulge us with his definition of the word.
If, when he says it is a consolidation, he means so far as relates to the general objects of the Union, so far it was intended to be a consolidation, and on such a consolidation, perhaps, our very existence, as a nation, depends.
If, on the other hand, (as something which has been said seems to indicate,) he (Mr. Findley) means that it will absorb the governments of the individual states, so far is this position from being admitted, that it is unanswerably controverted.
TO BE CONTINUED ...