The Problem of Judicial Review
by Brutus
1787
Anti-Federalist Paper, #78, #79 (BRUTUS)
THE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY (PART 1), concluded ...
When great and extraordinary powers are vested in any man, or body of men, which in their exercise, may operate to the oppression of the people, it is of high importance that powerful checks should be formed to prevent the abuse of it.
Perhaps no restraints are more forcible, than such as arise from responsibility to some superior power.
Hence it is that the true policy of a republican government is, to frame it in such manner, that all persons who are concerned in the government, are made accountable to some superior for their conduct in office.
This responsibility should ultimately rest with the people.
To have a government well administered in all its parts, it is requisite the different departments of it should be separated and lodged as much as may be in different hands.
The legislative power should be in one body, the executive in another, and the judicial in one different from either.
But still each of these bodies should be accountable for their conduct.
Hence it is impracticable, perhaps, to maintain a perfect distinction between these several departments.
For it is difficult, if not impossible, to call to account the several officers in government, without in some degree mixing the legislative and judicial.
The legislature in a free republic are chosen by the people at stated periods, and their responsibility consists, in their being amenable to the people.
When the term for which they are chosen shall expire, who [the people) will then have opportunity to displace them if they disapprove of their conduct.
But it would be improper that the judicial should be elective, because their business requires that they should possess a degree of law knowledge, which is acquired only by a regular education; and besides it is fit that they should be placed, in a certain degree in an independent situation, that they may maintain firmness and steadiness in their decisions.
As the people therefore ought not to elect the judges, they cannot be amenable to them immediately, some other mode of amenability must therefore be devised for these, as well as for all other officers which do not spring from the immediate choice of the people.
This is to be effected by making one court subordinate to another, and by giving them cognizance of the behavior of all officers.
But on this plan we at last arrive at some supreme, over whom there is no power to control but the people themselves.
This supreme controlling power should be in the choice of the people, or else you establish an authority independent, and not amenable at all, which is repugnant to the principles of a free government.
Agreeable to these principles I suppose the supreme judicial ought to be liable to be called to account, for any misconduct, by some body of men, who depend upon the people for their places; and so also should all other great officers in the State, who are not made amenable to some superior officers.
BRUTUS
TO BE CONTINUED ...
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
The Problem of Judicial Review
by Brutus
1787
Anti-Federalist Paper, #80 (BRUTUS)
THE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY (PART 2)
The nature and extent of the judicial power of the United States, proposed to be granted by the constitution, claims our particular attention.
Much has been said and written upon the subject of this new system on both sides, but I have not met with any writer who has discussed the judicial powers with any degree of accuracy.
And yet it is obvious, that we can gain but very imperfect ideas of the manner in which this government will work, or the effect it will have in changing the internal police and mode of distributing justice at present subsisting in the respective states, without a thorough investigation of the powers of the judiciary and of the manner in which they will operate.
This government is a complete system, not only for making, but for executing laws.
And the courts of law, which will be constituted by it, are not only to decide upon the constitution and the laws made in pursuance of it, but by officers subordinate to them to execute all their decisions.
The real effect of this system of government, will therefore be brought home to the feelings of the people, through the medium of the judicial power.
It is, moreover, of great importance, to examine with care the nature and extent of the judicial power, because those who are to be vested with it, are to be placed in a situation altogether unprecedented in a free country.
They are to be rendered totally independent, both of the people and the legislature, both with respect to their offices and salaries.
No errors they may commit can be corrected by any power above them, if any such power there be, nor can they be removed from office for making ever so many erroneous adjudications.
The only causes for which they can be displaced, is, conviction of treason, bribery, and high crimes and misdemeanors.
This part of the plan is so modelled, as to authorize the courts, not only to carry into execution the powers expressly given, but where these are wanting or ambiguously expressed, to supply what is wanting by their own decisions.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Brutus
1787
Anti-Federalist Paper, #80 (BRUTUS)
THE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY (PART 2)
The nature and extent of the judicial power of the United States, proposed to be granted by the constitution, claims our particular attention.
Much has been said and written upon the subject of this new system on both sides, but I have not met with any writer who has discussed the judicial powers with any degree of accuracy.
And yet it is obvious, that we can gain but very imperfect ideas of the manner in which this government will work, or the effect it will have in changing the internal police and mode of distributing justice at present subsisting in the respective states, without a thorough investigation of the powers of the judiciary and of the manner in which they will operate.
This government is a complete system, not only for making, but for executing laws.
And the courts of law, which will be constituted by it, are not only to decide upon the constitution and the laws made in pursuance of it, but by officers subordinate to them to execute all their decisions.
The real effect of this system of government, will therefore be brought home to the feelings of the people, through the medium of the judicial power.
It is, moreover, of great importance, to examine with care the nature and extent of the judicial power, because those who are to be vested with it, are to be placed in a situation altogether unprecedented in a free country.
They are to be rendered totally independent, both of the people and the legislature, both with respect to their offices and salaries.
No errors they may commit can be corrected by any power above them, if any such power there be, nor can they be removed from office for making ever so many erroneous adjudications.
The only causes for which they can be displaced, is, conviction of treason, bribery, and high crimes and misdemeanors.
