Genuine Information II, continued ...
by Luther Martin
January 01, 1788
Mr. MARTIN’S Information to the House of Assembly, continued ...
The jersey propositions being thus rejected, the convention took up those reported by the committee, and proceeded to debate them by paragraphs.
It was now that they who disapproved the report found it necessary to make a warm and decided opposition, which took place upon the discussion of the seventh resolution, which related to the inequality of representation in the first branch.
Those who advocated this inequality, urged, that when the articles of confederation were formed, it was only from necessity and expediency that the States were admitted each to have an equal vote; but that our situation was now altered, and therefore those States who considered it contrary to their interest, would no longer abide by it.
They said no State ought to wish to have influence in government, except in proportion to what it contributes to it; that if it contributes but little, it ought to have but a small vote; that taxation and representation ought always to go together; that if one State had sixteen times as many inhabitants as another, or was sixteen times as wealthy, it ought to have sixteen times as many votes; that an inhabitant of Pennsylvania ought to have as much weight and consequence as an inhabitant of Jersey or Delaware; that it was contrary to the feelings of the human mind — what the large States would never submit to; that the large States would have great objects in view, in which they would never permit the smaller States to thwart them; that equality of suffrage was the rotten part of the constitution, and that this was a happy time to get clear of it.
In fine, that it was the poison which contaminated our whole system, and the source of all the evils we experienced.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Genuine Information II, continued ...
by Luther Martin
January 01, 1788
Mr. MARTIN’S Information to the House of Assembly, continued ...
This, Sir, is the substance of the arguments, if arguments they can be called, which were used in favour of inequality of suffrage.
Those, who advocated the equality of suffrage, took the matter up on the original principles of government.
They urged that all men considered in a state of nature, before any government formed, are equally free and independent, no one having any right or authority to exercise power over another, and this without any regard to difference in personal strength, understanding, or wealth.
That when such individuals enter into government, they have each a right to an equal voice in its first formation, and afterwards have each a right to an equal vote in every matter which relates to their government.
That if it could be done conveniently, they have a right to exercise it in person.
Where it cannot be done in person but for convenience, representatives are appointed to act for them, every person has a right to an equal vote in choosing that representative who is entrusted to do for the whole, that which the whole, if they could assemble, might do in person, and in the transacting of which each would have an equal voice.
That if we were to admit, because a man was more wise, more strong, or more wealthy, he should be entitled to more votes than another, it would be inconsistent with the freedom and liberty of that other, and would reduce him to slavery.
Suppose, for instance, ten individuals in a state of nature, about to enter into government, nine of whom are equally wise, equally strong, and equally wealthy, the tenth is ten times as wise, ten times as strong or ten times as rich; if for this reason he is to have ten votes for each vote of either of the others, the nine might as well have no vote at all, since though the whole nine might assent to a measure, yet the vote of the tenth would countervail, and set aside all their votes.
If this tenth approved of what they wished to adopt, it would be well, but if he disapproved, he could prevent it, and in the same manner he could carry into execution any measure he wished contrary to the opinion of all the others, he having ten votes, and the other all together but nine.
It is evident, that on these principles, the nine would have no will nor discretion of their own, but must be totally dependent on the will and discretion of the tenth, to him they would be as absolutely slaves as any negro is to his master.
If he did not attempt to carry into execution any measures injurious to the other nine, it could only be said that they had a good master, they would not be the less slaves, because they would be totally dependent on the will of another, and not on their own will.
They might not feel their chains, but they would notwithstanding wear them, and whenever their master pleased he might draw them so tight as to gall them to the bone.
Hence it was urged the inequality of representation, or giving to one man more votes than another on account of his wealth, &c. was altogether inconsistent with the principles of liberty, and in the same proportion as it should be adopted, in favour of one or more, in that proportion are the others inslaved.
It was urged that though every individual should have an equal voice in the government, yet, even then superiour wealth, strength or understanding, would give great and undue advantages to those who possessed them.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Luther Martin
January 01, 1788
Mr. MARTIN’S Information to the House of Assembly, continued ...
This, Sir, is the substance of the arguments, if arguments they can be called, which were used in favour of inequality of suffrage.
Those, who advocated the equality of suffrage, took the matter up on the original principles of government.
They urged that all men considered in a state of nature, before any government formed, are equally free and independent, no one having any right or authority to exercise power over another, and this without any regard to difference in personal strength, understanding, or wealth.
That when such individuals enter into government, they have each a right to an equal voice in its first formation, and afterwards have each a right to an equal vote in every matter which relates to their government.
