John T. WATKINS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America, Supreme Court 354 U.S. 178, continued ...
50 More important and more fundamental than that, however, it insulates the House that has authorized the investigation from the witnesses who are subjected to the sanctions of compulsory process.
There is a wide gulf between the responsibility for the use of investigative power and the actual exercise of that power.
This is an especially vital consideration in assuring respect for constitutional liberties.
Protected freedoms should not be placed in danger in the absence of a clear determination by the House or the Senate that a particular inquiry is justified by a specific legislative need.
51 It is, of course, not the function of this Court to prescribe rigid rules for the Congress to follow in drafting resolutions establishing investigating committees.
That is a matter peculiarly within the realm of the legislature, and its decisions will be accepted by the courts up to the point where their own duty to enforce the constitutionally protected rights of individuals is affected.
An excessively broad charter, like that of the House Un-American Activities Committee, places the courts in an untenable position if they are to strike a balance between the public need for a particular interogation and the right of citizens to carry on their affairs free from unnecessary governmental interference.
It is impossible in such a situation to ascertain whether any legislative purpose justifies the disclosures sought and, if so, the importance of that information to the Congress in furtherance of its legislative function.
The reason no court can make this critical judgment is that the House of Representatives itself has never made it.
Only the legislative assembly initiating an investigation can assay the relative necessity of specific disclosures.
52 Absence of the qualitative consideration of petitioner's questioning by the House of Representatives aggravates a serious problem, revealed in this case, in the relationship of congressional investigating committees and the witnesses who appear before them.
Plainly these committees are restricted to the missions delegated to them, i.e., to acquire certain data to be used by the House or the Senate in coping with a problem that falls within its legislative sphere.
No witness can be compelled to make disclosures on matters outside that area.
This is a jurisdictional concept of pertinency drawn from the nature of a congressional committee's source of authority.
It is not wholly different from nor unrelated to the element of pertinency embodied in the criminal statute under which petitioner was prosecuted.
When the definition of jurisdictional pertinency is as uncertain and wavering as in the case of the Un-American Activities Committee, it becomes extremely difficult for the Committee to limit its inquiries to statutory pertinency.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
WATKINS V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Re: WATKINS V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
John T. WATKINS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America, Supreme Court 354 U.S. 178, continued ...
53 Since World War II, the Congress has practically abandoned its original practice of utilizing the coercive sanction of contempt proceedings at the bar of the House.
The sanction there imposed is imprisonment by the House until the recalcitrant witness agrees to testify or disclose the matters sought, provided that the incarceration does not extend beyond adjournment.
The Congress has instead invoked the aid of the federal judicial system in protecting itself against contumacious conduct.
It has become customary to refer these matters to the United States Attorneys for prosecution under criminal law.
54 The appropriate statute is found in 2 U.S.C. § 192, 2 U.S.C.A. § 192.
It provides:
55 'Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the authority of either House of Congress to give testimony or to produce papers upon any matter under inquiry before either House, or any joint committee established by a joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, or any committee of either House of Congress, willfully makes default, or who, having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 nor less than $100 and imprisonment in a common jail for not less than one month nor more than twelve months.' 45
56 In fulfillment of their obligation under this statute, the courts must accord to the defendants every right which is guaranteed to defendants in all other criminal cases.
Among these is the right to have available, through a sufficiently precise statute, information revealing the standard of criminality before the commission of the alleged offense. 46
Applied to persons prosecuted under § 192, this raises a special problem in that the statute defines the crime as refusal to answer 'any question pertinent to the question under inquiry.'
Part of the standard of criminality, therefore, is the pertinency of the questions propounded to the witness. 47
57 The problem attains proportion when viewed from the standpoint of the witness who appears before a congressional committee.
He must decide at the time the questions are propounded whether or not to answer.
As the Court said in Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 49 S.Ct. 268, 73 L.Ed. 692, the witness acts at his peril - he is '* * * bound rightly to construe the statute.' Id., 279 U.S. at page 299, 49 S.Ct. at page 274.
An erroneous determination on his part, even if made in the utmost good faith, does not exculpate him if the court should later rule that the questions were pertinent to the question under inquiry.
58 It is obvious that a person compelled to make this choice is entitled to have knowledge of the subject to which the interrogation is deemed pertinent.
That knowledge must be available with the same degree of explicitness and clarity that the Due Process Clause requires in the expression of any element of a criminal offense.
The 'vice of vagueness' 48 must be avoided here as in all other crimes.
There are several sources that can outline the 'question under inquiry' in such a way that the rules against vagueness are satisfied.
The authorizing resolution, the remarks of the chairman or members of the committee, or even the nature of the proceedings themselves, might sometimes make the topic clear.
This case demonstrates, however, that these sources often leave the matter in grave doubt.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
53 Since World War II, the Congress has practically abandoned its original practice of utilizing the coercive sanction of contempt proceedings at the bar of the House.
The sanction there imposed is imprisonment by the House until the recalcitrant witness agrees to testify or disclose the matters sought, provided that the incarceration does not extend beyond adjournment.
The Congress has instead invoked the aid of the federal judicial system in protecting itself against contumacious conduct.
