Brutus VII, continued ...
by Brutus
January 03, 1788
The European governments are almost all of them framed, and administered with a view to arms, and war, as that in which their chief glory consists; they mistake the end of government — it was designed to save men’s lives, not to destroy them.
We ought to furnish the world with an example of a great people, who in their civil institutions hold chiefly in view, the attainment of virtue, and happiness among ourselves.
Let the monarchs, in Europe, share among them the glory of depopulating countries, and butchering thousands of their innocent citizens, to revenge private quarrels, or to punish an insult offered to a wife, a mistress, or a favorite: I envy them not the honor, and I pray heaven this country may never be ambitious of it.
The czar Peter the great, acquired great glory by his arms; but all this was nothing, compared with the true glory which he obtained, by civilizing his rude and barbarous subjects, diffusing among them knowledge, and establishing, and cultivating the arts of life: by the former he desolated countries, and drenched the earth with human blood: by the latter he softened the ferocious nature of his people, and pointed them to the means of human happiness.
The most important end of government then, is the proper direction of its internal policy, and economy; this is the province of the state governments, and it is evident, and is indeed admitted, that these ought to be under their controul.
Is it not then preposterous, and in the highest degree absurd, when the state governments are vested with powers so essential to the peace and good order of society, to take from them the means of their own preservation?
TO BE CONTINUED ...
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Brutus VII, continued ...
by Brutus
January 03, 1788
The idea, that the powers of congress in respect to revenue ought to be unlimited, “because the circumstances which may affect the public safety are not reducible to certain determinate limits,” is novel, as it relates to the government of the united states.
The inconveniencies which resulted from the feebleness of the present confederation was discerned, and felt soon after its adoption.
It was soon discovered, that a power to require money, without either the authority or means to enforce a collection of it, could not be relied upon either to provide for the common defence, the discharge of the national debt, or for support of government.
Congress therefore, so early as February 1781, recommended to the states to invest them with a power to levy an impost of five per cent ad valorem, on all imported goods, as a fund to be appropriated to discharge the debts already contracted, or which should hereafter be contracted for the support of the war, to be continued until the debts should be fully and finally discharged.
There is not the most distant idea held out in this act, that an unlimited power to collect taxes, duties and excises was necessary to be vested in the united states, and yet this was a time of the most pressing danger and distress.
The idea then was, that if certain definite funds were assigned to the union, which were certain in their natures, productive, and easy of collection, it would enable them to answer their engagements, and provide for their defence, and the impost of five per cent was fixed upon for the purpose.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Brutus
January 03, 1788
The idea, that the powers of congress in respect to revenue ought to be unlimited, “because the circumstances which may affect the public safety are not reducible to certain determinate limits,” is novel, as it relates to the government of the united states.
The inconveniencies which resulted from the feebleness of the present confederation was discerned, and felt soon after its adoption.
It was soon discovered, that a power to require money, without either the authority or means to enforce a collection of it, could not be relied upon either to provide for the common defence, the discharge of the national debt, or for support of government.
Congress therefore, so early as February 1781, recommended to the states to invest them with a power to levy an impost of five per cent ad valorem, on all imported goods, as a fund to be appropriated to discharge the debts already contracted, or which should hereafter be contracted for the support of the war, to be continued until the debts should be fully and finally discharged.
There is not the most distant idea held out in this act, that an unlimited power to collect taxes, duties and excises was necessary to be vested in the united states, and yet this was a time of the most pressing danger and distress.
The idea then was, that if certain definite funds were assigned to the union, which were certain in their natures, productive, and easy of collection, it would enable them to answer their engagements, and provide for their defence, and the impost of five per cent was fixed upon for the purpose.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Brutus VII, continued ...
by Brutus
January 03, 1788
This same subject was revived in the winter and spring of 1783, and after a long consideration of the subject, and many schemes were proposed; the result was, a recommendation of the revenue system of April 1783; this system does not suggest an idea that it was necessary to grant the United States unlimited authority in matters of revenue.
A variety of amendments were proposed to this system, some of which are upon the journals of Congress, but it does not appear that any of them proposed to invest the general government with discretionary power to raise money.
On the contrary, all of them limit them to certain definite objects, and fix the bounds over which they could not pass.
This recommendation was passed at the conclusion of the war, and was founded on an estimate of the whole national debt.
It was computed, that one million and an half of dollars, in addition to the impost, was a sufficient sum to pay the annual interest of the debt, and gradually to abolish the principal.
Events have proved that their estimate was sufficiently liberal, as the domestic debt appears upon its being adjusted to be less than it was computed, and since this period a considerable portion of the principal of the domestic debt has been discharged by the sale of the western lands.
