Congressional Oversight Manual
Updated January 16, 2020
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
RL30240
Summary
Today’s lawmakers and congressional aides, as well as commentators and scholars, recognize that Congress’s lawmaking role does not end when it passes legislation.
Oversight is considered fundamental to making sure that laws work and are being administered in an effective, efficient, and economical manner.
This function is seen as one of Congress’s principal roles as it grapples with the complexities of American government.
A fundamental objective of the Congressional Oversight Manual is to assist Members, committees, and legislative staff in carrying out this vital legislative function.
It is intended to provide a broad overview of the procedural, legal, and practical issues that are likely to arise as Congress conducts oversight.
This includes information on the mechanics of oversight practice based on the House and Senate rules, common investigative techniques, and an inventory of statutes that impact oversight activity.
In addition, the Manual discusses important legal principles that have developed around Congress’s oversight practice.
It is not intended to address all the legal issues that committees, Members, and staff may encounter when engaged in investigative activities.
The Manual is organized both to address specific questions and to support those seeking a general introduction to or broader understanding of oversight practice.
CRS first developed the Congressional Oversight Manual four decades ago following a three-day December 1978 Workshop on Congressional Oversight and Investigations.
The workshop was organized by a group of House and Senate committee aides from both parties and CRS at the request of the bipartisan House leadership.
The Manual was produced by CRS with the assistance initially of a number of House committee staffers.
In subsequent years, CRS has sponsored and conducted various oversight seminars for House and Senate staff and updated the Manual periodically.
Over the years, CRS has assisted many Members, committees, party leaders, and staff aides in the performance of the oversight function: providing consultative support on matters ranging from routine oversight and basic information gathering to the most complex and highest profile investigations conducted by Congress.
Given the size and scope of the modern executive establishment, Congress’s oversight role may be even more significant — and more demanding — than when Woodrow Wilson wrote in his classic Congressional Government (1885): “Quite as important as lawmaking is vigilant oversight of administration.”
Legal questions on Congress’s investigatory powers should be directed to CRS legislative attorneys.
For ease of reference, the relevant CRS legislative attorneys and legal products are cited throughout this report.
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Purposes, Authority, and Participants
Throughout its history, Congress has engaged in oversight — broadly defined as reviewing, monitoring, and supervising the implementation of public policy by the executive branch.
Investigating how a statute is being administered enables Congress to assess whether federal agencies and departments are administering programs in an effective, efficient, and economical manner.
The expansion of the national government’s size and scope has only increased Congress’s need for and use of available oversight tools to check on and check the executive.
The “checking” function serves to protect Congress’s policymaking role and its place under Article I in the U.S. constitutional system of checks and balances. 1
Congress’s oversight role is also significant because it shines the spotlight of public attention on many critical issues, which enables lawmakers and the general public to make informed judgments about executive performance.
Woodrow Wilson, in his classic 1885 study Congressional Government, emphasized that the “informing function should be preferred even to its [lawmaking] function.”
He added that unless Congress conducts oversight of administrative activities, the “country must remain in embarrassing, crippling ignorance of the very affairs which it is most important it should understand and direct.” 2
Congress’s authority to conduct oversight comes from four overlapping sources: the Constitution, Supreme Court decisions, laws, and House and Senate rules.
First, oversight is an implicit constitutional responsibility of Congress.
According to historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr., the Framers believed “it was not considered necessary to make an explicit grant of such authority."
"The power to make laws implied the power to see whether they were faithfully executed.” 3
Second, the investigative authority of Congress is broad and bolstered by an array of Supreme Court decisions.
For example, in Watkins v. United States, 4 the Court stated that the “power of Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process."
"That power is broad."
"It encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed laws.”
There are limits to Congress’s power to investigate, such as the Constitution (e.g., the protection accorded witnesses under the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination).
Third, there are numerous laws that provide Congress with the authority to conduct oversight.
Despite its lengthy heritage, oversight was not given explicit recognition in public law until enactment of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. 5
That act required House and Senate standing committees to exercise “continuous watchfulness” over programs and agencies within their jurisdiction.
Fourth, the House and Senate have often amended their formal rules to encourage and strengthen committee oversight of the administration of laws.
For example, House rules direct committees to create oversight subcommittees, undertake futures research and forecasting, and review the impact of tax expenditures within their respective jurisdictions.
Senate rules require each standing committee to include regulatory impact statements in committee reports accompanying legislation.
1 See James Madison, Federalist No. 48.
2 Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1885), p. 303.
3 Arthur Schlesinger Jr. and Roger Burns, eds., Congress Investigates: A Documented History, 1792-1974, vol. 1 (New York: Chelsea House, 1975), p. xiii.
4 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
5 P.L. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812 (1946).
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Purposes, Authority, and Participants
Throughout its history, Congress has engaged in oversight — broadly defined as reviewing, monitoring, and supervising the implementation of public policy by the executive branch.
Investigating how a statute is being administered enables Congress to assess whether federal agencies and departments are administering programs in an effective, efficient, and economical manner.
The expansion of the national government’s size and scope has only increased Congress’s need for and use of available oversight tools to check on and check the executive.
The “checking” function serves to protect Congress’s policymaking role and its place under Article I in the U.S. constitutional system of checks and balances. 1
Congress’s oversight role is also significant because it shines the spotlight of public attention on many critical issues, which enables lawmakers and the general public to make informed judgments about executive performance.
Woodrow Wilson, in his classic 1885 study Congressional Government, emphasized that the “informing function should be preferred even to its [lawmaking] function.”
He added that unless Congress conducts oversight of administrative activities, the “country must remain in embarrassing, crippling ignorance of the very affairs which it is most important it should understand and direct.” 2
Congress’s authority to conduct oversight comes from four overlapping sources: the Constitution, Supreme Court decisions, laws, and House and Senate rules.
First, oversight is an implicit constitutional responsibility of Congress.
According to historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr., the Framers believed “it was not considered necessary to make an explicit grant of such authority."
"The power to make laws implied the power to see whether they were faithfully executed.” 3
Second, the investigative authority of Congress is broad and bolstered by an array of Supreme Court decisions.
For example, in Watkins v. United States, 4 the Court stated that the “power of Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process."
"That power is broad."
"It encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed laws.”
There are limits to Congress’s power to investigate, such as the Constitution (e.g., the protection accorded witnesses under the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination).
Third, there are numerous laws that provide Congress with the authority to conduct oversight.
Despite its lengthy heritage, oversight was not given explicit recognition in public law until enactment of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. 5
That act required House and Senate standing committees to exercise “continuous watchfulness” over programs and agencies within their jurisdiction.
Fourth, the House and Senate have often amended their formal rules to encourage and strengthen committee oversight of the administration of laws.
For example, House rules direct committees to create oversight subcommittees, undertake futures research and forecasting, and review the impact of tax expenditures within their respective jurisdictions.
Senate rules require each standing committee to include regulatory impact statements in committee reports accompanying legislation.
1 See James Madison, Federalist No. 48.
2 Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1885), p. 303.
3 Arthur Schlesinger Jr. and Roger Burns, eds., Congress Investigates: A Documented History, 1792-1974, vol. 1 (New York: Chelsea House, 1975), p. xiii.
4 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
5 P.L. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812 (1946).
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Oversight occurs in virtually any congressional activity and through a wide variety of channels, organizations, and structures.
These range from formal committee hearings to informal Member contacts with executive officials, from staff studies to reviews by congressional support agencies, and from casework conducted by Member offices to studies prepared by non-congressional entities, such as academic institutions, private commissions, or think tanks.
