A Landholder IV, continued ...
Oliver Ellsworth
November 26, 1787
Several of the honorable Gentleman’s objections are expressed in such vague and indecisive terms, that they rather deserve the name of insinuations, and we know not against what particular parts of the system they are pointed.
Others are explicit, and if real deserve serious attention.
His first objection is “that there is no adequate provision for a representation of the people”.
This must have respect either to the number of representatives, or to the manner in which they are chosen.
The proper number to constitute a safe representation is a matter of judgement, in which honest and wise men often disagree.
Were it possible for all the people to convene and give their personal assent, some would think this the best mode of making laws, but in the present instance it is impracticable.
The state representation is composed of one or two from every town and district, which composes an assembly not so large as to be unwieldy in acting nor so expensive as to burden the people.
But if so numerous a representation were made from every part of the United States with our present population, the new Congress would consist of three thousand men; with the population of Great Britain to which we may arrive in a half century, of ten thousand; and with the population of France, which we shall probably equal in a century and a half, of thirty thousand.
Such a body of men might be an army to defend the country in case of foreign invasion, but not a legislature, and the expense to support them would equal the whole national revenue.
By the proposed constitution the new Congress will consist of nearly one hundred men.
When our population is equal to Great Britain of three hundred men, and when equal to France of nine hundred.
Plenty of Lawgivers!
Why any gentlemen should wish for more is inconceivable.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
A Landholder IV, continued ...
Oliver Ellsworth
November 26, 1787
Considering the immense territory of America, the objection with many will be on the other side; that when this whole is populated it will constitute a legislature unmanagable by its members.
Convention foreseeing this danger, have so worded the article, that if the people should at any time judge necessary, they may diminish the representation.
As the state legislature have to regulate the internal policy, of every town and neighborhood, it is convenient enough to have one or two men, particularly acquainted with every small district of country, its interests, parties, and passions.
But the federal legislature can take cognizance only of national questions and interests, which in their very nature are general, and for this purpose five or ten honest and wise men are chosen from each state; men who have had previous experience in state legislation, will be more competent than an hundred.
From an acquaintance with their own state legislatures, they will always know the sense of the people at large, and the expence of supporting such a number will be as much as we ought to incur.
If the Hon. gentleman, in saying “there is no adequate provision for a representation of the people” refers to the manner of choosing them, a reply to this is naturally blended with his second objection “that they have no security for the right of election” it is impossible to conceive what greater security can be given, by any form of Words, than we here find.
The federal representatives are to be chosen by the people.
Every freeman is an elector.
The same qualifications which enable you to vote for state representatives, give you federal voice.
It is a right you cannot loose, unless you first annihilate the state legislature, and declare yourselves incapable of electing, which is a degree of infatuation improbable as a second deluge to drown the world.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Oliver Ellsworth
November 26, 1787
Considering the immense territory of America, the objection with many will be on the other side; that when this whole is populated it will constitute a legislature unmanagable by its members.
Convention foreseeing this danger, have so worded the article, that if the people should at any time judge necessary, they may diminish the representation.
As the state legislature have to regulate the internal policy, of every town and neighborhood, it is convenient enough to have one or two men, particularly acquainted with every small district of country, its interests, parties, and passions.
But the federal legislature can take cognizance only of national questions and interests, which in their very nature are general, and for this purpose five or ten honest and wise men are chosen from each state; men who have had previous experience in state legislation, will be more competent than an hundred.
From an acquaintance with their own state legislatures, they will always know the sense of the people at large, and the expence of supporting such a number will be as much as we ought to incur.
If the Hon. gentleman, in saying “there is no adequate provision for a representation of the people” refers to the manner of choosing them, a reply to this is naturally blended with his second objection “that they have no security for the right of election” it is impossible to conceive what greater security can be given, by any form of Words, than we here find.
The federal representatives are to be chosen by the people.
Every freeman is an elector.
The same qualifications which enable you to vote for state representatives, give you federal voice.
It is a right you cannot loose, unless you first annihilate the state legislature, and declare yourselves incapable of electing, which is a degree of infatuation improbable as a second deluge to drown the world.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
A Landholder IV, concluded ...
Oliver Ellsworth
November 26, 1787
Your own assemblies are to regulate the formalities of this choice, and unless they betray you, you cannot be betrayed.
But perhaps it may be said, Congress have a power to control this formality as to the time and place of electing, and we allow they have.
But this objections which at first looks frightful was designed as a guard to the privileges of the electors.