It has been constantly urged by Congress, and by individuals, ever since, until lately, that had this revenue been appropriated by the states, as it was recommended, it would have been adequate to every exigency of the union.
Now indeed it is insisted, that all the treasures of the country are to be under the controul of that body, whom we are to appoint to provide for our protection and defence against foreign enemies.
The debts of the several states, and the support of the governments of them are to trust to fortune and accident.
If the union should not have occasion for all the money they can raise, they will leave a portion for the state, but this must be a matter of mere grace and favor.
Doctrines like these would not have been listened to by any state in the union, at a time when we were pressed on every side by a powerful enemy, and were called upon to make greater exertions than we have any reason to expect we shall ever be again.
The ability and character of the convention, who framed the preferred constitution, is sounded forth and reiterated by every declaimer and writer in its favor, as a powerful argument to induce its adoption.
But are not the patriots who guided our councils in the perilous times of the war, entitled to equal respect.
How has it happened, that none of these perceived a truth, which it is pretended is capable of such clear demonstration, that the power to raise a revenue should be deposited in the general government without limitation?
Were the men so dull of apprehension, so incapable of reasoning as not to be able to draw the inference?
The truth is, no such necessity exists.
It is a thing practicable, and by no means so difficult as is pretended, to limit the powers of the general government in respect to revenue, while yet they may retain reasonable means to provide for the common defence.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Brutus
January 03, 1788
This same subject was revived in the winter and spring of 1783, and after a long consideration of the subject, and many schemes were proposed; the result was, a recommendation of the revenue system of April 1783; this system does not suggest an idea that it was necessary to grant the United States unlimited authority in matters of revenue.
A variety of amendments were proposed to this system, some of which are upon the journals of Congress, but it does not appear that any of them proposed to invest the general government with discretionary power to raise money.
On the contrary, all of them limit them to certain definite objects, and fix the bounds over which they could not pass.
This recommendation was passed at the conclusion of the war, and was founded on an estimate of the whole national debt.
It was computed, that one million and an half of dollars, in addition to the impost, was a sufficient sum to pay the annual interest of the debt, and gradually to abolish the principal.
Events have proved that their estimate was sufficiently liberal, as the domestic debt appears upon its being adjusted to be less than it was computed, and since this period a considerable portion of the principal of the domestic debt has been discharged by the sale of the western lands.
It has been constantly urged by Congress, and by individuals, ever since, until lately, that had this revenue been appropriated by the states, as it was recommended, it would have been adequate to every exigency of the union.
Now indeed it is insisted, that all the treasures of the country are to be under the controul of that body, whom we are to appoint to provide for our protection and defence against foreign enemies.
The debts of the several states, and the support of the governments of them are to trust to fortune and accident.
If the union should not have occasion for all the money they can raise, they will leave a portion for the state, but this must be a matter of mere grace and favor.
Doctrines like these would not have been listened to by any state in the union, at a time when we were pressed on every side by a powerful enemy, and were called upon to make greater exertions than we have any reason to expect we shall ever be again.
The ability and character of the convention, who framed the preferred constitution, is sounded forth and reiterated by every declaimer and writer in its favor, as a powerful argument to induce its adoption.
But are not the patriots who guided our councils in the perilous times of the war, entitled to equal respect.
How has it happened, that none of these perceived a truth, which it is pretended is capable of such clear demonstration, that the power to raise a revenue should be deposited in the general government without limitation?
Were the men so dull of apprehension, so incapable of reasoning as not to be able to draw the inference?
The truth is, no such necessity exists.
It is a thing practicable, and by no means so difficult as is pretended, to limit the powers of the general government in respect to revenue, while yet they may retain reasonable means to provide for the common defence.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Brutus VII, continued ...
by Brutus
January 03, 1788
It is admitted, that human wisdom cannot foresee all the variety of circumstances that may arise to endanger the safety of nations — and it may with equal truth be added, that the power of a nation, exerted with its utmost vigour, may not be equal to repel a force with which it may be assailed, much less may it be able, with its ordinary resources and power, to oppose an extraordinary and unexpected attack; but yet every nation may form a rational judgment, what force will be competent to protect and defend it, against any enemy with which it is probable it may have to contend.
In extraordinary attacks, every country must rely upon the spirit and special exertions of its inhabitants — and these extraordinary efforts will always very much depend upon the happiness and good order the people experience from a wise and prudent administration of their internal government.
The states are as capable of making a just estimate on this head, as perhaps any nation in the world.
We have no powerful nation in our neighbourhood; if we are to go to war, it must either be with the Aboriginal natives, or with European nations.
The first are so unequal to a contest with this whole continent, that they are rather to be dreaded for the depredations they may make on our frontiers, than for any impression they will ever be able to make on the body of the country.