Purposes
Congressional oversight of the executive is designed to fulfill a variety of purposes, such as those outlined below.
Ensure Executive Compliance with Legislative Intent
Congress, of necessity, must delegate discretionary authority to federal administrators.
To make certain that these officers faithfully execute laws according to the intent of Congress, committees and Members can review the actions taken and regulations formulated by departments and agencies.
Improve the Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Economy of Governmental Operations
A large federal bureaucracy makes it imperative for Congress to encourage and secure efficient and effective program management and to make every dollar count toward the achievement of program goals.
A basic objective is strengthening federal programs through better managerial operations and service delivery.
Such steps can improve the accountability of agency managers to Congress and enhance program performance.
Evaluate Program Performance
Systematic program performance evaluation remains an evolving technique of oversight.
Modern program evaluation uses social science and management methodologies — such as surveys, cost-benefit analyses, and efficiency studies — to assess the effectiveness of ongoing programs.
Prevent Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives and Powers
Many commentators, public policy analysts, and legislators state that Presidents and executive officials may overstep their authority in various areas, such as the impoundment of funds, executive privilege, and war powers.
Increased oversight — as part of the constitutional checks and balances system — can redress what many in the public and Congress might view as executive arrogation of legislative prerogatives.
Investigate Alleged Instances of Poor Administration, Arbitrary and Capricious Behavior, Abuse, Waste, Dishonesty, and Fraud
Instances of fraud and other forms of corruption, wasteful expenditures, incompetent management, and the subversion of governmental processes can provoke legislative and public interest in oversight.
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Purposes, Authority, and Participants, continued ...
Oversight occurs in virtually any congressional activity and through a wide variety of channels, organizations, and structures.
These range from formal committee hearings to informal Member contacts with executive officials, from staff studies to reviews by congressional support agencies, and from casework conducted by Member offices to studies prepared by non-congressional entities, such as academic institutions, private commissions, or think tanks.
Purposes
Congressional oversight of the executive is designed to fulfill a variety of purposes, such as those outlined below.
Ensure Executive Compliance with Legislative Intent
Congress, of necessity, must delegate discretionary authority to federal administrators.
To make certain that these officers faithfully execute laws according to the intent of Congress, committees and Members can review the actions taken and regulations formulated by departments and agencies.
Improve the Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Economy of Governmental Operations
A large federal bureaucracy makes it imperative for Congress to encourage and secure efficient and effective program management and to make every dollar count toward the achievement of program goals.
A basic objective is strengthening federal programs through better managerial operations and service delivery.
Such steps can improve the accountability of agency managers to Congress and enhance program performance.
Evaluate Program Performance
Systematic program performance evaluation remains an evolving technique of oversight.
Modern program evaluation uses social science and management methodologies — such as surveys, cost-benefit analyses, and efficiency studies — to assess the effectiveness of ongoing programs.
Prevent Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives and Powers
Many commentators, public policy analysts, and legislators state that Presidents and executive officials may overstep their authority in various areas, such as the impoundment of funds, executive privilege, and war powers.
Increased oversight — as part of the constitutional checks and balances system — can redress what many in the public and Congress might view as executive arrogation of legislative prerogatives.
Investigate Alleged Instances of Poor Administration, Arbitrary and Capricious Behavior, Abuse, Waste, Dishonesty, and Fraud
Instances of fraud and other forms of corruption, wasteful expenditures, incompetent management, and the subversion of governmental processes can provoke legislative and public interest in oversight.
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Assess Agency or Officials’ Ability to Manage and Implement Program Objectives
Congress’s ability to evaluate the capacity of agencies and managers to carry out program objectives can be accomplished in various ways.
For example, numerous laws require agencies to submit reports to Congress.
Some of these are regular, occurring annually or semi-annually, for instance, while others are activated by a specific event, development, or set of conditions.
Reporting requirements may promote self-evaluation by the agency.
Organizations outside of Congress — such as offices of inspector general, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and study commissions — also advise Members and committees on how well federal agencies are working.
Review and Determine Federal Financial Priorities
Congress exercises some of its most effective oversight through the appropriations process, which provides the opportunity to assess agency and departmental expenditures in detail.
In addition, most federal agencies and programs are under regular and frequent reauthorizations — on an annual, two-year, five-year, or other basis — giving authorizing committees the opportunity to review agency activities, operations, and procedures.
As a consequence of these oversight efforts, Congress can abolish or curtail obsolete or ineffective programs by cutting off or reducing funds.
Congress might also increase funding for effective programs.
Ensure That Executive Policies Reflect the Public Interest
Congressional oversight can appraise whether the needs and interests of the public are adequately served by federal programs.
Such evaluations might prompt corrective action through legislation, administrative changes, or other means and methods.
Legislative reviews might also prompt measures to consolidate or terminate duplicative and unnecessary programs or agencies.
Protect Individual Rights and Liberties
Congressional oversight can help safeguard the rights and liberties of citizens and others.
By revealing abuses of authority, oversight hearings and other efforts can halt executive misconduct and help prevent its recurrence through, for example, new legislation or indirectly by heightening public awareness of the issue(s).
Other Purposes
The purposes of oversight — and what activities are illustrative of this function — can also be stated in more precise terms.
Like the general purposes noted above, these more specific purposes unavoidably overlap because of the numerous and multifaceted dimensions of oversight.
A brief list includes the following:
review the agency rulemaking process,
monitor the use of contractors and consultants for government services,
encourage and promote mutual cooperation between the branches,
examine agency personnel procedures,
acquire information useful in future policymaking,
investigate constituent complaints and media critiques,
assess whether program design and execution maximize the delivery of services
to beneficiaries,
compare the effectiveness of one program with another,
protect agencies and programs against unjustified criticisms, and
appraise federal evaluation activities.
Thoughts on Oversight and Its Rationales from...
James Wilson (The Works of James Wilson, 1896, vol. II, p. 29), an architect of the Constitution and Associate Justice on the first Supreme Court:
The House of Representatives … form the grand inquest of the state.
They will diligently inquire into grievances, arising both from men and things.
Woodrow Wilson (Congressional Government, 1885, p. 297), perhaps the first scholar to use the term oversight to refer to the review and investigation of the executive branch:
Quite as important as legislation is vigilant oversight of administration.
It is the proper duty of a representative body to look diligently into every affair of government and to talk much about what it sees.
It is meant to be the eyes and the voice, and to embody the wisdom and will of its constituents.
The informing function of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative function.
John Stuart Mill (Considerations on Representative Government, 1861, p.104), British utilitarian philosopher:
The proper office of a representative assembly is to watch and control the government; to throw the light of publicity on its acts; to compel a full exposition and justification of all of them which any one considers questionable.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
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Purposes, Authority, and Participants, continued ...
Purposes, concluded ...
Assess Agency or Officials’ Ability to Manage and Implement Program Objectives
Congress’s ability to evaluate the capacity of agencies and managers to carry out program objectives can be accomplished in various ways.
For example, numerous laws require agencies to submit reports to Congress.
Some of these are regular, occurring annually or semi-annually, for instance, while others are activated by a specific event, development, or set of conditions.
Reporting requirements may promote self-evaluation by the agency.
Organizations outside of Congress — such as offices of inspector general, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and study commissions — also advise Members and committees on how well federal agencies are working.
Review and Determine Federal Financial Priorities
Congress exercises some of its most effective oversight through the appropriations process, which provides the opportunity to assess agency and departmental expenditures in detail.
