Federal Farmer X, continued ...
by Richard Henry Lee
January 07, 1788
To excuse the smallness of the representation, it is said the new congress will be more numerous than the old one.
This is not true; and for the facts I refer you to my letter of the 4th instant, to the plan and confederation; besides there is no kind of similitude between the two plans.
The confederation is a mere league of the states, and congress is formed with the particular checks, and possess the united powers, enumerated in my letter of the 25th ult.
The new plan is totally a different thing: a national government to many purposes administered, by men chosen for two, four, and six years, not recallable, and among whom there will be no rotation; operating immediately in all money and military matters, &c. on the persons and property of the citizens.
I think, therefore, that no part of the confederation ought to be adduced for supporting or injuring the new constitution.
It is also said that the constitution gives no more power to congress than the confederation, respecting money and military matters; that congress, under the confederation, may require men and monies to any amount, and the states are bound to comply.
This is generally true; but, I think, I shall in a subsequent letter satisfactorily prove, that the states have well founded checks for securing their liberties.
I admit the force of the observation, that all the federal powers, by the confederation, are lodged in a single assembly; however, I think much more may be said in defence of the leading principles of the confederation.
I do not object to the qualifications of the electors of representatives, and I fully agree that the people ought to elect one branch.
Further, it may be observed, that the present congress is principally an executive body, which ought not to be numerous; that the house of representatives will be a mere legislative branch, and being the democratic one, ought to be numerous.
It is one of the greatest advantages of a government of different branches, that each branch may be conveniently made conformable to the nature of the business assigned it, and all be made conformable to the condition of the several orders of the people.
After all the possible checks and limitations we can devise, the powers of the union must be very extensive; the sovereignty of the nation cannot produce the object in view, the defence and tranquility of the whole, without such powers, executive and judicial.
I dislike the present congress a single, assembly, because it is impossible to fit it to receive those powers: the executive and judicial powers, in the nature of things, ought to be lodged in a few hands, the legislature in many hands; therefore, want of safety, and unavoidable hasty measures, out of the question, they never can all be lodged in one assembly properly — it, in its very formation, must imply a contradiction.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Federal Farmer X, continued ...
by Richard Henry Lee
January 07, 1788
In objection to increasing the representation, it has also been observed, that it is difficult to assemble a hundred men or more without making them tumultuous and a mere mob; reason and experience do not support this observation.
The most respectable assemblies we have any knowledge of and the wisest, have been those, each of which consisted of several hundred members; as the senate of Rome, of Carthage, of Venice, the British Parliament, &c. &c.
I think I may without hazarding much, affirm, that our more numerous state assemblies and conventions have universally discovered more wisdom, and as much order, as the less numerous ones.
There must be also a very great difference between the characters of two or three hundred men assembled from a single state, and the characters of the number or half the number assembled from all the united states.
It is added, that on the proposed plan the house of representatives in fifty or a hundred years, will consist of several hundred members.
The plan will begin with sixty-five, and we have no certainty that the number ever will be encreased, for this plain reason — that all that combination of interests and influence which has produced this plan, and supported so far, will constantly oppose the increase of the representation, knowing that thereby the government will become more free and democratic.
But admitting, after a few years, there will be a member for each 30,000 inhabitants, the observation is trifling, the government is in a considerable measure to take its tone from its early movements, and by means of a small representation it may in half of 50 or 100 years, get moved from its basis, or at least so far as to be incapable of ever being recovered.
We ought, therefore, on every principle now to fix the government on proper principles, and fit to our present condition — when the representation shall become too numerous, alter it; or we may now make provision, that when the representation shall be increased to a given number, that then there shall be one for each given number of inhabitants, &c.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Richard Henry Lee
January 07, 1788
In objection to increasing the representation, it has also been observed, that it is difficult to assemble a hundred men or more without making them tumultuous and a mere mob; reason and experience do not support this observation.
The most respectable assemblies we have any knowledge of and the wisest, have been those, each of which consisted of several hundred members; as the senate of Rome, of Carthage, of Venice, the British Parliament, &c. &c.
I think I may without hazarding much, affirm, that our more numerous state assemblies and conventions have universally discovered more wisdom, and as much order, as the less numerous ones.
There must be also a very great difference between the characters of two or three hundred men assembled from a single state, and the characters of the number or half the number assembled from all the united states.
It is added, that on the proposed plan the house of representatives in fifty or a hundred years, will consist of several hundred members.
The plan will begin with sixty-five, and we have no certainty that the number ever will be encreased, for this plain reason — that all that combination of interests and influence which has produced this plan, and supported so far, will constantly oppose the increase of the representation, knowing that thereby the government will become more free and democratic.
But admitting, after a few years, there will be a member for each 30,000 inhabitants, the observation is trifling, the government is in a considerable measure to take its tone from its early movements, and by means of a small representation it may in half of 50 or 100 years, get moved from its basis, or at least so far as to be incapable of ever being recovered.