Some of the European nations, it is true, have provinces bordering upon us, but from these, unsupported by their European forces, we have nothing to apprehend; if any of them should attack us, they will have to transport their armies across the atlantic, at immense expence, while we should defend ourselves in our own country, which abounds with every necessary of life.
For defence against any assault, which there is any probability will be made upon us, we may easily form an estimate.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Brutus
January 03, 1788
It is admitted, that human wisdom cannot foresee all the variety of circumstances that may arise to endanger the safety of nations — and it may with equal truth be added, that the power of a nation, exerted with its utmost vigour, may not be equal to repel a force with which it may be assailed, much less may it be able, with its ordinary resources and power, to oppose an extraordinary and unexpected attack; but yet every nation may form a rational judgment, what force will be competent to protect and defend it, against any enemy with which it is probable it may have to contend.
In extraordinary attacks, every country must rely upon the spirit and special exertions of its inhabitants — and these extraordinary efforts will always very much depend upon the happiness and good order the people experience from a wise and prudent administration of their internal government.
The states are as capable of making a just estimate on this head, as perhaps any nation in the world.
We have no powerful nation in our neighbourhood; if we are to go to war, it must either be with the Aboriginal natives, or with European nations.
The first are so unequal to a contest with this whole continent, that they are rather to be dreaded for the depredations they may make on our frontiers, than for any impression they will ever be able to make on the body of the country.
Some of the European nations, it is true, have provinces bordering upon us, but from these, unsupported by their European forces, we have nothing to apprehend; if any of them should attack us, they will have to transport their armies across the atlantic, at immense expence, while we should defend ourselves in our own country, which abounds with every necessary of life.
For defence against any assault, which there is any probability will be made upon us, we may easily form an estimate.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Brutus VII, concluded ...
by Brutus
January 03, 1788
I may be asked to point out the sources, from which the general government could derive a sufficient revenue, to answer the demands of the union.
Many might be suggested, and for my part, I am not disposed to be tenacious of my own opinion on the subject.
If the object be defined with precision, and will operate to make the burden fall any thing nearly equal on the different parts of the union, I shall be satisfied.
There is one source of revenue, which it is agreed, the general government ought to have the sole controul of.
This is an impost upon all goods imported from foreign countries.
This would, of itself, be very productive, and would be collected with ease and certainty.
It will be a fund too, constantly encreasing — for our commerce will grow, with the productions of the country; and these, together with our consumption of foreign goods, will encrease with our population.
It is said, that the impost will not produce a sufficient sum to satisfy the demands of the general government; perhaps it would not.
Let some other then, equally well defined, be assigned them: that this is practicable is certain, because such particular objects were proposed by some members of Congress when the revenue system of April 1783, was agitated in that body.
It was then moved, that a tax at the rate of _____ ninetieths of a dollar on surveyed land, and a house tax of half a dollar on a house, should be granted to the United States.
I do not mention this, because I approve of raising a revenue in this mode.
I believe such a tax would be difficult in its collection, and inconvenient in its operation.
But it shews, that it has heretofore been the sense of some of those, who now contend, that the general government should have unlimited authority in matters of revenue, that their authority should be definite and limitted on that head.
My own opinion is, that the objects from which the general government should have authority to raise a revenue, should be of such a nature, that the tax should be raised by simple laws, with few officers, with certainty and expedition, and with the least interference with the internal police of the states.
Of this nature is the impost on imported goods — and it appears to me that a duty on exports, would also be of this nature — and therefore, for ought I can discover, this would be the best source of revenue to grant the general government.
I know neither the Congress nor the state legislatures will have authority under the new constitution to raise a revenue in this way.
But I cannot perceive the reason of the restriction.
It appears to me evident, that a tax on articles exported, would be as nearly equal as any that we can expect to lay, and it certainly would be collected with more ease and less expence than any direct tax.
I do not however, contend for this mode, it may be liable to well founded objections that have not occurred to me.
But this I do contend for, that some mode is practicable, and that limits must be marked between the general government, and the states on this head, or if they be not, either the Congress in the exercise of this power, will deprive the state legislatures of the means of their existence, or the states by resisting the constitutional authority of the general government, will render it nugatory.
by Brutus
January 03, 1788
I may be asked to point out the sources, from which the general government could derive a sufficient revenue, to answer the demands of the union.
Many might be suggested, and for my part, I am not disposed to be tenacious of my own opinion on the subject.
If the object be defined with precision, and will operate to make the burden fall any thing nearly equal on the different parts of the union, I shall be satisfied.
There is one source of revenue, which it is agreed, the general government ought to have the sole controul of.