Even state assemblies may have their madness and passion, this tho’ not probable is still possible.
We have a recent instance in the state of Rhode Island, where a desperate junto are governing, contrary to the sense of a great majority of the people.
It may be the case in any other state, and should it ever happen, that the ignorance or rashness of the state assemblies, in a fit of jealousy should deny you this sacred right, the deliberate justice of the continent, is enabled to interpose, and restore you a federal voice.
This right is therefore more inviolably guarded than it can be by the government of your state, for it is guarenteed by the whole empire.
Tho out of the order in which the Hon. Gentleman proposes his doubts, I wish here to notice some opinions which he makes.
The proposed plan among others he tells us involves these questions “whether the several state government, shall be altered as in effect to be dissolved?"
"Whether in lieu of the state governments the national constitution now proposed shall be substituted?”
I wish for sagacity to see on what these questions are founded.
No alteration in the state governments is even proposed, but they are to remain identically the same that they now are.
Some powers are to be given into the hands of your federal representatives, but these powers are all in their nature general, such as must be exercised by the whole or not at all, and such as are absolutely necessary; or your commerce, the price of your commodities, your riches and your safety will be the sport of every foreign adventurer.
Why are we told of the dissolution of our state governments, when by this plan they are indissolubly linked.
They must stand or fall, live or die together.
The national legislature consists of two houses, a senate and a house of Representative.
The senate is to be chosen by the assemblies of the particular states; so that if the assemblies are dissolved, the senate dissolves with them.
The national representatives are to be chosen by the same electors, and under the same qualifications, as choose state representatives; so that if the state representation be dissolved, the national representation is gone of course.
State representation and government is the very basis of the congressional power proposed.
This is the most valuable link in the chain of connexion, and affords double security for the rights of the people.
Your liberties are pledged to you by your own state, and by the power of the whole empire.
You have a voice in the government of your own state, and in the government of the whole.
Were not the gentleman on whom the remarks are made very honourable, and the eminence of office raised above a suspicion of cunning, we should think he had, in this instance, insinuated merely to alarm the fears of the people.
His other objections will be mentioned in some future number of the LANDHOLDER.
Landholder
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/lib ... holder-iv/
Oliver Ellsworth
November 26, 1787
Your own assemblies are to regulate the formalities of this choice, and unless they betray you, you cannot be betrayed.
But perhaps it may be said, Congress have a power to control this formality as to the time and place of electing, and we allow they have.
But this objections which at first looks frightful was designed as a guard to the privileges of the electors.
Even state assemblies may have their madness and passion, this tho’ not probable is still possible.
We have a recent instance in the state of Rhode Island, where a desperate junto are governing, contrary to the sense of a great majority of the people.
It may be the case in any other state, and should it ever happen, that the ignorance or rashness of the state assemblies, in a fit of jealousy should deny you this sacred right, the deliberate justice of the continent, is enabled to interpose, and restore you a federal voice.
This right is therefore more inviolably guarded than it can be by the government of your state, for it is guarenteed by the whole empire.
Tho out of the order in which the Hon. Gentleman proposes his doubts, I wish here to notice some opinions which he makes.
The proposed plan among others he tells us involves these questions “whether the several state government, shall be altered as in effect to be dissolved?"
"Whether in lieu of the state governments the national constitution now proposed shall be substituted?”
I wish for sagacity to see on what these questions are founded.
No alteration in the state governments is even proposed, but they are to remain identically the same that they now are.
Some powers are to be given into the hands of your federal representatives, but these powers are all in their nature general, such as must be exercised by the whole or not at all, and such as are absolutely necessary; or your commerce, the price of your commodities, your riches and your safety will be the sport of every foreign adventurer.
Why are we told of the dissolution of our state governments, when by this plan they are indissolubly linked.
They must stand or fall, live or die together.
The national legislature consists of two houses, a senate and a house of Representative.
The senate is to be chosen by the assemblies of the particular states; so that if the assemblies are dissolved, the senate dissolves with them.
The national representatives are to be chosen by the same electors, and under the same qualifications, as choose state representatives; so that if the state representation be dissolved, the national representation is gone of course.
State representation and government is the very basis of the congressional power proposed.
This is the most valuable link in the chain of connexion, and affords double security for the rights of the people.
Your liberties are pledged to you by your own state, and by the power of the whole empire.
You have a voice in the government of your own state, and in the government of the whole.
Were not the gentleman on whom the remarks are made very honourable, and the eminence of office raised above a suspicion of cunning, we should think he had, in this instance, insinuated merely to alarm the fears of the people.