That if it could be done conveniently, they have a right to exercise it in person.
Where it cannot be done in person but for convenience, representatives are appointed to act for them, every person has a right to an equal vote in choosing that representative who is entrusted to do for the whole, that which the whole, if they could assemble, might do in person, and in the transacting of which each would have an equal voice.
That if we were to admit, because a man was more wise, more strong, or more wealthy, he should be entitled to more votes than another, it would be inconsistent with the freedom and liberty of that other, and would reduce him to slavery.
Suppose, for instance, ten individuals in a state of nature, about to enter into government, nine of whom are equally wise, equally strong, and equally wealthy, the tenth is ten times as wise, ten times as strong or ten times as rich; if for this reason he is to have ten votes for each vote of either of the others, the nine might as well have no vote at all, since though the whole nine might assent to a measure, yet the vote of the tenth would countervail, and set aside all their votes.
If this tenth approved of what they wished to adopt, it would be well, but if he disapproved, he could prevent it, and in the same manner he could carry into execution any measure he wished contrary to the opinion of all the others, he having ten votes, and the other all together but nine.
It is evident, that on these principles, the nine would have no will nor discretion of their own, but must be totally dependent on the will and discretion of the tenth, to him they would be as absolutely slaves as any negro is to his master.
If he did not attempt to carry into execution any measures injurious to the other nine, it could only be said that they had a good master, they would not be the less slaves, because they would be totally dependent on the will of another, and not on their own will.
They might not feel their chains, but they would notwithstanding wear them, and whenever their master pleased he might draw them so tight as to gall them to the bone.
Hence it was urged the inequality of representation, or giving to one man more votes than another on account of his wealth, &c. was altogether inconsistent with the principles of liberty, and in the same proportion as it should be adopted, in favour of one or more, in that proportion are the others inslaved.
It was urged that though every individual should have an equal voice in the government, yet, even then superiour wealth, strength or understanding, would give great and undue advantages to those who possessed them.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Genuine Information II, continued ...
by Luther Martin
January 01, 1788
Mr. MARTIN’S Information to the House of Assembly, continued ...
That wealth attracts respect and attention; superior strength would cause the weaker and more feeble to be cautious how they offended, and to put up with small injuries rather than to engage in an unequal contest,
In like manner superior understanding would give its possessor many opportunities of profiting at the expence of the more ignorant.
Having thus established these principles with respect to the rights of individuals in a state of nature, and what is due to each on entering into government, principles established by every writer on liberty, they proceeded to shew that States, when once formed, are considered with respect to each other as individuals in a state of nature,
That, like individuals, each State is considered equally free and equally independent, the one having no right to exercise authority over the other, though more strong, more wealthy, or abounding with more inhabitants.
That when a number of States unite themselves under a federal government, the same principles apply to them as when a number of individual men unite themselves under a State government.
That every argument which shews one man ought not to have more votes than another, because he is wiser, stronger or wealthier, proves that one State ought not to have more votes than another, because it is stronger, richer, or more populous.
And that by giving one State, or one or two States more votes than the others, the others thereby are enslaved to such State or States, having the greater number of votes, in the same manner as in the case before put of individuals where one has more votes than the others.
That the reason why each individual man in forming a State government should have an equal vote is, because each individual before he enters into government is equally free and independent.
So each State, when States enter into a federal government, are entitled to an equal vote, because before they entered into such federal government, each State was equally free and equally independent.
That adequate representation of men formed into a State government, consists in each man having an equal voice either personally, or if by representatives, that he should have an equal voice in choosing the representative.
So adequate representation of States in a federal government, consists in each State having an equal voice either in person or by its representative in every thing which relates to the federal government.
That this adequacy of representation is more important in a federal, than in a State government, because the members of a State government, the district of which is not very large, have generally such a common interest, that laws can scarcely be made by one part oppressive to the others, without their suffering in common; but the different States composing an extensive federal empire, widely distant, one from the other, may have interests so totally distinct, that the one part might be greatly benefited by what would be destructive to the other.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Luther Martin
January 01, 1788
Mr. MARTIN’S Information to the House of Assembly, continued ...
That wealth attracts respect and attention; superior strength would cause the weaker and more feeble to be cautious how they offended, and to put up with small injuries rather than to engage in an unequal contest,
In like manner superior understanding would give its possessor many opportunities of profiting at the expence of the more ignorant.