It has become customary to refer these matters to the United States Attorneys for prosecution under criminal law.
54 The appropriate statute is found in 2 U.S.C. § 192, 2 U.S.C.A. § 192.
It provides:
55 'Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the authority of either House of Congress to give testimony or to produce papers upon any matter under inquiry before either House, or any joint committee established by a joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, or any committee of either House of Congress, willfully makes default, or who, having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 nor less than $100 and imprisonment in a common jail for not less than one month nor more than twelve months.' 45
56 In fulfillment of their obligation under this statute, the courts must accord to the defendants every right which is guaranteed to defendants in all other criminal cases.
Among these is the right to have available, through a sufficiently precise statute, information revealing the standard of criminality before the commission of the alleged offense. 46
Applied to persons prosecuted under § 192, this raises a special problem in that the statute defines the crime as refusal to answer 'any question pertinent to the question under inquiry.'
Part of the standard of criminality, therefore, is the pertinency of the questions propounded to the witness. 47
57 The problem attains proportion when viewed from the standpoint of the witness who appears before a congressional committee.
He must decide at the time the questions are propounded whether or not to answer.
As the Court said in Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 49 S.Ct. 268, 73 L.Ed. 692, the witness acts at his peril - he is '* * * bound rightly to construe the statute.' Id., 279 U.S. at page 299, 49 S.Ct. at page 274.
An erroneous determination on his part, even if made in the utmost good faith, does not exculpate him if the court should later rule that the questions were pertinent to the question under inquiry.
58 It is obvious that a person compelled to make this choice is entitled to have knowledge of the subject to which the interrogation is deemed pertinent.
That knowledge must be available with the same degree of explicitness and clarity that the Due Process Clause requires in the expression of any element of a criminal offense.
The 'vice of vagueness' 48 must be avoided here as in all other crimes.
There are several sources that can outline the 'question under inquiry' in such a way that the rules against vagueness are satisfied.
The authorizing resolution, the remarks of the chairman or members of the committee, or even the nature of the proceedings themselves, might sometimes make the topic clear.
This case demonstrates, however, that these sources often leave the matter in grave doubt.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: WATKINS V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
John T. WATKINS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America, Supreme Court 354 U.S. 178, continued ...
59 The first possibility is that the authorizing resolution itself will so clearly declare the 'question under inquiry' that a witness can understand the pertinency of questions asked him.
The Government does not contend that the authorizing resolution of the Un-American Activities Committee could serve such a purpose.
Its confusing breadth is amply illustrated by the innumerable and diverse questions into which the Committee has inquired under this charter since 1938.
If the 'question under inquiry' were stated with such sweeping and uncertain scope, we doubt that it would withstand an attack on the ground of vagueness.
60 That issue is not before us, however, in light of the Government's position that the immediate subject under inquiry before the Subcommittee interviewing petitioner was only one aspect of the Committee's authority to investigate un-American activities.
Distilling that single topic from the broad field is an extremely difficult task upon the record before us.
There was an opening statement by the Committee Chairman at the outset of the hearing, but this gives us no guidance.
In this statement, the Chairman did no more than paraphrase the authorizing resolution and give a very general sketch of the past efforts of the Committee. 49
61 No aid is given as to the 'question under inquiry' in the action of the full Committee that authorized the creation of the Subcommittee before which petitioner appeared.
The Committee adopted a formal resolution giving the Chairman the power to appoint subcommittees '* * * for the purpose of performing any and all acts which the Committee as a whole is authorized to do.' 50
In effect, this was a device to enable the investigations to proceed with a quorum of one or two members and sheds no light on the relevancy of the questions asked of petitioner. 51
62 The Government believes that the topic of inquiry before the Subcommittee concerned Communist infiltration in labor.
In his introductory remarks, the Chairman made reference to a bill, then pending before the Committee, 52 which would have penalized labor unions controlled or dominated by persons who were, or had been, members of a 'Communist-action' organization, as defined in the Internal Security Act of 1950.
The Subcommittee, it is contended, might have been endeavoring to determine the extent of such a problem.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
59 The first possibility is that the authorizing resolution itself will so clearly declare the 'question under inquiry' that a witness can understand the pertinency of questions asked him.
The Government does not contend that the authorizing resolution of the Un-American Activities Committee could serve such a purpose.
Its confusing breadth is amply illustrated by the innumerable and diverse questions into which the Committee has inquired under this charter since 1938.
If the 'question under inquiry' were stated with such sweeping and uncertain scope, we doubt that it would withstand an attack on the ground of vagueness.
60 That issue is not before us, however, in light of the Government's position that the immediate subject under inquiry before the Subcommittee interviewing petitioner was only one aspect of the Committee's authority to investigate un-American activities.
Distilling that single topic from the broad field is an extremely difficult task upon the record before us.
There was an opening statement by the Committee Chairman at the outset of the hearing, but this gives us no guidance.
In this statement, the Chairman did no more than paraphrase the authorizing resolution and give a very general sketch of the past efforts of the Committee. 49
61 No aid is given as to the 'question under inquiry' in the action of the full Committee that authorized the creation of the Subcommittee before which petitioner appeared.