In addition, most federal agencies and programs are under regular and frequent reauthorizations — on an annual, two-year, five-year, or other basis — giving authorizing committees the opportunity to review agency activities, operations, and procedures.
As a consequence of these oversight efforts, Congress can abolish or curtail obsolete or ineffective programs by cutting off or reducing funds.
Congress might also increase funding for effective programs.
Ensure That Executive Policies Reflect the Public Interest
Congressional oversight can appraise whether the needs and interests of the public are adequately served by federal programs.
Such evaluations might prompt corrective action through legislation, administrative changes, or other means and methods.
Legislative reviews might also prompt measures to consolidate or terminate duplicative and unnecessary programs or agencies.
Protect Individual Rights and Liberties
Congressional oversight can help safeguard the rights and liberties of citizens and others.
By revealing abuses of authority, oversight hearings and other efforts can halt executive misconduct and help prevent its recurrence through, for example, new legislation or indirectly by heightening public awareness of the issue(s).
Other Purposes
The purposes of oversight — and what activities are illustrative of this function — can also be stated in more precise terms.
Like the general purposes noted above, these more specific purposes unavoidably overlap because of the numerous and multifaceted dimensions of oversight.
A brief list includes the following:
review the agency rulemaking process,
monitor the use of contractors and consultants for government services,
encourage and promote mutual cooperation between the branches,
examine agency personnel procedures,
acquire information useful in future policymaking,
investigate constituent complaints and media critiques,
assess whether program design and execution maximize the delivery of services
to beneficiaries,
compare the effectiveness of one program with another,
protect agencies and programs against unjustified criticisms, and
appraise federal evaluation activities.
Thoughts on Oversight and Its Rationales from...
James Wilson (The Works of James Wilson, 1896, vol. II, p. 29), an architect of the Constitution and Associate Justice on the first Supreme Court:
The House of Representatives … form the grand inquest of the state.
They will diligently inquire into grievances, arising both from men and things.
Woodrow Wilson (Congressional Government, 1885, p. 297), perhaps the first scholar to use the term oversight to refer to the review and investigation of the executive branch:
Quite as important as legislation is vigilant oversight of administration.
It is the proper duty of a representative body to look diligently into every affair of government and to talk much about what it sees.
It is meant to be the eyes and the voice, and to embody the wisdom and will of its constituents.
The informing function of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative function.
John Stuart Mill (Considerations on Representative Government, 1861, p.104), British utilitarian philosopher:
The proper office of a representative assembly is to watch and control the government; to throw the light of publicity on its acts; to compel a full exposition and justification of all of them which any one considers questionable.
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Authority to Conduct Oversight
U.S. Constitution
The Constitution grants Congress extensive authority to oversee and investigate executive branch activities.
The constitutional authority for Congress to conduct oversight stems from such explicit and implicit provisions as:
The power of the purse.
The Constitution provides: “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” 6
Each year the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations review the financial practices and needs of federal agencies.
The appropriations process allows Congress to exercise extensive control over the activities of executive agencies.
Congress can define the precise purposes for which money may be spent, adjust funding levels, and prohibit expenditures for certain purposes.
The power to organize the executive branch.
Congress has the authority to create, abolish, reorganize, and fund federal departments and agencies.
It has the authority to assign or reassign functions to departments and agencies and grant new forms of authority and staff to administrators.
Congress, in short, exercises ultimate authority over executive branch organization and generally over policy. 7
The power to make all laws for “carrying into Execution” Congress’s own enumerated powers as well as those of the executive.
Article I grants Congress a wide range of powers, such as the power to tax and coin money, regulate foreign and interstate commerce, declare war, provide for the creation and maintenance of armed forces, and establish post offices. 8
Augmenting these specific powers is the Necessary and Proper Clause, also known as the “Elastic Clause,” which gives Congress the authority to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” 9
These provisions grant broad authority to regulate and oversee departmental activities established by law.
The power to confirm officers of the United States.
The confirmation process not only involves the determination of a nominee’s suitability for an executive (or judicial) position but also provides an opportunity to examine the current policies and programs of an agency along with those policies and programs that the nominee intends to pursue. 10
The power of investigation and inquiry.
A traditional method of exercising the oversight function, an implied power, is through investigations and inquiries into executive branch operations.
Legislators often seek to know how effectively and efficiently programs are working, how well agency officials are responding to legislative directives, and how the public perceives the programs.
The investigatory method helps to ensure a more responsible bureaucracy while supplying Congress with information needed to formulate new legislation.
Impeachment and removal.
Impeachment provides Congress with a powerful, ultimate oversight tool to investigate alleged executive and judicial misbehavior and to eliminate such misbehavior through the convictions and removal from office of the offending individuals. 11
The Supreme Court on Congress’s Power to Oversee and Investigate
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 177, 181-182 (1927):
Congress, investigating the administration of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) during the Teapot Dome scandal, was considering a subject “on which legislation could be had or would be materially aided by the information which the investigation was calculated to elicit.”
The “potential” for legislation was sufficient.
The majority added, “We are of [the] opinion that the power of inquiry — with process to enforce it — is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.”
Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 509 (1975):
Expanding on its holding in McGrain, the Court declared, “To be a valid legislative inquiry there need be no predictable end result.”
6 U.S. Const. art. I, §9, cl. 7.
7 U.S. Const. art. I, §9; see also U.S. Const. art. II, §2, cl. 2
8 U.S. Const. art. I, §8.
9 U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 18.
10 See U.S. Const. art. II, §2, cl. 2.
11 See U.S. Const. art. II, §4.
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Authority to Conduct Oversight
U.S. Constitution
The Constitution grants Congress extensive authority to oversee and investigate executive branch activities.
The constitutional authority for Congress to conduct oversight stems from such explicit and implicit provisions as:
The power of the purse.
The Constitution provides: “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” 6
Each year the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations review the financial practices and needs of federal agencies.
The appropriations process allows Congress to exercise extensive control over the activities of executive agencies.
Congress can define the precise purposes for which money may be spent, adjust funding levels, and prohibit expenditures for certain purposes.
The power to organize the executive branch.
Congress has the authority to create, abolish, reorganize, and fund federal departments and agencies.
It has the authority to assign or reassign functions to departments and agencies and grant new forms of authority and staff to administrators.
Congress, in short, exercises ultimate authority over executive branch organization and generally over policy. 7
The power to make all laws for “carrying into Execution” Congress’s own enumerated powers as well as those of the executive.
Article I grants Congress a wide range of powers, such as the power to tax and coin money, regulate foreign and interstate commerce, declare war, provide for the creation and maintenance of armed forces, and establish post offices. 8
Augmenting these specific powers is the Necessary and Proper Clause, also known as the “Elastic Clause,” which gives Congress the authority to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” 9
These provisions grant broad authority to regulate and oversee departmental activities established by law.
The power to confirm officers of the United States.
The confirmation process not only involves the determination of a nominee’s suitability for an executive (or judicial) position but also provides an opportunity to examine the current policies and programs of an agency along with those policies and programs that the nominee intends to pursue. 10
The power of investigation and inquiry.
A traditional method of exercising the oversight function, an implied power, is through investigations and inquiries into executive branch operations.
Legislators often seek to know how effectively and efficiently programs are working, how well agency officials are responding to legislative directives, and how the public perceives the programs.
The investigatory method helps to ensure a more responsible bureaucracy while supplying Congress with information needed to formulate new legislation.
Impeachment and removal.