Having thus established these principles with respect to the rights of individuals in a state of nature, and what is due to each on entering into government, principles established by every writer on liberty, they proceeded to shew that States, when once formed, are considered with respect to each other as individuals in a state of nature,
That, like individuals, each State is considered equally free and equally independent, the one having no right to exercise authority over the other, though more strong, more wealthy, or abounding with more inhabitants.
That when a number of States unite themselves under a federal government, the same principles apply to them as when a number of individual men unite themselves under a State government.
That every argument which shews one man ought not to have more votes than another, because he is wiser, stronger or wealthier, proves that one State ought not to have more votes than another, because it is stronger, richer, or more populous.
And that by giving one State, or one or two States more votes than the others, the others thereby are enslaved to such State or States, having the greater number of votes, in the same manner as in the case before put of individuals where one has more votes than the others.
That the reason why each individual man in forming a State government should have an equal vote is, because each individual before he enters into government is equally free and independent.
So each State, when States enter into a federal government, are entitled to an equal vote, because before they entered into such federal government, each State was equally free and equally independent.
That adequate representation of men formed into a State government, consists in each man having an equal voice either personally, or if by representatives, that he should have an equal voice in choosing the representative.
So adequate representation of States in a federal government, consists in each State having an equal voice either in person or by its representative in every thing which relates to the federal government.
That this adequacy of representation is more important in a federal, than in a State government, because the members of a State government, the district of which is not very large, have generally such a common interest, that laws can scarcely be made by one part oppressive to the others, without their suffering in common; but the different States composing an extensive federal empire, widely distant, one from the other, may have interests so totally distinct, that the one part might be greatly benefited by what would be destructive to the other.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Genuine Information II, concluded ...
by Luther Martin
January 01, 1788
Mr. MARTIN’S Information to the House of Assembly, concluded ...
They were not satisfied by resting it on principles; they also appealed to history.
They shewed that in the amphyctionic confederation of the Grecian cities, each city however different in wealth, strength, and other circumstances, sent the same number of deputies, and had each an equal voice in every thing that related to the common concerns of Greece.
It was shewn that in the seven provinces of the United Netherlands, and the confederated Cantons of Switzerland, each Canton and each province have an equal vote, although there are as great distinctions of wealth, strength, population, and extent of territory among those provinces and those Cantons, as among these States.
It was said, that the maxim that taxation and representation ought to go together, was true so far, that no person ought to be taxed who is not represented, but not in the extent insisted upon, to wit, that the quantum of taxation and representation ought to be the same; on the contrary, the quantum of representation depends upon the quantum of freedom, and therefore all, whether individual States, or individual men, who are equally free, have a right to equal representation.
That to those who insist that he who pays the greatest share of taxes, ought to have the greatest number of votes; it is a sufficient answer to say, that this rule would be destructive of the liberty of the others, and would render them slaves to the more rich and wealthy.
That if one man pays more taxes than another, it is because he has more wealth to be protected by government, and he receives greater benefits from the government.
So if one State pays more to the federal government, it is because as a State, she enjoys greater blessings from it; she has more wealth protected by it, or a greater number of inhabitants, whose rights are secured, and who share its advantages.
(To be continued.)
by Luther Martin
January 01, 1788
Mr. MARTIN’S Information to the House of Assembly, concluded ...
They were not satisfied by resting it on principles; they also appealed to history.
They shewed that in the amphyctionic confederation of the Grecian cities, each city however different in wealth, strength, and other circumstances, sent the same number of deputies, and had each an equal voice in every thing that related to the common concerns of Greece.
It was shewn that in the seven provinces of the United Netherlands, and the confederated Cantons of Switzerland, each Canton and each province have an equal vote, although there are as great distinctions of wealth, strength, population, and extent of territory among those provinces and those Cantons, as among these States.
It was said, that the maxim that taxation and representation ought to go together, was true so far, that no person ought to be taxed who is not represented, but not in the extent insisted upon, to wit, that the quantum of taxation and representation ought to be the same; on the contrary, the quantum of representation depends upon the quantum of freedom, and therefore all, whether individual States, or individual men, who are equally free, have a right to equal representation.
That to those who insist that he who pays the greatest share of taxes, ought to have the greatest number of votes; it is a sufficient answer to say, that this rule would be destructive of the liberty of the others, and would render them slaves to the more rich and wealthy.
That if one man pays more taxes than another, it is because he has more wealth to be protected by government, and he receives greater benefits from the government.
So if one State pays more to the federal government, it is because as a State, she enjoys greater blessings from it; she has more wealth protected by it, or a greater number of inhabitants, whose rights are secured, and who share its advantages.
(To be continued.)