We ought, therefore, on every principle now to fix the government on proper principles, and fit to our present condition — when the representation shall become too numerous, alter it; or we may now make provision, that when the representation shall be increased to a given number, that then there shall be one for each given number of inhabitants, &c.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Federal Farmer X, continued ...
by Richard Henry Lee
January 07, 1788
Another observation is, that congress will have no temptations to do wrong — the men that make it must be very uninformed, or suppose they are talking to children.
In the first place, the members will be governed by all those motives which govern the conduct of men, and have before them all the allurements of offices and temptations, to establish unequal burdens, before described.
In the second place, they and their friends, probably, will find it for their interests to keep up large armies, navies, salaries, &c. and in laying adequate taxes.
In the third place, we have no good grounds to presume, from reason or experience, that it will be agreeable to their characters or views, that the body of the people should continue to have power effectually to interfere in the affairs of government.
But it is confidently added, that congress will not have it in their power to oppress or enslave the people, that the people will not bear it.
It is not supposed that congress will act the tyrant immediately, and in the face of day light.
It is not supposed congress will adopt important measures, without plausible pretences, especially those which may tend to alarm or produce opposition.
We are to consider the natural progress of things: that men unfriendly to republican equality will go systematically to work, gradually to exclude the body of the people from any share in the government, first of the substance, and then of the forms.
The men who will have these views will not be without their agents and supporters.
When we reflect, that a few years ago we established democratic republics, and fixed the state governments as the barriers between congress and the pockets of the people; what great progress has been made in less than seven years to break down those barriers, and essentially to change the principles of our governments, even by the armless few: is it chimerical to suppose that in fifteen or twenty years to come, that much more can be performed, especially after the adoption of the constitution, when the few will be so much better armed with power and influence, to continue the struggle?
Pprobably, they will be wise enough never to alarm, but gradually prepare the minds of the people for one specious change after another, till the final object shall be obtained.
Say the advocates, these are only possibilities — they are probabilities, a wise people ought to guard against; and the address made use of to keep the evils out of sight, and the means to prevent them, confirm my opinion.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Richard Henry Lee
January 07, 1788
Another observation is, that congress will have no temptations to do wrong — the men that make it must be very uninformed, or suppose they are talking to children.
In the first place, the members will be governed by all those motives which govern the conduct of men, and have before them all the allurements of offices and temptations, to establish unequal burdens, before described.
In the second place, they and their friends, probably, will find it for their interests to keep up large armies, navies, salaries, &c. and in laying adequate taxes.
In the third place, we have no good grounds to presume, from reason or experience, that it will be agreeable to their characters or views, that the body of the people should continue to have power effectually to interfere in the affairs of government.
But it is confidently added, that congress will not have it in their power to oppress or enslave the people, that the people will not bear it.
It is not supposed that congress will act the tyrant immediately, and in the face of day light.
It is not supposed congress will adopt important measures, without plausible pretences, especially those which may tend to alarm or produce opposition.
We are to consider the natural progress of things: that men unfriendly to republican equality will go systematically to work, gradually to exclude the body of the people from any share in the government, first of the substance, and then of the forms.
The men who will have these views will not be without their agents and supporters.
When we reflect, that a few years ago we established democratic republics, and fixed the state governments as the barriers between congress and the pockets of the people; what great progress has been made in less than seven years to break down those barriers, and essentially to change the principles of our governments, even by the armless few: is it chimerical to suppose that in fifteen or twenty years to come, that much more can be performed, especially after the adoption of the constitution, when the few will be so much better armed with power and influence, to continue the struggle?
Pprobably, they will be wise enough never to alarm, but gradually prepare the minds of the people for one specious change after another, till the final object shall be obtained.
Say the advocates, these are only possibilities — they are probabilities, a wise people ought to guard against; and the address made use of to keep the evils out of sight, and the means to prevent them, confirm my opinion.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Federal Farmer X, concluded ...
by Richard Henry Lee
January 07, 1788
But to obviate all objections to the proposed plan in the last resort: it is said our people will be free, so long as they possess the habits of freemen, and when they lose them, they must receive some other forms of government.
To this I shall only observe, that this is very humiliating language, and can, I trust, never suit a manly people, who have contended nobly for liberty, and declared to the world they will be free.
I have dwelt much longer than I expected upon the increasing the representation, the democratic interest in the federal system; but I hope the importance of the subject will justify my dwelling upon it.
I have pursued it in a manner new, and I have found it necessary to be somewhat prolix, to illustrate the point I had in view.
My idea has ever been, when the democratic branch is weak and small, the body of the people have no defence, and every thing to fear; if they expect to find genuine political friends in kings and nobles, in great and powerful men, they deceive themselves.