Impeachment provides Congress with a powerful, ultimate oversight tool to investigate alleged executive and judicial misbehavior and to eliminate such misbehavior through the convictions and removal from office of the offending individuals. 11
The Supreme Court on Congress’s Power to Oversee and Investigate
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 177, 181-182 (1927):
Congress, investigating the administration of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) during the Teapot Dome scandal, was considering a subject “on which legislation could be had or would be materially aided by the information which the investigation was calculated to elicit.”
The “potential” for legislation was sufficient.
The majority added, “We are of [the] opinion that the power of inquiry — with process to enforce it — is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.”
Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 509 (1975):
Expanding on its holding in McGrain, the Court declared, “To be a valid legislative inquiry there need be no predictable end result.”
6 U.S. Const. art. I, §9, cl. 7.
7 U.S. Const. art. I, §9; see also U.S. Const. art. II, §2, cl. 2
8 U.S. Const. art. I, §8.
9 U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 18.
10 See U.S. Const. art. II, §2, cl. 2.
11 See U.S. Const. art. II, §4.
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Principal Statutory Authority: Illustrative Examples
Direct Expansions of Congress’s Oversight Power
A number of laws directly augment and safeguard Congress’s authority, mandate, and resources to conduct oversight and legislative investigations.
For example, there are pertinent statutes that affect congressional proceedings, such as obstruction (18 U.S.C. §1505), false statements by witnesses (18 U.S.C. §1001(c)(2)), and contempt procedures (2 U.S.C. §§192, 194).
Among several other noteworthy laws, listed chronologically, are the following: 12
1912 anti-gag legislation and whistleblower protection laws for federal employees:
The Lloyd-La Follettee Act of 1912 (5 U.S.C. §7211) countered executive orders, issued by Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft, that prohibited civil service employees from communicating directly with Congress.
It also guaranteed that “the right of any persons employed in the civil service … to petition Congress, or any Member thereof, or to furnish information to either House of Congress, or to any committee or member thereof, shall not be denied or interfered with.”
The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 (P.L. 101-12, 5 U.S.C. ch. 12) makes it a prohibited personnel practice for an agency employee to take (or not take) any action against an employee that is in retaliation for disclosure of information that the employee believes relates to violation of law, rule, or regulation or evidences gross mismanagement, waste, fraud, or abuse of authority (5 U.S.C. §2302(b)(8)).
The prohibition is explicitly intended to protect disclosures to Congress: “This subsection shall not be construed to authorize the withholding of information from Congress or the taking of any personnel action against an employee who discloses information to Congress.”
The Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act (P.L. 105-272) establishes special procedures for personnel in the Intelligence Community to transmit urgent concerns involving classified information to inspectors general and the House and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence.
Section 714 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117) prohibits the payment of the salary of any officer or employee of the federal government who prohibits, prevents, attempts, or threatens to prohibit or prevent any other federal officer or employee from having direct oral or written communication or contact with any Member, committee, or subcommittee.
This prohibition applies irrespective of whether such communication was initiated by such officer or employee or in response to the request or inquiry of such Member, committee, or subcommittee.
Further, any punishment or threat of punishment because of any contact or communication by an officer or employee with a Member, committee, or subcommittee is prohibited under the provisions of this act.
Section 716 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117) prohibits the expenditure of any appropriated funds for use in implementing or enforcing agreement in Standard Forms 312 and 4414 of the government or any other non-disclosure policy, form, or agreement if such policy, form, or agreement does not contain a provision that states that the restrictions are consistent with and do not supersede, conflict with, or otherwise alter the employee obligation, rights, and liabilities created by Executive Order 12958; 13 the Lloyd-La Follette Act (5 U.S.C. §7211); the Military Whistleblower Act (10 U.S.C. §1034); the Whistleblower Protection Act (5 U.S.C. §2303(b)(8)); the Intelligence Identities Protection Act (50 U.S.C. §421 et seq.); and United States Code Title 18, Sections 641, 793, 794, 798, and 952 and Title 50, Section 783(b).
12 See also pages 67-71.
13 Executive Order 12958 was promulgated by President Bill Clinton on April 20, 1995, and established the classification system for national security information.
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Purposes, Authority, and Participants, continued ...
Principal Statutory Authority: Illustrative Examples
Direct Expansions of Congress’s Oversight Power
A number of laws directly augment and safeguard Congress’s authority, mandate, and resources to conduct oversight and legislative investigations.
For example, there are pertinent statutes that affect congressional proceedings, such as obstruction (18 U.S.C. §1505), false statements by witnesses (18 U.S.C. §1001(c)(2)), and contempt procedures (2 U.S.C. §§192, 194).
Among several other noteworthy laws, listed chronologically, are the following: 12
1912 anti-gag legislation and whistleblower protection laws for federal employees:
The Lloyd-La Follettee Act of 1912 (5 U.S.C. §7211) countered executive orders, issued by Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft, that prohibited civil service employees from communicating directly with Congress.
It also guaranteed that “the right of any persons employed in the civil service … to petition Congress, or any Member thereof, or to furnish information to either House of Congress, or to any committee or member thereof, shall not be denied or interfered with.”
The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 (P.L. 101-12, 5 U.S.C. ch. 12) makes it a prohibited personnel practice for an agency employee to take (or not take) any action against an employee that is in retaliation for disclosure of information that the employee believes relates to violation of law, rule, or regulation or evidences gross mismanagement, waste, fraud, or abuse of authority (5 U.S.C. §2302(b)(8)).
The prohibition is explicitly intended to protect disclosures to Congress: “This subsection shall not be construed to authorize the withholding of information from Congress or the taking of any personnel action against an employee who discloses information to Congress.”
The Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act (P.L. 105-272) establishes special procedures for personnel in the Intelligence Community to transmit urgent concerns involving classified information to inspectors general and the House and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence.
Section 714 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117) prohibits the payment of the salary of any officer or employee of the federal government who prohibits, prevents, attempts, or threatens to prohibit or prevent any other federal officer or employee from having direct oral or written communication or contact with any Member, committee, or subcommittee.
This prohibition applies irrespective of whether such communication was initiated by such officer or employee or in response to the request or inquiry of such Member, committee, or subcommittee.
Further, any punishment or threat of punishment because of any contact or communication by an officer or employee with a Member, committee, or subcommittee is prohibited under the provisions of this act.
Section 716 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117) prohibits the expenditure of any appropriated funds for use in implementing or enforcing agreement in Standard Forms 312 and 4414 of the government or any other non-disclosure policy, form, or agreement if such policy, form, or agreement does not contain a provision that states that the restrictions are consistent with and do not supersede, conflict with, or otherwise alter the employee obligation, rights, and liabilities created by Executive Order 12958; 13 the Lloyd-La Follette Act (5 U.S.C. §7211); the Military Whistleblower Act (10 U.S.C. §1034); the Whistleblower Protection Act (5 U.S.C. §2303(b)(8)); the Intelligence Identities Protection Act (50 U.S.C. §421 et seq.); and United States Code Title 18, Sections 641, 793, 794, 798, and 952 and Title 50, Section 783(b).
12 See also pages 67-71.
13 Executive Order 12958 was promulgated by President Bill Clinton on April 20, 1995, and established the classification system for national security information.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MANUAL
Congressional Oversight Manual, continued ...
Updated January 16, 2020
Congressional Research Service
Purposes, Authority, and Participants, continued ...
Principal Statutory Authority: Illustrative Examples, continued ...
Direct Expansions of Congress’s Oversight Power, concluded ...
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 (P.L. 67-13) establishing GAO
Stated that GAO “shall be independent of the executive departments and under the control and direction of the Comptroller General of the United States.”