This part of the plan is so modelled, as to authorize the courts, not only to carry into execution the powers expressly given, but where these are wanting or ambiguously expressed, to supply what is wanting by their own decisions.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
The Problem of Judicial Review
by Brutus
1787
Anti-Federalist Paper, #80 (BRUTUS)
THE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY (PART 2), continued ...
That we may be enabled to form a just opinion on this subject, I shall, in considering it, lst. Examine the nature and extent of the judicial powers, and 2nd. Inquire, whether the courts who are to exercise them, are so constituted as to afford reasonable ground of confidence, that they will exercise them for the general good.
With a regard to the nature and extent of the judicial powers, I have to regret my want of capacity to give that full and minute explanation of them that the subject merits.
To be able to do this, a man should be possessed of a degree of law knowledge far beyond what I pretend to.
A number of hard words and technical phrases are used in this part of the system, about the meaning of which gentlemen learned in the law differ.
Its advocates know how to avail themselves of these phrases.
In a number of instances, where objections are made to the powers given to the judicial, they give such an explanation to the technical terms as to avoid them.
Though I am not competent to give a perfect explanation of the powers granted to this department of the government, I shall yet attempt to trace some of the leading features of it, from which I presume it will appear, that they will operate to a total subversion of the state judiciaries, if not to the legislative authority of the states.
In article 3d, sect. 2d, it is said, “The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority, etc.”
The first article to which this power extends is, all cases in law and equity arising under this constitution.
What latitude of construction this clause should receive, it is not easy to say.
At first view, one would suppose, that it meant no more than this, that the courts under the general government should exercise, not only the powers of courts of law, but also that of courts of equity, in the manner in which those powers are usually exercised in the different states.
But this cannot be the meaning, because the next clause authorises the courts to take cognizance of all cases in law and equity arising under the laws of the United States; this last article, I conceive, conveys as much power to the general judicial as any of the state courts possess.
The cases arising under the constitution must be different from those arising under the laws, or else the two clauses mean exactly the same thing.
The cases arising under the constitution must include such, as bring into question its meaning, and will require an explanation of the nature and extent of the powers of the different departments under it.
This article, therefore, vests the judicial with a power to resolve all questions that may arise on any case on the construction of the constitution, either in law or in equity.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Brutus
1787
Anti-Federalist Paper, #80 (BRUTUS)
THE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY (PART 2), continued ...
That we may be enabled to form a just opinion on this subject, I shall, in considering it, lst. Examine the nature and extent of the judicial powers, and 2nd. Inquire, whether the courts who are to exercise them, are so constituted as to afford reasonable ground of confidence, that they will exercise them for the general good.
With a regard to the nature and extent of the judicial powers, I have to regret my want of capacity to give that full and minute explanation of them that the subject merits.
To be able to do this, a man should be possessed of a degree of law knowledge far beyond what I pretend to.
A number of hard words and technical phrases are used in this part of the system, about the meaning of which gentlemen learned in the law differ.
Its advocates know how to avail themselves of these phrases.
In a number of instances, where objections are made to the powers given to the judicial, they give such an explanation to the technical terms as to avoid them.
Though I am not competent to give a perfect explanation of the powers granted to this department of the government, I shall yet attempt to trace some of the leading features of it, from which I presume it will appear, that they will operate to a total subversion of the state judiciaries, if not to the legislative authority of the states.
In article 3d, sect. 2d, it is said, “The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority, etc.”
The first article to which this power extends is, all cases in law and equity arising under this constitution.
What latitude of construction this clause should receive, it is not easy to say.
At first view, one would suppose, that it meant no more than this, that the courts under the general government should exercise, not only the powers of courts of law, but also that of courts of equity, in the manner in which those powers are usually exercised in the different states.
But this cannot be the meaning, because the next clause authorises the courts to take cognizance of all cases in law and equity arising under the laws of the United States; this last article, I conceive, conveys as much power to the general judicial as any of the state courts possess.
The cases arising under the constitution must be different from those arising under the laws, or else the two clauses mean exactly the same thing.
The cases arising under the constitution must include such, as bring into question its meaning, and will require an explanation of the nature and extent of the powers of the different departments under it.
This article, therefore, vests the judicial with a power to resolve all questions that may arise on any case on the construction of the constitution, either in law or in equity.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
The Problem of Judicial Review
by Brutus
1787
Anti-Federalist Paper, #80 (BRUTUS)
THE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY (PART 2), continued ...
lst. They are authorised to determine all questions that may arise upon the meaning of the constitution in law.
This article vests the courts with authority to give the constitution a legal construction, or to explain it according to the rules laid down for construing a law.
These rules give a certain degree of latitude of explanation.
According to this mode of construction, the courts are to give such meaning to the constitution as comports best with the common, and generally received acceptation of the words in which it is expressed, regarding their ordinary and popular use, rather than their grammatical propriety.
Where words are dubious, they will be explained by the context.
The end of the clause will be attended to, and the words will be understood, as having a view to it; and the words will not be so understood as to bear no meaning or a very absurd one.
2nd. The judicial are not only to decide questions arising upon the meaning of the constitution in law, but also in equity.
By this they are empowered, to explain the constitution according to the reasoning spirit of it, without being confined to the words or letter.