On the other hand, fix a genuine democratic branch in the government, solely to hold the purse, and with the power of impeachment, and to propose and negative laws, cautiously limit the king and nobles, or the executive and the senate, as the case may be, and the people, I conceive, have but little to fear, and their liberties will be always secure.
I think we are now arrived to a new aera in the affairs of men, when the true principles of government will be more fully unfolded than heretofore, and a new world, as it were, grow up in America.
In contemplating representation, the next thing is the security of elections.
Before I proceed to this, I beg leave to observe, that the pay of the representatives of the people is essentially connected with their interests.
Congress may put the pay of the members unreasonably high, or so low as that none but the rich and opulent can attend; there are very strong reasons for supposing the latter, probably, will be the case, and a part of the same policy, which uniformly and constantly exerts itself to transfer power from the many to the few.
Should the pay be well fixed, and made alterable by congress, with the consent of a majority of the state legislatures, perhaps, all the evils to be feared on this head might, in the best practicable manner, be guarded against, and proper security introduced.
It is said the state legislatures fix their own pay — the answer is, that congress is not, nor can it ever be well formed on those equal principles the state legislatures are.
I shall not dwell on this point, but conclude this letter with one general observation, that the checks I contend for in the system proposed, do not, in the least, any of them tend to lessen the energy of it; but giving grounds for the confidence of the people, greatly to increase its real energy, by insuring their constant and hearty support.
by Richard Henry Lee
January 07, 1788
But to obviate all objections to the proposed plan in the last resort: it is said our people will be free, so long as they possess the habits of freemen, and when they lose them, they must receive some other forms of government.
To this I shall only observe, that this is very humiliating language, and can, I trust, never suit a manly people, who have contended nobly for liberty, and declared to the world they will be free.
I have dwelt much longer than I expected upon the increasing the representation, the democratic interest in the federal system; but I hope the importance of the subject will justify my dwelling upon it.
I have pursued it in a manner new, and I have found it necessary to be somewhat prolix, to illustrate the point I had in view.
My idea has ever been, when the democratic branch is weak and small, the body of the people have no defence, and every thing to fear; if they expect to find genuine political friends in kings and nobles, in great and powerful men, they deceive themselves.
On the other hand, fix a genuine democratic branch in the government, solely to hold the purse, and with the power of impeachment, and to propose and negative laws, cautiously limit the king and nobles, or the executive and the senate, as the case may be, and the people, I conceive, have but little to fear, and their liberties will be always secure.
I think we are now arrived to a new aera in the affairs of men, when the true principles of government will be more fully unfolded than heretofore, and a new world, as it were, grow up in America.
In contemplating representation, the next thing is the security of elections.
Before I proceed to this, I beg leave to observe, that the pay of the representatives of the people is essentially connected with their interests.
Congress may put the pay of the members unreasonably high, or so low as that none but the rich and opulent can attend; there are very strong reasons for supposing the latter, probably, will be the case, and a part of the same policy, which uniformly and constantly exerts itself to transfer power from the many to the few.
Should the pay be well fixed, and made alterable by congress, with the consent of a majority of the state legislatures, perhaps, all the evils to be feared on this head might, in the best practicable manner, be guarded against, and proper security introduced.
It is said the state legislatures fix their own pay — the answer is, that congress is not, nor can it ever be well formed on those equal principles the state legislatures are.
I shall not dwell on this point, but conclude this letter with one general observation, that the checks I contend for in the system proposed, do not, in the least, any of them tend to lessen the energy of it; but giving grounds for the confidence of the people, greatly to increase its real energy, by insuring their constant and hearty support.
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Speeches in the Connecticut Convention
by James Wadsworth & Oliver Ellsworth
January 07, 1788
The paragraph which respects taxes, imposts and excises, was largely debated, by several Gentlemen.
Gen. Wadsworth objected against it, because it gave the power of the purse to the general Legislature; another paragraph gave the power of the sword; and that authority, which has the power of the sword and purse, is despotic.
He objected against imposts and excises, because their operation would be partial and in favour of the southern States.
Some other objections were likewise made against this Paragraph.
In answer to them Mr. Ellsworth expressed himself nearly to the following effect.
Mr. President, This is a most important clause in the constitution; and the Gentlemen do well to offer all the objections which they have against it.
Through the whole of this debate, I have attended to the objections which have been made against this clause; and I think them all to be unfounded.
The clause is general; it gives the general Legislature “power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States.”
There are three objections against this clause.
First, that it is too extensive, it extends to all the objects of taxation; secondly, that it is partial; thirdly, that Congress ought not to have power to lay taxes at all.
The first objection is that this clause extends to all the objects of taxation.
But, though it does extend to all, it does not extend to them exclusively.
It does not say that Congress shall have all these sources of revenue, and the States none.
All, excepting the impost, still lie open to the States.
This State owes a debt, it must provide for the payment of it.