Granted authority to the comptroller general to “investigate, at the seat of government or elsewhere, all matters relating to the receipt, disbursement, and application of public funds.”
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (P.L. 79-600):
Mandated House and Senate committees to exercise “continuous watchfulness” of the administration of laws and programs under their jurisdiction.
Authorized, for the first time in history, permanent professional and clerical staff for committees.
Authorized and directed the comptroller general to make administrative management analyses of each executive branch agency.
Established the Legislative Reference Service, renamed the Congressional Research Service by the 1970 Legislative Reorganization Act (see below), as a separate department in the Library of Congress and called upon the service “to advise and assist any committee of either House or joint committee in the analysis, appraisal, and evaluation of any legislative proposal … and otherwise to assist in furnishing a basis for the proper determination of measures before the committee.”
Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-577):
Required that House and Senate committees having jurisdiction over grants-in-aid conduct studies of the programs under which grants-in-aid are made.
Provided that studies of these programs are to determine whether (1) their purposes have been met, (2) their objectives could be carried on without further assistance, (3) they are adequate to meet needs, and (4) any changes in programs or procedures should be made.
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-510):
Revised and rephrased in more explicit language the oversight function of House and Senate standing committees: “each standing committee shall review and study, on a continuing basis, the application, administration, and execution of those laws or parts of laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of that committee.”
Required most House and Senate committees to issue biennial oversight reports.
Strengthened the program evaluation responsibilities and other authorities and duties of the GAO.
Re-designated the Legislative Reference Service as the Congressional Research Service, strengthening its policy analysis role and expanding its other responsibilities to Congress.
Recommended that House and Senate committees ascertain whether programs within their jurisdiction could be appropriated for annually.
Required most House and Senate committees to include in their committee reports on legislation five-year cost estimates for carrying out the proposed program.
Increased by two the number of permanent staff for each standing committee, including provisions for minority party hirings, and provided for hiring of consultants by standing committees.
Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972 (P.L. 92-463):
Directed House and Senate committees to make a continuing review of the activities of each advisory committee under its jurisdiction.
The studies are to determine whether (1) such committee should be abolished or merged with any other advisory committee, (2) its responsibility should be revised, and (3) it performs a necessary function not already being performed. 14
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-344):
Expanded House and Senate committee authority for oversight.
Permitted committees to appraise and evaluate programs themselves “or by contract, or (to) require a Government agency to do so and furnish a report thereon to the Congress.”
Directed the comptroller general to “review and evaluate the results of Government programs and activities” on his own initiative or at the request of either House or any standing or joint committee and to assist committees in analyzing and assessing program reviews or evaluation studies.
Authorized GAO to establish an Office of Program Review and Evaluation to carry out these responsibilities.
Strengthened GAO’s role in acquiring fiscal, budgetary, and program-related information;
Established House and Senate Budget Committees and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).
The CBO director is authorized to “secure information, data, estimates, and statistics directly from the various departments, agencies, and establishments” of the government.
Required any House or Senate legislative committee report on a public bill or resolution to include an analysis (prepared by CBO) providing an estimate and comparison of costs that would be incurred in carrying out the bill during the next and following four fiscal years in which it would be effective.
Public Debt Limit Increase of 2010 (P.L. 111-139):
Required the comptroller general to conduct routine investigations to identify programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives with duplicative goals and activities within departments and government-wide and report annually to Congress on the findings, including the cost of such duplication.
GAO Access and Oversight Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-3):
Authorized GAO to obtain federal agency records, including through civil actions, required to discharge GAO’s audit, evaluation, and investigative duties.
Provided that no provision of the Social Security Act shall be construed to limit, amend, or supersede GAO’s authority to obtain information or inspect records about an agency’s duties, powers, activities, organization, or financial transactions.
Required agency statements on actions taken or planned in response to GAO recommendations to be submitted to the congressional committees with jurisdiction over the pertinent agency program or activity.
14 86 Stat. 771 (1972).
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Updated January 16, 2020
Congressional Research Service
Purposes, Authority, and Participants, continued ...
Principal Statutory Authority: Illustrative Examples, continued ...
Direct Expansions of Congress’s Oversight Power, concluded ...
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 (P.L. 67-13) establishing GAO
Stated that GAO “shall be independent of the executive departments and under the control and direction of the Comptroller General of the United States.”
Granted authority to the comptroller general to “investigate, at the seat of government or elsewhere, all matters relating to the receipt, disbursement, and application of public funds.”
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (P.L. 79-600):
Mandated House and Senate committees to exercise “continuous watchfulness” of the administration of laws and programs under their jurisdiction.
Authorized, for the first time in history, permanent professional and clerical staff for committees.
Authorized and directed the comptroller general to make administrative management analyses of each executive branch agency.
Established the Legislative Reference Service, renamed the Congressional Research Service by the 1970 Legislative Reorganization Act (see below), as a separate department in the Library of Congress and called upon the service “to advise and assist any committee of either House or joint committee in the analysis, appraisal, and evaluation of any legislative proposal … and otherwise to assist in furnishing a basis for the proper determination of measures before the committee.”
Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-577):
Required that House and Senate committees having jurisdiction over grants-in-aid conduct studies of the programs under which grants-in-aid are made.
Provided that studies of these programs are to determine whether (1) their purposes have been met, (2) their objectives could be carried on without further assistance, (3) they are adequate to meet needs, and (4) any changes in programs or procedures should be made.
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-510):
Revised and rephrased in more explicit language the oversight function of House and Senate standing committees: “each standing committee shall review and study, on a continuing basis, the application, administration, and execution of those laws or parts of laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of that committee.”
Required most House and Senate committees to issue biennial oversight reports.
Strengthened the program evaluation responsibilities and other authorities and duties of the GAO.
Re-designated the Legislative Reference Service as the Congressional Research Service, strengthening its policy analysis role and expanding its other responsibilities to Congress.
Recommended that House and Senate committees ascertain whether programs within their jurisdiction could be appropriated for annually.
Required most House and Senate committees to include in their committee reports on legislation five-year cost estimates for carrying out the proposed program.
Increased by two the number of permanent staff for each standing committee, including provisions for minority party hirings, and provided for hiring of consultants by standing committees.
Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972 (P.L. 92-463):
Directed House and Senate committees to make a continuing review of the activities of each advisory committee under its jurisdiction.
The studies are to determine whether (1) such committee should be abolished or merged with any other advisory committee, (2) its responsibility should be revised, and (3) it performs a necessary function not already being performed. 14
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-344):
Expanded House and Senate committee authority for oversight.
Permitted committees to appraise and evaluate programs themselves “or by contract, or (to) require a Government agency to do so and furnish a report thereon to the Congress.”
Directed the comptroller general to “review and evaluate the results of Government programs and activities” on his own initiative or at the request of either House or any standing or joint committee and to assist committees in analyzing and assessing program reviews or evaluation studies.
Authorized GAO to establish an Office of Program Review and Evaluation to carry out these responsibilities.
Strengthened GAO’s role in acquiring fiscal, budgetary, and program-related information;
Established House and Senate Budget Committees and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).
The CBO director is authorized to “secure information, data, estimates, and statistics directly from the various departments, agencies, and establishments” of the government.
Required any House or Senate legislative committee report on a public bill or resolution to include an analysis (prepared by CBO) providing an estimate and comparison of costs that would be incurred in carrying out the bill during the next and following four fiscal years in which it would be effective.
