A Federal Republican: A Review of the Constitution, continued ...
November 28, 1787
The power of internal taxation given to Congress in the foregoing clause, is a very unjust and improper one.
It has been hinted in some publication, that impost will defray all our national expences.
This is a proposition perfectly absurd.
Will not the support of a standing army, a navy, &c. be a prodigious addition to national expence?
To say that this government will not be an additional expence to the country, is an assertion to which common sense would never assent.
Let it be remembered, that this constitution, if adopted, will create a vast number of expensive offices.
Most of them will be of the national character, and must be supported with a superior degree of dignity and credit; without regarding the enormous expence which Congress may incur if they please.
The many places that will and must be created and paid for, will add much to the burden of our debts.
In the legislative, executive, and particularly the judiciary department, there will be a multiplicity of officers hitherto unknown, and the salaries annexed to them must be very considerable.
Besides, if the states are to retain even a shadow of sovreignty, the expence thence arising must also be defrayed.
This combination will cause a greater demand than can easily be answered.
The gentleman who remarks upon the address of the sixteen members, answers this objection with uncommon sagacity.
“The first objection is, (says he) that the government proposed will be too expensive.”
"I answer that, if the appointment of offices are not more, and the compensation or emoluments of office not greater than is necessary, the expence will be by no means burdensome, and this must be left to the prudence of Congress: for I know no way to control supreme power from extingenciesm in this respect.”
What does all this amount to, but an oblique confession, that Congress may, if they please, load us with many needless expences?
TO BE CONTINUED ...
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
A Federal Republican: A Review of the Constitution, continued ...
November 28, 1787
The taxation of the particular states for their own support will be over-ruled by Congress, or else it will be obliged to embrace a measure perhaps the most odious in the world, viz. excessive taxation.
This would be widely different from the opinion of the ablest politicians.
I am persuaded that if this constitution were to be adopted, Congress would be reduced to this alternative, either to oppress the people in the manner just hinted, or commit upon them a violent injury by depriving them of their rights.
Congress will be the judges of what is necessary for the general welfare of the United States, and this will open the door to any extravagant expence which they shall be pleased to incur.
For this reason their power should have been accurately defined.
Baron Montesquieu (B. 13, C. I) observes that “the real wants of the people ought never to give way to the imaginary wants of the state."
"Imaginary wants are those which flow from passion, and from the weakness of the governors, from the charms of an extraordinary project, from a distempered desire of vain glory, and from a certain impotency of mind that renders it incapable of with-standing the attacks of fancy."
"Often times has it happened, that ministers of restless dispositions have imagined that the wants of the state were those of their own little and ignoble souls.”
That this may happen here, we have a right, and indeed ought to suppose.
Any man who carefully attends to the constitution quoted above, must judge that the powers granted by it, are too indifinite.
Indeed as it stands there expressed, it includes every other power afterwards mentioned.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
November 28, 1787
The taxation of the particular states for their own support will be over-ruled by Congress, or else it will be obliged to embrace a measure perhaps the most odious in the world, viz. excessive taxation.
This would be widely different from the opinion of the ablest politicians.
I am persuaded that if this constitution were to be adopted, Congress would be reduced to this alternative, either to oppress the people in the manner just hinted, or commit upon them a violent injury by depriving them of their rights.
Congress will be the judges of what is necessary for the general welfare of the United States, and this will open the door to any extravagant expence which they shall be pleased to incur.
For this reason their power should have been accurately defined.
Baron Montesquieu (B. 13, C. I) observes that “the real wants of the people ought never to give way to the imaginary wants of the state."
"Imaginary wants are those which flow from passion, and from the weakness of the governors, from the charms of an extraordinary project, from a distempered desire of vain glory, and from a certain impotency of mind that renders it incapable of with-standing the attacks of fancy."
"Often times has it happened, that ministers of restless dispositions have imagined that the wants of the state were those of their own little and ignoble souls.”
That this may happen here, we have a right, and indeed ought to suppose.