“From this method of interpreting laws (says Blackstone) by the reason of them, arises what we call equity” which is thus defined by Grotius, “the correction of that, wherein the law, by reason of its universality, is deficient; for since in laws all cases cannot be foreseen, or expressed, it is necessary, that when the decrees of the law cannot be applied to particular cases, there should somewhere be a power vested of defining those circumstances, which had they been foreseen the legislator would have expressed. . . .”
The same learned author observes, “That equity, thus depending essentially upon each individual case, there can be no established rules and fixed principles of equity laid down, without destroying its very essence, and reducing it to a positive law."
From these remarks, the authority and business of the courts of law, under this clause, may be understood.
They will give the sense of every article of the constitution, that may from time to time come before them.
And in their decisions they will not confine themselves to any fixed or established rules, but will determine, according to what appears to them, the reason and spirit of the constitution.
The opinions of the supreme court, whatever they may be, will have the force of law; because there is no power provided in the constitution that can correct their errors, or control their adjudications.
From this court there is no appeal.
And I conceive the legislature themselves, cannot set aside a judgment of this court, because they are authorised by the constitution to decide in the last resort.
The legislature must be controlled by the constitution, and not the constitution by them.
They have therefore no more right to set aside any judgment pronounced upon the construction of the constitution, than they have to take from the president, the chief command of the army and navy, and commit it to some other person.
The reason is plain; the judicial and executive derive their authority from the same source, that the legislature do theirs; and therefore in all cases, where the constitution does not make the one responsible to, or controllable by the other, they are altogether independent of each other.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Brutus
1787
Anti-Federalist Paper, #80 (BRUTUS)
THE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY (PART 2), continued ...
lst. They are authorised to determine all questions that may arise upon the meaning of the constitution in law.
This article vests the courts with authority to give the constitution a legal construction, or to explain it according to the rules laid down for construing a law.
These rules give a certain degree of latitude of explanation.
According to this mode of construction, the courts are to give such meaning to the constitution as comports best with the common, and generally received acceptation of the words in which it is expressed, regarding their ordinary and popular use, rather than their grammatical propriety.
Where words are dubious, they will be explained by the context.
The end of the clause will be attended to, and the words will be understood, as having a view to it; and the words will not be so understood as to bear no meaning or a very absurd one.
2nd. The judicial are not only to decide questions arising upon the meaning of the constitution in law, but also in equity.
By this they are empowered, to explain the constitution according to the reasoning spirit of it, without being confined to the words or letter.
“From this method of interpreting laws (says Blackstone) by the reason of them, arises what we call equity” which is thus defined by Grotius, “the correction of that, wherein the law, by reason of its universality, is deficient; for since in laws all cases cannot be foreseen, or expressed, it is necessary, that when the decrees of the law cannot be applied to particular cases, there should somewhere be a power vested of defining those circumstances, which had they been foreseen the legislator would have expressed. . . .”
The same learned author observes, “That equity, thus depending essentially upon each individual case, there can be no established rules and fixed principles of equity laid down, without destroying its very essence, and reducing it to a positive law."
From these remarks, the authority and business of the courts of law, under this clause, may be understood.
They will give the sense of every article of the constitution, that may from time to time come before them.
And in their decisions they will not confine themselves to any fixed or established rules, but will determine, according to what appears to them, the reason and spirit of the constitution.
The opinions of the supreme court, whatever they may be, will have the force of law; because there is no power provided in the constitution that can correct their errors, or control their adjudications.
From this court there is no appeal.
And I conceive the legislature themselves, cannot set aside a judgment of this court, because they are authorised by the constitution to decide in the last resort.
The legislature must be controlled by the constitution, and not the constitution by them.
They have therefore no more right to set aside any judgment pronounced upon the construction of the constitution, than they have to take from the president, the chief command of the army and navy, and commit it to some other person.
The reason is plain; the judicial and executive derive their authority from the same source, that the legislature do theirs; and therefore in all cases, where the constitution does not make the one responsible to, or controllable by the other, they are altogether independent of each other.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
The Problem of Judicial Review
by Brutus
1787
Anti-Federalist Paper, #80 (BRUTUS)
THE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY (PART 2), continued ...
The judicial power will operate to effect, in the most certain, but yet silent and imperceptible manner, what is evidently the tendency of the constitution: I mean, an entire subversion of the legislative, executive and judicial powers of the individual states.
Every adjudication of the supreme court, on any question that may arise upon the nature and extent of the general government, will affect the limits of the state jurisdiction.
In proportion as the former enlarge the exercise of their powers, will that of the latter be restricted.
That the judicial power of the United States, will lean strongly in favor of the general government, and will give such an explanation to the constitution, as will favor an extension of its jurisdiction, is very evident from a variety of considerations.
lst. The constitution itself strongly countenances such a mode of construction.
Most of the articles in this system, which convey powers of any considerable importance, are conceived in general and indefinite terms, which are either equivocal, ambiguous, or which require long definitions to unfold the extent of their meaning.
The two most important powers committed to any government, those of raising money, and of raising and keeping up troops, have already been considered, and shown to be unlimited by any thing but the discretion of the legislature.
The clause which vests the power to pass all laws which are proper and necessary, to carry the powers given into execution, it has been shown, leaves the legislature at liberty, to do everything, which in their judgment is best.