So do all the other States.
This will not escape the attention of Congress.
When making calculations to raise a revenue, they will bear this in mind.
They will not take away that which is necessary for the States.
They are the head, and will take care that the members do not perish.
The State debt, which now lies heavy upon us arose, from the want of powers in the federal system.
Give the necessary powers to the national government, and the State will not be again necessitated to involve itself in debt for its defence in war.
It will lie upon the national government to defend all the States, to defend all its members, from hostile attacks.
The United States will bear the whole burden of war.
It is necessary, that the power of the general Legislature should extend to all the objects of taxation, that Government should be able to command all the resources of the country; because no man can tell what our exigencies may be.
Wars have now become rather war of the purse, than of the sword.
Government must therefore be able to command the whole power of the purse; otherwise a hostile nation may look into our constitution, see what resources are in the power of Government, and calculate to go a little beyond us; then they may obtain a decided superiority over us, and reduce us to the utmost distress.
A government, which can command but half its resources, is like a man with but one arm to defend himself.
The second objection is that the impost is not a proper mode of taxation; that it is partial to the southern States.
I confess I am mortified, when I find gentlemen supposing that their delegates in convention were inattentive to their duty, and made a sacrifice of the interests of their constituents.
If however the impost be a partial mode, this circumstance, high as my opinion of it is, would stagger my belief in it; for I abhor partiality.
But I think there are three special reasons, why an impost is the best way of raising a national revenue.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by James Wadsworth & Oliver Ellsworth
January 07, 1788
The paragraph which respects taxes, imposts and excises, was largely debated, by several Gentlemen.
Gen. Wadsworth objected against it, because it gave the power of the purse to the general Legislature; another paragraph gave the power of the sword; and that authority, which has the power of the sword and purse, is despotic.
He objected against imposts and excises, because their operation would be partial and in favour of the southern States.
Some other objections were likewise made against this Paragraph.
In answer to them Mr. Ellsworth expressed himself nearly to the following effect.
Mr. President, This is a most important clause in the constitution; and the Gentlemen do well to offer all the objections which they have against it.
Through the whole of this debate, I have attended to the objections which have been made against this clause; and I think them all to be unfounded.
The clause is general; it gives the general Legislature “power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States.”
There are three objections against this clause.
First, that it is too extensive, it extends to all the objects of taxation; secondly, that it is partial; thirdly, that Congress ought not to have power to lay taxes at all.
The first objection is that this clause extends to all the objects of taxation.
But, though it does extend to all, it does not extend to them exclusively.
It does not say that Congress shall have all these sources of revenue, and the States none.
All, excepting the impost, still lie open to the States.
This State owes a debt, it must provide for the payment of it.
So do all the other States.
This will not escape the attention of Congress.
When making calculations to raise a revenue, they will bear this in mind.
They will not take away that which is necessary for the States.
They are the head, and will take care that the members do not perish.
The State debt, which now lies heavy upon us arose, from the want of powers in the federal system.
Give the necessary powers to the national government, and the State will not be again necessitated to involve itself in debt for its defence in war.
It will lie upon the national government to defend all the States, to defend all its members, from hostile attacks.
The United States will bear the whole burden of war.
It is necessary, that the power of the general Legislature should extend to all the objects of taxation, that Government should be able to command all the resources of the country; because no man can tell what our exigencies may be.
Wars have now become rather war of the purse, than of the sword.
Government must therefore be able to command the whole power of the purse; otherwise a hostile nation may look into our constitution, see what resources are in the power of Government, and calculate to go a little beyond us; then they may obtain a decided superiority over us, and reduce us to the utmost distress.
A government, which can command but half its resources, is like a man with but one arm to defend himself.
The second objection is that the impost is not a proper mode of taxation; that it is partial to the southern States.
I confess I am mortified, when I find gentlemen supposing that their delegates in convention were inattentive to their duty, and made a sacrifice of the interests of their constituents.
If however the impost be a partial mode, this circumstance, high as my opinion of it is, would stagger my belief in it; for I abhor partiality.
But I think there are three special reasons, why an impost is the best way of raising a national revenue.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Speeches in the Connecticut Convention
by James Wadsworth & Oliver Ellsworth
January 07, 1788
Mr. Ellsworth, continued ...
The first is, it is the most fruitful and easy way.
All nations have found it to be so.
Direct taxation can go but little way towards raising a revenue.
To raise money in this way, people must be provident; they must be constantly laying up money to answer the demands of the collector.
But you cannot make people thus provident; if you would do any thing to purpose, you must come in when they are spending, and take a part with them.
This does not take away the tools of a man’s business, or the necessary utensils of his family: It only comes in, when he is taking his pleasure, and feels generous, when he is laying out a shilling for superfluities, it takes two—pence of it for public use, and the remainder will do him as much good as the whole.