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Advertisement for the Pamphlet Edition of The Federalist
January 02, 1788
To the People of America.
Amongst the numerous publications that have issued from the press, on the subject of Federal Government, none have attracted the public attention more than that intitled the FEDERALIST, under the signature of PUBLIUS: The justness of the reasoning, the force of the arguments, and the beauty of the language, which distinguish this performance, have justly recommended it to general applause.
To attain a competent knowledge of the advantages to be derived from adopting the proposed Federal Constitution, is no doubt the sincere wish of every true friend to his country: This performance being entirely free from party spirit and personal invective, is therefore well calculated to accomplish so desireable an end.
The avidity with which this writer’s pieces have been sought after by politicians and persons of every description, and the particular attention the different printers throughout the United States have shewn them by regular insertions in their papers, are conclusive proofs of the superior excellence of this elegant political production.
The manner in which the author treats and discusses the controverted parts of the Constitution, displays much information, patriotism and candour, and can hardly fail of meeting with a favourable reception from the opposers, as well as the advocates of the new system of Government.
Under this persuasion the Publishers flatter themselves with the countenance and support of the Citizens of America, to a publication evidently written to promote their Welfare, Happiness and prosperity.
In the Press and speedily will be published,
The FEDERALIST, A Collection of Essays, written in favour of the New Constitution,
By a Citizen of New-York, Corrected by the Author, with Additions and Alterations.
CONDITIONS.
This Work will be printed on a fine Paper and good Type, in one handsome Volume duodecimo.
The number of Pages the Volume will contain, cannot rightly be ascertained, as the Author has not yet done publishing, but the Printers engage to deliver them to Subscribers at the very reasonable Rate of Five Shillings for 200 Pages, Six Shillings if 250, and all above gratis.
(The Numbers already published will make more than 200 Pages, and the Author does not seem to be nigh a close.)
To render this Work more complete, will be added, without any additional expence, PHILO–PUBLIUS, and the ARTICLES of the CONVENTION, as agreed upon at Philadelphia, September 17th, 1787.
A few Copies will be printed on superfine Royal Writing Paper, Price Ten Shillings.
No Money required till Delivery.
SUBSCRIPTIONS are taken in by J. M’LEAN, and Co. No. 41, Hanover-Square, by the several Booksellers of the City, and by all others intrusted with Proposals.
New-York, January 1, 1788.
January 02, 1788
To the People of America.
Amongst the numerous publications that have issued from the press, on the subject of Federal Government, none have attracted the public attention more than that intitled the FEDERALIST, under the signature of PUBLIUS: The justness of the reasoning, the force of the arguments, and the beauty of the language, which distinguish this performance, have justly recommended it to general applause.
To attain a competent knowledge of the advantages to be derived from adopting the proposed Federal Constitution, is no doubt the sincere wish of every true friend to his country: This performance being entirely free from party spirit and personal invective, is therefore well calculated to accomplish so desireable an end.
The avidity with which this writer’s pieces have been sought after by politicians and persons of every description, and the particular attention the different printers throughout the United States have shewn them by regular insertions in their papers, are conclusive proofs of the superior excellence of this elegant political production.
The manner in which the author treats and discusses the controverted parts of the Constitution, displays much information, patriotism and candour, and can hardly fail of meeting with a favourable reception from the opposers, as well as the advocates of the new system of Government.
Under this persuasion the Publishers flatter themselves with the countenance and support of the Citizens of America, to a publication evidently written to promote their Welfare, Happiness and prosperity.
In the Press and speedily will be published,
The FEDERALIST, A Collection of Essays, written in favour of the New Constitution,
By a Citizen of New-York, Corrected by the Author, with Additions and Alterations.
CONDITIONS.
This Work will be printed on a fine Paper and good Type, in one handsome Volume duodecimo.
The number of Pages the Volume will contain, cannot rightly be ascertained, as the Author has not yet done publishing, but the Printers engage to deliver them to Subscribers at the very reasonable Rate of Five Shillings for 200 Pages, Six Shillings if 250, and all above gratis.
(The Numbers already published will make more than 200 Pages, and the Author does not seem to be nigh a close.)
To render this Work more complete, will be added, without any additional expence, PHILO–PUBLIUS, and the ARTICLES of the CONVENTION, as agreed upon at Philadelphia, September 17th, 1787.
A few Copies will be printed on superfine Royal Writing Paper, Price Ten Shillings.
No Money required till Delivery.
SUBSCRIPTIONS are taken in by J. M’LEAN, and Co. No. 41, Hanover-Square, by the several Booksellers of the City, and by all others intrusted with Proposals.