It is said, I know, that this clause confers no power on the legislature, which they would not have had without it - though I believe this is not the fact.
Yet, admitting it to be, it implies that the constitution is not to receive an explanation strictly according to its letter; but more power is implied than is expressed.
And this clause, if it is to be considered as explanatory of the extent of the powers given, rather than giving a new power, is to be understood as declaring that in construing any of the articles conveying power, the spirit, intent and design of the clause should be attended to, as welt as the words in their common acceptation.
This constitution gives sufficient color for adopting an equitable construction, if we consider the great end and design it professedly has in view.
These appear from its preamble to be, “to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and posterity.”
The design of this system is here expressed, and it is proper to give such a meaning to the various parts, as will best promote the accomplishment of the end; this idea suggests itself naturally upon reading the preamble, and will countenance the court in giving the several articles such a sense, as will the most effectually promote the ends the constitution had in view.
How this manner of explaining the constitution will operate in practice, shall be the subject of future inquiry.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Brutus
1787
Anti-Federalist Paper, #80 (BRUTUS)
THE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY (PART 2), continued ...
The judicial power will operate to effect, in the most certain, but yet silent and imperceptible manner, what is evidently the tendency of the constitution: I mean, an entire subversion of the legislative, executive and judicial powers of the individual states.
Every adjudication of the supreme court, on any question that may arise upon the nature and extent of the general government, will affect the limits of the state jurisdiction.
In proportion as the former enlarge the exercise of their powers, will that of the latter be restricted.
That the judicial power of the United States, will lean strongly in favor of the general government, and will give such an explanation to the constitution, as will favor an extension of its jurisdiction, is very evident from a variety of considerations.
lst. The constitution itself strongly countenances such a mode of construction.
Most of the articles in this system, which convey powers of any considerable importance, are conceived in general and indefinite terms, which are either equivocal, ambiguous, or which require long definitions to unfold the extent of their meaning.
The two most important powers committed to any government, those of raising money, and of raising and keeping up troops, have already been considered, and shown to be unlimited by any thing but the discretion of the legislature.
The clause which vests the power to pass all laws which are proper and necessary, to carry the powers given into execution, it has been shown, leaves the legislature at liberty, to do everything, which in their judgment is best.
It is said, I know, that this clause confers no power on the legislature, which they would not have had without it - though I believe this is not the fact.
Yet, admitting it to be, it implies that the constitution is not to receive an explanation strictly according to its letter; but more power is implied than is expressed.
And this clause, if it is to be considered as explanatory of the extent of the powers given, rather than giving a new power, is to be understood as declaring that in construing any of the articles conveying power, the spirit, intent and design of the clause should be attended to, as welt as the words in their common acceptation.
This constitution gives sufficient color for adopting an equitable construction, if we consider the great end and design it professedly has in view.
These appear from its preamble to be, “to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and posterity.”
The design of this system is here expressed, and it is proper to give such a meaning to the various parts, as will best promote the accomplishment of the end; this idea suggests itself naturally upon reading the preamble, and will countenance the court in giving the several articles such a sense, as will the most effectually promote the ends the constitution had in view.
How this manner of explaining the constitution will operate in practice, shall be the subject of future inquiry.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
The Problem of Judicial Review
by Brutus
1787
Anti-Federalist Paper, #80 (BRUTUS)
THE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY (PART 2), concluded ...
2nd. Not only will the constitution justify the courts in inclining to this mode of explaining it, but they will be interested in using this latitude of interpretation.
Every body of men invested with office are tenacious of power; they feel interested, and hence it has become a kind of maxim, to hand down their offices, with all its rights and privileges, unimpaired to their successors.
The same principle will influence them to extend their power, and increase their rights; this of itself will operate strongly upon the courts to give such a meaning to the constitution in all cases where it can possibly be done, as will enlarge the sphere of their own authority.
Every extension of the power of the general legislature, as well as of the judicial powers, will increase the powers of the courts; and the dignity and importance of the judges, will be in proportion to the extent and magnitude of the powers they exercise.
I add, it is highly probable the emolument of the judges will be increased, with the increase of the business they will have to transact and its importance.
From these considerations the judges will be interested to extend the powers of the courts, and to construe the constitution as much as possible, in such a way as to favor it; and that they will do it, appears probable.
3rd. Because they will have precedent to plead, to justify them in it, it is well known, that the courts in England, have by their authority, extended their jurisdiction far beyond the limits set them in their original institution, and by the laws of the land.
The court of exchequer is a remarkable instance of this.
It was originally intended principally to recover the king’s debts, and to order the revenues of the crown.
It had a common law jurisdiction, which was established merely for the benefit of the king’s accountants.
We learn from Blackstone, that the proceedings in this court are grounded on a writ called quo minus, in which the plaintiff suggests, that he is the king’s farmer or debtor, and that the defendant hath done him the damage complained of, by which he is less able to pay the king.
These suits, by the statute of Rutland, are expressly directed to be confined to such matters as specially concern the king, or his ministers in the exchequer.
And by the articuli super cartas, it is enacted, that no common pleas be thenceforth held in the exchequer contrary to the form of the great charter.
But now any person may sue in the exchequer.