I will instance two facts, which shew how easily and insensibly a revenue is raised by indirect taxation.
I suppose people in general are not sensible, that we pay a tax to the State of New—York.
Yet it is an uncontrovertible fact, that we the people of Connecticut pay annually into the Treasury of New—York more than fifty Thousand Dollars.
Another instance I will mention: One of our common river sloops pays in the West—Indies a Portage Bill of £.60.
This is a tax which foreigners lay upon us and we pay it.
For a duty laid upon our shipping which transports our produce to foreign markets, sinks the price of our produce, and operates as an effectual tax upon those who till the ground, and bring the fruits of it to market.
All nations have seen the necessity and propriety of raising a revenue by indirect taxation, by duties upon articles of consumption.
France raises a revenue of 24 Millions Sterling per annum, and it is chiefly in this way.
50 Millions of Livres they raise upon the single article of Salt.
The Swiss cantons raise almost the whole of their revenue upon Salt.
Those States purchase all the Salt which is to be used in the country; they sell it out to the people at an advanced price; the advance is the revenue of the country.
In England the whole public revenue is about 12 Millions Sterling per annum.
The land tax amounts to about 2 Millions, the window and some other taxes to about two millions more.
The other 8 Millions is raised upon articles of consumption.
The whole standing army of Great—Britain could not enforce the collection of this vast sum by direct taxation.
In Holland their prodigious taxes amounting to forty shillings for each inhabitant, are levied chiefly upon articles of consumption.
They excise every thing, not excepting even their houses of infamy.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by James Wadsworth & Oliver Ellsworth
January 07, 1788
Mr. Ellsworth, continued ...
The first is, it is the most fruitful and easy way.
All nations have found it to be so.
Direct taxation can go but little way towards raising a revenue.
To raise money in this way, people must be provident; they must be constantly laying up money to answer the demands of the collector.
But you cannot make people thus provident; if you would do any thing to purpose, you must come in when they are spending, and take a part with them.
This does not take away the tools of a man’s business, or the necessary utensils of his family: It only comes in, when he is taking his pleasure, and feels generous, when he is laying out a shilling for superfluities, it takes two—pence of it for public use, and the remainder will do him as much good as the whole.
I will instance two facts, which shew how easily and insensibly a revenue is raised by indirect taxation.
I suppose people in general are not sensible, that we pay a tax to the State of New—York.
Yet it is an uncontrovertible fact, that we the people of Connecticut pay annually into the Treasury of New—York more than fifty Thousand Dollars.
Another instance I will mention: One of our common river sloops pays in the West—Indies a Portage Bill of £.60.
This is a tax which foreigners lay upon us and we pay it.
For a duty laid upon our shipping which transports our produce to foreign markets, sinks the price of our produce, and operates as an effectual tax upon those who till the ground, and bring the fruits of it to market.
All nations have seen the necessity and propriety of raising a revenue by indirect taxation, by duties upon articles of consumption.
France raises a revenue of 24 Millions Sterling per annum, and it is chiefly in this way.
50 Millions of Livres they raise upon the single article of Salt.
The Swiss cantons raise almost the whole of their revenue upon Salt.
Those States purchase all the Salt which is to be used in the country; they sell it out to the people at an advanced price; the advance is the revenue of the country.
In England the whole public revenue is about 12 Millions Sterling per annum.
The land tax amounts to about 2 Millions, the window and some other taxes to about two millions more.
The other 8 Millions is raised upon articles of consumption.
The whole standing army of Great—Britain could not enforce the collection of this vast sum by direct taxation.
In Holland their prodigious taxes amounting to forty shillings for each inhabitant, are levied chiefly upon articles of consumption.
They excise every thing, not excepting even their houses of infamy.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Speeches in the Connecticut Convention
by James Wadsworth & Oliver Ellsworth
January 07, 1788
Mr. Ellsworth, continued ...
The experiments, which have been made in our own country, shew the productive nature of indirect taxes.
The imports into the United States amount to a very large sum.
They never will be less, but will continue to increase for ages and centuries to come.
As the population of our country increases, the imposts will necessarily increase.
They will increase, because our citizens will choose to be farmers living independently on their free holds, rather than to be manufacturers, and work for a groat a day.
I find by calculation, that a general impost of 5 per cent would raise the sum of £.245,000 per annum, deducting 8 per cent for the charges of collecting.
A further sum might be deducted for smuggling, a business which is understood too well among us, and which is looked upon in too favourable a light.
But this loss in the public revenue will be over balanced by the increase of importations.
And a further sum may be reckoned upon some articles, which will bear a higher duty than the one recommended by Congress.
Rum, instead of 4d. per Gallon, may be set higher, without any detriment to our health or morals.
In England it pays a duty of 4s.6d. the Gallon.
Now let us compare this source of revenue with our national wants.
The interest of the Foreign debt is £.130,000 Lawful Money per annum.