The Committee adopted a formal resolution giving the Chairman the power to appoint subcommittees '* * * for the purpose of performing any and all acts which the Committee as a whole is authorized to do.' 50
In effect, this was a device to enable the investigations to proceed with a quorum of one or two members and sheds no light on the relevancy of the questions asked of petitioner. 51
62 The Government believes that the topic of inquiry before the Subcommittee concerned Communist infiltration in labor.
In his introductory remarks, the Chairman made reference to a bill, then pending before the Committee, 52 which would have penalized labor unions controlled or dominated by persons who were, or had been, members of a 'Communist-action' organization, as defined in the Internal Security Act of 1950.
The Subcommittee, it is contended, might have been endeavoring to determine the extent of such a problem.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: WATKINS V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
John T. WATKINS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America, Supreme Court 354 U.S. 178, continued ...
63 This view is corroborated somewhat by the witnesses who preceded and followed petitioner before the Subcommittee.
Looking at the entire hearings, however, there is strong reason to doubt that the subject revolved about labor matters.
The published transcript is entitled: Investigation of Communist Activities in the Chicago Area, and six of the nine witnesses had no connection with labor at all. 53
64 The most serious doubts as to the Subcommittee's 'question under inquiry,' however, stem from the precise questions that petitioner has been charged with refusing to answer.
Under the terms of the statute, after all, it is these which must be proved pertinent.
Petitioner is charged with refusing to tell the Subcommittee whether or not be knew that certain named persons had been members of the Communist Party in the past.
The Subcommittee's counsel read the list from the testimony of a previous witness who had identified them as Communists.
Although this former witness was identified with labor, he had not stated that the persons he named were involved in union affairs.
Of the thirty names propounded to petitioner, seven were completely unconnected with organized labor.
One operated a beauty parlor.
Another was a watchmaker.
Several were identified as 'just citizens' or 'only Communists.'
When almost a quarter of the persons on the list are not labor people, the inference becomes strong that the subject before the Subcommittee was not defined in terms of Communism in labor.
65 The final source of evidence as to the 'question under inquiry' is the Chairman's response when petitioner objected to the questions on the grounds of lack of pertinency.
The Chairman then announced that the Subcommittee was investigating 'subversion and subversive propaganda.' 54
This is a subject at least as broad and indefinite as the authorizing resolution of the Committee, if not more so.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
63 This view is corroborated somewhat by the witnesses who preceded and followed petitioner before the Subcommittee.
Looking at the entire hearings, however, there is strong reason to doubt that the subject revolved about labor matters.
The published transcript is entitled: Investigation of Communist Activities in the Chicago Area, and six of the nine witnesses had no connection with labor at all. 53
64 The most serious doubts as to the Subcommittee's 'question under inquiry,' however, stem from the precise questions that petitioner has been charged with refusing to answer.
Under the terms of the statute, after all, it is these which must be proved pertinent.
Petitioner is charged with refusing to tell the Subcommittee whether or not be knew that certain named persons had been members of the Communist Party in the past.
The Subcommittee's counsel read the list from the testimony of a previous witness who had identified them as Communists.
Although this former witness was identified with labor, he had not stated that the persons he named were involved in union affairs.
Of the thirty names propounded to petitioner, seven were completely unconnected with organized labor.
One operated a beauty parlor.
Another was a watchmaker.
Several were identified as 'just citizens' or 'only Communists.'
When almost a quarter of the persons on the list are not labor people, the inference becomes strong that the subject before the Subcommittee was not defined in terms of Communism in labor.
65 The final source of evidence as to the 'question under inquiry' is the Chairman's response when petitioner objected to the questions on the grounds of lack of pertinency.
The Chairman then announced that the Subcommittee was investigating 'subversion and subversive propaganda.' 54
This is a subject at least as broad and indefinite as the authorizing resolution of the Committee, if not more so.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: WATKINS V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
John T. WATKINS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America, Supreme Court 354 U.S. 178, continued ...
66 Having exhausted the several possible indicia of the 'question under inquiry,' we remain unenlightened as to the subject to which the questions asked petitioner were pertinent.
Certainly, if the point is that obscure after trial and appeal, it was not adequately revealed to petitioner when he had to decide at his peril whether or not to answer.
Fundamental fairness demands that no witness be compelled to make such a determination with so little guidance.
Unless the subject matter has been made to appear with undisputable clarity, it is the duty of the investigative body, upon objection of the witness on grounds of pertinency, to state for the record the subject under inquiry at that time and the manner in which the propounded questions are pertinent thereto. 55
To be meaningful, the explanation must describe what the topic under inquiry is and the connective reasoning whereby the precise questions asked relate to it.
67 The statement of the Committee Chairman in this case, in response to petitioner's protest, was woefully inadequate to convey sufficient information as to the pertinency of the questions to the subject under inquiry.
Petitioner was thus not accorded a fair opportunity to determine whether he was within his rights in refusing to answer, and his conviction is necessarily invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
68 We are mindful of the complexities of modern government and the ample scope that must be left to the Congress as the sole constitutional depository of legislative power.
Equally mindful are we of the indispensable function, in the exercise of that power, of congressional investigations.