The surmise of being debtor to the king being matter of form, and mere words of course, the court is open to all the nation.
When the courts will have a precedent before them of a court which extended its jurisdiction in opposition to an act of the legislature, is it not to be expected that they will extend theirs, especially when there is nothing in the constitution expressly against it?
And they are authorised to construe its meaning, and are not under any control.
This power in the judicial, will enable them to mould the government, into any shape they please.
The manner in which this may be effected we will hereafter examine.
BRUTUS
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Brutus
1787
Anti-Federalist Paper, #80 (BRUTUS)
THE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY (PART 2), concluded ...
2nd. Not only will the constitution justify the courts in inclining to this mode of explaining it, but they will be interested in using this latitude of interpretation.
Every body of men invested with office are tenacious of power; they feel interested, and hence it has become a kind of maxim, to hand down their offices, with all its rights and privileges, unimpaired to their successors.
The same principle will influence them to extend their power, and increase their rights; this of itself will operate strongly upon the courts to give such a meaning to the constitution in all cases where it can possibly be done, as will enlarge the sphere of their own authority.
Every extension of the power of the general legislature, as well as of the judicial powers, will increase the powers of the courts; and the dignity and importance of the judges, will be in proportion to the extent and magnitude of the powers they exercise.
I add, it is highly probable the emolument of the judges will be increased, with the increase of the business they will have to transact and its importance.
From these considerations the judges will be interested to extend the powers of the courts, and to construe the constitution as much as possible, in such a way as to favor it; and that they will do it, appears probable.
3rd. Because they will have precedent to plead, to justify them in it, it is well known, that the courts in England, have by their authority, extended their jurisdiction far beyond the limits set them in their original institution, and by the laws of the land.
The court of exchequer is a remarkable instance of this.
It was originally intended principally to recover the king’s debts, and to order the revenues of the crown.
It had a common law jurisdiction, which was established merely for the benefit of the king’s accountants.
We learn from Blackstone, that the proceedings in this court are grounded on a writ called quo minus, in which the plaintiff suggests, that he is the king’s farmer or debtor, and that the defendant hath done him the damage complained of, by which he is less able to pay the king.
These suits, by the statute of Rutland, are expressly directed to be confined to such matters as specially concern the king, or his ministers in the exchequer.
And by the articuli super cartas, it is enacted, that no common pleas be thenceforth held in the exchequer contrary to the form of the great charter.
But now any person may sue in the exchequer.
The surmise of being debtor to the king being matter of form, and mere words of course, the court is open to all the nation.
When the courts will have a precedent before them of a court which extended its jurisdiction in opposition to an act of the legislature, is it not to be expected that they will extend theirs, especially when there is nothing in the constitution expressly against it?
And they are authorised to construe its meaning, and are not under any control.
This power in the judicial, will enable them to mould the government, into any shape they please.
The manner in which this may be effected we will hereafter examine.
BRUTUS
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
The Problem of Judicial Review
by Brutus
1787
Anti-Federalist Paper, #81 (BRUTUS)
THE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY (PART 3)
In my last, I showed, that the judicial power of the United States under the first clause of the second section of article eight, would be authorised to explain the constitution, not only according to its letter, but according to its spirit and intention; and having this power, they would strongly incline to give it such a construction as to extend the powers of the general government, as much as possible, to the diminution, and finally to the destruction, of that of the respective states.
I shall now proceed to show how this power will operate in its exercise to effect these purposes.
First, let us inquire how the judicial power will effect an extension of the legislative authority.
Perhaps the judicial power will not be able, by direct and positive decrees, ever to direct the legislature, because it is not easy to conceive how a question can be brought before them in a course of legal discussion, in which they can give a decision, declaring, that the legislature have certain powers which they have not exercised, and which, in consequence of the determination of the judges, they will be bound to exercise.
But it is easy to see, that in their adjudication they may establish certain principles, which being received by the legislature will enlarge the sphere of their power beyond all bounds.
It is to be observed, that the supreme court has the power, in the last resort, to determine all questions that may arise in the course of legal discussion, on the meaning and construction of the constitution.
This power they will hold under the constitution, and independent of the legislature.
The latter can no more deprive the former of this right, than either of them, or both of them together, can take from the president, with the advice of the senate, the power of making treaties, or appointing ambassadors.
In determining these questions, the court must and will assume certain principles, from which they will reason, in forming their decisions.
These principles, whatever they may be, when they become fixed by a course of decisions, will be adopted by the legislature, and will be the rule by which they will explain their own powers.
This appears evident from this consideration, that if the legislature pass laws, which, in the judgment of the court, they are not authorised to do by the constitution, the court will not take notice of them; for it will not be denied, that the constitution is the highest or supreme law.
And the courts are vested with the supreme and uncontrollable power, to determine in all cases that come before them, what the constitution means.
They cannot, therefore, execute a law, which in their judgment, opposes the constitution, unless we can suppose they can make a superior law give way to an inferior.
The legislature, therefore, will not go over the limits by which the courts may adjudge they are confined.
And there is little room to doubt but that they will come up to those bounds, as often as occasion and opportunity may offer, and they may judge it proper to do it.