This is an impost upon all goods imported from foreign countries.
This would, of itself, be very productive, and would be collected with ease and certainty.
It will be a fund too, constantly encreasing — for our commerce will grow, with the productions of the country; and these, together with our consumption of foreign goods, will encrease with our population.
It is said, that the impost will not produce a sufficient sum to satisfy the demands of the general government; perhaps it would not.
Let some other then, equally well defined, be assigned them: that this is practicable is certain, because such particular objects were proposed by some members of Congress when the revenue system of April 1783, was agitated in that body.
It was then moved, that a tax at the rate of _____ ninetieths of a dollar on surveyed land, and a house tax of half a dollar on a house, should be granted to the United States.
I do not mention this, because I approve of raising a revenue in this mode.
I believe such a tax would be difficult in its collection, and inconvenient in its operation.
But it shews, that it has heretofore been the sense of some of those, who now contend, that the general government should have unlimited authority in matters of revenue, that their authority should be definite and limitted on that head.
My own opinion is, that the objects from which the general government should have authority to raise a revenue, should be of such a nature, that the tax should be raised by simple laws, with few officers, with certainty and expedition, and with the least interference with the internal police of the states.
Of this nature is the impost on imported goods — and it appears to me that a duty on exports, would also be of this nature — and therefore, for ought I can discover, this would be the best source of revenue to grant the general government.
I know neither the Congress nor the state legislatures will have authority under the new constitution to raise a revenue in this way.
But I cannot perceive the reason of the restriction.
It appears to me evident, that a tax on articles exported, would be as nearly equal as any that we can expect to lay, and it certainly would be collected with more ease and less expence than any direct tax.
I do not however, contend for this mode, it may be liable to well founded objections that have not occurred to me.
But this I do contend for, that some mode is practicable, and that limits must be marked between the general government, and the states on this head, or if they be not, either the Congress in the exercise of this power, will deprive the state legislatures of the means of their existence, or the states by resisting the constitutional authority of the general government, will render it nugatory.
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Federal Farmer VIII
by Richard Henry Lee
January 03, 1788
Dear sir,
Before I proceed to examine the objections, I beg leave to add a valuable idea respecting representation, to be collected from De Lolme, and other able writers, which essentially tends to confirm my positions: They very justly impute the establishment of general and equal liberty in England to a balance of interests and powers among the different orders of men; aided by a series of fortunate events, that never before, and possibly never again will happen.
Before the Norman conquest the people of England enjoyed much of this liberty.
The first of the Norman kings, aided by foreign mercenaries and foreign attendants, obnoxious to the English, immediately laid arbitrary taxes, and established arbitrary courts, and severely oppressed all orders of people.
The barons and people, who recollected their former liberties, were induced, by those oppressions, to unite their efforts in their common defence.
Here it became necessary for the great men, instead of deceiving and depressing the people, to enlighten and court them; the royal power was too strongly fixed to be annihilated, and rational means were, therefore directed to limiting it within proper bounds.
In this long and arduous task, in this new species of contests, the barons and people succeeded, because they had been freemen, and knew the value of the object they were contending for; because they were the people of a small island one people who found it practicable to meet and deliberate in one assembly, and act under one system of resolves, and who were not obliged to meet in different provincial assemblies, as is the case in large countries, as was the case in France, Spain, &c. where their determinations were inconsistent with each other, and where the king could play off one assembly against another.
It was in this united situation the people of England were for several centuries, enabled to combine their exertions, and by compacts, as Magna Charta, a bill of rights, &c. were able to limit, by degrees, the royal prerogatives, and establish their own liberties.
The first combination was, probably, the accidental effect of pre-existing circumstances; but there was an admirable balance of interests in it, which has been the parent of English liberty, and excellent regulations enjoyed since that time.
The executive power having been uniformly in the king, and he the visible head of the nation, it was chimerical for the greatest lord or most popular leader, consistent with the state of the government, and opinion of the people, to seriously think of becoming the king’s rival, or to aim at even a share of the executive power; the greatest subject’s prospect was only in acquiring a respectable influence in the house of commons, house of lords, or in the ministry; circumstances at once made it the interests of the leaders of the people to stand by them.
Far otherwise was it with the ephori in Sparta, and tribunes in Rome.
The leaders in England have led the people to freedom, in almost all other countries to servitude.
The people in England have made use of deliberate exertions, their safest and most efficient weapons.
In other countries they have often acted like mobs, and been enslaved by their enemies, or by their own leaders.