The expense of the civil list is £.37,000.
There are likewise further expenses, for maintaining the Frontier posts, for the support of those who have been disabled in the service of the Continent, and some other contingencies, amounting together with the civil list to £.130,000.
This sum added to the interest of the foreign debt will be £.260,000.
The consequence follows, that the avails of the impost will pay the interest of the whole foreign debt, and nearly satisfy these current national expenses.
But perhaps it will be said, that these paper calculations are overdone, and that the real avails will fall far short.
Let me point out then what has actually been done.
In only three of the States, in Massachusetts, New—York, and Pennsylvania, £.160 or 180,000 per annum have been raised by impost.
From this fact we may certainly conclude, that, if a general impost should be laid, it would raise a greater sum than I have calculated.
It is a strong argument in favor of an impost, that the collection of it will interfere less with the internal police of the States, than any other species of taxation.
It does not fill the country with revenue officers, but is confined to the sea coast, and is chiefly a water operation.
Another weighty reason in favour of this branch of revenue is, if we do not give it to Congress, the individual States will have it.
It will give some States an opportunity of oppressing others, and destroy all harmony between them.
If we would have the States friendly to each other, let us take away this bone of contention, and place it, as it ought in justice to be placed, in the hands of the general government.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by James Wadsworth & Oliver Ellsworth
January 07, 1788
Mr. Ellsworth, continued ...
The experiments, which have been made in our own country, shew the productive nature of indirect taxes.
The imports into the United States amount to a very large sum.
They never will be less, but will continue to increase for ages and centuries to come.
As the population of our country increases, the imposts will necessarily increase.
They will increase, because our citizens will choose to be farmers living independently on their free holds, rather than to be manufacturers, and work for a groat a day.
I find by calculation, that a general impost of 5 per cent would raise the sum of £.245,000 per annum, deducting 8 per cent for the charges of collecting.
A further sum might be deducted for smuggling, a business which is understood too well among us, and which is looked upon in too favourable a light.
But this loss in the public revenue will be over balanced by the increase of importations.
And a further sum may be reckoned upon some articles, which will bear a higher duty than the one recommended by Congress.
Rum, instead of 4d. per Gallon, may be set higher, without any detriment to our health or morals.
In England it pays a duty of 4s.6d. the Gallon.
Now let us compare this source of revenue with our national wants.
The interest of the Foreign debt is £.130,000 Lawful Money per annum.
The expense of the civil list is £.37,000.
There are likewise further expenses, for maintaining the Frontier posts, for the support of those who have been disabled in the service of the Continent, and some other contingencies, amounting together with the civil list to £.130,000.
This sum added to the interest of the foreign debt will be £.260,000.
The consequence follows, that the avails of the impost will pay the interest of the whole foreign debt, and nearly satisfy these current national expenses.
But perhaps it will be said, that these paper calculations are overdone, and that the real avails will fall far short.
Let me point out then what has actually been done.
In only three of the States, in Massachusetts, New—York, and Pennsylvania, £.160 or 180,000 per annum have been raised by impost.
From this fact we may certainly conclude, that, if a general impost should be laid, it would raise a greater sum than I have calculated.
It is a strong argument in favor of an impost, that the collection of it will interfere less with the internal police of the States, than any other species of taxation.
It does not fill the country with revenue officers, but is confined to the sea coast, and is chiefly a water operation.
Another weighty reason in favour of this branch of revenue is, if we do not give it to Congress, the individual States will have it.
It will give some States an opportunity of oppressing others, and destroy all harmony between them.
If we would have the States friendly to each other, let us take away this bone of contention, and place it, as it ought in justice to be placed, in the hands of the general government.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Speeches in the Connecticut Convention
by James Wadsworth & Oliver Ellsworth
January 07, 1788
Mr. Ellsworth, continued ...
But says an honourable Gentleman near me, the impost will be a partial tax; the southern States will pay but little in comparison with the Northern.
I ask, what reason is there for this assertion?
Why says he, we live in a cold climate, and want warming.
Do not they live in a hot climate, and want quenching?
Until you get as far south as the Carolinas, there is no material difference in the quantity of cloathing which is worn.
In Virginia they have the same course of cloathing, that we have.
In Carolina, they have a great deal of cold, raw, chilly weather: even in Georgia, the river Savannah has been crossed upon the ice.
And if they do not wear quite so great a quantity of cloathing in those States as with us; yet people of rank wear that which is of a much more expensive kind.
In these States, we manufacture one half of our cloathing and all our tools of Husbandry; in those, they manufacture none, nor ever will.
They will not manufacture, because they find it much more profitable to cultivate their lands which are exceedingly fertile.
Hence they import almost every thing, not excepting the carriages in which they ride, the hoes with which they till the ground, and the Boots which they wear.
If we doubt of the extent of their importations, let us look at their exports.