Any man who carefully attends to the constitution quoted above, must judge that the powers granted by it, are too indifinite.
Indeed as it stands there expressed, it includes every other power afterwards mentioned.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
A Federal Republican: A Review of the Constitution, continued ...
November 28, 1787
We come now to speak of a standing army.
By this constitution, the Congress have power to “declare war,” as also to “raise and support armies; but no appropriation of money for that purpose shall be for a longer term than two years.”
We are to suppose that Congress is a representation of the people of the United States at large; if so, the nexus imperii even of the English constitution is lost.
There the king has only the power of declaring war, and the house of parliament, that of raising money for the support of it.
So that it seems to be wrong to give Congress this combined power independent of a check from a majority of the state legislatures.
“No appropriation of money for this purpose shall be for a longer term than two years.”
This is not very moderate.
The space of time is only as long again as that permitted in England, for the same purpose.
But a standing army in time of peace is strongly to be objected to.
It always hath been and always will be the grand machine made use of to subvert the liberties of free states.
Pisistratus and Caesar are not forgotten.
It ought to be laid down as a principle that free states should never keep a standing army for the support of its laws.
“They ought (as Brutus says) to depend for their support upon the citizens."
"And when a government is to receive its support from the aid of the citizens, it ought to be so constructed as to have the confidence, respect and affection of the people."
"Men who upon the call of the magistrate, offer themselves to execute the laws, are influenced to do it from affection for the government or from fear; when a standing army is at hand to punish offenders, every man is actuated by the latter principle, and therefore, when the magistrate calls, will obey.”
Fear however is a contracting principle of obedience.
“But when this is not the case, the government must rest for its support upon the confidence and respect which the people have for their government and laws.”
If therefore the government of the United States be just and equal, and the states are to retain their seperate powers, a standing army is useless and dangerous.
It will inevitably sow the seeds of corruption and depravity of manners.
Indolence will increase, and with it crimes cannot but increase.
The springs of honesty will gradually grow lax and chaste, and severe manners be succeeded by those that are dissolute and vicious.
Where a standing army is kept up, virtue never thrives.
In this particular experience will abundantly testify what the nature of the thing would suggest.
Whatever the refinement of modern politics may inculcate, it still is certain that some degree of virtue must exist, or freedom cannot live.
Unless Mandervill’s position be embraced, “that private vices are public benefits:” a standing army will work the destruction of these states.
Virtue and simplicity of manners in an extensive country by their innate energy and vigour, create a healthy constitution, and command prosperity to accompany it; but vice like a sickly air, debilitates the nerves of the political body, and withers all its bloom.
A standing army will increase vice, and that a disunion of interest and affections.
It is this that weakens the force, and destroys the harmony of free states.
These evils in process of time will be derived from a standing army, and when we shall have outlived our virtue, every effort to recover it, will be vain and abortive.
The propriety and advantage of a standing army can be but poorly vindicated.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
November 28, 1787
We come now to speak of a standing army.
By this constitution, the Congress have power to “declare war,” as also to “raise and support armies; but no appropriation of money for that purpose shall be for a longer term than two years.”
We are to suppose that Congress is a representation of the people of the United States at large; if so, the nexus imperii even of the English constitution is lost.
There the king has only the power of declaring war, and the house of parliament, that of raising money for the support of it.
So that it seems to be wrong to give Congress this combined power independent of a check from a majority of the state legislatures.
“No appropriation of money for this purpose shall be for a longer term than two years.”
This is not very moderate.
The space of time is only as long again as that permitted in England, for the same purpose.
But a standing army in time of peace is strongly to be objected to.
It always hath been and always will be the grand machine made use of to subvert the liberties of free states.
Pisistratus and Caesar are not forgotten.
It ought to be laid down as a principle that free states should never keep a standing army for the support of its laws.
“They ought (as Brutus says) to depend for their support upon the citizens."
"And when a government is to receive its support from the aid of the citizens, it ought to be so constructed as to have the confidence, respect and affection of the people."