Public Debt Limit Increase of 2010 (P.L. 111-139):
Required the comptroller general to conduct routine investigations to identify programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives with duplicative goals and activities within departments and government-wide and report annually to Congress on the findings, including the cost of such duplication.
GAO Access and Oversight Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-3):
Authorized GAO to obtain federal agency records, including through civil actions, required to discharge GAO’s audit, evaluation, and investigative duties.
Provided that no provision of the Social Security Act shall be construed to limit, amend, or supersede GAO’s authority to obtain information or inspect records about an agency’s duties, powers, activities, organization, or financial transactions.
Required agency statements on actions taken or planned in response to GAO recommendations to be submitted to the congressional committees with jurisdiction over the pertinent agency program or activity.
14 86 Stat. 771 (1972).
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MANUAL
Congressional Oversight Manual, continued ...
Updated January 16, 2020
Congressional Research Service
Purposes, Authority, and Participants, continued ...
Principal Statutory Authority: Illustrative Examples, continued ...
Indirect Expansions of Congress’s Oversight Power
Separate from expanding its own authority and resources directly, Congress has strengthened its oversight capabilities indirectly by, for instance, establishing study commissions to review and evaluate programs, policies, and operations of the government.
In addition, Congress has created various mechanisms, structures, and procedures within the executive branch that improve the executive’s ability to monitor and control its own operations and, at the same time, provide additional information and oversight-related analyses to Congress.
These statutory provisions include:
Inspector General Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-452, 5 U.S.C. Appendix 3): Established offices of inspectors general in all cabinet departments and larger agencies and numerous boards, commissions, and government corporations.
Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-576): Established chief financial officers in all cabinet departments and larger agencies.
Financial Integrity Act of 1982 (P.L. 97-255): Designed to improve the government’s ability to manage its programs.
Cash Management Improvement Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-453): Designed to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and equity in the exchange of funds between the federal government and state governments.
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (P.L. 103-62), as amended by the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-352): Designed to increase efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability within the government.
Government Management and Reform Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-356): Designed to improve the executive’s stewardship of federal resources and accountability.
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (P.L. 104-13): Controlled federal paperwork requirements.
Information Technology Management Reform Act (P.L. 104-106): Established the position of chief information officer in federal agencies to provide relevant advice for purchasing the best and most cost-effective information technology available.
Single Audit Act of 1984 (P.L. 98-502), as amended by the Single Audit Act Amendments of 1996 (P.L. 104-156): Established uniform audit requirements for state and local governments and nonprofit organizations receiving federal financial assistance;
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-121): Created a mechanism, the Congressional Review Act (CRA), by which Congress can review and disapprove a final federal rule or regulation.
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-343):
Allowed the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase and insure “troubled assets” to help promote the strength of the economy and financial system.
The act established two organizations to provide broad oversight of the program — a Financial Stability Oversight Board and a Congressional Oversight Panel.
Placed audit responsibilities for the program with two individuals — a new special inspector general for the Troubled Asset Relief Program and the comptroller general.
In 2010, Congress called on GAO to report annually, identifying “areas of potential duplication, overlap, and fragmentation, which, if effectively addressed, could provide financial and other benefits.”
Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-282): Enabled the public to access information on all entities and organizations receiving federal grants and contracts over $25,000.
Summary information on these matters is made available on a single, searchable website: USASpending.gov.
The law required the comptroller general to submit a report to Congress on compliance with the act.
The 2006 law was amended two years later by the Government Funding Transparency Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-252).
It required recipients of federal awards to report certain information about themselves and other recipients.
Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-101):
Established government-wide standardization of federal spending data beyond grants and contracts with the aim of creating a unified, publicly accessible data set of information on all federal spending.
Required the comptroller general, after reviewing federal agency inspector general reports, to submit to Congress and make publicly available a report assessing and comparing the completeness, timeliness, quality, and accuracy of the data submitted by federal agencies and the implementation and use of data standards by federal agencies.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Updated January 16, 2020
Congressional Research Service
Purposes, Authority, and Participants, continued ...
Principal Statutory Authority: Illustrative Examples, continued ...
Indirect Expansions of Congress’s Oversight Power
Separate from expanding its own authority and resources directly, Congress has strengthened its oversight capabilities indirectly by, for instance, establishing study commissions to review and evaluate programs, policies, and operations of the government.
In addition, Congress has created various mechanisms, structures, and procedures within the executive branch that improve the executive’s ability to monitor and control its own operations and, at the same time, provide additional information and oversight-related analyses to Congress.
These statutory provisions include:
Inspector General Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-452, 5 U.S.C. Appendix 3): Established offices of inspectors general in all cabinet departments and larger agencies and numerous boards, commissions, and government corporations.
Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-576): Established chief financial officers in all cabinet departments and larger agencies.
Financial Integrity Act of 1982 (P.L. 97-255): Designed to improve the government’s ability to manage its programs.
Cash Management Improvement Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-453): Designed to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and equity in the exchange of funds between the federal government and state governments.
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (P.L. 103-62), as amended by the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-352): Designed to increase efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability within the government.
Government Management and Reform Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-356): Designed to improve the executive’s stewardship of federal resources and accountability.
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (P.L. 104-13): Controlled federal paperwork requirements.
Information Technology Management Reform Act (P.L. 104-106): Established the position of chief information officer in federal agencies to provide relevant advice for purchasing the best and most cost-effective information technology available.
Single Audit Act of 1984 (P.L. 98-502), as amended by the Single Audit Act Amendments of 1996 (P.L. 104-156): Established uniform audit requirements for state and local governments and nonprofit organizations receiving federal financial assistance;
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-121): Created a mechanism, the Congressional Review Act (CRA), by which Congress can review and disapprove a final federal rule or regulation.
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-343):
Allowed the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase and insure “troubled assets” to help promote the strength of the economy and financial system.
The act established two organizations to provide broad oversight of the program — a Financial Stability Oversight Board and a Congressional Oversight Panel.
Placed audit responsibilities for the program with two individuals — a new special inspector general for the Troubled Asset Relief Program and the comptroller general.
In 2010, Congress called on GAO to report annually, identifying “areas of potential duplication, overlap, and fragmentation, which, if effectively addressed, could provide financial and other benefits.”
Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-282): Enabled the public to access information on all entities and organizations receiving federal grants and contracts over $25,000.
Summary information on these matters is made available on a single, searchable website: USASpending.gov.
The law required the comptroller general to submit a report to Congress on compliance with the act.
The 2006 law was amended two years later by the Government Funding Transparency Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-252).
It required recipients of federal awards to report certain information about themselves and other recipients.
Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-101):
Established government-wide standardization of federal spending data beyond grants and contracts with the aim of creating a unified, publicly accessible data set of information on all federal spending.
Required the comptroller general, after reviewing federal agency inspector general reports, to submit to Congress and make publicly available a report assessing and comparing the completeness, timeliness, quality, and accuracy of the data submitted by federal agencies and the implementation and use of data standards by federal agencies.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MANUAL
Congressional Oversight Manual, continued ...
Updated January 16, 2020
Congressional Research Service
Purposes, Authority, and Participants, continued ...
Illustrative Examples of House and Senate Rules on Oversight
House Rules
House rules 15 grant the Committee on Oversight and Reform a comprehensive role in the conduct of oversight.
For example, the committee has the authority or responsibility to:
review and study on a continuing basis the operation of government activities at all levels, including the Executive Office of the President (Rule X, clause 3).
receive and examine reports of the Comptroller General and submit to the House such recommendations as it considers necessary or desirable in connection with the subject matter of the reports (Rule X, clause 4).
study intergovernmental relationships between the United States and the states and municipalities and between the United States and international organizations of which the United States is a member (Rule X, clause 4).
conduct investigations, at its discretion and at any time, of matters that are jurisdictionally conferred to another standing committee.