The conclusions we have reached in this case will not prevent the Congress, through its committees, from obtaining any information it needs for the proper fulfillment of its role in our scheme of government.
The legislature is free to determine the kinds of data that should be collected.
It is only those investigations that are conducted by use of compulsory process that give rise to a need to protect the rights of individuals against illegal encroachment.
That protection can be readily achieved through procedures which prevent the separation of power from responsibility and which provide the constitutional requisites of fairness for witnesses.
A measure of added care on the part of the House and the Senate in authorizing the use of compulsory process and by their committees in exercising that power would suffice.
That is a small price to pay if it serves to uphold the principles of limited, constitutional government without constricting the power of the Congress to inform itself.
69 The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the District Court with instructions to dismiss the indictment.
70 It is so ordered.
71 Judgment of Court of Appeals reversed and case remanded to District Court with instructions.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
66 Having exhausted the several possible indicia of the 'question under inquiry,' we remain unenlightened as to the subject to which the questions asked petitioner were pertinent.
Certainly, if the point is that obscure after trial and appeal, it was not adequately revealed to petitioner when he had to decide at his peril whether or not to answer.
Fundamental fairness demands that no witness be compelled to make such a determination with so little guidance.
Unless the subject matter has been made to appear with undisputable clarity, it is the duty of the investigative body, upon objection of the witness on grounds of pertinency, to state for the record the subject under inquiry at that time and the manner in which the propounded questions are pertinent thereto. 55
To be meaningful, the explanation must describe what the topic under inquiry is and the connective reasoning whereby the precise questions asked relate to it.
67 The statement of the Committee Chairman in this case, in response to petitioner's protest, was woefully inadequate to convey sufficient information as to the pertinency of the questions to the subject under inquiry.
Petitioner was thus not accorded a fair opportunity to determine whether he was within his rights in refusing to answer, and his conviction is necessarily invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
68 We are mindful of the complexities of modern government and the ample scope that must be left to the Congress as the sole constitutional depository of legislative power.
Equally mindful are we of the indispensable function, in the exercise of that power, of congressional investigations.
The conclusions we have reached in this case will not prevent the Congress, through its committees, from obtaining any information it needs for the proper fulfillment of its role in our scheme of government.
The legislature is free to determine the kinds of data that should be collected.
It is only those investigations that are conducted by use of compulsory process that give rise to a need to protect the rights of individuals against illegal encroachment.
That protection can be readily achieved through procedures which prevent the separation of power from responsibility and which provide the constitutional requisites of fairness for witnesses.
A measure of added care on the part of the House and the Senate in authorizing the use of compulsory process and by their committees in exercising that power would suffice.
That is a small price to pay if it serves to uphold the principles of limited, constitutional government without constricting the power of the Congress to inform itself.
69 The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the District Court with instructions to dismiss the indictment.
70 It is so ordered.
71 Judgment of Court of Appeals reversed and case remanded to District Court with instructions.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: WATKINS V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
John T. WATKINS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America, Supreme Court 354 U.S. 178, continued ...
72 Mr. Justice BURTON and Mr. Justice WHITTAKER took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
73 Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER, concurring.
74 I deem it important to state what I understand to be the Court's holding.
Agreeing with its holding, I join its opinion.
75 The power of the Congress to punish for contempt of its authority is, as the Court points out, rooted in history.
It has been acknowledged by this Court since 1821. Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 5 L.Ed. 242.
Until 1857, Congress was content to punish for contempt through its own process.
By the Act of January 24, 1857, 11 Stat. 155, as amended by the Act of January 24, 1862, 12 Stat. 333, Congress provided that, 'in addition to the pains and penalties now existing' (referring of course to the power of Congress itself to punish for contempt), 'contumacy in a witness called to testify in a matter properly under consideration by either House, and deliberately refusing to answer questions pertinent thereto, shall be a misdemeanor against the United States.' In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 672, 17 S.Ct. 677, 681, 41 L.Ed. 1154.
This legislation is now 2 U.S.C. § 192, 2 U.S.C.A. § 192.
By thus making the federal judiciary the affirmative agency for enforcing the authority that underlies the congressional power to punish for contempt Congress necessarily brings into play the specific provisions of the Constitution relating to the prosecution of offenses and those implied restrictions under which courts function.
76 To turn to the immediate problem before us, the scope of inquiry that a committee is authorized to pursue must be defined with sufficiently unambiguous clarity to safeguard a witness from the hazards of vagueness in the enforcement of the criminal process against which the Due Process Clause protects.
The questions must be put with relevance and definiteness sufficient to enable the witness to know whether his refusal to answer may lead to conviction for criminal contempt and to enable both the trial and the appellate courts readily to determine whether the particular circumstances justify a finding of guilt.
77 While implied authority for the questioning by the Committee, sweeping as was its inquiry, may be squeezed out of the repeated acquiescence by Congress in the Committee's inquiries, the basis for determining petitioner's guilt is not thereby laid.
Prosecution for contempt of Congress presupposes an adequate opportunity for the defendant to have awareness of the pertinency of the information that he has denied to Congress.
And the basis of such awareness must be contemporaneous with the witness' refusal to answer and not at the trial for it.