His other objections will be mentioned in some future number of the LANDHOLDER.
Landholder
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/lib ... holder-iv/
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
A Democratic Federalist, November 26, 1787
Tench Coxe
November 26, 1787
The examination of the principle of liberty and civil polity is one of the most delightful exercises of the rational faculties of man.
Hence the pleasure we feel in a candid, unimpassioned investigation of the grounds and probably consequences of the new frame of government submitted to the people by the Federal Convention.
The various doubts, which the subject has created, will lead us to consider it the more by awakening our minds to that attention with which ever freeman should examine the intended constitutions of his country.
Several zealous defenders of liberty in America, and some of them of the first reputation, have differed from the bulk of the nation in their speculative opinions on the best Constitution for a legislative body.
In Pennsylvania this question has formed the line of division between two parties, in each of which are to be found men of sound judgment and very general knowledge.
As this diversity of opinion has not arisen from any peculiarity in our situation or circumstances, it must have been produced by the imperfections of our political researches and by the fallibility of the human mind, ever liable to unfavorable influence even from laudable and necessary passions.
The sincere and zealous friend of liberty is naturally in love with a refined democracy, beautiful and perfect as a theory, and adapted to the government of the purest beings; and he views with jealousy, apprehension and dislike not only real deviations from democratic principles, but the appearance of aristocracy.
Hence the idea of an upper house (a term erroneously adopted from the British constitution) has been disagreeable and even alarming to many, who were equally friends to perfect and real liberty and to an effective government.
Among the various regulations and arrangements of the new Federal Constitution the peculiar ground on which the Senate is placed is on this account the most striking and perhaps estimable.
A careful comparison of our second branch, as proposed by the Convention, with the upper house in the British constitution, will show, I hope, that there is something like a middle ground on which the wise and good of both opinions may meet and unite.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Tench Coxe
November 26, 1787
The examination of the principle of liberty and civil polity is one of the most delightful exercises of the rational faculties of man.
Hence the pleasure we feel in a candid, unimpassioned investigation of the grounds and probably consequences of the new frame of government submitted to the people by the Federal Convention.
The various doubts, which the subject has created, will lead us to consider it the more by awakening our minds to that attention with which ever freeman should examine the intended constitutions of his country.
Several zealous defenders of liberty in America, and some of them of the first reputation, have differed from the bulk of the nation in their speculative opinions on the best Constitution for a legislative body.
In Pennsylvania this question has formed the line of division between two parties, in each of which are to be found men of sound judgment and very general knowledge.
As this diversity of opinion has not arisen from any peculiarity in our situation or circumstances, it must have been produced by the imperfections of our political researches and by the fallibility of the human mind, ever liable to unfavorable influence even from laudable and necessary passions.
The sincere and zealous friend of liberty is naturally in love with a refined democracy, beautiful and perfect as a theory, and adapted to the government of the purest beings; and he views with jealousy, apprehension and dislike not only real deviations from democratic principles, but the appearance of aristocracy.
Hence the idea of an upper house (a term erroneously adopted from the British constitution) has been disagreeable and even alarming to many, who were equally friends to perfect and real liberty and to an effective government.
Among the various regulations and arrangements of the new Federal Constitution the peculiar ground on which the Senate is placed is on this account the most striking and perhaps estimable.
A careful comparison of our second branch, as proposed by the Convention, with the upper house in the British constitution, will show, I hope, that there is something like a middle ground on which the wise and good of both opinions may meet and unite.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
A Democratic Federalist, November 26, 1787, continued ...
Tench Coxe
November 26, 1787
The ancestors of the upper house in England originally derived all their power from the feudal system.
Possessed by lawless force of extensive domains, which, after a certain period, became hereditary in their families, they established a permanent power through the military service of their tenants, for upon those terms were all the lands of the kingdom once held under them.
When the address and spirit of the people, exerted upon every proper occasion, obtained for them the interesting privileges of holding in their families also the tenanted estates of the lords, and of alienating their tenancies to such as would perform the conditions on which they were held - when, by the extinction of the families of some of the barons, their tenants remained in possession of their lands - when by the increase of the property, the knowledge and the power of the tenants (or Commons of England) and from other favorable circumstances, the people of that country obtained a portion of that independence which Providence intended for them, such of their nobles as stood the chock, which fell from these circumstances on their order, were formed into a separate independent body.
They claimed an absolute right to act in their proper persons, and not by representatives, in the formation of the laws.