For as on the one hand, they will not readily pass taws which they know the courts will not execute, so on the other, we may be sure they will not scruple to pass such as they know they will give effect, as often as they may judge it proper.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Brutus
1787
Anti-Federalist Paper, #81 (BRUTUS)
THE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY (PART 3)
In my last, I showed, that the judicial power of the United States under the first clause of the second section of article eight, would be authorised to explain the constitution, not only according to its letter, but according to its spirit and intention; and having this power, they would strongly incline to give it such a construction as to extend the powers of the general government, as much as possible, to the diminution, and finally to the destruction, of that of the respective states.
I shall now proceed to show how this power will operate in its exercise to effect these purposes.
First, let us inquire how the judicial power will effect an extension of the legislative authority.
Perhaps the judicial power will not be able, by direct and positive decrees, ever to direct the legislature, because it is not easy to conceive how a question can be brought before them in a course of legal discussion, in which they can give a decision, declaring, that the legislature have certain powers which they have not exercised, and which, in consequence of the determination of the judges, they will be bound to exercise.
But it is easy to see, that in their adjudication they may establish certain principles, which being received by the legislature will enlarge the sphere of their power beyond all bounds.
It is to be observed, that the supreme court has the power, in the last resort, to determine all questions that may arise in the course of legal discussion, on the meaning and construction of the constitution.
This power they will hold under the constitution, and independent of the legislature.
The latter can no more deprive the former of this right, than either of them, or both of them together, can take from the president, with the advice of the senate, the power of making treaties, or appointing ambassadors.
In determining these questions, the court must and will assume certain principles, from which they will reason, in forming their decisions.
These principles, whatever they may be, when they become fixed by a course of decisions, will be adopted by the legislature, and will be the rule by which they will explain their own powers.
This appears evident from this consideration, that if the legislature pass laws, which, in the judgment of the court, they are not authorised to do by the constitution, the court will not take notice of them; for it will not be denied, that the constitution is the highest or supreme law.
And the courts are vested with the supreme and uncontrollable power, to determine in all cases that come before them, what the constitution means.
They cannot, therefore, execute a law, which in their judgment, opposes the constitution, unless we can suppose they can make a superior law give way to an inferior.
The legislature, therefore, will not go over the limits by which the courts may adjudge they are confined.
And there is little room to doubt but that they will come up to those bounds, as often as occasion and opportunity may offer, and they may judge it proper to do it.
For as on the one hand, they will not readily pass taws which they know the courts will not execute, so on the other, we may be sure they will not scruple to pass such as they know they will give effect, as often as they may judge it proper.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
The Problem of Judicial Review
by Brutus
1787
Anti-Federalist Paper, #81 (BRUTUS)
THE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY (PART 3), continued ...
From these observations it appears, that the judgment of the judicial, on the constitution, will become the rule to guide the legislature in their construction of their powers.
What the principles are, which the courts will adopt, it is impossible for us to say.
But taking up the powers as I have explained them in my last number, which they will possess under this clause, it is not difficult to see, that they may, and probably will, be very liberal ones.
We have seen, that they will be authorized to give the constitution a construction according to its spirit and reason, and not to confine themselves to its letter.
To discover the spirit of the constitution, it is of the first importance to attend to the principal ends and designs it has in view.
These are expressed in the preamble, in the following words, viz., “We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this constitution,” etc.
If the end of the government is to be learned from these words, which are clearly designed to declare it, it is obvious it has in view every object which is embraced by any government.
The preservation of internal peace - the due admission of justice - and to provide for the defense of the community - seems to include all the objects of government.
But if they do not, they are certainly comprehended in the words, “to provide for the general welfare.”
If it be further considered, that this constitution, if it is ratified, will not be a compact entered into by states, in their corporate capacities, but an agreement of the people of the United States as one great body politic, no doubt can remain but that the great end of the constitution, if it is to be collected from the preamble, in which its end is declared, is to constitute a government which is to extend to every case for which any government is instituted, whether external or internal.
The courts, therefore, will establish this as a principle in expounding the constitution, and will give every part of it such an explanation as will give latitude to every department under it, to take cognizance of every matter, not only that affects the general and national concerns of the union, but also of such as relate to the administration of private justice, and to regulating the internal and local affairs of the different parts.
Such a rule of exposition is not only consistent with the general spirit of the preamble, but it will stand confirmed by considering more minutely the different clauses of it.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Brutus
1787
Anti-Federalist Paper, #81 (BRUTUS)
THE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY (PART 3), continued ...
From these observations it appears, that the judgment of the judicial, on the constitution, will become the rule to guide the legislature in their construction of their powers.
What the principles are, which the courts will adopt, it is impossible for us to say.
But taking up the powers as I have explained them in my last number, which they will possess under this clause, it is not difficult to see, that they may, and probably will, be very liberal ones.
We have seen, that they will be authorized to give the constitution a construction according to its spirit and reason, and not to confine themselves to its letter.
To discover the spirit of the constitution, it is of the first importance to attend to the principal ends and designs it has in view.
These are expressed in the preamble, in the following words, viz., “We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this constitution,” etc.
If the end of the government is to be learned from these words, which are clearly designed to declare it, it is obvious it has in view every object which is embraced by any government.
The preservation of internal peace - the due admission of justice - and to provide for the defense of the community - seems to include all the objects of government.