"Men who upon the call of the magistrate, offer themselves to execute the laws, are influenced to do it from affection for the government or from fear; when a standing army is at hand to punish offenders, every man is actuated by the latter principle, and therefore, when the magistrate calls, will obey.”
Fear however is a contracting principle of obedience.
“But when this is not the case, the government must rest for its support upon the confidence and respect which the people have for their government and laws.”
If therefore the government of the United States be just and equal, and the states are to retain their seperate powers, a standing army is useless and dangerous.
It will inevitably sow the seeds of corruption and depravity of manners.
Indolence will increase, and with it crimes cannot but increase.
The springs of honesty will gradually grow lax and chaste, and severe manners be succeeded by those that are dissolute and vicious.
Where a standing army is kept up, virtue never thrives.
In this particular experience will abundantly testify what the nature of the thing would suggest.
Whatever the refinement of modern politics may inculcate, it still is certain that some degree of virtue must exist, or freedom cannot live.
Unless Mandervill’s position be embraced, “that private vices are public benefits:” a standing army will work the destruction of these states.
Virtue and simplicity of manners in an extensive country by their innate energy and vigour, create a healthy constitution, and command prosperity to accompany it; but vice like a sickly air, debilitates the nerves of the political body, and withers all its bloom.
A standing army will increase vice, and that a disunion of interest and affections.
It is this that weakens the force, and destroys the harmony of free states.
These evils in process of time will be derived from a standing army, and when we shall have outlived our virtue, every effort to recover it, will be vain and abortive.
The propriety and advantage of a standing army can be but poorly vindicated.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
A Federal Republican: A Review of the Constitution, continued ...
November 28, 1787
My fellow citizens, beware of such pretences, and while this tyrannical monster of depravity exists in the plan, do not adopt it, unless you are willing to entail upon your children the miseries of vice, and leave to posterity the corrupted relics of a shattered government.
The next thing which we proceed to, is the importation of slaves, contained in the ninth section of the first article.
It says, that “the migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by Congress prior to the year 1808, but a tax or duty may be imposed upon such importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each person.”
“The truth is, (says a citizen of America) Congress cannot prohibit the importation of slaves during that period; but the laws against the importation of them into any particular state stand unrepealed."
"An immediate abolition of slavery would be ruin upon the whites and misery upon the blacks in the southern states."
"The constitution therefore hath wisely left each state to pursue its own measures with respect to this article of legislation during the period of twenty-one years.”
That the importation of slaves shall not be forbidden till that time may be very wise - but what hath that to do with the abolition of slavery?
To prohibit the importation of slaves is not to abolish slavery.
For all that is contained in this constitution, this country may remain degraded by this impious custom till the end of time.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
November 28, 1787
My fellow citizens, beware of such pretences, and while this tyrannical monster of depravity exists in the plan, do not adopt it, unless you are willing to entail upon your children the miseries of vice, and leave to posterity the corrupted relics of a shattered government.
The next thing which we proceed to, is the importation of slaves, contained in the ninth section of the first article.
It says, that “the migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by Congress prior to the year 1808, but a tax or duty may be imposed upon such importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each person.”
“The truth is, (says a citizen of America) Congress cannot prohibit the importation of slaves during that period; but the laws against the importation of them into any particular state stand unrepealed."
"An immediate abolition of slavery would be ruin upon the whites and misery upon the blacks in the southern states."
"The constitution therefore hath wisely left each state to pursue its own measures with respect to this article of legislation during the period of twenty-one years.”
That the importation of slaves shall not be forbidden till that time may be very wise - but what hath that to do with the abolition of slavery?
To prohibit the importation of slaves is not to abolish slavery.
For all that is contained in this constitution, this country may remain degraded by this impious custom till the end of time.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
A Federal Republican: A Review of the Constitution, continued ...
November 28, 1787
The next thing that strikes our attention in a review of the constitution is the disposition of the judicial powers.
The first section of the third article says; that “the judicial powers of the United States shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as Congress shall from time to time establish."