Accordingly, the actual scope of the inquiry that the Committee was authorized to conduct and the relevance of the questions to that inquiry must be shown to have been luminous at the time when asked and not left, at best, in cloudiness.
The circumstances of this case were wanting in these essentials.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
72 Mr. Justice BURTON and Mr. Justice WHITTAKER took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
73 Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER, concurring.
74 I deem it important to state what I understand to be the Court's holding.
Agreeing with its holding, I join its opinion.
75 The power of the Congress to punish for contempt of its authority is, as the Court points out, rooted in history.
It has been acknowledged by this Court since 1821. Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 5 L.Ed. 242.
Until 1857, Congress was content to punish for contempt through its own process.
By the Act of January 24, 1857, 11 Stat. 155, as amended by the Act of January 24, 1862, 12 Stat. 333, Congress provided that, 'in addition to the pains and penalties now existing' (referring of course to the power of Congress itself to punish for contempt), 'contumacy in a witness called to testify in a matter properly under consideration by either House, and deliberately refusing to answer questions pertinent thereto, shall be a misdemeanor against the United States.' In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 672, 17 S.Ct. 677, 681, 41 L.Ed. 1154.
This legislation is now 2 U.S.C. § 192, 2 U.S.C.A. § 192.
By thus making the federal judiciary the affirmative agency for enforcing the authority that underlies the congressional power to punish for contempt Congress necessarily brings into play the specific provisions of the Constitution relating to the prosecution of offenses and those implied restrictions under which courts function.
76 To turn to the immediate problem before us, the scope of inquiry that a committee is authorized to pursue must be defined with sufficiently unambiguous clarity to safeguard a witness from the hazards of vagueness in the enforcement of the criminal process against which the Due Process Clause protects.
The questions must be put with relevance and definiteness sufficient to enable the witness to know whether his refusal to answer may lead to conviction for criminal contempt and to enable both the trial and the appellate courts readily to determine whether the particular circumstances justify a finding of guilt.
77 While implied authority for the questioning by the Committee, sweeping as was its inquiry, may be squeezed out of the repeated acquiescence by Congress in the Committee's inquiries, the basis for determining petitioner's guilt is not thereby laid.
Prosecution for contempt of Congress presupposes an adequate opportunity for the defendant to have awareness of the pertinency of the information that he has denied to Congress.
And the basis of such awareness must be contemporaneous with the witness' refusal to answer and not at the trial for it.
Accordingly, the actual scope of the inquiry that the Committee was authorized to conduct and the relevance of the questions to that inquiry must be shown to have been luminous at the time when asked and not left, at best, in cloudiness.
The circumstances of this case were wanting in these essentials.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: WATKINS V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
John T. WATKINS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America, Supreme Court 354 U.S. 178, continued ...
78 Mr. Justice CLARK, dissenting.
79 As I see it the chief fault in the majority opinion is its mischievous curbing of the informing function of the Congress.
While I am not versed in its procedures, my experience in the Executive Branch of the Government leads me to believe that the requirements laid down in the opinion for the operation of the committee system of inquiry are both unnecessary and unworkable.
It is my purpose to first discuss this phase of the opinion and then record my views on the merits of Watkins' case.
I.
80 It may be that at times the House Committee on Un-American Activities has, as the Court says, 'conceived of its task in the grand view of its name.'
And, perhaps, as the Court Indicates, the rules of conduct placed upon the Committee by the House admit of individual abuse and unfairness.
But that is none of our affair.
So long as the object of a legislative inquiry is legitimate and the questions propounded are pertinent thereto, it is not for the courts to interfere with the committee system of inquiry.
To hold otherwise would be an infringement on the power given the Congress to inform itself, and thus a trespass upon the fundamental American principle of separation of powers.
The majority has substituted the judiciary as the grand inquisitor and supervisor of congressional investigations.
It has never been so.
II.
81 Legislative committees to inquire into facts or conditions for assurance of the public welfare or to determine the need for legislative action have grown in importance with the complexity of government.
The investigation that gave rise to this prosecution is of the latter type.
Since many matters requiring statutory action lie in the domain of the specialist or are unknown without testimony from informed witnesses, the need for information has brought about legislative inquiries that have used the compulsion of the subpoena to lay bare needed facts and a statute, 2 U.S.C. § 192, 2 U.S.C.A. § 192 here involved, to punish recalcitrant witnesses.
The propriety of investigations has long been recognized and rarely curbed by the courts, though constitutional limitations on the investigatory powers are admitted. 1
The use of legislative committees to secure information follows the example of the people from whom our legislative system is derived.
The British method has variations from that of the United States but fundamentally serves the same purpose — the enlightenment of Parliament for the better performance of its duties.
There are standing committees to carry on the routine work, royal commissions to grapple with important social or economic problems, and special tribunals of inquiry for some alleged offense in government. 2
Our Congress has since its beginning used the committee system to inform itself.
It has been estimated that over 600 investigations have been conducted since the First Congress.
They are 'a necessary and appropriate attribute of the power to legislate * * *.' McGrain v. Daugherty, 1927, 273 U.S. 135, 175, 47 S.Ct. 319, 329, 71 L.Ed. 580.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
78 Mr. Justice CLARK, dissenting.
79 As I see it the chief fault in the majority opinion is its mischievous curbing of the informing function of the Congress.