Being from their wealth, their hereditary power to legislate and judge, and their extraordinary learning in those times, perfectly independent of the rest of the nation, they have often been useful in checking the encroachments of the crown, and the precipitation and inadvertence of the people.
In that country they have really held the balance between the king and the Commons.
But though such a balance may be proper in a royal government, it does not appear necessary merely in that view in a genuine republic - which ought to be a government of laws.
Yet there are striking and capital advantages resulting from a second, not an upper house, if they can be obtained without departing, in our practice, from the real principles of liberty.
The arts and influence of popular and unworthy men; too hasty, careless, incautious and passionate proceedings; breaches of wholesome order and necessary form are evils we must wish to avoid, if to be effected without the hazard of greater.
Let us examine how far the peculiar constitution of our federal Senate will give us the advantages of a second legislative branch without subjecting us to the dangers usually apprehended from such bodies, that the sincere friends of freedom and mankind in America, if there is no longer reason for their differing upon a point of speculation may harmonize and unite.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Tench Coxe
November 26, 1787
The ancestors of the upper house in England originally derived all their power from the feudal system.
Possessed by lawless force of extensive domains, which, after a certain period, became hereditary in their families, they established a permanent power through the military service of their tenants, for upon those terms were all the lands of the kingdom once held under them.
When the address and spirit of the people, exerted upon every proper occasion, obtained for them the interesting privileges of holding in their families also the tenanted estates of the lords, and of alienating their tenancies to such as would perform the conditions on which they were held - when, by the extinction of the families of some of the barons, their tenants remained in possession of their lands - when by the increase of the property, the knowledge and the power of the tenants (or Commons of England) and from other favorable circumstances, the people of that country obtained a portion of that independence which Providence intended for them, such of their nobles as stood the chock, which fell from these circumstances on their order, were formed into a separate independent body.
They claimed an absolute right to act in their proper persons, and not by representatives, in the formation of the laws.
Being from their wealth, their hereditary power to legislate and judge, and their extraordinary learning in those times, perfectly independent of the rest of the nation, they have often been useful in checking the encroachments of the crown, and the precipitation and inadvertence of the people.
In that country they have really held the balance between the king and the Commons.
But though such a balance may be proper in a royal government, it does not appear necessary merely in that view in a genuine republic - which ought to be a government of laws.
Yet there are striking and capital advantages resulting from a second, not an upper house, if they can be obtained without departing, in our practice, from the real principles of liberty.
The arts and influence of popular and unworthy men; too hasty, careless, incautious and passionate proceedings; breaches of wholesome order and necessary form are evils we must wish to avoid, if to be effected without the hazard of greater.
Let us examine how far the peculiar constitution of our federal Senate will give us the advantages of a second legislative branch without subjecting us to the dangers usually apprehended from such bodies, that the sincere friends of freedom and mankind in America, if there is no longer reason for their differing upon a point of speculation may harmonize and unite.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
A Democratic Federalist, November 26, 1787, continued ...
Tench Coxe
November 26, 1787
The federal Senate, from the nature of our governments, will not be hereditary, nor will they possess, like the British barons, a power originally usurped by lawless violence and supported by military tenants.
They will not necessarily have even an influential property, for they will have a greater number of fellow citizens, as rich as themselves; and no qualification of wealth exists in the Constitution at present, nor can it be introduced without the consent of three-fourths of the people of the Union.
It cannot be apprehended, that the people at large of these free commonwealths will consent to disqualify themselves for the senatorial office, which God and the Constitution have intended they should fill.
The members of the Senate should certainly be men of very general information, but through the goodness of Providence, numbers will be found in every state, equally well qualified in that respect to execute a trust for which two persons only will be necessary.
Instead of their possessing all the knowledge of the state, an equal proportion will be found in some of the members of the House of Representatives, and even a greater share of it will often adorn persons in private walks of life.
They will have no distinctions of rank, for the persons over whom a Senator might be weak enough to affect a superiority will be really equal to him and may in a short time change situations with him.
The Senator will again become a private citizen and the citizen may become a Senator - nay more - a president of the Senate or President of the Union.
The upper house in England have an interest different and separate from the people and, whether in the execution of their circumstances tend to favor and promote this unjust and preposterous distinction.
If an ambassador is sent to their court by France or Spain, he is a nobleman of his own country, and a nobleman must be sent from England in return, which operates as a deprivation of the rights of every well-qualified commoner in the kingdom.
This is a hardship, which cannot arise from our second branch, but exists in Britain not only in the case particularized, but in regard to many other employments of honor and profit.