"The judges both of the supreme and inferior courts shall hold their offices during good behaviour, and shall at stated times receive for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.”
This is certainly too indifinitely comprehensive.
What inferior courts Congress shall be pleased to establish, is not known, nor can be imagined.
Montesquieu is of opinion, that where the judicial power is not kept perfectly distinct from the legislative and executive, liberty is endangered.
The Centinel quotes a clause from Blackstone, much to the purpose, which says, “that if the power of judging were entirely trusted with the magistrates, or any select body of men, named by executive authority, there decisions in spite of their own natural integrity would have a bias towards those of their own rank and dignity; for it is not to be expected, that the few will be attentive to the rights of the many."
"This therefore preserves in the hands of the people, that power which they ought to have in the administration of justice, and prevents the encroachments of the most powerful and wealthy citizens.”
If this be true, what may not the judiciary come to under this constitution?
It may gradually grow corrupted, till the very power of judging become the readiest tool in the work of tyranny.
Drowsy justice may e’er long sit nodding on her rotten bench, and a collective despot smile upon the harpies of ravenous ambition.
Such a despot must indeed have many friends, whose injustice in their way to glory, would readily be connived at.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
November 28, 1787
The next thing that strikes our attention in a review of the constitution is the disposition of the judicial powers.
The first section of the third article says; that “the judicial powers of the United States shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as Congress shall from time to time establish."
"The judges both of the supreme and inferior courts shall hold their offices during good behaviour, and shall at stated times receive for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.”
This is certainly too indifinitely comprehensive.
What inferior courts Congress shall be pleased to establish, is not known, nor can be imagined.
Montesquieu is of opinion, that where the judicial power is not kept perfectly distinct from the legislative and executive, liberty is endangered.
The Centinel quotes a clause from Blackstone, much to the purpose, which says, “that if the power of judging were entirely trusted with the magistrates, or any select body of men, named by executive authority, there decisions in spite of their own natural integrity would have a bias towards those of their own rank and dignity; for it is not to be expected, that the few will be attentive to the rights of the many."
"This therefore preserves in the hands of the people, that power which they ought to have in the administration of justice, and prevents the encroachments of the most powerful and wealthy citizens.”
If this be true, what may not the judiciary come to under this constitution?
It may gradually grow corrupted, till the very power of judging become the readiest tool in the work of tyranny.
Drowsy justice may e’er long sit nodding on her rotten bench, and a collective despot smile upon the harpies of ravenous ambition.
Such a despot must indeed have many friends, whose injustice in their way to glory, would readily be connived at.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
A Federal Republican: A Review of the Constitution, continued ...
November 28, 1787
It is worth our while to enquire how far the proposed constitution will tend to reduce the dignity and importance of the states.
The several states are by this constitution, to have a republican government guaranteed to them; but where is the use of such a position, when the powers granted to Congress must inevitably make it void?
That the republican form here decreed to each state will indeed be only form, human nature as well as experience will evince.
Let us attend to the three first articles in the constitution of Poland.
1. “The crown of Poland shall be forever elective, and all order of succession provided; any person who shall endeavour to break this law, shall be declared an enemy to his country, and liable to be punished accordingly."
2. "Foreign candidates to the throne, being the frequent cause of troubles and divisions shall be excluded; and it shall be enacted, that for the future, no person can be chosen king of Poland, and great duke of Lithuania, excepting a native Pole, of noble origin, and possessing land within the kingdom."
"A son or grandson of a king of Poland, cannot be elected immediately after the death of their father or grandfather; and are not eligible excepting after an interval of two reigns."
3. "The government of Poland shall be forever free, independent, and of a republican form.”
What frenzy to talk of freedom and independence after the two first articles.
The height and extent of this freedom and independence, experience has shown and will show.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
November 28, 1787
It is worth our while to enquire how far the proposed constitution will tend to reduce the dignity and importance of the states.
The several states are by this constitution, to have a republican government guaranteed to them; but where is the use of such a position, when the powers granted to Congress must inevitably make it void?