While I am not versed in its procedures, my experience in the Executive Branch of the Government leads me to believe that the requirements laid down in the opinion for the operation of the committee system of inquiry are both unnecessary and unworkable.
It is my purpose to first discuss this phase of the opinion and then record my views on the merits of Watkins' case.
I.
80 It may be that at times the House Committee on Un-American Activities has, as the Court says, 'conceived of its task in the grand view of its name.'
And, perhaps, as the Court Indicates, the rules of conduct placed upon the Committee by the House admit of individual abuse and unfairness.
But that is none of our affair.
So long as the object of a legislative inquiry is legitimate and the questions propounded are pertinent thereto, it is not for the courts to interfere with the committee system of inquiry.
To hold otherwise would be an infringement on the power given the Congress to inform itself, and thus a trespass upon the fundamental American principle of separation of powers.
The majority has substituted the judiciary as the grand inquisitor and supervisor of congressional investigations.
It has never been so.
II.
81 Legislative committees to inquire into facts or conditions for assurance of the public welfare or to determine the need for legislative action have grown in importance with the complexity of government.
The investigation that gave rise to this prosecution is of the latter type.
Since many matters requiring statutory action lie in the domain of the specialist or are unknown without testimony from informed witnesses, the need for information has brought about legislative inquiries that have used the compulsion of the subpoena to lay bare needed facts and a statute, 2 U.S.C. § 192, 2 U.S.C.A. § 192 here involved, to punish recalcitrant witnesses.
The propriety of investigations has long been recognized and rarely curbed by the courts, though constitutional limitations on the investigatory powers are admitted. 1
The use of legislative committees to secure information follows the example of the people from whom our legislative system is derived.
The British method has variations from that of the United States but fundamentally serves the same purpose — the enlightenment of Parliament for the better performance of its duties.
There are standing committees to carry on the routine work, royal commissions to grapple with important social or economic problems, and special tribunals of inquiry for some alleged offense in government. 2
Our Congress has since its beginning used the committee system to inform itself.
It has been estimated that over 600 investigations have been conducted since the First Congress.
They are 'a necessary and appropriate attribute of the power to legislate * * *.' McGrain v. Daugherty, 1927, 273 U.S. 135, 175, 47 S.Ct. 319, 329, 71 L.Ed. 580.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: WATKINS V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
John T. WATKINS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America, Supreme Court 354 U.S. 178, continued ...
78 Mr. Justice CLARK, dissenting, continued ...
82 The Court indicates that in this case the source of the trouble lies in the 'tremendous latitude' given the Un-American Activities Committee in the Legislative Reorganization Act. 3
It finds that the Committee 'is allowed, in essence, to define its own authority, (and) to choose the direction and focus of its activities.'
This, of course, is largely true of all committees within their respective spheres.
And, while it is necessary that the 'charter,' as the opinion calls the enabling resolution, 'spell out (its) jurisdiction and purpose,' that must necessarily be in more or less general terms.
An examination of the enabling resolutions of other committees reveals the extent to which this is true.
83 Permanent or standing committees of both Houses have been given power in exceedingly broad terms.
For example, the Committees on the Armed Services have jurisdiction over 'Common defense generally'; 4 the Committees on Interstate and Foreign Commerce have jurisdiction over 'interstate and foreign commerce generally'; 5 and the Committees on Appropriation have jurisdiction over 'Appropriation of the revenue for the support of the Government.' 6
Perhaps even more important for purposes of comparison are the broad authorizations given to select or special committees established by the Congress from time to time.
Such committees have been 'authorized and directed' to make full and complete studies 'of whether organized crime utilizes the facilities of interstate commerce or otherwise operates in interstate commerce'; 7 'of * * * all lobbying activities intended to influence, encourage, promote, or retard legislation'; 8 'to determine the extent to which current literature * * * containing immoral, (or) obscene * * * matter, or placing improper emphasis on crime * * * are being made available to the people of the United States * * *'; 9 and 'of the extent to which criminal or other improper practices * * * are or have been, engaged in in the field of labor-management relations * * * to the detriment of the interests of the public * * *.' 10 (Emphasis added in each example.)
Surely these authorizations permit the committees even more 'tremendous latitude' than the 'charter' of the Un-American Activities Committee.
Yet no one has suggested that the powers granted were too broad.
To restrain and limit the breadth of investigative power of this Committee necessitates the similar handling of all other committees.
The resulting restraint imposed on the committee system appears to cripple the system beyond workability.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
78 Mr. Justice CLARK, dissenting, continued ...
82 The Court indicates that in this case the source of the trouble lies in the 'tremendous latitude' given the Un-American Activities Committee in the Legislative Reorganization Act. 3
It finds that the Committee 'is allowed, in essence, to define its own authority, (and) to choose the direction and focus of its activities.'
This, of course, is largely true of all committees within their respective spheres.
And, while it is necessary that the 'charter,' as the opinion calls the enabling resolution, 'spell out (its) jurisdiction and purpose,' that must necessarily be in more or less general terms.