But a greater and more essential distinction between the upper house in England and our federal Senate yet remains.
The members of the former claim and possess all their powers and honors in their own right, their own hereditary right, while the new Constitution renders our Senate merely a representative body without one distinction in favor of the birth, rank, wealth or power of the Senators or their fathers.
There has arisen out of the particular nature of our affairs, a peculiar happiness in the formation of this body.
The federal Senate are the representatives of the sovereignties of their respective states.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Tench Coxe
November 26, 1787
The federal Senate, from the nature of our governments, will not be hereditary, nor will they possess, like the British barons, a power originally usurped by lawless violence and supported by military tenants.
They will not necessarily have even an influential property, for they will have a greater number of fellow citizens, as rich as themselves; and no qualification of wealth exists in the Constitution at present, nor can it be introduced without the consent of three-fourths of the people of the Union.
It cannot be apprehended, that the people at large of these free commonwealths will consent to disqualify themselves for the senatorial office, which God and the Constitution have intended they should fill.
The members of the Senate should certainly be men of very general information, but through the goodness of Providence, numbers will be found in every state, equally well qualified in that respect to execute a trust for which two persons only will be necessary.
Instead of their possessing all the knowledge of the state, an equal proportion will be found in some of the members of the House of Representatives, and even a greater share of it will often adorn persons in private walks of life.
They will have no distinctions of rank, for the persons over whom a Senator might be weak enough to affect a superiority will be really equal to him and may in a short time change situations with him.
The Senator will again become a private citizen and the citizen may become a Senator - nay more - a president of the Senate or President of the Union.
The upper house in England have an interest different and separate from the people and, whether in the execution of their circumstances tend to favor and promote this unjust and preposterous distinction.
If an ambassador is sent to their court by France or Spain, he is a nobleman of his own country, and a nobleman must be sent from England in return, which operates as a deprivation of the rights of every well-qualified commoner in the kingdom.
This is a hardship, which cannot arise from our second branch, but exists in Britain not only in the case particularized, but in regard to many other employments of honor and profit.
But a greater and more essential distinction between the upper house in England and our federal Senate yet remains.
The members of the former claim and possess all their powers and honors in their own right, their own hereditary right, while the new Constitution renders our Senate merely a representative body without one distinction in favor of the birth, rank, wealth or power of the Senators or their fathers.
There has arisen out of the particular nature of our affairs, a peculiar happiness in the formation of this body.
The federal Senate are the representatives of the sovereignties of their respective states.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
A Democratic Federalist, November 26, 1787, continued ...
Tench Coxe
November 26, 1787
A second branch, thus constituted, is a novelty in the history of the world.
Instead of an hereditary upper house, the American Confederacy has created a body, the temporary representatives of their component sovereignties, dignified only be their being the immediate delegates and guardians of sovereign states selected from the body of the people for that purpose, and for no reasons, but their possessing the qualifications necessary for their station.
We find then in this body, none of the evils of aristocracy apprehended by those who have drawn their reasonings from an erroneous comparison with the upper house of Britain, and all the benefits of a second branch, without hazarding the rights of the people in the smallest particular.
As our federal Representatives and state legislatures will be composed of men, who, the moment before their election, were a part of the people and who on the expiration of their time, will return to the same private situations, so the members of our federal Senate will be elected from out of the body of the people, without one qualification being made necessary, but mere citizenship, and at the expiration of their term will again be placed in private life.
The Senate, therefore, will be as much a democratic body as the House of Representatives, with this advantage, that they will be elected by the state legislatures to whom, on account of their superior wisdom and virtue, the people at large will have previously committed the care of their affairs.
The plan of federal government proposed by the Convention has another merit of essential consequence to our national liberties.
Under the old Confederation, the people at large had no voice in the election of their rulers.
The collected wisdom of the state legislatures will hereafter be exercised in the choice of the Senate, but our federal Representatives will be chosen by the votes of the people themselves.
The Electors of the President and Vice President of the Union may also, by laws of the separate states, be put on the same footing.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Tench Coxe
November 26, 1787
A second branch, thus constituted, is a novelty in the history of the world.
Instead of an hereditary upper house, the American Confederacy has created a body, the temporary representatives of their component sovereignties, dignified only be their being the immediate delegates and guardians of sovereign states selected from the body of the people for that purpose, and for no reasons, but their possessing the qualifications necessary for their station.