New-York, January 1, 1788.
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Cato VII
by Cato
January 03, 1788
To the Citizens of the State of New York,
That the senate and president are further improperly connected, will appear, if it is considered, that their dependence on each other will prevent either from being a check upon the other; they must act in concert, and whether the power and influence of the one or the other is to prevail, will depend on the character and abilities of the men who hold those offices at the time.
The senate is vested with such a proportion of the executive, that it would be found necessary that they should be constantly sitting.
This circumstance did not escape the convention, and they have provided for the event, in the 2d article, which declares, that the executive may, on extraordinary occasions, convene both houses or either of them.
No occasion can exist for calling the assembly without the senate; the words or either of them, must have been intended to apply only to the senate.
Their wages are already provided for; and it will be therefore readily observed, that the partition between a perpetuation of their sessions and a perpetuation of their offices, in the progress of the government, will be found to be but thin and feeble.
Besides, the senate, who have the sole power to try all impeachments, in case of the impeachment of the president, are to determine, as judges, the propriety of the advice they gave him, as senators.
Can the senate in this, therefore, be an impartial judicature?
And will they not rather serve as a screen to great public defaulters?
Among the many evils that are incorporated in this new system of government, is that of congress having the power of making or altering the regulations prescribed by the different legislatures, respecting the time, place, and manner of holding elections for representatives, and the time, and manner of choosing senators.
If it is enquired, in what manner this regulation may be exercised to your injury the answer is easy.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Cato
January 03, 1788
To the Citizens of the State of New York,
That the senate and president are further improperly connected, will appear, if it is considered, that their dependence on each other will prevent either from being a check upon the other; they must act in concert, and whether the power and influence of the one or the other is to prevail, will depend on the character and abilities of the men who hold those offices at the time.
The senate is vested with such a proportion of the executive, that it would be found necessary that they should be constantly sitting.
This circumstance did not escape the convention, and they have provided for the event, in the 2d article, which declares, that the executive may, on extraordinary occasions, convene both houses or either of them.
No occasion can exist for calling the assembly without the senate; the words or either of them, must have been intended to apply only to the senate.
Their wages are already provided for; and it will be therefore readily observed, that the partition between a perpetuation of their sessions and a perpetuation of their offices, in the progress of the government, will be found to be but thin and feeble.
Besides, the senate, who have the sole power to try all impeachments, in case of the impeachment of the president, are to determine, as judges, the propriety of the advice they gave him, as senators.
Can the senate in this, therefore, be an impartial judicature?
And will they not rather serve as a screen to great public defaulters?
Among the many evils that are incorporated in this new system of government, is that of congress having the power of making or altering the regulations prescribed by the different legislatures, respecting the time, place, and manner of holding elections for representatives, and the time, and manner of choosing senators.
If it is enquired, in what manner this regulation may be exercised to your injury the answer is easy.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Cato VII, continued ...
by Cato
January 03, 1788
By the first article the house of representatives shall consist of members, chosen every second year by the people of the several states, who are qualified to vote for members of their several state assemblies; it can therefore readily be believed, that the different state legislatures, provided such can exist after the adoption of this government, will continue those easy and convenient modes for the election of representatives for the national legislature, that are in use, for the election of members of assembly for their own states; but the congress have, by the constitution, a power to make other regulations, or alter those in practice, prescribed by your own state legislature; hence, instead of having the places of elections in the precincts, and brought home almost to your own doors, Congress may establish a place, or places, at either the extremes, center, or outer parts of the states; at a time and season too, when it may be very inconvenient to attend; and by these means destroy the rights of election; but in opposition to this reasoning, it is asserted, that it is a necessary power because the states might omit making rules for the purpose, and thereby defeat the existence of that branch of the government; this is what logicians call argumentum absurdum, for the different states, if they will have any security at all in this government, will find it in the house of representatives, and they, therefore, would not be very ready to eradicate a principle in which it dwells, or involve their country in an instantaneous revolution.
Besides, if this was the apprehension of the framers, and the ground of that provision, why did not they extend this controlling power to the other duties of the several state legislatures.
To exemplify this the states are to appoint senators and electors for choosing of a president; but the time is to be under the direction of congress.
Now, suppose they were to omit the appointment of senators and electors, though congress was to appoint the time, which might well be apprehended as the omission of regulations for the election of members of the house of representatives, provided they had that power; or suppose they were not to meet at all: of course, the government cannot proceed in its exercise.