The findings and recommendations of the Oversight and Reform Committee in such an investigation shall be made available to any other standing committee having jurisdiction over the matter involved (Rule X, clause 4).
report to the House not later than April 15 in the first session of a Congress — after consultation with the Speaker, the majority leader, and the minority leader — the authorization and oversight plans submitted by the committees together with any recommendations that the Oversight and Reform Committee, or the House leadership group, may make to ensure the most effective coordination of authorization and oversight plans (Rule X, clause 2).
choose to adopt a rule authorizing and regulating the taking of depositions by a Member or counsel of the committee including pursuant to subpoena under clause 2(m) of Rule XI (Rule X, clause 4).
evaluate the effect of laws enacted to reorganize the legislative and executive branches of government.
House rules also provide authority for oversight by other standing committees as follows:
Each standing committee (except Appropriations) shall review and study the application, administration, execution, and effectiveness of all laws within its jurisdiction and determine whether laws and programs addressing subjects within its jurisdiction should be continued, curtailed, or eliminated (Rule X, clause 2).
Information pertinent to committee oversight and investigative procedures, such as subpoena power, can be found in Rule XI, clauses 1 and 2.
Committees have the authority to review and study the impact or probable impact of tax policies on subjects that fall within their jurisdiction (Rule X, clause 2).
Certain committees have special oversight authority (i.e., to review and study, on an ongoing basis, specific subject areas that are within the legislative jurisdiction of other committees).
Special oversight is somewhat akin to the broad oversight authority granted the Committee on Oversight and Reform by the 1946 Legislature Reorganization Act except that special oversight is generally limited to named subjects (Rule X, clause 3).
Each standing committee having more than 20 members shall establish an oversight subcommittee or require its subcommittees to conduct oversight in their respective jurisdictional areas (Rule X, clause 2 and 5).
Committee reports on measures are to include oversight findings separately set out and clearly identified.
They are also to include a statement of general performance goals and objectives, including outcome-related goals and objectives, for which the measure authorizes funding (Rule XIII, clause 3).
Each standing committee, or a subcommittee thereof, shall hold at least one hearing during each 120-day period following the establishment of the committee on the topic of waste, fraud, abuse, or mismanagement in government programs that that committee may authorize.
Such hearings shall include a focus on the most egregious instances of waste, fraud, abuse, or mismanagement in government programs as documented by any report the committees have received from the comptroller general or an inspector general.
Committee and subcommittees shall also hold at least one hearing on issues raised by reports issued by the comptroller general indicating that federal programs or operations that the committee may authorize are at high risk for waste, fraud, and mismanagement, known as the “high-risk list” or “high-risk series” (Rule XI, clause 2).
The chair of each standing committee (except Appropriations, Ethics, and Rules) shall prepare, in consultation with the ranking minority member, an oversight plan for that Congress not later than March 1 of the first session of a Congress.
Committee plans shall be submitted simultaneously to the Committees on Oversight and Reform and House Administration.
No later than April 15 in the first session of a Congress — after consultation with the Speaker, the majority leader, and the minority leader — the Committee on Oversight and Reform shall report to the House on the oversight plans of the committees together with any recommendations that it, or the House leadership group, may make to ensure the most effective coordination of oversight plans and otherwise to achieve these objectives.
In developing their plans, each standing committee shall to the maximum extent feasible (Rule X, clause 2):
consult with other committees that have jurisdiction over the same or related laws, programs, or agencies with the objective of ensuring maximum coordination and cooperation among committees when conducting reviews of such laws, programs, or agencies and include in the plan an explanation of steps that have been or will be taken to ensure such coordination and cooperation;
review specific problems with federal rules, regulations, statutes, and court decisions that are ambiguous, arbitrary, or nonsensical or that impose severe financial burdens on individuals;
give priority consideration to including in the plan the review of those laws, programs, or agencies operating under permanent budget authority or permanent statutory authority;
have a view toward ensuring that all significant laws, programs, or agencies within the committee’s jurisdiction are subject to review every 10 years; and
have a view toward insuring against duplication of federal programs.
Each committee must submit to the House not later than January 2 of each odd numbered year a report that includes (Rule XI, clause 1):
separate sections summarizing the legislative and oversight activities of the committee during the applicable period,
a summary of the oversight plans submitted by the committee,
a summary of the actions taken and recommendations made with respect to the authorization and oversight plans, and
a summary of any additional oversight activities undertaken by that committee and any recommendations made or actions taken thereon.
In addition, the Speaker, with the approval of the House, may appoint special ad hoc oversight committees for the purpose of reviewing specific matters within the jurisdiction of two or more standing committees (Rule X, clause 2).
15 The rules of the House of Representatives are available at https://rules.house.gov/rules-and-resou ... sentatives.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Updated January 16, 2020
Congressional Research Service
Purposes, Authority, and Participants, continued ...
Illustrative Examples of House and Senate Rules on Oversight
House Rules
House rules 15 grant the Committee on Oversight and Reform a comprehensive role in the conduct of oversight.
For example, the committee has the authority or responsibility to:
review and study on a continuing basis the operation of government activities at all levels, including the Executive Office of the President (Rule X, clause 3).
receive and examine reports of the Comptroller General and submit to the House such recommendations as it considers necessary or desirable in connection with the subject matter of the reports (Rule X, clause 4).
study intergovernmental relationships between the United States and the states and municipalities and between the United States and international organizations of which the United States is a member (Rule X, clause 4).
conduct investigations, at its discretion and at any time, of matters that are jurisdictionally conferred to another standing committee.
The findings and recommendations of the Oversight and Reform Committee in such an investigation shall be made available to any other standing committee having jurisdiction over the matter involved (Rule X, clause 4).
report to the House not later than April 15 in the first session of a Congress — after consultation with the Speaker, the majority leader, and the minority leader — the authorization and oversight plans submitted by the committees together with any recommendations that the Oversight and Reform Committee, or the House leadership group, may make to ensure the most effective coordination of authorization and oversight plans (Rule X, clause 2).
choose to adopt a rule authorizing and regulating the taking of depositions by a Member or counsel of the committee including pursuant to subpoena under clause 2(m) of Rule XI (Rule X, clause 4).
evaluate the effect of laws enacted to reorganize the legislative and executive branches of government.
House rules also provide authority for oversight by other standing committees as follows:
Each standing committee (except Appropriations) shall review and study the application, administration, execution, and effectiveness of all laws within its jurisdiction and determine whether laws and programs addressing subjects within its jurisdiction should be continued, curtailed, or eliminated (Rule X, clause 2).
Information pertinent to committee oversight and investigative procedures, such as subpoena power, can be found in Rule XI, clauses 1 and 2.
Committees have the authority to review and study the impact or probable impact of tax policies on subjects that fall within their jurisdiction (Rule X, clause 2).
Certain committees have special oversight authority (i.e., to review and study, on an ongoing basis, specific subject areas that are within the legislative jurisdiction of other committees).
Special oversight is somewhat akin to the broad oversight authority granted the Committee on Oversight and Reform by the 1946 Legislature Reorganization Act except that special oversight is generally limited to named subjects (Rule X, clause 3).
Each standing committee having more than 20 members shall establish an oversight subcommittee or require its subcommittees to conduct oversight in their respective jurisdictional areas (Rule X, clause 2 and 5).