We find then in this body, none of the evils of aristocracy apprehended by those who have drawn their reasonings from an erroneous comparison with the upper house of Britain, and all the benefits of a second branch, without hazarding the rights of the people in the smallest particular.
As our federal Representatives and state legislatures will be composed of men, who, the moment before their election, were a part of the people and who on the expiration of their time, will return to the same private situations, so the members of our federal Senate will be elected from out of the body of the people, without one qualification being made necessary, but mere citizenship, and at the expiration of their term will again be placed in private life.
The Senate, therefore, will be as much a democratic body as the House of Representatives, with this advantage, that they will be elected by the state legislatures to whom, on account of their superior wisdom and virtue, the people at large will have previously committed the care of their affairs.
The plan of federal government proposed by the Convention has another merit of essential consequence to our national liberties.
Under the old Confederation, the people at large had no voice in the election of their rulers.
The collected wisdom of the state legislatures will hereafter be exercised in the choice of the Senate, but our federal Representatives will be chosen by the votes of the people themselves.
The Electors of the President and Vice President of the Union may also, by laws of the separate states, be put on the same footing.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
A Democratic Federalist, November 26, 1787, continued ...
Tench Coxe
November 26, 1787
The separation of the judicial power from the legislative and executive has been justly deemed one of the most inestimable improvements in modern polity; yet no country has ever completely accomplished it in their actual practice.
The British peers are criminal judges in cases of impeachment, and are a court of appeal in civil cases.
The power of impeachment, vested in our federal Representatives, and the right to hear those cases, which is vested in the Senate, can produce no punishment in person or property, even on conviction.
Their whole judicial power lies within a narrow compass.
They can take no cognizance of a private citizen and can only declare any dangerous public officer no longer worthy to serve this country.
To punish him for his crimes, in body or estate, is not within their constitutional powers.
They must consign him to a jury and a court, with whom the deprivation of his office is to be no proof of guilt.
The size of the Senate has been considered by some, as an objection to that body.
Should this appear of any importance it is fortunate that there are reasons to expect an addition to their number.
The legislature of Virginia have taken measures preparatory to the erection of their western counties into a separate state, from which another good consequence will follow, that the free persons, which will remain within the Dominion of Virginia, will perhaps be nearly or quite as well represented in the Senate as Pennsylvania or Massachusetts.
Should Vermont, at some future time, be also introduced into the Union, a further addition to the number of our Senators will take place.
If therefore there is any importance in the objection to the size of our federal Senate, or if any such objection prevails in the minds of the people, it is in a way of being removed.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Tench Coxe
November 26, 1787
The separation of the judicial power from the legislative and executive has been justly deemed one of the most inestimable improvements in modern polity; yet no country has ever completely accomplished it in their actual practice.
The British peers are criminal judges in cases of impeachment, and are a court of appeal in civil cases.
The power of impeachment, vested in our federal Representatives, and the right to hear those cases, which is vested in the Senate, can produce no punishment in person or property, even on conviction.
Their whole judicial power lies within a narrow compass.
They can take no cognizance of a private citizen and can only declare any dangerous public officer no longer worthy to serve this country.
To punish him for his crimes, in body or estate, is not within their constitutional powers.
They must consign him to a jury and a court, with whom the deprivation of his office is to be no proof of guilt.
The size of the Senate has been considered by some, as an objection to that body.
Should this appear of any importance it is fortunate that there are reasons to expect an addition to their number.
The legislature of Virginia have taken measures preparatory to the erection of their western counties into a separate state, from which another good consequence will follow, that the free persons, which will remain within the Dominion of Virginia, will perhaps be nearly or quite as well represented in the Senate as Pennsylvania or Massachusetts.
Should Vermont, at some future time, be also introduced into the Union, a further addition to the number of our Senators will take place.
If therefore there is any importance in the objection to the size of our federal Senate, or if any such objection prevails in the minds of the people, it is in a way of being removed.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
A Democratic Federalist, November 26, 1787, concluded ...
Tench Coxe
November 26, 1787
The executive powers of the Union are separated in a higher degree from the legislative than in any government now existing in the world.
As a check upon the President, the Senate may disapprove of the officers he appoints, but no person holding any office under the United States can be a member of the federal legislature.
How differently are things circumstanced in the two houses in Britain were any officer of any kind, naval, military, civil or ecclesiastical, may hold a seat in either house.
This is a most enlightened time, but more especially so in regard to matters of government.
The divine right of kings, the force of ecclesiastical obligations in civil affairs, and many other gross errors, under which our forefathers have lain in darker ages of the world, are now done away.