So exceedingly fertile and profitable are their Lands, that a hundred large ships are every year loaded with rice and indigo from the single port of Charlestown.
The rich returns of these cargoes of immense value will be all subject to the impost.
Nothing is omitted, a duty is to be paid upon the blacks which they import.
From Virginia their exports are valued at a million sterling per annum; the single article of tobacco amounts to seven or eight hundred thousand.
How does this come back?
Not in money, for the Virginians are poor to a proverb in money.
They anticipate their crops; they spend faster than they earn; they are ever in debt.
Their rich exports return in eatables, in drinkables, in wearables.
All these are subject to the impost.
In Maryland their exports are as great in proportion as those in Virginia.
The imports and exports of the southern States are quite as great in proportion as those of the northern.
Where then exists this partiality, which has been objected?
It exists no where but in the uninformed mind.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by James Wadsworth & Oliver Ellsworth
January 07, 1788
Mr. Ellsworth, continued ...
But says an honourable Gentleman near me, the impost will be a partial tax; the southern States will pay but little in comparison with the Northern.
I ask, what reason is there for this assertion?
Why says he, we live in a cold climate, and want warming.
Do not they live in a hot climate, and want quenching?
Until you get as far south as the Carolinas, there is no material difference in the quantity of cloathing which is worn.
In Virginia they have the same course of cloathing, that we have.
In Carolina, they have a great deal of cold, raw, chilly weather: even in Georgia, the river Savannah has been crossed upon the ice.
And if they do not wear quite so great a quantity of cloathing in those States as with us; yet people of rank wear that which is of a much more expensive kind.
In these States, we manufacture one half of our cloathing and all our tools of Husbandry; in those, they manufacture none, nor ever will.
They will not manufacture, because they find it much more profitable to cultivate their lands which are exceedingly fertile.
Hence they import almost every thing, not excepting the carriages in which they ride, the hoes with which they till the ground, and the Boots which they wear.
If we doubt of the extent of their importations, let us look at their exports.
So exceedingly fertile and profitable are their Lands, that a hundred large ships are every year loaded with rice and indigo from the single port of Charlestown.
The rich returns of these cargoes of immense value will be all subject to the impost.
Nothing is omitted, a duty is to be paid upon the blacks which they import.
From Virginia their exports are valued at a million sterling per annum; the single article of tobacco amounts to seven or eight hundred thousand.
How does this come back?
Not in money, for the Virginians are poor to a proverb in money.
They anticipate their crops; they spend faster than they earn; they are ever in debt.
Their rich exports return in eatables, in drinkables, in wearables.
All these are subject to the impost.
In Maryland their exports are as great in proportion as those in Virginia.
The imports and exports of the southern States are quite as great in proportion as those of the northern.
Where then exists this partiality, which has been objected?
It exists no where but in the uninformed mind.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Speeches in the Connecticut Convention
by James Wadsworth & Oliver Ellsworth
January 07, 1788
Mr. Ellsworth, continued ...
But there is one objection, Mr. President, which is broad enough to cover the whole subject.
Says the objector, Congress ought not to have power to raise any money at all.
Why?
Because they have the power of the sword, and if we give them the power of the purse, they are despotic.
But I ask, Sir, was there ever a government without the power of the sword and the purse?
This is not a new coined phraise; but it is misapplied; it belongs to quite another subject.
It was brought into use in Great—Britain, where they have a king vested with hereditary power.
Here, say they, it is dangerous to place the power of the sword and the purse in the hands of one man, who claims an authority independent of the people.
Therefore we will have a parliament.
But the king and parliament together, the supreme power of the nation, they have the sword and the purse.
And they must have both, else how could the country be defended?
For the sword without the purse is of no effect, it is a sword in the scabbard.
But does it follow, because it is dangerous to give the power of the sword and the purse to a hereditary prince, who is independent of the people, that therefore, it is dangerous to give it to the parliament, to congress which is your parliament, to men appointed by yourselves, and dependent upon yourselves?
This argument amounts to this, you must cut a man in two in the middle, to prevent his hurting himself.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by James Wadsworth & Oliver Ellsworth
January 07, 1788
Mr. Ellsworth, continued ...
But there is one objection, Mr. President, which is broad enough to cover the whole subject.
Says the objector, Congress ought not to have power to raise any money at all.
Why?
Because they have the power of the sword, and if we give them the power of the purse, they are despotic.
But I ask, Sir, was there ever a government without the power of the sword and the purse?
This is not a new coined phraise; but it is misapplied; it belongs to quite another subject.
It was brought into use in Great—Britain, where they have a king vested with hereditary power.
Here, say they, it is dangerous to place the power of the sword and the purse in the hands of one man, who claims an authority independent of the people.
Therefore we will have a parliament.
But the king and parliament together, the supreme power of the nation, they have the sword and the purse.