In England, the people have been led uniformly, and systematically by their representatives to secure their rights by compact, and to abolish innovations upon the government: they successively obtained Magna Charta, the powers of taxation, the power to propose laws, the habeas corpus act, bill of rights, &c. they, in short, secured general and equal liberty, security to their persons and property; and, as an everlasting security and bulwark of their liberties, they fixed the democratic branch in the legislature, and jury trial in the execution of the laws, the freedom of the press, &c.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Richard Henry Lee
January 03, 1788
Dear sir,
Before I proceed to examine the objections, I beg leave to add a valuable idea respecting representation, to be collected from De Lolme, and other able writers, which essentially tends to confirm my positions: They very justly impute the establishment of general and equal liberty in England to a balance of interests and powers among the different orders of men; aided by a series of fortunate events, that never before, and possibly never again will happen.
Before the Norman conquest the people of England enjoyed much of this liberty.
The first of the Norman kings, aided by foreign mercenaries and foreign attendants, obnoxious to the English, immediately laid arbitrary taxes, and established arbitrary courts, and severely oppressed all orders of people.
The barons and people, who recollected their former liberties, were induced, by those oppressions, to unite their efforts in their common defence.
Here it became necessary for the great men, instead of deceiving and depressing the people, to enlighten and court them; the royal power was too strongly fixed to be annihilated, and rational means were, therefore directed to limiting it within proper bounds.
In this long and arduous task, in this new species of contests, the barons and people succeeded, because they had been freemen, and knew the value of the object they were contending for; because they were the people of a small island one people who found it practicable to meet and deliberate in one assembly, and act under one system of resolves, and who were not obliged to meet in different provincial assemblies, as is the case in large countries, as was the case in France, Spain, &c. where their determinations were inconsistent with each other, and where the king could play off one assembly against another.
It was in this united situation the people of England were for several centuries, enabled to combine their exertions, and by compacts, as Magna Charta, a bill of rights, &c. were able to limit, by degrees, the royal prerogatives, and establish their own liberties.
The first combination was, probably, the accidental effect of pre-existing circumstances; but there was an admirable balance of interests in it, which has been the parent of English liberty, and excellent regulations enjoyed since that time.
The executive power having been uniformly in the king, and he the visible head of the nation, it was chimerical for the greatest lord or most popular leader, consistent with the state of the government, and opinion of the people, to seriously think of becoming the king’s rival, or to aim at even a share of the executive power; the greatest subject’s prospect was only in acquiring a respectable influence in the house of commons, house of lords, or in the ministry; circumstances at once made it the interests of the leaders of the people to stand by them.
Far otherwise was it with the ephori in Sparta, and tribunes in Rome.
The leaders in England have led the people to freedom, in almost all other countries to servitude.
The people in England have made use of deliberate exertions, their safest and most efficient weapons.
In other countries they have often acted like mobs, and been enslaved by their enemies, or by their own leaders.
In England, the people have been led uniformly, and systematically by their representatives to secure their rights by compact, and to abolish innovations upon the government: they successively obtained Magna Charta, the powers of taxation, the power to propose laws, the habeas corpus act, bill of rights, &c. they, in short, secured general and equal liberty, security to their persons and property; and, as an everlasting security and bulwark of their liberties, they fixed the democratic branch in the legislature, and jury trial in the execution of the laws, the freedom of the press, &c.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Federal Farmer VIII, continued ...
by Richard Henry Lee
January 03, 1788
In Rome, and most other countries, the reverse of all this is true.
In Greece, Rome, and wherever the civil law has been adopted, torture has been admitted.
In Rome the people were subject to arbitrary confiscations, and even their lives would be arbitrarily disposed of by consuls, tribunes, dictators, masters, &c.
Half of the inhabitants were slaves, and the other half never knew what equal liberty was; yet in England the people have had king, lords, and commons; in Rome they had consuls, senators and tribunes: why then was the government of England so mild and favourable to the body of the people, and that of Rome an ambitious and oppressive aristocracy?
Why in England have the revolutions always ended in stipulations in favour of general liberty, equal laws, and the common rights of the people, and in most other countries in favour only of a few influential men?
The reasons, in my mind, are obvious: In England the people have been substantially represented in many respects; in the other countries it has not been so.
Perhaps a small degree of attention to a few simple facts will illustrate this.
In England, from the oppressions of the Norman kings to the revolution in 1688, during which period of two or three hundred years, the English liberties were ascertained and established, the aristocratic part of that nation was substantially represented by a very large number of nobles, possessing similar interests and feelings with those they represented.
The body of the people, about four or five millions, then mostly a frugal landed people, were represented by about five hundred representatives, taken not from the order of men which formed the aristocracy, but from the body of the people, and possessed of the same interests and feelings.
De Lolme, speaking of the British representation, expressly founds all his reasons on this union; this similitude of interests, feelings, views and circumstances.