The natural, indefeasible and unalienable rights of mankind form the more eligible ground on which we now stand.
The United States are in this respect “the favored of Heaven.”
The Magna Charta, Bill of Rights, and common law of England furnished in 1776 a great part of the materials out of which were formed our several state constitutions.
All these were more or less recognized in the old Articles of Confederation.
On this solid basis is reared the fabric of our new federal government.
These taken together form THE GREAT WHOLE OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, the fairest fabric of liberty that ever blessed mankind, immovably founded on a solid rock, whose mighty base is laid at the center of the earth.
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/lib ... ederalist/
Tench Coxe
November 26, 1787
The executive powers of the Union are separated in a higher degree from the legislative than in any government now existing in the world.
As a check upon the President, the Senate may disapprove of the officers he appoints, but no person holding any office under the United States can be a member of the federal legislature.
How differently are things circumstanced in the two houses in Britain were any officer of any kind, naval, military, civil or ecclesiastical, may hold a seat in either house.
This is a most enlightened time, but more especially so in regard to matters of government.
The divine right of kings, the force of ecclesiastical obligations in civil affairs, and many other gross errors, under which our forefathers have lain in darker ages of the world, are now done away.
The natural, indefeasible and unalienable rights of mankind form the more eligible ground on which we now stand.
The United States are in this respect “the favored of Heaven.”
The Magna Charta, Bill of Rights, and common law of England furnished in 1776 a great part of the materials out of which were formed our several state constitutions.
All these were more or less recognized in the old Articles of Confederation.
On this solid basis is reared the fabric of our new federal government.
These taken together form THE GREAT WHOLE OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, the fairest fabric of liberty that ever blessed mankind, immovably founded on a solid rock, whose mighty base is laid at the center of the earth.
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/lib ... ederalist/
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Agrippa II
Agrippa
November 27, 1787
To the People of Massachusetts.
In the Gazette of the 23d instant, I ascertained from the state of other countries and the experience of mankind, that free countries are most friendly to commerce and to the rights of property.
This produces greater internal tranquillity.
For every man, finding sufficient employment for his active powers in the way of trade, agriculture and manufactures, feels no disposition to quarrel with his neighbour, nor with the government which protects him, and of which he is a constituent part.
Of the truth of these positions we have abundant evidence in the history of our own country.
Soon after the settlement of Massachusetts, and its formation into a commonwealth, in the earlier part of the last century, there was a sedition at Hingham and Weymouth.
The governour passing by at that time with his guard, seized some of the mutineers and imprisoned them.
This was complained of as a violation of their rights, and the govenour lost his election the next year; but the year afterwards was restored and continued to be re-elected for several years.
The government does not appear to have been disturbed again till the revocation of the charter in 1686, being a period of about half a century.
Connecticut set out originally on the same principles, and has continued uniformly to exercise the powers of government to this time.
During the last year, we had decisive evidences of the vigour of this kind of government.
In Connecticut, the treason was restrained while it existed only in the form of conspiracy.
In Vermont, the conspirators assembled in arms, but were suppressed by the exertions of the militia, under the direction of their sheriffs.
In New-Hampshire, the attack was made on the legislature, but the insurrection was in a very few hours suppressed, and has never been renewed.
In Massachusetts, the danger was, by delay, suffered to increase.
One judicial court after another was stopped, and even the capital trembled.
Still, however, when the supreme executive gave the signal, a force of many thousands of active, resolute men, took the field, during the severities of winter, and every difficulty vanished before them.
Since that time we have been continually coalescing.
The people have applied with diligence to their several occupations, and the whole country wears one face of improvement.
Agriculture has been improved, manufactures multiplied, and trade prodigiously enlarged.
These are the advantages of freedom in a growing country.
While our resources have been thus rapidly increasing, the courts have set in every part of the commonwealth, without any guard to defend them; have tried causes of every kind, whether civil or criminal, and the sheriffs, have in no case been interrupted in the execution of their office.
In those cases indeed, where the government was more particularly interested, mercy has been extended, but in civil causes, and in the case of moral offences, the law has been punctually executed.
Damage done to individuals, during the tumults, has been repaired, by judgment of the courts of law, and the award has been carried into effect.
This is the present state of affairs, when we are asked to relinquish that freedom
which produces such happy effects.
The attempt has been made to deprive us of such a beneficial system, and to substitute a rigid one in its stead, by criminally alarming our fears, exalting certain characters on one side, and villifying them on the other.
I wish to say nothing of the merits or demerits of individuals; such arguments always do hurt.