An examination of the enabling resolutions of other committees reveals the extent to which this is true.
83 Permanent or standing committees of both Houses have been given power in exceedingly broad terms.
For example, the Committees on the Armed Services have jurisdiction over 'Common defense generally'; 4 the Committees on Interstate and Foreign Commerce have jurisdiction over 'interstate and foreign commerce generally'; 5 and the Committees on Appropriation have jurisdiction over 'Appropriation of the revenue for the support of the Government.' 6
Perhaps even more important for purposes of comparison are the broad authorizations given to select or special committees established by the Congress from time to time.
Such committees have been 'authorized and directed' to make full and complete studies 'of whether organized crime utilizes the facilities of interstate commerce or otherwise operates in interstate commerce'; 7 'of * * * all lobbying activities intended to influence, encourage, promote, or retard legislation'; 8 'to determine the extent to which current literature * * * containing immoral, (or) obscene * * * matter, or placing improper emphasis on crime * * * are being made available to the people of the United States * * *'; 9 and 'of the extent to which criminal or other improper practices * * * are or have been, engaged in in the field of labor-management relations * * * to the detriment of the interests of the public * * *.' 10 (Emphasis added in each example.)
Surely these authorizations permit the committees even more 'tremendous latitude' than the 'charter' of the Un-American Activities Committee.
Yet no one has suggested that the powers granted were too broad.
To restrain and limit the breadth of investigative power of this Committee necessitates the similar handling of all other committees.
The resulting restraint imposed on the committee system appears to cripple the system beyond workability.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: WATKINS V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
John T. WATKINS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America, Supreme Court 354 U.S. 178, continued ...
78 Mr. Justice CLARK, dissenting, continued ...
84 The Court finds fault with the use made of compulsory process, power for the use of which is granted the Committee in the Reorganization Act.
While the Court finds that the Congress is free 'to determine the kinds of data' it wishes its committees to collect, this has led the Court says, to an encroachment on individual rights through the abuse of process.
To my mind this indicates a lack of understanding of the problems facing such committees.
I am sure that the committees would welcome voluntary disclosure.
It would simplify and relieve their burden considerably if the parties involved in investigations would come forward with a frank willingness to cooperate.
But everyday experience shows this just does not happen.
One needs only to read the newspapers to know that the Congress could gather little 'data' unless its committees had, unfettered, the power of subpoena.
In fact, Watkins himself could not be found for appearance at the first hearing and it was only by subpoena that he attended the second.
The Court generalizes on this crucial problem saying 'added care on the part of the House and the Senate in authorizing the use of compulsory process and by their committees in exercising that power would suffice.'
It does not say how this 'added care' could be applied in practice; however, there are many implications since the opinion warns that 'procedures which prevent the separation of power from responsibility' would be necessary along with 'constitutional requisites of fairness for witnesses.'
The 'power' and 'responsibility' for the investigations are, of course, in the House where the proceeding is initiated.
But the investigating job itself can only be done through the use of committees.
They must have the 'power' to force compliance with their requirements.
If the rule requires that this power be retained in the full House then investigations will be so cumbrous that their conduct will be a practical impossibility.
As to 'fairness for witnesses' there is nothing in the record showing any abuse of Watkins.
If anything, the Committee was abused by his recalcitrance.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
78 Mr. Justice CLARK, dissenting, continued ...
84 The Court finds fault with the use made of compulsory process, power for the use of which is granted the Committee in the Reorganization Act.
While the Court finds that the Congress is free 'to determine the kinds of data' it wishes its committees to collect, this has led the Court says, to an encroachment on individual rights through the abuse of process.
To my mind this indicates a lack of understanding of the problems facing such committees.
I am sure that the committees would welcome voluntary disclosure.
It would simplify and relieve their burden considerably if the parties involved in investigations would come forward with a frank willingness to cooperate.
But everyday experience shows this just does not happen.
One needs only to read the newspapers to know that the Congress could gather little 'data' unless its committees had, unfettered, the power of subpoena.
In fact, Watkins himself could not be found for appearance at the first hearing and it was only by subpoena that he attended the second.
The Court generalizes on this crucial problem saying 'added care on the part of the House and the Senate in authorizing the use of compulsory process and by their committees in exercising that power would suffice.'
It does not say how this 'added care' could be applied in practice; however, there are many implications since the opinion warns that 'procedures which prevent the separation of power from responsibility' would be necessary along with 'constitutional requisites of fairness for witnesses.'
The 'power' and 'responsibility' for the investigations are, of course, in the House where the proceeding is initiated.
But the investigating job itself can only be done through the use of committees.
They must have the 'power' to force compliance with their requirements.
If the rule requires that this power be retained in the full House then investigations will be so cumbrous that their conduct will be a practical impossibility.
As to 'fairness for witnesses' there is nothing in the record showing any abuse of Watkins.
If anything, the Committee was abused by his recalcitrance.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: WATKINS V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
John T. WATKINS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America, Supreme Court 354 U.S. 178, continued ...
78 Mr. Justice CLARK, dissenting, continued ...
85 While ambiguity prevents exactness (and there is 'vice in vagueness' the majority reminds), the sweep of the opinion seems to be that 'preliminary control' of the Committee must be exercised.
