CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MANUAL

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Re: CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MANUAL

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Congressional Oversight Manual, continued ...

Updated January 16, 2020

Congressional Research Service

Types and Categories

Currently, 74 statutory IGs exist in the federal government. 303

Of these IGs, 65 are governed by the IG Act, and the remaining nine are governed by individual statutes outside the IG Act.

Statutory IGs may be grouped into four different types: (1) establishment IGs, (2) DFE IGs, (3) other permanent IGs, and (4) special IGs.

IGs were grouped into these four types based on criteria that are commonly used to distinguish between IGs, including authorizing statute, appointment method, affiliated federal entity and the branch of government in which it is located, oversight jurisdiction, and oversight duration. 304

Each type is described in more detail below.

 Establishment IGs.

IGs for federal establishments lead permanent offices that operate under the IG Act for the 15 Cabinet departments and Cabinet-level agencies, as well as larger agencies in the executive branch.

Each establishment IG is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate and removable by the President (or through the impeachment process in Congress).

The IG cannot be removed by the affiliated agency head.

Each establishment IG typically oversees the programs and operations of his or her affiliated agency. 305

 DFE IGs.

IGs for DFEs lead permanent offices that operate under the IG Act for smaller boards, commissions, foundations, and government-funded enterprises in the executive branch, as well as certain defense intelligence agencies.

Each DFE IG is appointed and removable by the affiliated agency head.

Similar to establishment IGs, each DFE IG typically oversees the programs and operations of his or her affiliated agency. 306

 Other permanent IGs.

This category includes seven permanent IGs that operate under statutes outside the IG Act for certain legislative branch agencies and executive branch intelligence agencies (listed below).

The appointment structure varies by IG — legislative branch IGs are appointed and removable by the affiliated agency head, while IGs for the Central Intelligence Agency and Intelligence Community are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate and removable by the President (or through the impeachment process in Congress).

 Architect of the Capitol (established by P.L. 110-161);

 GAO (P.L. 110-323);

 Government Publishing Office (P.L. 100-504);

 Library of Congress (P.L. 109-55);

 U.S. Capitol Police (P.L. 109-55);

 Central Intelligence Agency (P.L. 101-193); and

 Intelligence Community (P.L. 111-259).

 Special IGs.

Two temporary offices with sunset dates operate under statutes outside of the IG Act:

(1) the Special IG for the Troubled Asset and Relief Program (SIGTARP; P.L. 110-343), and

(2) the Special IG for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR; P.L. 110-181). 307

The IG for SIGTARP is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate and is removable by the President. 308

The IG for SIGAR is appointed and removable by the President alone.

Special IGs’ oversight jurisdictions are unique in that they are expressly authorized to oversee a specific set of government programs or operations that span multiple agency jurisdictions rather than those under a single agency’s jurisdiction.

303 Some now-defunct statutory IGs have been abolished or transferred either when their parent agencies met the same fate or when superseded by another OIG. For example, the OIG in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) — which operated under the full discretionary authority of the DNI (P.L. 108-458) — was supplanted by the IG of the Intelligence Community. The new Intelligence Community IG post was established by the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-259, §405) with substantially broader authority, jurisdiction, and independence than the previous IG.

304 IGs can be grouped in a variety of ways based on several criteria. IGs could be categorized into types other than those listed here based on a different set of criteria.

305 For a list of federal establishments, see 5 U.S.C. Appendix (IG Act) §12.

306 For a list of DFEs, see 5 U.S.C. Appendix (IG Act) §8G.

307 SIGTARP and SIGAR are listed, respectively, at 12 U.S.C. §5231 and 5 U.S.C. Appendix (IG Act) §8G note.

308 The Troubled Asset Relief Program investment authority expired on October 3, 2010. However, SIGTARP continues to operate, as it is authorized to carry out the office’s duties until the government has sold or transferred all assets and terminated all insurance contracts acquired under the program.

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Re: CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MANUAL

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Congressional Oversight Manual, continued ...

Updated January 16, 2020

Congressional Research Service

Authorities and Responsibilities

As mentioned previously, the IG Act vests establishment IGs and DFE IGs — which comprise nearly 90% of all statutory IGs — with many authorities and responsibilities to carry out their respective missions.

Several of these authorities and responsibilities are described below. 309

Oversight Jurisdiction

Typically, the jurisdiction of an IG includes only the programs, operations, and activities of a single affiliated entity and its components.