But if they do not, they are certainly comprehended in the words, “to provide for the general welfare.”
If it be further considered, that this constitution, if it is ratified, will not be a compact entered into by states, in their corporate capacities, but an agreement of the people of the United States as one great body politic, no doubt can remain but that the great end of the constitution, if it is to be collected from the preamble, in which its end is declared, is to constitute a government which is to extend to every case for which any government is instituted, whether external or internal.
The courts, therefore, will establish this as a principle in expounding the constitution, and will give every part of it such an explanation as will give latitude to every department under it, to take cognizance of every matter, not only that affects the general and national concerns of the union, but also of such as relate to the administration of private justice, and to regulating the internal and local affairs of the different parts.
Such a rule of exposition is not only consistent with the general spirit of the preamble, but it will stand confirmed by considering more minutely the different clauses of it.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
The Problem of Judicial Review
by Brutus
1787
Anti-Federalist Paper, #81 (BRUTUS)
THE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY (PART 3), continued ...
The first object declared to be in view, is “To form a more perfect union.”
It is to be observed, it is not an union of states or bodies corporate; had this been the case the existence of the state governments might have been secured.
But it is a union of the people of the United States considered as one body, who are to ratify this constitution if it is adopted.
Now to make a union of this kind perfect, it is necessary to abolish all inferior governments, and to give the general one complete legislative, executive and judicial powers to every purpose.
The courts therefore will establish it as a rule in explaining the constitution; to give it such a construction as will best tend to perfect the union or take from the state governments every power of either making or executing laws.
The second object is “to establish justice.”
This must include not only the idea of instituting the rule of justice, or of making laws which shall be the measure or rule of right, but also of providing for the application of this rule or of administering justice under it.
And under this the courts will in their decisions extend the power of the government to all cases they possibly can, or otherwise they will be restricted in doing what appears to be the intent of the constitution they should do, to wit, pass laws and provide for the execution of them, for the general distribution of justice between man and man.
Another end declared is “to insure domestic tranquility.”
This comprehends a provision against all private breaches of the peace, as well as against all public commotions or general insurrections; and to attain the object of this clause fully, the government must exercise the power of passing laws in these subjects, as well as of appointing magistrates with authority to execute them.
And the courts will adopt these ideas in their expositions.
I might proceed to the other clause, in the preamble, and it would appear by a consideration of all of them separately, as it does by taking them together, that if the spirit of this system is to be known from its declared end and design in the preamble, its spirit is to subvert and abolish all the powers of the state governments, and to embrace every object to which any government extends.
As it sets out in the preamble with this declared intention, so it proceeds in the different parts with the same idea.
Any person, who will peruse the 5th section with attention, in which most of the powers are enumerated, will perceive that they either expressly or by implication extend to almost every thing about which any legislative power can be employed.
If this equitable mode of construction is applied to this part of the constitution, nothing can stand before it.
This will certainly give the first clause in that article a construction which I confess I think the most natural and grammatical one, to authorise the Congress to do any thing which in their judgment will tend to provide for the general welfare, and this amounts to the same thing as general and unlimited powers of legislation in all cases.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Brutus
1787
Anti-Federalist Paper, #81 (BRUTUS)
THE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY (PART 3), continued ...
The first object declared to be in view, is “To form a more perfect union.”
It is to be observed, it is not an union of states or bodies corporate; had this been the case the existence of the state governments might have been secured.
But it is a union of the people of the United States considered as one body, who are to ratify this constitution if it is adopted.
Now to make a union of this kind perfect, it is necessary to abolish all inferior governments, and to give the general one complete legislative, executive and judicial powers to every purpose.
The courts therefore will establish it as a rule in explaining the constitution; to give it such a construction as will best tend to perfect the union or take from the state governments every power of either making or executing laws.
The second object is “to establish justice.”
This must include not only the idea of instituting the rule of justice, or of making laws which shall be the measure or rule of right, but also of providing for the application of this rule or of administering justice under it.
And under this the courts will in their decisions extend the power of the government to all cases they possibly can, or otherwise they will be restricted in doing what appears to be the intent of the constitution they should do, to wit, pass laws and provide for the execution of them, for the general distribution of justice between man and man.
Another end declared is “to insure domestic tranquility.”
This comprehends a provision against all private breaches of the peace, as well as against all public commotions or general insurrections; and to attain the object of this clause fully, the government must exercise the power of passing laws in these subjects, as well as of appointing magistrates with authority to execute them.
And the courts will adopt these ideas in their expositions.
I might proceed to the other clause, in the preamble, and it would appear by a consideration of all of them separately, as it does by taking them together, that if the spirit of this system is to be known from its declared end and design in the preamble, its spirit is to subvert and abolish all the powers of the state governments, and to embrace every object to which any government extends.
As it sets out in the preamble with this declared intention, so it proceeds in the different parts with the same idea.
Any person, who will peruse the 5th section with attention, in which most of the powers are enumerated, will perceive that they either expressly or by implication extend to almost every thing about which any legislative power can be employed.
If this equitable mode of construction is applied to this part of the constitution, nothing can stand before it.