He observes, the English have preserved their liberties, because they and their leaders or representatives have been strictly united in interests, and in contending for general liberty.
Here we see a genuine balance founded in the actual state of things.
The whole community, probably, not more than two-fifths more numerous than we now are, were represented by seven or eight hundred men; the barons stipulated with the common people, and the king with the whole.
Had the legal distinction between lords and commons been broken down, and the people of that island been called upon to elect forty-five senators, and one hundred and twenty representatives, about the proportion we propose to establish, their whole legislature evidently would have been of the natural aristocracy, and the body of the people would not have had scarcely a single sincere advocate; their interests would have been neglected, general and equal liberty forgot, and the balance lost; contests and conciliations, as in most other countries, would have been merely among the few, and as it might have been necessary to serve their purposes, the people at large would have been flattered or threatened, and probably not a single stipulation made in their favour.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Richard Henry Lee
January 03, 1788
In Rome, and most other countries, the reverse of all this is true.
In Greece, Rome, and wherever the civil law has been adopted, torture has been admitted.
In Rome the people were subject to arbitrary confiscations, and even their lives would be arbitrarily disposed of by consuls, tribunes, dictators, masters, &c.
Half of the inhabitants were slaves, and the other half never knew what equal liberty was; yet in England the people have had king, lords, and commons; in Rome they had consuls, senators and tribunes: why then was the government of England so mild and favourable to the body of the people, and that of Rome an ambitious and oppressive aristocracy?
Why in England have the revolutions always ended in stipulations in favour of general liberty, equal laws, and the common rights of the people, and in most other countries in favour only of a few influential men?
The reasons, in my mind, are obvious: In England the people have been substantially represented in many respects; in the other countries it has not been so.
Perhaps a small degree of attention to a few simple facts will illustrate this.
In England, from the oppressions of the Norman kings to the revolution in 1688, during which period of two or three hundred years, the English liberties were ascertained and established, the aristocratic part of that nation was substantially represented by a very large number of nobles, possessing similar interests and feelings with those they represented.
The body of the people, about four or five millions, then mostly a frugal landed people, were represented by about five hundred representatives, taken not from the order of men which formed the aristocracy, but from the body of the people, and possessed of the same interests and feelings.
De Lolme, speaking of the British representation, expressly founds all his reasons on this union; this similitude of interests, feelings, views and circumstances.
He observes, the English have preserved their liberties, because they and their leaders or representatives have been strictly united in interests, and in contending for general liberty.
Here we see a genuine balance founded in the actual state of things.
The whole community, probably, not more than two-fifths more numerous than we now are, were represented by seven or eight hundred men; the barons stipulated with the common people, and the king with the whole.
Had the legal distinction between lords and commons been broken down, and the people of that island been called upon to elect forty-five senators, and one hundred and twenty representatives, about the proportion we propose to establish, their whole legislature evidently would have been of the natural aristocracy, and the body of the people would not have had scarcely a single sincere advocate; their interests would have been neglected, general and equal liberty forgot, and the balance lost; contests and conciliations, as in most other countries, would have been merely among the few, and as it might have been necessary to serve their purposes, the people at large would have been flattered or threatened, and probably not a single stipulation made in their favour.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Federal Farmer VIII, continued ...
by Richard Henry Lee
January 03, 1788
In Rome the people were miserable, though they had three orders, the consuls, senators and tribunes, and approved the laws, and all for want of a genuine representation.
The people were too numerous to assemble, and do any thing properly themselves; the voice of a few, the dupes of artifice, was called the voice of the people.
It is difficult for the people to defend themselves against the arts and intrigues of the great, but by selecting a suitable number of men fixed to their interests to represent them, and to oppose ministers and senators.
And the people’s all depends on the number of the men selected, and the manner of doing it.
To be convinced of this, we need only attend to the reason of the case, the conduct of the British commons, and of the Roman tribunes: equal liberty prevails in England, because there was a representation of the people, in fact and reality, to establish it; equal liberty never prevailed in Rome, because there was but the shadow of a representation.
There were consuls in Rome annually elected to execute the laws, several hundred senators represented the great families; the body of the people annually chose tribunes from among themselves to defend them and to secure their rights; I think the number of tribunes annually chosen never exceeded ten.
This representation, perhaps, was not proportionally so numerous as the representation proposed in the new plan; but the difference will not appear to be so great, when it shall be recollected, that these tribunes were chosen annually; that the great patrician families were not admitted to these offices of tribunes, and that the people of Italy who elected the tribunes were a long while, if not always, a small people compared with the people of the United States.
What was the consequence of this triffling representation?