Committee reports on measures are to include oversight findings separately set out and clearly identified.
They are also to include a statement of general performance goals and objectives, including outcome-related goals and objectives, for which the measure authorizes funding (Rule XIII, clause 3).
Each standing committee, or a subcommittee thereof, shall hold at least one hearing during each 120-day period following the establishment of the committee on the topic of waste, fraud, abuse, or mismanagement in government programs that that committee may authorize.
Such hearings shall include a focus on the most egregious instances of waste, fraud, abuse, or mismanagement in government programs as documented by any report the committees have received from the comptroller general or an inspector general.
Committee and subcommittees shall also hold at least one hearing on issues raised by reports issued by the comptroller general indicating that federal programs or operations that the committee may authorize are at high risk for waste, fraud, and mismanagement, known as the “high-risk list” or “high-risk series” (Rule XI, clause 2).
The chair of each standing committee (except Appropriations, Ethics, and Rules) shall prepare, in consultation with the ranking minority member, an oversight plan for that Congress not later than March 1 of the first session of a Congress.
Committee plans shall be submitted simultaneously to the Committees on Oversight and Reform and House Administration.
No later than April 15 in the first session of a Congress — after consultation with the Speaker, the majority leader, and the minority leader — the Committee on Oversight and Reform shall report to the House on the oversight plans of the committees together with any recommendations that it, or the House leadership group, may make to ensure the most effective coordination of oversight plans and otherwise to achieve these objectives.
In developing their plans, each standing committee shall to the maximum extent feasible (Rule X, clause 2):
consult with other committees that have jurisdiction over the same or related laws, programs, or agencies with the objective of ensuring maximum coordination and cooperation among committees when conducting reviews of such laws, programs, or agencies and include in the plan an explanation of steps that have been or will be taken to ensure such coordination and cooperation;
review specific problems with federal rules, regulations, statutes, and court decisions that are ambiguous, arbitrary, or nonsensical or that impose severe financial burdens on individuals;
give priority consideration to including in the plan the review of those laws, programs, or agencies operating under permanent budget authority or permanent statutory authority;
have a view toward ensuring that all significant laws, programs, or agencies within the committee’s jurisdiction are subject to review every 10 years; and
have a view toward insuring against duplication of federal programs.
Each committee must submit to the House not later than January 2 of each odd numbered year a report that includes (Rule XI, clause 1):
separate sections summarizing the legislative and oversight activities of the committee during the applicable period,
a summary of the oversight plans submitted by the committee,
a summary of the actions taken and recommendations made with respect to the authorization and oversight plans, and
a summary of any additional oversight activities undertaken by that committee and any recommendations made or actions taken thereon.
In addition, the Speaker, with the approval of the House, may appoint special ad hoc oversight committees for the purpose of reviewing specific matters within the jurisdiction of two or more standing committees (Rule X, clause 2).
15 The rules of the House of Representatives are available at https://rules.house.gov/rules-and-resou ... sentatives.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MANUAL
Congressional Oversight Manual, continued ...
Updated January 16, 2020
Congressional Research Service
Purposes, Authority, and Participants, continued ...
Illustrative Examples of House and Senate Rules on Oversight, concluded ...
Senate Rules
Under Senate Rules, 16 each standing committee (except for Appropriations and Budget) shall review and study, on a continuing basis, the application, administration, and execution of those laws, or parts of laws, within its legislative jurisdiction (Rule XXVI, clause 8).
In addition to that general oversight requirement, “comprehensive policy oversight” responsibilities are granted to specified standing committees.
This duty is similar to special oversight in the House.
For example, the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry is authorized to study and review, on a comprehensive basis, matters relating to food, nutrition, and hunger both in the United States and in foreign countries — and rural affairs — and report thereon from time to time (Rule XXV, clause 1(a)).
All standing committees, except Appropriations, are required to include regulatory impact evaluations in their committee reports accompanying each public bill or joint resolution (Rule XXVI, clause 11).
The evaluations are to include matters such as:
an estimate of the numbers of individuals and businesses that would be regulated,
a determination of the measure’s economic impact and effect on personal privacy, and
a determination of the amount of additional paperwork that will result from the regulations.
The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs exercises jurisdiction over government operations generally and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in particular.
Selected oversight duties under Rule XXV, clause 1(k) include:
reviewing and studying on a continuing basis the operation of government activities at all levels to determine their economy, effectiveness, and efficiency;
receiving and examining reports of the comptroller general and submit recommendations as it deems necessary to the Senate;
evaluating the effects of laws enacted to reorganize the legislative and executive branches of the government; and
studying intergovernmental relationships between the United States and the states and municipalities and international organizations of which the United States is a member.
Finally, on March 1, 1948 (during the 80th Congress), the Senate adopted S.Res. 189, which established the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (then titled the Committee on Government Operations).
The subcommittee was an outgrowth of the 1941 Truman Committee (after Senator Harry Truman), which investigated fraud and mismanagement of the nation’s war program.
The Truman Committee ended in 1948, but the chairman of the Government Operations Committee transferred the functions of the Truman Committee to a subcommittee: the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.
Since then this subcommittee has investigated scores of issues, such as government waste, fraud, and inefficiency.
16 The rules of the Senate are available at https://www.rules.senate.gov/rules-of-the-senate.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Updated January 16, 2020
Congressional Research Service
Purposes, Authority, and Participants, continued ...
Illustrative Examples of House and Senate Rules on Oversight, concluded ...
Senate Rules
Under Senate Rules, 16 each standing committee (except for Appropriations and Budget) shall review and study, on a continuing basis, the application, administration, and execution of those laws, or parts of laws, within its legislative jurisdiction (Rule XXVI, clause 8).
In addition to that general oversight requirement, “comprehensive policy oversight” responsibilities are granted to specified standing committees.
This duty is similar to special oversight in the House.
For example, the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry is authorized to study and review, on a comprehensive basis, matters relating to food, nutrition, and hunger both in the United States and in foreign countries — and rural affairs — and report thereon from time to time (Rule XXV, clause 1(a)).
All standing committees, except Appropriations, are required to include regulatory impact evaluations in their committee reports accompanying each public bill or joint resolution (Rule XXVI, clause 11).
The evaluations are to include matters such as:
an estimate of the numbers of individuals and businesses that would be regulated,
a determination of the measure’s economic impact and effect on personal privacy, and
a determination of the amount of additional paperwork that will result from the regulations.
The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs exercises jurisdiction over government operations generally and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in particular.
Selected oversight duties under Rule XXV, clause 1(k) include:
reviewing and studying on a continuing basis the operation of government activities at all levels to determine their economy, effectiveness, and efficiency;
receiving and examining reports of the comptroller general and submit recommendations as it deems necessary to the Senate;
evaluating the effects of laws enacted to reorganize the legislative and executive branches of the government; and
studying intergovernmental relationships between the United States and the states and municipalities and international organizations of which the United States is a member.
Finally, on March 1, 1948 (during the 80th Congress), the Senate adopted S.Res. 189, which established the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (then titled the Committee on Government Operations).
The subcommittee was an outgrowth of the 1941 Truman Committee (after Senator Harry Truman), which investigated fraud and mismanagement of the nation’s war program.
The Truman Committee ended in 1948, but the chairman of the Government Operations Committee transferred the functions of the Truman Committee to a subcommittee: the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.
Since then this subcommittee has investigated scores of issues, such as government waste, fraud, and inefficiency.
16 The rules of the Senate are available at https://www.rules.senate.gov/rules-of-the-senate.
TO BE CONTINUED ...