This will certainly give the first clause in that article a construction which I confess I think the most natural and grammatical one, to authorise the Congress to do any thing which in their judgment will tend to provide for the general welfare, and this amounts to the same thing as general and unlimited powers of legislation in all cases.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
The Problem of Judicial Review
by Brutus
1787
Anti-Federalist Paper, #81 (BRUTUS)
THE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY (PART 3), continued ...
This same manner of explaining the constitution, will fix a meaning, and a very important one too, to the 12th clause of the same section, which authorises the Congress to make all laws which shall be proper and necessary for carrying into effect the foregoing powers, etc.
A voluminous writer in favor of this system, has taken great pains to convince the public, that this clause means nothing: for that the same powers expressed in this, are implied in other parts of the constitution.
Perhaps it is so, but still this will undoubtedly be an excellent auxiliary to assist the courts to discover the spirit and reason of the constitution, and when applied to any and every of the other clauses granting power, will operate powerfully in extracting the spirit from them.
I might instance a number of clauses in the constitution, which, if explained in an equitable manner, would extend the powers of the government to every case, and reduce the state legislatures to nothing.
But, I should draw out my remarks to an undue length, and I presume enough has been said to show, that the courts have sufficient ground in the exercise of this power, to determine, that the legislature have no bounds set to them by this constitution, by any supposed right the legislatures of the respective states may have to regulate any of their local concerns.
I proceed, 2nd, to inquire, in what manner this power will increase the jurisdiction of the courts.
I would here observe, that the judicial power extends, expressly, to all civil cases that may arise save such as arise between citizens of the same state, with this exception to those of that description, that the judicial of the United States have cognizance of cases between citizens of the same state, claiming lands under grants of different states.
Nothing more, therefore, is necessary to give the courts of law, under this constitution, complete jurisdiction of all civil causes, but to comprehend cases between citizens of the same state not included in the foregoing exception.
I presume there will be no difficulty in accomplishing this.
Nothing more is necessary than to set forth in the process, that the party who brings the suit is a citizen of a different state from the one against whom the suit is brought and there can be little doubt but that the court will take cognizance of the matter.
And if they do, who is to restrain them?
Indeed, I will freely confess, that it is my decided opinion, that the courts ought to take cognizance of such causes under the powers of the constitution.
For one of the great ends of the constitution is, “to establish justice.”
This supposes that this cannot be done under the existing governments of the states; and there is certainly as good reason why individuals, living in the same state, should have justice, as those who live in different states.
Moreover, the constitution expressly declares, that “the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.”
It will therefore be no fiction, for a citizen of one state to set forth, in a suit, that he is a citizen of another; for he that is entitled to all the privileges and immunities of a country, is a citizen of that country.
And in truth, the citizen of one state will, under this constitution, be a citizen of every state.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Brutus
1787
Anti-Federalist Paper, #81 (BRUTUS)
THE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY (PART 3), continued ...
This same manner of explaining the constitution, will fix a meaning, and a very important one too, to the 12th clause of the same section, which authorises the Congress to make all laws which shall be proper and necessary for carrying into effect the foregoing powers, etc.
A voluminous writer in favor of this system, has taken great pains to convince the public, that this clause means nothing: for that the same powers expressed in this, are implied in other parts of the constitution.
Perhaps it is so, but still this will undoubtedly be an excellent auxiliary to assist the courts to discover the spirit and reason of the constitution, and when applied to any and every of the other clauses granting power, will operate powerfully in extracting the spirit from them.
I might instance a number of clauses in the constitution, which, if explained in an equitable manner, would extend the powers of the government to every case, and reduce the state legislatures to nothing.
But, I should draw out my remarks to an undue length, and I presume enough has been said to show, that the courts have sufficient ground in the exercise of this power, to determine, that the legislature have no bounds set to them by this constitution, by any supposed right the legislatures of the respective states may have to regulate any of their local concerns.
I proceed, 2nd, to inquire, in what manner this power will increase the jurisdiction of the courts.
I would here observe, that the judicial power extends, expressly, to all civil cases that may arise save such as arise between citizens of the same state, with this exception to those of that description, that the judicial of the United States have cognizance of cases between citizens of the same state, claiming lands under grants of different states.
Nothing more, therefore, is necessary to give the courts of law, under this constitution, complete jurisdiction of all civil causes, but to comprehend cases between citizens of the same state not included in the foregoing exception.
I presume there will be no difficulty in accomplishing this.
Nothing more is necessary than to set forth in the process, that the party who brings the suit is a citizen of a different state from the one against whom the suit is brought and there can be little doubt but that the court will take cognizance of the matter.
And if they do, who is to restrain them?
Indeed, I will freely confess, that it is my decided opinion, that the courts ought to take cognizance of such causes under the powers of the constitution.
For one of the great ends of the constitution is, “to establish justice.”
This supposes that this cannot be done under the existing governments of the states; and there is certainly as good reason why individuals, living in the same state, should have justice, as those who live in different states.
Moreover, the constitution expressly declares, that “the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.”
It will therefore be no fiction, for a citizen of one state to set forth, in a suit, that he is a citizen of another; for he that is entitled to all the privileges and immunities of a country, is a citizen of that country.
And in truth, the citizen of one state will, under this constitution, be a citizen of every state.
TO BE CONTINUED ...