The people of Rome always elected for their tribunes men conspicuous for their riches, military commands, professional popularity, &c. great commoners, between whom and the noble families there was only the shadowy difference of legal distinction.
Among all the tribunes the people chose for several centuries, they had scarcely five real friends to their interests.
These tribunes lived, felt and saw, not like the people, but like the great patrician families, like senators and great officers of state, to get into which it was evident, by their conduct, was their sole object.
These tribunes often talked about the rights and prerogatives of the people, and that was all; for they never even attempted to establish equal liberty: so far from establishing the rights of the people, they suffered the senate, to the exclusion of the people, to engross the powers of taxation; those excellent and almost only real weapons of defence even the people of England possess.
The tribunes obtained that the people should be eligible to some of the great offices of state, and marry, if they pleased, into the noble families; these were advantages in their nature, confined to a few elevated commoners, and of triffling importance to the people at large.
Nearly the same observations may be made as to the ephori of Sparta.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Richard Henry Lee
January 03, 1788
In Rome the people were miserable, though they had three orders, the consuls, senators and tribunes, and approved the laws, and all for want of a genuine representation.
The people were too numerous to assemble, and do any thing properly themselves; the voice of a few, the dupes of artifice, was called the voice of the people.
It is difficult for the people to defend themselves against the arts and intrigues of the great, but by selecting a suitable number of men fixed to their interests to represent them, and to oppose ministers and senators.
And the people’s all depends on the number of the men selected, and the manner of doing it.
To be convinced of this, we need only attend to the reason of the case, the conduct of the British commons, and of the Roman tribunes: equal liberty prevails in England, because there was a representation of the people, in fact and reality, to establish it; equal liberty never prevailed in Rome, because there was but the shadow of a representation.
There were consuls in Rome annually elected to execute the laws, several hundred senators represented the great families; the body of the people annually chose tribunes from among themselves to defend them and to secure their rights; I think the number of tribunes annually chosen never exceeded ten.
This representation, perhaps, was not proportionally so numerous as the representation proposed in the new plan; but the difference will not appear to be so great, when it shall be recollected, that these tribunes were chosen annually; that the great patrician families were not admitted to these offices of tribunes, and that the people of Italy who elected the tribunes were a long while, if not always, a small people compared with the people of the United States.
What was the consequence of this triffling representation?
The people of Rome always elected for their tribunes men conspicuous for their riches, military commands, professional popularity, &c. great commoners, between whom and the noble families there was only the shadowy difference of legal distinction.
Among all the tribunes the people chose for several centuries, they had scarcely five real friends to their interests.
These tribunes lived, felt and saw, not like the people, but like the great patrician families, like senators and great officers of state, to get into which it was evident, by their conduct, was their sole object.
These tribunes often talked about the rights and prerogatives of the people, and that was all; for they never even attempted to establish equal liberty: so far from establishing the rights of the people, they suffered the senate, to the exclusion of the people, to engross the powers of taxation; those excellent and almost only real weapons of defence even the people of England possess.
The tribunes obtained that the people should be eligible to some of the great offices of state, and marry, if they pleased, into the noble families; these were advantages in their nature, confined to a few elevated commoners, and of triffling importance to the people at large.
Nearly the same observations may be made as to the ephori of Sparta.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Federal Farmer VIII, continued ...
by Richard Henry Lee
January 03, 1788
We may amuse ourselves with names; but the fact is, men will be governed by the motives and temptations that surround their situation.
Political evils to be guarded against are in the human character, and not in the name of patrician or plebian.
Had the people of Italy, in the early period of the republic, selected yearly, or biennially, four or five hundred of their best informed men, emphatically from among themselves, these representatives would have formed an honest respectable assembly, capable of combining in them the views and exertions of the people, and their respectability would have procured them honest and able leaders, and we should have seen equal liberty established.
True liberty stands in need of a fostering hand; from the days of Adam she has found but one temple to dwell in securely; she has laid the foundation of one, perhaps her last, in America; whether this is to be compleated and have duration, is yet a question.
Equal liberty never yet found many advocates among the great: it is a disagreeable truth, that power perverts men's views in a greater degree, than public employments inform their understandings they become hardened in certain maxims, and more lost to fellow feelings.
Men may always be too cautious to commit alarming and glaring iniquities: but they, as well as systems, are liable to be corrupted by slow degrees.
Junius well observes, we are not only to guard against what men will do, but even against what they may do.
Men in high public offices are in stations where they gradually lose sight of the people, and do not often think of attending to them, except when necessary to answer private purposes.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Richard Henry Lee
January 03, 1788
We may amuse ourselves with names; but the fact is, men will be governed by the motives and temptations that surround their situation.
Political evils to be guarded against are in the human character, and not in the name of patrician or plebian.