That the republican form here decreed to each state will indeed be only form, human nature as well as experience will evince.
Let us attend to the three first articles in the constitution of Poland.
1. “The crown of Poland shall be forever elective, and all order of succession provided; any person who shall endeavour to break this law, shall be declared an enemy to his country, and liable to be punished accordingly."
2. "Foreign candidates to the throne, being the frequent cause of troubles and divisions shall be excluded; and it shall be enacted, that for the future, no person can be chosen king of Poland, and great duke of Lithuania, excepting a native Pole, of noble origin, and possessing land within the kingdom."
"A son or grandson of a king of Poland, cannot be elected immediately after the death of their father or grandfather; and are not eligible excepting after an interval of two reigns."
3. "The government of Poland shall be forever free, independent, and of a republican form.”
What frenzy to talk of freedom and independence after the two first articles.
The height and extent of this freedom and independence, experience has shown and will show.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
A Federal Republican: A Review of the Constitution, continued ...
November 28, 1787
After a candid examination into the disposition of the legislative, executive and judicial authority of the United States, it will appear that the several states will have very little or no seperate internal policy, but will be all pressed into one compact system of government, of which they will only be parts.
The want of responsibility to the people among the representatives in this constitution, would furnish matter for ample discussion, but we pass over it in silence, only observing that it is a grand and indeed a daring fault, and one that sanctions with security the most tyrannic edicts of a despotic voice.
Here, my fellow citizens, is a wide avenue to corruption, of which time will evince the danger.
Which circumstance taking place, every species of venality must spread through the land with rapid progress.
The contagion will not be confined to the higher classes; it will extend its baneful influence over all ranks and degrees of men.
Thenceforward the security of property will be unhinged, and our most valuable rights will be held upon a precarious tenure.
The judges of our property are named by the supreme, and his favour will be confined on those persons who lend their support perhaps to tyrannical measures.
Hence the contagion of venality will pervade the seats of justice.
It will be kept alive by gainful prospects; and every occasion of solicitation in favour of a son or a brother, or any relation or friend, will be a fresh incitement to preserve the venal system in strength and vigor.
It will not escape notice, that the determination of our property in the last resort, will, by the power decreed to the supreme, by this constitution, be lodged with persons, whom, if corrupted, no dependence on the people will oblige to be just.
The ministers of justice of all others should not be beyond the reach of the people.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
November 28, 1787
After a candid examination into the disposition of the legislative, executive and judicial authority of the United States, it will appear that the several states will have very little or no seperate internal policy, but will be all pressed into one compact system of government, of which they will only be parts.
The want of responsibility to the people among the representatives in this constitution, would furnish matter for ample discussion, but we pass over it in silence, only observing that it is a grand and indeed a daring fault, and one that sanctions with security the most tyrannic edicts of a despotic voice.
Here, my fellow citizens, is a wide avenue to corruption, of which time will evince the danger.
Which circumstance taking place, every species of venality must spread through the land with rapid progress.
The contagion will not be confined to the higher classes; it will extend its baneful influence over all ranks and degrees of men.
Thenceforward the security of property will be unhinged, and our most valuable rights will be held upon a precarious tenure.
The judges of our property are named by the supreme, and his favour will be confined on those persons who lend their support perhaps to tyrannical measures.
Hence the contagion of venality will pervade the seats of justice.
It will be kept alive by gainful prospects; and every occasion of solicitation in favour of a son or a brother, or any relation or friend, will be a fresh incitement to preserve the venal system in strength and vigor.
It will not escape notice, that the determination of our property in the last resort, will, by the power decreed to the supreme, by this constitution, be lodged with persons, whom, if corrupted, no dependence on the people will oblige to be just.
The ministers of justice of all others should not be beyond the reach of the people.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
A Federal Republican: A Review of the Constitution, continued ...
November 28, 1787
The same thing is true of political as of other machines.
The utility of them does not increase with the complication of their parts.