And from this motive, or apprehension, congress ought to have taken these duties entirely in their own hands, and, by a decisive declaration, annihilated them, which they in fact have done by leaving them without the means of support, or at least resting on their bounty.
To this, the advocates for this system oppose the common, empty declamation, that there is no danger that congress will abuse this power, but such language, as relative to so important a subject, is mere vapour, and sound without sense.
Is it not in their power, however, to make such regulations as may be inconvenient to you?
It must be admitted because the words are unlimited in their sense.
It is a good rule, in the construction of a contract, to support, that what may be done will be; therefore, in considering this subject, you are to suppose, that in the exercise of this government, a regulation of congress will be made, for holding an election for the whole state at Poughkeepsie, at New York, or, perhaps, at Fort Stanwix: who will then be the actual electors for the house of representatives?
Very few more than those who may live in the vicinity of these places.
Could any others afford the expense and time of attending?
And would not the government by this means have it in their power to put whom they pleased in the house of representatives?
You ought certainly to have as much or more distrust with respect to the exercise of these powers by congress, than congress ought to have with respect to the exercise of those duties which ought to be entrusted to the several states, because over them congress can have a legislative controlling power.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Cato
January 03, 1788
By the first article the house of representatives shall consist of members, chosen every second year by the people of the several states, who are qualified to vote for members of their several state assemblies; it can therefore readily be believed, that the different state legislatures, provided such can exist after the adoption of this government, will continue those easy and convenient modes for the election of representatives for the national legislature, that are in use, for the election of members of assembly for their own states; but the congress have, by the constitution, a power to make other regulations, or alter those in practice, prescribed by your own state legislature; hence, instead of having the places of elections in the precincts, and brought home almost to your own doors, Congress may establish a place, or places, at either the extremes, center, or outer parts of the states; at a time and season too, when it may be very inconvenient to attend; and by these means destroy the rights of election; but in opposition to this reasoning, it is asserted, that it is a necessary power because the states might omit making rules for the purpose, and thereby defeat the existence of that branch of the government; this is what logicians call argumentum absurdum, for the different states, if they will have any security at all in this government, will find it in the house of representatives, and they, therefore, would not be very ready to eradicate a principle in which it dwells, or involve their country in an instantaneous revolution.
Besides, if this was the apprehension of the framers, and the ground of that provision, why did not they extend this controlling power to the other duties of the several state legislatures.
To exemplify this the states are to appoint senators and electors for choosing of a president; but the time is to be under the direction of congress.
Now, suppose they were to omit the appointment of senators and electors, though congress was to appoint the time, which might well be apprehended as the omission of regulations for the election of members of the house of representatives, provided they had that power; or suppose they were not to meet at all: of course, the government cannot proceed in its exercise.
And from this motive, or apprehension, congress ought to have taken these duties entirely in their own hands, and, by a decisive declaration, annihilated them, which they in fact have done by leaving them without the means of support, or at least resting on their bounty.
To this, the advocates for this system oppose the common, empty declamation, that there is no danger that congress will abuse this power, but such language, as relative to so important a subject, is mere vapour, and sound without sense.
Is it not in their power, however, to make such regulations as may be inconvenient to you?
It must be admitted because the words are unlimited in their sense.
It is a good rule, in the construction of a contract, to support, that what may be done will be; therefore, in considering this subject, you are to suppose, that in the exercise of this government, a regulation of congress will be made, for holding an election for the whole state at Poughkeepsie, at New York, or, perhaps, at Fort Stanwix: who will then be the actual electors for the house of representatives?
Very few more than those who may live in the vicinity of these places.
Could any others afford the expense and time of attending?
And would not the government by this means have it in their power to put whom they pleased in the house of representatives?
You ought certainly to have as much or more distrust with respect to the exercise of these powers by congress, than congress ought to have with respect to the exercise of those duties which ought to be entrusted to the several states, because over them congress can have a legislative controlling power.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Cato VII, concluded ...
by Cato
January 03, 1788
Hitherto we have tied up our rulers in the exercise of their duties by positive restrictions if the cord has been drawn too tight, loosen it to the necessary extent, but do not entirely unbind them.
I am no enemy to placing a reasonable confidence in them but such an unbounded one as the advocates and framers of this new system advise you to, would be dangerous to your liberties; it has been the ruin of other governments, and will be yours, if you adopt with all its latitudinal powers unlimited confidence in governors as well as individuals is frequently the parent of deception.
What facilitated the corrupt designs of Philip of Macedon, and caused the ruin of Athens, but the unbounded confidence in their statesmen and rulers?