And they must have both, else how could the country be defended?
For the sword without the purse is of no effect, it is a sword in the scabbard.
But does it follow, because it is dangerous to give the power of the sword and the purse to a hereditary prince, who is independent of the people, that therefore, it is dangerous to give it to the parliament, to congress which is your parliament, to men appointed by yourselves, and dependent upon yourselves?
This argument amounts to this, you must cut a man in two in the middle, to prevent his hurting himself.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Speeches in the Connecticut Convention
by James Wadsworth & Oliver Ellsworth
January 07, 1788
Mr. Ellsworth, continued ...
But says the Honourable objector, if Congress levy money, they must legislate.
I admit it.
Two Legislative powers, says he, cannot exist together in the same place.
I ask, why can they not?
It is not enough to say they cannot.
I wish for some reason.
I grant that both cannot legislate upon the same object, at the same time, and carry into effect Laws which are contrary to each other.
But the constitution excludes every thing of this kind.
Each Legislature has its province; their limits may be distinguished.
If they will run foul of each other, if they will be trying who has the hardest head, it cannot be helped.
The road is broad enough, but if two men will justle each other, the fault is not in the road.
Two several Legislatures have in fact existed, and acted at the same time in the same territory.
It is in vain to say, they cannot exist, when they actually have done it.
In the time of the war we had an army.
Who made the laws for the army?
By whose authority were offenders tried and executed?
Congress was the power.
By their authority, a man was taken, tried, condemned and hanged, in this very town.
He belonged to the army; he was a proper subject of military law; he deserted to the enemy; he deserved his fate.
Wherever the army was, in whatever state, there congress had complete legislative, judicial and executive power.
This very spot where we now are, is a city.
It has complete legislative, judicial and executive powers.
It is a complete state in miniature.
Yet it breeds no confusion, it makes no scism.
The city has not eat up the state, nor the state the city.
But if this is a new city, if it has not had time to unfold its principles, I will instance the city of New—York, which is and long has been an important part of that state, it has been found beneficial, its powers and privileges have not clashed with the state.
The city of London contains three or four times as many inhabitants as the whole state of Connecticut.
It has extensive powers of government, and yet it makes no interference with the general government of the kingdom.
This constitution defines the extent of the powers of the general government.
If the general legislature should at any time overleap their limits, the judicial department is a constitutional check.
If the United States go beyond their powers, if they make a law which the constitution does not authorise, it is void; and the judicial power, the national judges, who to secure their impartiality are to be made independent, will declare it to be void.
On the other hand, if the states go beyond their limits, if they make a law which is an usurpation upon the general government, the law is void, and upright independent judges will declare it to be so.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by James Wadsworth & Oliver Ellsworth
January 07, 1788
Mr. Ellsworth, continued ...
But says the Honourable objector, if Congress levy money, they must legislate.
I admit it.
Two Legislative powers, says he, cannot exist together in the same place.
I ask, why can they not?
It is not enough to say they cannot.
I wish for some reason.
I grant that both cannot legislate upon the same object, at the same time, and carry into effect Laws which are contrary to each other.
But the constitution excludes every thing of this kind.
Each Legislature has its province; their limits may be distinguished.
If they will run foul of each other, if they will be trying who has the hardest head, it cannot be helped.
The road is broad enough, but if two men will justle each other, the fault is not in the road.
Two several Legislatures have in fact existed, and acted at the same time in the same territory.
It is in vain to say, they cannot exist, when they actually have done it.
In the time of the war we had an army.
Who made the laws for the army?
By whose authority were offenders tried and executed?
Congress was the power.
By their authority, a man was taken, tried, condemned and hanged, in this very town.
He belonged to the army; he was a proper subject of military law; he deserted to the enemy; he deserved his fate.
Wherever the army was, in whatever state, there congress had complete legislative, judicial and executive power.
This very spot where we now are, is a city.
It has complete legislative, judicial and executive powers.
It is a complete state in miniature.
Yet it breeds no confusion, it makes no scism.
The city has not eat up the state, nor the state the city.
But if this is a new city, if it has not had time to unfold its principles, I will instance the city of New—York, which is and long has been an important part of that state, it has been found beneficial, its powers and privileges have not clashed with the state.
The city of London contains three or four times as many inhabitants as the whole state of Connecticut.
It has extensive powers of government, and yet it makes no interference with the general government of the kingdom.
This constitution defines the extent of the powers of the general government.
If the general legislature should at any time overleap their limits, the judicial department is a constitutional check.
If the United States go beyond their powers, if they make a law which the constitution does not authorise, it is void; and the judicial power, the national judges, who to secure their impartiality are to be made independent, will declare it to be void.
On the other hand, if the states go beyond their limits, if they make a law which is an usurpation upon the general government, the law is void, and upright independent judges will declare it to be so.
TO BE CONTINUED ...