In some cases, however, one IG operates for multiple federal entities. 310

For example, the IG of the Board of Governors for the Federal Reserve System was given jurisdiction over the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which was established as an “independent bureau” in the Federal Reserve System by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. 311

In other cases, multiple IGs operate for a single federal entity.

For example, two statutory IGs operate for Department of the Treasury — one IG to oversee department-wide programs and operations and one IG to oversee the programs and operations of the Internal Revenue Service.

Reporting Requirements

IGs have various reporting obligations to Congress, the Attorney General, agency head(s), and the public.

One such obligation is to report suspected violations of federal criminal law directly and expeditiously to the Attorney General. 312

IGs are also required to report semiannually about their activities, findings, and recommendations to the agency head, who must submit the IG’s report to Congress within 30 days. 313

The agency head’s submission must provide the IG’s report unaltered, but it may include any comments from the agency head.

These semiannual reports are to be made available to the public within 60 days of their submission to Congress. 314

IGs are also to report “particularly serious or flagrant problems” immediately to the agency head, who must submit the IG report (unaltered, but with the IG’s comments) to Congress within seven days. 315

The majority of statutory IGs have also elected to participate in Oversight.gov, a central repository for OIG reports that was established in 2017. 316

309 In general, the authorities and responsibilities of IGs operating outside of the IG Act are beyond the scope of this report and can differ from those governed by the act. In certain cases, such differences are significant. In addition, unique statutory authorities and responsibilities for some IGs covered by the IG Act are also out of scope. Many IGs covered by the IG Act have been provided additional, unique responsibilities and powers on a selective basis.

310 5 U.S.C. Appendix (IG Act) §§2, 8G(g)(1), and 12(2). For more information on IG oversight jurisdiction, see CRS Report R43814, Federal Inspectors General: History, Characteristics, and Recent Congressional Actions, by Kathryn A. Francis and Michael Greene.

311 P.L. 111-203, §§1011,1081(1)-(2).

312 5 U.S.C. Appendix (IG Act) §4(d).

313 5 U.S.C. Appendix (IG Act) §5(a), (b).

314 5 U.S.C. Appendix (IG Act) §5(c).

315 5 U.S.C. Appendix (IG Act) §5(d). This is commonly referred to as the “Seven Day Letter.” More broadly, IGs are to keep the agency head and Congress “fully and currently informed” by means of the required reports and “otherwise.” See 5 U.S.C. Appendix (IG Act) §4(a)(5).

316 Establishment of, and participation in, Oversight.gov is not statutorily required. A list of participating OIGs is available at CIGIE, “About Oversight.gov,” https://oversight.gov/about. For more information on Oversight.gov, see CRS Insight IN10752, Inspector General Community Launches Oversight.gov to Increase Accessibility to Reports, by Kathryn A. Francis.

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Re: CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MANUAL

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Congressional Oversight Manual, continued ...

Updated January 16, 2020

Congressional Research Service

Independence

Pursuant to the IG Act, IGs are to be selected without regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial and management analysis, law, public administration, or investigations. 317

IGs have broad authorities and protections to support and reinforce their independence, such as the authority to hire their own staff and access all records related to the programs and operations of their affiliated entities. 318

IGs determine the priorities and projects for their offices without outside direction in most cases.

IGs may decide to conduct a review requested by the agency head, the President, legislators, employees, and others.

They are not obligated to do so, however, unless it is required by law. 319

IGs serve under the “general supervision” of the agency head, reporting exclusively to the head or to the officer next in rank if such authority is delegated. 320

317 5 U.S.C. Appendix (IG Act) §§3(a) and 8G(c).

318 For more information on IG authorities, see 5 U.S.C. Appendix (IG Act) §§4 and 6.

319 The heads of eight agencies — the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and Treasury, plus the U.S. Postal Service (USPS), Federal Reserve Board, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Office of the DNI — are explicitly authorized to prevent or halt the IG from initiating, carrying out, or completing an audit or investigation or issuing a subpoena, and then only for certain reasons: to preserve national security interests or to protect ongoing criminal investigations, among a few others. See 5 U.S.C. Appendix (IG Act) §§8, 8D(a), 8E(a), 8G(f), 8G(g)(3), 8G(f)(3)(A), and 8I(a); 50 U.S.C. §3033(f)(1); and 50 U.S.C. §3517(b)(3). When exercising this power, the governing statute generally provides for congressional notification of the exercise of such authority.

320 5 U.S.C. Appendix (IG Act) §§3(a), 8G(d).