But provided the effect be the same, the more simple the better.
The organization of this is evidently so complex that it will require much strength to put it in motion: and great care must be taken in the use of it, that the smaller parts be not broken to pieces.
But I fear that no care can prevent the extinction of independence among the several states.
The judicial power proposed to be granted by this constitution, goes far to produce this effect.
The powers of the supreme courts and of such inferior courts, as Congress shall be pleased to ordain, are exceedingly comprehensive.
It comprises all civil cases, except those which arise between citizens of the same state.
That the judicial power of each state will sink into nothing, will easily be seen.
Suppose, for instance that Congress be pleased to ordain or establish one of these inferior federal courts in each state.
The consequence will be that the others will be nullified.
The courts are to be under the sanction of the United States of America, not of a particular state.
They must be supported with dignity, and their judges and other necessary officers will have their salaries stated by Congress which will be paid out of the treasury of the United States.
In this situation, we can easily foresee that in the common and unavoidable course of things, the courts established by subordinate power supported with less splendor and dignity, will at length dwindle into nothing.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
November 28, 1787
The same thing is true of political as of other machines.
The utility of them does not increase with the complication of their parts.
But provided the effect be the same, the more simple the better.
The organization of this is evidently so complex that it will require much strength to put it in motion: and great care must be taken in the use of it, that the smaller parts be not broken to pieces.
But I fear that no care can prevent the extinction of independence among the several states.
The judicial power proposed to be granted by this constitution, goes far to produce this effect.
The powers of the supreme courts and of such inferior courts, as Congress shall be pleased to ordain, are exceedingly comprehensive.
It comprises all civil cases, except those which arise between citizens of the same state.
That the judicial power of each state will sink into nothing, will easily be seen.
Suppose, for instance that Congress be pleased to ordain or establish one of these inferior federal courts in each state.
The consequence will be that the others will be nullified.
The courts are to be under the sanction of the United States of America, not of a particular state.
They must be supported with dignity, and their judges and other necessary officers will have their salaries stated by Congress which will be paid out of the treasury of the United States.
In this situation, we can easily foresee that in the common and unavoidable course of things, the courts established by subordinate power supported with less splendor and dignity, will at length dwindle into nothing.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
A Federal Republican: A Review of the Constitution, continued ...
November 28, 1787
Another circumstance should be attended to: The States will be exceedingly strained to support them.
Most of the ways and means as they are called are entirely shut out from the State governments.
The tenth section of the first article says, “No state shall, without the consent of Congress lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, &c. &c. the net produce of all such imposts and duties laid by any state on imports or exports, shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States, and all such laws shall be subjected to the revision and controul of Congress.”
What then is to be the mode of raising money for defraying the expences of the state?
It is reducing them to the necessity of laying direct taxes, which is egregiously abusive.
Most of the states are already groaning under their taxes.
Here the very idea of state is entirely done away.
But on the other hand, the government of the United States has an enormous power of raising money in every way as well as that of contracting debts at pleasure.
To give them the power of laying taxes, duties, imposts and excise, by way of providing for the welfare of the United States, and then constitute them judges of what is necessary for these purposes, is giving them power to satisfy at the expence of the states, any whim which ambition or the love of ostentation might suggest to them.
But yet every law thus made will be binding: for they have an additional power expressly granted them, “to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all the powers vested by this constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or office thereof.”
TO BE CONTINUED ...
November 28, 1787
Another circumstance should be attended to: The States will be exceedingly strained to support them.
Most of the ways and means as they are called are entirely shut out from the State governments.
The tenth section of the first article says, “No state shall, without the consent of Congress lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, &c. &c. the net produce of all such imposts and duties laid by any state on imports or exports, shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States, and all such laws shall be subjected to the revision and controul of Congress.”
What then is to be the mode of raising money for defraying the expences of the state?
It is reducing them to the necessity of laying direct taxes, which is egregiously abusive.
Most of the states are already groaning under their taxes.
Here the very idea of state is entirely done away.