Such improper confidence Demosthenes was so well convinced had ruined his country, that in his second Philippic oration he remarks “that there is one common bulwark with which men of prudence are naturally provided, the guard and security of all people, particularly of free states, against the assaults of tyrants."
"What is this?"
"Distrust."
"Of this be mindful; to this adhere; preserve this carefully, and no calamity can affect you.”
Montesquieu observes, that “the course of government is attended with an insensible descent to evil, and there is no reascending to good without very great efforts.”
The plain inference from this doctrine is, that rulers in all governments will erect an interest separate from the ruled, which will have a tendency to enslave them.
There is therefore no other way of interrupting this insensible descent and warding off the evil as long as possible, than by establishing principles of distrust in your constituents, and cultivating the sentiment among yourselves.
But let me enquire of you, my countrymen, whether the freedom and independence of elections is a point of magnitude?
If it is, what kind of a spirit of amity, deference and concession, is that which has put in the power of congress at one stroke to prevent your interference in government, and do away your liberties forever?
Does either the situation or circumstances of things warrant it?
CATO
by Cato
January 03, 1788
Hitherto we have tied up our rulers in the exercise of their duties by positive restrictions if the cord has been drawn too tight, loosen it to the necessary extent, but do not entirely unbind them.
I am no enemy to placing a reasonable confidence in them but such an unbounded one as the advocates and framers of this new system advise you to, would be dangerous to your liberties; it has been the ruin of other governments, and will be yours, if you adopt with all its latitudinal powers unlimited confidence in governors as well as individuals is frequently the parent of deception.
What facilitated the corrupt designs of Philip of Macedon, and caused the ruin of Athens, but the unbounded confidence in their statesmen and rulers?
Such improper confidence Demosthenes was so well convinced had ruined his country, that in his second Philippic oration he remarks “that there is one common bulwark with which men of prudence are naturally provided, the guard and security of all people, particularly of free states, against the assaults of tyrants."
"What is this?"
"Distrust."
"Of this be mindful; to this adhere; preserve this carefully, and no calamity can affect you.”
Montesquieu observes, that “the course of government is attended with an insensible descent to evil, and there is no reascending to good without very great efforts.”
The plain inference from this doctrine is, that rulers in all governments will erect an interest separate from the ruled, which will have a tendency to enslave them.
There is therefore no other way of interrupting this insensible descent and warding off the evil as long as possible, than by establishing principles of distrust in your constituents, and cultivating the sentiment among yourselves.
But let me enquire of you, my countrymen, whether the freedom and independence of elections is a point of magnitude?
If it is, what kind of a spirit of amity, deference and concession, is that which has put in the power of congress at one stroke to prevent your interference in government, and do away your liberties forever?
Does either the situation or circumstances of things warrant it?
CATO
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Brutus VII
by Brutus
January 03, 1788
The result of our reasoning in the two preceeding numbers is this, that in a confederated government, where the powers are divided between the general and the state government, it is essential to its existence, that the revenues of the country, without which no government can exist, should be divided between them, and so apportioned to each, as to answer their respective exigencies, as far as human wisdom can effect such a division and apportionment.
It has been shewn, that no such allotment is made in this constitution, but that every source of revenue is under the controul of the Congress; it therefore follows, that if this system is intended to be a complex and not a simple, a confederate and not an entire consolidated government, it contains in it the sure seeds of its own dissolution.
One of two things must happen.
Either the new constitution will become a mere nudum pactum, and all the authority of the rulers under it be cried down, as has happened to the present confederation.
Or the authority of the individual states will be totally supplanted, and they will retain the mere form without any of the powers of government.
To one or the other of these issues, I think, this new government, if it is adopted, will advance with great celerity.
It is said, I know, that such a separation of the sources of revenue, cannot be made without endangering the public safety — “unless (says a writer) it can be shewn that the circumstances which may affect the public safety are reducible within certain determinate limits; unless the contrary of this position can be fairly and rationally disputed; it must be admitted as a necessary consequence, that there can be no limitation of that authority which is to provide for the defence and protection of the community, &c.”
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Brutus
January 03, 1788
The result of our reasoning in the two preceeding numbers is this, that in a confederated government, where the powers are divided between the general and the state government, it is essential to its existence, that the revenues of the country, without which no government can exist, should be divided between them, and so apportioned to each, as to answer their respective exigencies, as far as human wisdom can effect such a division and apportionment.