Had the people of Italy, in the early period of the republic, selected yearly, or biennially, four or five hundred of their best informed men, emphatically from among themselves, these representatives would have formed an honest respectable assembly, capable of combining in them the views and exertions of the people, and their respectability would have procured them honest and able leaders, and we should have seen equal liberty established.
True liberty stands in need of a fostering hand; from the days of Adam she has found but one temple to dwell in securely; she has laid the foundation of one, perhaps her last, in America; whether this is to be compleated and have duration, is yet a question.
Equal liberty never yet found many advocates among the great: it is a disagreeable truth, that power perverts men's views in a greater degree, than public employments inform their understandings they become hardened in certain maxims, and more lost to fellow feelings.
Men may always be too cautious to commit alarming and glaring iniquities: but they, as well as systems, are liable to be corrupted by slow degrees.
Junius well observes, we are not only to guard against what men will do, but even against what they may do.
Men in high public offices are in stations where they gradually lose sight of the people, and do not often think of attending to them, except when necessary to answer private purposes.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Federal Farmer VIII, concluded ...
by Richard Henry Lee
January 03, 1788
The body of the people must have this true representative security placed some where in the nation; and in the United States, or in any extended empire, I am fully persuaded can be placed no where, but in the forms of a federal republic, where we can divide and place it in several state or district legislatures, giving the people in these the means of opposing heavy internal taxes and oppressive measures in the proper stages.
A great empire contains the amities and animosities of a world within itself.
We are not like the people of England, one people compactly settled on a small island, with a great city filled with frugal merchants, serving as a common centre of liberty and union: we are dispersed, and it is impracticable for any but the few to assemble in one place: the few must be watched, checked, and often resisted tyranny has ever shewn a prediliction to be in close amity with them, or the one man.
Drive it from kings and it flies to senators, to dicemvirs, to dictators, to tribunes, to popular leaders, to military chiefs, &c.
De Lolme well observes, that in societies, laws which were to be equal to all are soon warped to the private interests of the administrators, and made to defend the usurpations of a few.
The English, who had tasted the sweets of equal laws, were aware of this, and though they restored their king, they carefully delegated to parliament the advocates of freedom.
I have often lately heard it observed, that it will do very well for a people to make a constitution, and ordain, that at stated periods they will chuse, in a certain manner, a first magistrate, a given number of senators and representatives, and let them have all power to do as they please.
This doctrine, however it may do for a small republic, as Connecticut, for instance, where the people may chuse so many senators and representatives to assemble in the legislature, in an eminent degree, the interests, the views, feelings, and genuine sentiments of the people themselves, can never be admitted in an extensive country; and when this power is lodged in the hands of a few, not to limit the few, is but one step short of giving absolute power to one man in a numerous representation the abuse of power is a common injury, and has no temptation among the few, the abuse of power may often operate to the private emolument of those who abuse it.
by Richard Henry Lee
January 03, 1788
The body of the people must have this true representative security placed some where in the nation; and in the United States, or in any extended empire, I am fully persuaded can be placed no where, but in the forms of a federal republic, where we can divide and place it in several state or district legislatures, giving the people in these the means of opposing heavy internal taxes and oppressive measures in the proper stages.
A great empire contains the amities and animosities of a world within itself.
We are not like the people of England, one people compactly settled on a small island, with a great city filled with frugal merchants, serving as a common centre of liberty and union: we are dispersed, and it is impracticable for any but the few to assemble in one place: the few must be watched, checked, and often resisted tyranny has ever shewn a prediliction to be in close amity with them, or the one man.
Drive it from kings and it flies to senators, to dicemvirs, to dictators, to tribunes, to popular leaders, to military chiefs, &c.
De Lolme well observes, that in societies, laws which were to be equal to all are soon warped to the private interests of the administrators, and made to defend the usurpations of a few.
The English, who had tasted the sweets of equal laws, were aware of this, and though they restored their king, they carefully delegated to parliament the advocates of freedom.
I have often lately heard it observed, that it will do very well for a people to make a constitution, and ordain, that at stated periods they will chuse, in a certain manner, a first magistrate, a given number of senators and representatives, and let them have all power to do as they please.
This doctrine, however it may do for a small republic, as Connecticut, for instance, where the people may chuse so many senators and representatives to assemble in the legislature, in an eminent degree, the interests, the views, feelings, and genuine sentiments of the people themselves, can never be admitted in an extensive country; and when this power is lodged in the hands of a few, not to limit the few, is but one step short of giving absolute power to one man in a numerous representation the abuse of power is a common injury, and has no temptation among the few, the abuse of power may often operate to the private emolument of those who abuse it.