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Re: CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MANUAL

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Updated January 16, 2020

Congressional Research Service

Budget Formulation

Establishment and DFE IGs are required to develop annual budget estimates that are distinct from the budgets of their affiliated entities.

Such budget estimates must include some transparency into the requested amounts before agency heads and the President can modify them. 321

The budget formulation and submission process for the aforementioned IG types includes the following key steps:

 IG budget estimate to affiliated agency head.

The IG submits an annual budget estimate for its office to the affiliated entity head.

The estimate must include (1) the aggregate amount for the IG’s total operations, (2) a subtotal amount for training needs, and (3) resources necessary to support CIGIE.

 Agency budget request to President.

The affiliated entity head compiles and submits an aggregated budget request for the IG to the President.

The budget request includes any comments from the IG regarding the entity head’s proposal.

 President’s annual budget to Congress.

The President submits an annual budget to Congress.

The budget submission must include (1) the IG’s original budget that was transmitted to the entity head, (2) the President’s requested amount for the IG, (3) the amount requested by the President for training of IGs, and (4) any comments from the IG if the President’s amount would “substantially inhibit” the IG from performing his or her duties. 322

This process arguably provides a level of budgetary independence from their affiliated entities, particularly by enabling Congress to perceive differences between the budgetary perspectives of IGs and affiliated agencies or the President.

Governing statutory provisions outline the following submission process, although it is unclear whether every IG interprets the statute similarly.

321 5 U.S.C. Appendix (IG Act) §§6(g) and 8G(g)(1).

322 5 U.S.C. Appendix (IG Act) §§6(g) and 8G(g)(1).

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Re: CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MANUAL

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Appropriations

Federal laws explicitly provide establishment IGs a separate appropriations account for their respective offices. 323

This requirement provides an additional level of budgetary independence from the affiliated entity by preventing attempts to limit, reallocate, or otherwise reduce IG funding once it has been specified in law, except as provided through established transfer and reprogramming procedures and related interactions between agencies and the appropriations committees. 324

Appropriations for DFE IGs, in contrast, are part of the affiliated entity’s appropriations account.

Absent statutory separation of a budget account, the appropriations may be more susceptible to some reallocation of funds, although other protections may apply. 325

323 31 U.S.C. §1105(a)(25).

324 For more information on reprogramming and transfers, see CRS Report R43098, Transfer and Reprogramming of Appropriations: An Overview of Authorities, Limitations, and Procedures, by Michelle D. Christensen.

325 For example, appropriations committees may choose to allocate funding to an IG in ways that would require advance notification of any attempt by an affiliated entity head to reprogram funds away from the IG to another purpose.

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Congressional Research Service

Appointment and Removal Methods

Appointment and removal procedures can vary among statutory IGs.

Establishment IGs are appointed and removable by the President.

When exercising removal authority, the President must communicate the reasons to Congress in writing 30 days prior to the scheduled removal date. 326

DFE IGs, by contrast, are appointed and can be removed by the agency head, who must notify Congress in writing 30 days in advance when exercising the removal authority. 327

In cases where a board or commission is considered the DFE head, removal of a DFE IG requires the written concurrence of a two-thirds majority of the board or commission members. 328

The U.S. Postal Service IG is the only IG that can be removed only “for cause,” and then only by the written concurrence of at least seven of the nine presidentially appointed governors of USPS. 329

326 5 U.S.C. Appendix (IG Act) §3(a)-(b). This advance notice allows the IG, Congress, or other interested parties to examine, and possibly object to, the planned removal.

327 5 U.S.C. Appendix (IG Act) §8G(c) and (e). Differences arise over who is considered the “head of the agency” in a DFE. The agency head may be (1) an individual serving as the administrator or director or as spelled out in law (e.g., the Archivist of the United States in the National Archives and Records Administration); (2) the chairperson of a board or commission, a full board, or council as specified in law (e.g., the National Council on the Arts in the National Endowment for the Arts); or (3) a certain supermajority of a governing board. See 5 U.S.C. Appendix (IG Act) §§8G(f)(1)-(2) and (4)). For the USPS, for instance, the USPS governors appoint the inspector general.

328 5 U.S.C. Appendix (IG Act) §8G(e)(1).

329 39 U.S.C. §202(e)(3)

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Coordination and Oversight

Coordination among the IGs and oversight of their actions exists through several channels, including interagency bodies created by public law or administrative directive:

 CIGIE.