But assuredly my countrymen cannot fail to consider and determine who are the most worthy of confidence in a business of this magnitude.
Whether they will trust persons, who have, from their cradles, been incapable of comprehending any other principles of government, than those of absolute power, and who have, in this very affair, tried to deprive them of their constitutional liberty, by a pitiful trick.
They cannot avoid prefering those who have uniformly exerted themselves to establish a limited government, and to secure to individuals all the liberty that is consistent with justice, between man and man, and whose efforts, by the smiles of Providence, have hitherto been crowned with the most splendid success.
After the treatment we have received, we have a right to be jealous, and to guard our present constitution with the strictest care.
It is the right of the people to judge, and they will do wisely to give an explicit instruction to their delegates in the proposed convention, not to agree to any proposition that will, in any degree, militate with that happy system of government under which Heaven has placed them.
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/lib ... grippa-ii/
Agrippa
November 27, 1787
To the People of Massachusetts.
In the Gazette of the 23d instant, I ascertained from the state of other countries and the experience of mankind, that free countries are most friendly to commerce and to the rights of property.
This produces greater internal tranquillity.
For every man, finding sufficient employment for his active powers in the way of trade, agriculture and manufactures, feels no disposition to quarrel with his neighbour, nor with the government which protects him, and of which he is a constituent part.
Of the truth of these positions we have abundant evidence in the history of our own country.
Soon after the settlement of Massachusetts, and its formation into a commonwealth, in the earlier part of the last century, there was a sedition at Hingham and Weymouth.
The governour passing by at that time with his guard, seized some of the mutineers and imprisoned them.
This was complained of as a violation of their rights, and the govenour lost his election the next year; but the year afterwards was restored and continued to be re-elected for several years.
The government does not appear to have been disturbed again till the revocation of the charter in 1686, being a period of about half a century.
Connecticut set out originally on the same principles, and has continued uniformly to exercise the powers of government to this time.
During the last year, we had decisive evidences of the vigour of this kind of government.
In Connecticut, the treason was restrained while it existed only in the form of conspiracy.
In Vermont, the conspirators assembled in arms, but were suppressed by the exertions of the militia, under the direction of their sheriffs.
In New-Hampshire, the attack was made on the legislature, but the insurrection was in a very few hours suppressed, and has never been renewed.
In Massachusetts, the danger was, by delay, suffered to increase.
One judicial court after another was stopped, and even the capital trembled.
Still, however, when the supreme executive gave the signal, a force of many thousands of active, resolute men, took the field, during the severities of winter, and every difficulty vanished before them.
Since that time we have been continually coalescing.
The people have applied with diligence to their several occupations, and the whole country wears one face of improvement.
Agriculture has been improved, manufactures multiplied, and trade prodigiously enlarged.
These are the advantages of freedom in a growing country.
While our resources have been thus rapidly increasing, the courts have set in every part of the commonwealth, without any guard to defend them; have tried causes of every kind, whether civil or criminal, and the sheriffs, have in no case been interrupted in the execution of their office.
In those cases indeed, where the government was more particularly interested, mercy has been extended, but in civil causes, and in the case of moral offences, the law has been punctually executed.
Damage done to individuals, during the tumults, has been repaired, by judgment of the courts of law, and the award has been carried into effect.
This is the present state of affairs, when we are asked to relinquish that freedom
which produces such happy effects.
The attempt has been made to deprive us of such a beneficial system, and to substitute a rigid one in its stead, by criminally alarming our fears, exalting certain characters on one side, and villifying them on the other.
I wish to say nothing of the merits or demerits of individuals; such arguments always do hurt.
But assuredly my countrymen cannot fail to consider and determine who are the most worthy of confidence in a business of this magnitude.
Whether they will trust persons, who have, from their cradles, been incapable of comprehending any other principles of government, than those of absolute power, and who have, in this very affair, tried to deprive them of their constitutional liberty, by a pitiful trick.
They cannot avoid prefering those who have uniformly exerted themselves to establish a limited government, and to secure to individuals all the liberty that is consistent with justice, between man and man, and whose efforts, by the smiles of Providence, have hitherto been crowned with the most splendid success.
After the treatment we have received, we have a right to be jealous, and to guard our present constitution with the strictest care.
It is the right of the people to judge, and they will do wisely to give an explicit instruction to their delegates in the proposed convention, not to agree to any proposition that will, in any degree, militate with that happy system of government under which Heaven has placed them.
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/lib ... grippa-ii/