The Court says a witness' protected freedoms cannot 'be placed in danger in the absence of a clear determination by the House or the Senate that a particular inquiry is justified by a specific legislative need.'
Frankly I do not see how any such procedure as 'preliminary control' can be effected in either House of the Congress.
What will be controlled preliminarily?
The plans of the investigation, the necessity of calling certain witnesses, the questions to be asked, the details of subpoenas duces tecum, etc?
As it is now, Congress is hard pressed to find sufficient time to fully debate and adopt all needed legislation.
The Court asserts that 'the Congress has practically abandoned its original practice of utilizing the coercive sanction of contempt proceedings at the bar of the House.'
This was to be expected.
It may be that back in the twenties and thirties Congress could spare the time to conduct contempt hearings, but that appears impossible now.
The Court places a greater burden in the conduct of contempt cases before the courts than it does before 'the bar of the House.'
It cites with approval cases of contempt tried before a House of the Congress where no more safeguards were present than we find here.
In contempt prosecutions before a court, however, the majority places an investigative hearing on a par with a criminal trial, requiring that 'knowledge of the subject to which the interrogation is deemed pertinent * * * must be available (to the witness) with same degree of explicitness and clarity that the Due Process Clause requires in the expression of any element of a criminal offense.'
I know of no such claim ever being made before.
Such a requirement has never been thought applicable to investigations and is wholly out of place when related to the informing function of the Congress. See Frankfurter, Hands Off The Investigations, 38 New Republic, May 21, 1924, p. 329, 65 Cong.Rec. 9080—9082.
The Congress does not have the facts at the time of the investigation for it is the facts that are being sought.
In a criminal trial the investigation has been completed and all of the facts are at hand.
The informing function of the Congress is in effect 'a study by the government of circumstances which seem to call for study in the public interest.' See Black, Inside a Senate Investigation, 172 Harper's Magazine, Feb. 1936, pp. 275, 278.
In the conduct of such a proceeding it is impossible to be as explicit and exact as in a criminal prosecution.
If the Court is saying that its new rule does not apply to contempt cases tried before the bar of the House affected, it may well lead to trial of all contempt cases before the bar of the whole House in order to avoid the restrictions of the rule.
But this will not promote the result desired by the majority.
Summary treatment, at best, could be provided before the whole House because of the time factor, and such treatment would necessarily deprive the witness of many of the safeguards in the present procedures.
On review here the majority might then find fault with that procedure.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
78 Mr. Justice CLARK, dissenting, continued ...
85 While ambiguity prevents exactness (and there is 'vice in vagueness' the majority reminds), the sweep of the opinion seems to be that 'preliminary control' of the Committee must be exercised.
The Court says a witness' protected freedoms cannot 'be placed in danger in the absence of a clear determination by the House or the Senate that a particular inquiry is justified by a specific legislative need.'
Frankly I do not see how any such procedure as 'preliminary control' can be effected in either House of the Congress.
What will be controlled preliminarily?
The plans of the investigation, the necessity of calling certain witnesses, the questions to be asked, the details of subpoenas duces tecum, etc?
As it is now, Congress is hard pressed to find sufficient time to fully debate and adopt all needed legislation.
The Court asserts that 'the Congress has practically abandoned its original practice of utilizing the coercive sanction of contempt proceedings at the bar of the House.'
This was to be expected.
It may be that back in the twenties and thirties Congress could spare the time to conduct contempt hearings, but that appears impossible now.
The Court places a greater burden in the conduct of contempt cases before the courts than it does before 'the bar of the House.'
It cites with approval cases of contempt tried before a House of the Congress where no more safeguards were present than we find here.
In contempt prosecutions before a court, however, the majority places an investigative hearing on a par with a criminal trial, requiring that 'knowledge of the subject to which the interrogation is deemed pertinent * * * must be available (to the witness) with same degree of explicitness and clarity that the Due Process Clause requires in the expression of any element of a criminal offense.'
I know of no such claim ever being made before.
Such a requirement has never been thought applicable to investigations and is wholly out of place when related to the informing function of the Congress. See Frankfurter, Hands Off The Investigations, 38 New Republic, May 21, 1924, p. 329, 65 Cong.Rec. 9080—9082.
The Congress does not have the facts at the time of the investigation for it is the facts that are being sought.
In a criminal trial the investigation has been completed and all of the facts are at hand.
The informing function of the Congress is in effect 'a study by the government of circumstances which seem to call for study in the public interest.' See Black, Inside a Senate Investigation, 172 Harper's Magazine, Feb. 1936, pp. 275, 278.
In the conduct of such a proceeding it is impossible to be as explicit and exact as in a criminal prosecution.
If the Court is saying that its new rule does not apply to contempt cases tried before the bar of the House affected, it may well lead to trial of all contempt cases before the bar of the whole House in order to avoid the restrictions of the rule.
But this will not promote the result desired by the majority.
Summary treatment, at best, could be provided before the whole House because of the time factor, and such treatment would necessarily deprive the witness of many of the safeguards in the present procedures.
On review here the majority might then find fault with that procedure.
TO BE CONTINUED ...