It has been shewn, that no such allotment is made in this constitution, but that every source of revenue is under the controul of the Congress; it therefore follows, that if this system is intended to be a complex and not a simple, a confederate and not an entire consolidated government, it contains in it the sure seeds of its own dissolution.
One of two things must happen.
Either the new constitution will become a mere nudum pactum, and all the authority of the rulers under it be cried down, as has happened to the present confederation.
Or the authority of the individual states will be totally supplanted, and they will retain the mere form without any of the powers of government.
To one or the other of these issues, I think, this new government, if it is adopted, will advance with great celerity.
It is said, I know, that such a separation of the sources of revenue, cannot be made without endangering the public safety — “unless (says a writer) it can be shewn that the circumstances which may affect the public safety are reducible within certain determinate limits; unless the contrary of this position can be fairly and rationally disputed; it must be admitted as a necessary consequence, that there can be no limitation of that authority which is to provide for the defence and protection of the community, &c.”
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Brutus VII, continued ...
by Brutus
January 03, 1788
The pretended demonstration of this writer will instantly vanish, when it is considered, that the protection and defence of the community is not intended to be entrusted solely into the hands of the general government, and by his own confession it ought not to be.
It is true this system commits to the general government the protection and defence of the community against foreign force and invasion, against piracies and felonies on the high seas, and against insurrections among ourselves.
They are also authorised to provide for the administration of justice in certain matters of a general concern, and in some that I think are not so.
But it ought to be left to the state governments to provide for the protection and defence of the citizen against the hand of private violence, and the wrongs done or attempted by individuals to each other.
Protection and defence against the murderer, the robber, the thief, the cheat, and the unjust person, is to be derived from the respective state governments.
The just way of reasoning therefore on this subject is this, the general government is to provide for the protection and defence of the community against foreign attacks, &c., they therefore ought to have authority sufficient to effect this, so far as is consistent with the providing for our internal protection and defence.
The state governments are entrusted with the care of administring justice among its citizens, and the management of other internal concerns, they ought therefore to retain power adequate to the end.
The preservation of internal peace and good order, and the due administration of law and justice, ought to be the first care of every government.
The happiness of a people depends infinitely more on this than it does upon all that glory and respect which nations acquire by the most brilliant martial achievements — and I believe history will furnish but few examples of nations who have duly attended to these, who have been subdued by foreign invaders.
If a proper respect and submission to the laws prevailed over all orders of men in our country; and if a spirit of public and private justice, economy and industry influenced the people, we need not be under any apprehensions but what they would be ready to repel any invasion that might be made on the country.
And more than this, I would not wish from them.
A defensive war is the only one I think justifiable.
I do not make these observations to prove, that a government ought not to be authorised to provide for the protection and defence of a country against external enemies, but to shew that this is not the most important, much less the only object of their care.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Brutus
January 03, 1788
The pretended demonstration of this writer will instantly vanish, when it is considered, that the protection and defence of the community is not intended to be entrusted solely into the hands of the general government, and by his own confession it ought not to be.
It is true this system commits to the general government the protection and defence of the community against foreign force and invasion, against piracies and felonies on the high seas, and against insurrections among ourselves.
They are also authorised to provide for the administration of justice in certain matters of a general concern, and in some that I think are not so.
But it ought to be left to the state governments to provide for the protection and defence of the citizen against the hand of private violence, and the wrongs done or attempted by individuals to each other.
Protection and defence against the murderer, the robber, the thief, the cheat, and the unjust person, is to be derived from the respective state governments.
The just way of reasoning therefore on this subject is this, the general government is to provide for the protection and defence of the community against foreign attacks, &c., they therefore ought to have authority sufficient to effect this, so far as is consistent with the providing for our internal protection and defence.
The state governments are entrusted with the care of administring justice among its citizens, and the management of other internal concerns, they ought therefore to retain power adequate to the end.
The preservation of internal peace and good order, and the due administration of law and justice, ought to be the first care of every government.
The happiness of a people depends infinitely more on this than it does upon all that glory and respect which nations acquire by the most brilliant martial achievements — and I believe history will furnish but few examples of nations who have duly attended to these, who have been subdued by foreign invaders.
If a proper respect and submission to the laws prevailed over all orders of men in our country; and if a spirit of public and private justice, economy and industry influenced the people, we need not be under any apprehensions but what they would be ready to repel any invasion that might be made on the country.
And more than this, I would not wish from them.
A defensive war is the only one I think justifiable.
I do not make these observations to prove, that a government ought not to be authorised to provide for the protection and defence of a country against external enemies, but to shew that this is not the most important, much less the only object of their care.
TO BE CONTINUED ...