CIGIE is the primary coordinating body for statutory IGs. 330

Among other things, CIGIE is intended to aid in coordination among IGs and maintain programs and resources to train and professionalize OIG personnel. 331

CIGIE includes all statutory IGs along with other relevant officers, such as a representative of the FBI and the Special Counsel of the Office of Special Counsel. 332

The CIGIE chairperson is an IG chosen from within its ranks, while the executive chairperson is the OMB deputy director of management. 333

 CIGIE Integrity Committee.

The CIGIE Integrity Committee — the sole statutory committee of the council — plays a lead role in addressing allegations of IG wrongdoing.

The committee receives, reviews, and refers for investigation alleged misconduct by the IG or OIG according to processes and procedures detailed in the IG Act. 334

The committee is composed of six members — four IGs on the full council, the FBI representative on the council, and the director of the Office of Government Ethics.

The committee chairperson is elected to a two-year term by the members of the committee. 335

 Other coordinative bodies.

Other interagency mechanisms have been created by law or administrative directive to assist coordination among IGs.

For example, Congress established a Lead Inspector General for overseas contingency operations — a formal role assigned to one of three IGs (Departments of Defense, Department of State, and U.S. Agency for International Development) to coordinate comprehensive oversight of program and operations in support of covered overseas contingency operations. 336

Further, Congress established a Council of Inspectors General on Financial Oversight to facilitate information sharing among them and develop ways to improve financial oversight. 337

Organizations have also been administratively created to help coordinate IG activities and capabilities for selected policy issues, such as the Defense Council on Integrity and Efficiency and Disaster Assistance Working Group. 338

330 5 U.S.C. Appendix (IG Act) §11.

331 5 U.S.C. Appendix (IG Act) §11(c)(E).

332 5 U.S.C. Appendix (IG Act) §11(b)(1).

333 5 U.S.C. Appendix (IG Act) §11(b)(2).

334 5 U.S.C. Appendix (IG Act) §11(d).

335 5 U.S.C. Appendix (IG Act) §11(d)(2).

336 P.L. 112-239, §848; codified at 5 U.S.C. Appendix (IG Act) §8L.

337 P.L. 111-203, §989E; codified at 5 U.S.C. Appendix (IG Act) §11 note.

338 For more information on the Defense Council on Integrity and Efficiency, see http://www.dodig.mil/Resources/DCIE/ and https://media.defense.gov/2003/Jan/16/2 ... 0Final.pdf. For more information on the Disaster Assistance Working Group, see https://www.ignet.gov/content/disaster- ... rkinggroup.

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Oversight Information Sources and Consultant Services

Congress calls upon a variety of sources for information and analysis to support its oversight activities.

Most of this assistance is provided by legislative support agencies: CRS, CBO, and GAO.

In addition to the legislative support agencies, various support offices established in the House and Senate may have a role in oversight through the legal, legislative, administrative, financial, and ceremonial functions they perform.

Two of these — the Offices of Senate Legal Counsel and House General Counsel — are highlighted below.

A range of outside interest groups and research organizations also provide rich sources of information.

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Oversight Information Sources and Consultant Services, continued ...

CRS

CRS 339 is the public policy research arm of Congress.

Originally established as the Legislative Reference Service in 1914, CRS was renamed and given expanded research and analytic duties with the passage of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970.
340

CRS analysts, attorneys, and information specialists provide nonpartisan, confidential analysis on current and emerging issues of national policy.

CRS works exclusively for Congress, providing the legislature with an independent source of information and assisting the Congress in its ability to oversee the executive branch in a system characterized by separation of powers.

In addition to serving the committees and party leaders of the House and Senate, CRS responds to requests for assistance from all Members of both houses regardless of their party, length of service, or political philosophy.

CRS also assists congressional staff in district and state offices.

CRS supports the House and Senate at all stages of the legislative process.

Individual Members or their staffs may request help from CRS, for example, in learning about issues; developing ideas for legislation; providing technical assistance during hearings; evaluating and comparing legislative proposals made by the President, their colleagues, or private organizations; understanding the effects of House and Senate rules on the legislative process; and clarifying legal effects a bill may have.

CRS provides assistance in the form of reports, memoranda, customized briefings, introductory classes, seminars, digitally recorded presentations, courses offering continuing education credits, information obtained from governmental and nongovernmental databases, and consultations in person and by telephone.

Its analysts also deliver expert testimony before congressional committees.

Although CRS does not draft bills, resolutions, and amendments, CRS staff may join the staff of Members and committees consulting with the professional drafting staff within each chamber’s Office of the Legislative Counsel as they translate the Member’s policy decisions into formal legislative language.