But on the other hand, the government of the United States has an enormous power of raising money in every way as well as that of contracting debts at pleasure.
To give them the power of laying taxes, duties, imposts and excise, by way of providing for the welfare of the United States, and then constitute them judges of what is necessary for these purposes, is giving them power to satisfy at the expence of the states, any whim which ambition or the love of ostentation might suggest to them.
But yet every law thus made will be binding: for they have an additional power expressly granted them, “to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all the powers vested by this constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or office thereof.”
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
A Federal Republican: A Review of the Constitution, continued ...
November 28, 1787
This may from the mode of expression be construed into a tyrannical grant to enforce tyranny itself.
Have the states in this predicament any kind of consequence or power, or are they not rather reduced to inactive parts of the same grand empire?
But the very last clause but one in the constitution proves clearly that the whole country is to be comprised into one large system of lordly government.
A tight system indeed.
They say that “this constitution and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every state shall be bound by them or any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.”
Here is at once created a fruitful source of contention and error.
What end will there be to the confusion that will arise from the many laws or ordinances of Congress with respect to revenue, viz. taxes, duties, imposts, &c. when those of the seperate states are to be controlled by them?
But what judges are to be bound by them in all cases whatever, notwithstanding any laws to the contrary, that may have been promulgated by any particular state?
The judges not only of those inferior federal courts which Congress may from time to time establish in any or all the states; but also the judges of the courts immediately dependent on the states themselves.
They are to be over-ruled by the laws of Congress in “every state,” and the laws of every state must be prejudiced in their favor.
Can any state, or the citizens of any state think themselves secure when they are conscious that their own laws will not avail them in competition with those of Congress?
Suppose Congress in making its provision for the general welfare of the United States, and framing those laws which shall be deemed necessary and proper for carrying into execution all their powers, should, in the complex body of them, oppose the general system of state policy, what must be the consequence?
It must be laid prostrate in the dust, and yield to the ordinances of Congress, and that according to their own mode of construing them.
If this does not open the door to violent oppression, it at least pours upon us a load of inconveniencies.
I know it is said that all the powers of Congress must be exercised for the general welfare, and have for their object general concerns only.
But what are these general concerns?
May they not without difficulty be construed to the prejudice of particular concerns?
TO BE CONTINUED ...
November 28, 1787
This may from the mode of expression be construed into a tyrannical grant to enforce tyranny itself.
Have the states in this predicament any kind of consequence or power, or are they not rather reduced to inactive parts of the same grand empire?
But the very last clause but one in the constitution proves clearly that the whole country is to be comprised into one large system of lordly government.
A tight system indeed.
They say that “this constitution and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every state shall be bound by them or any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.”
Here is at once created a fruitful source of contention and error.
What end will there be to the confusion that will arise from the many laws or ordinances of Congress with respect to revenue, viz. taxes, duties, imposts, &c. when those of the seperate states are to be controlled by them?
But what judges are to be bound by them in all cases whatever, notwithstanding any laws to the contrary, that may have been promulgated by any particular state?
The judges not only of those inferior federal courts which Congress may from time to time establish in any or all the states; but also the judges of the courts immediately dependent on the states themselves.
They are to be over-ruled by the laws of Congress in “every state,” and the laws of every state must be prejudiced in their favor.
Can any state, or the citizens of any state think themselves secure when they are conscious that their own laws will not avail them in competition with those of Congress?
Suppose Congress in making its provision for the general welfare of the United States, and framing those laws which shall be deemed necessary and proper for carrying into execution all their powers, should, in the complex body of them, oppose the general system of state policy, what must be the consequence?
It must be laid prostrate in the dust, and yield to the ordinances of Congress, and that according to their own mode of construing them.
If this does not open the door to violent oppression, it at least pours upon us a load of inconveniencies.
I know it is said that all the powers of Congress must be exercised for the general welfare, and have for their object general concerns only.
But what are these general concerns?
May they not without difficulty be construed to the prejudice of particular concerns?
TO BE CONTINUED ...