CRS is also prohibited from preparing products of a partisan nature or advocating bills or policies and researching individual Members or living former Members of Congress (other than holders of, or nominees to, federal appointive office).

It also cannot undertake casework or provide translation services, provide personal legal or medical advice, undertake personal or academic research, provide clerical assistance, or conduct audits or field investigations.

In all of their work, CRS staff are governed by requirements for confidentiality, timeliness, accuracy, objectivity, balance, and nonpartisanship.

CRS makes no legislative or other policy recommendations to Congress.

Its responsibility is to ensure that Members of the House and Senate have available the best possible information and analysis on which to base the policy decisions the American people have elected them to make.


The Librarian of Congress appoints the director of CRS “after consultation with the Joint Committee on the Library.” 341

Pursuant to the FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act, a website was launched on September 18, 2018, to provide public access to CRS reports ( https://crsreports.congress.gov/ ). 342

The confidentiality of congressional requests or responses (such as confidential memoranda) remains unchanged, and these confidential communications may be released only by Congress.

339 Published reports, seminars and training offered, other resources and services provided by CRS are available at https://www.crs.gov/.

340 P.L. 63-127, ch. 141, July 16, 1914; P.L. 79-601, ch. 753, title II, §203, August 2, 1946, 60 Stat. 836; P.L. 91-510, title III, §321(a), October 26, 1970, 84 Stat. 1181; 2 U.S.C. §166.

341 2 U.S.C. §166.

342 P.L. 115-141; March 23, 2018; 2 U.S.C. §166a.

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Oversight Information Sources and Consultant Services, continued ...

GAO

The Government Accountability Office, formerly known as the General Accounting Office, was established by the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 as an independent auditor of government agencies 345 and has statutory authority to gather information from and investigate agencies. 346

The GAO’s mission is to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and ensure the accountability of the federal government.

GAO issues hundreds of reports, testimony statements, and legal opinions each year.

GAO’s reports typically support congressional oversight through focusing on:

 auditing agency operations to determine whether federal funds are being spent efficiently and effectively;

 identifying opportunities to address duplication, overlap, waste or inefficiencies in the use of public funds;

 reporting on how well government programs and policies are meeting their objectives;

 performing policy analyses and outlining options for congressional consideration; and

 investigating allegations of illegal and improper activities.

GAO’s objective is to produce high-quality reports, testimonies, briefings, and other products and services that are objective, fact-based, nonpartisan, non-ideological, fair, and balanced.

The agency operates under strict professional standards, including Government Auditing Standards and a quality assurance framework.

GAO’s products include oral briefings, testimony, and written reports.

All non-classified reports are made available to the public through posting on GAO’s website.

Report recommendations that remain to be addressed, including those that are a priority, are included in GAO’s Recommendations Database (https://www.gao.gov/
recommendations).

Most GAO reports are prepared in response to congressional requests or requirements in statute or committee or conference reports.

GAO is required to do work requested by committee chairs and, as a matter of policy, assigns equal status to requests from ranking minority members and subcommittee leaders.

A small percentage of reviews are undertaken under the comptroller general’s authority.

GAO’s Watchdog website (http://watchdog.gao.gov/), available on the House and Senate intranet, provides information on how to request GAO reports, GAO’s policies for accepting and prioritizing mandates and requests (contained in its Congressional Protocols 347) and information about ongoing reviews, among other things.

GAO encourages Members and staff to consult with its staff when considering a request or mandate for a report.

In addition to its audits and evaluations, GAO offers a number of other services, including performing forensic audits and investigations of fraud, waste, and abuse; providing various legal services; prescribing accounting principles and standards for the executive branch; providing other services to help the audit and evaluation community improve and keep abreast of current developments; occasionally detailing staff to work for congressional committees for up to one year, on request of committee leadership; and providing testimony from the comptroller general on high-level issues and the role of government.

GAO is led by the comptroller general of the United States, who is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, from a list of candidates selected by a bipartisan, bicameral congressional commission.

The comptroller general serves a term of 15 years.

GAO’s staff are located in Washington, DC, and in field offices located in Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Dayton, Denver, Huntsville, Los Angeles, Norfolk, Oakland, and Seattle.

345 P.L. 67-13, June 10, 1921; 31 U.S.C. §702. Renamed by P.L. 108-271, 118 Stat. 811.

346 31 U.S.C. §716.

347 GAO’s Congressional Protocols can be accessed at https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-767G.

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