John T. WATKINS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America, Supreme Court 354 U.S. 178, continued ...
78 Mr. Justice CLARK, dissenting, continued ...
III.
86 Coming to the merits of Watkins' case, the Court reverses the judgment because: (1) The subject matter of the inquiry was not 'made to appear with undisputable clarity' either through its 'charter' or by the Chairman at the time of the hearing and, therefore, Watkins was deprived of a clear understanding of 'the manner in which the propounded questions (were) pertinent thereto'; and (2) the present committee system of inquiry of the House, as practiced by the Un-American Activities Committee, does not provide adequate safeguards for the protection of the constitutional right of free speech.
I subscribe to neither conclusion.
87 Watkins had been an active leader in the labor movement for many years and had been identified by two previous witnesses at the Committee's hearing in Chicago as a member of the Communist Party.
There can be no question that he was fully informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.
His testimony reveals a complete knowledge and understanding of the hearings at Chicago.
There the Chairman had announced that the Committee had been directed 'to ascertain the extent and success of subversive activities directed against these United States (and) On the basis of these investigations and hearings * * * (report) its findings to the Congress and (make) recommendations * * * for new legislation.'
He pointed to the various laws that had been enacted as a result of Committee recommendations.
He stated that 'The Congress has also referred to the House Committee on Un-American Activities a bill which would amend the National Security Act of 1950' which, if made law, would restrict the availability of the Labor Act to unions not 'in fact Communist-controlled action groups.'
The Chairman went on to say that 'It cannot be said that subversive infiltration has had a greater nor a lesser success in infiltrating this important area.'
'The hearings today are the culmination of an investigation * * *.'
'Every witness who has been subpoenaed to appear before the committee here in Chicago * * * (is) known to possess information which will assist the Committee in performing its directed function to the Congress of the United States.'
TO BE CONTINUED ...
WATKINS V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Re: WATKINS V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
John T. WATKINS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America, Supreme Court 354 U.S. 178, continued ...
78 Mr. Justice CLARK, dissenting, continued ...
88 A subpoena had issued for Watkins to appear at the Chicago hearings but he was not served.
After Watkins was served the hearing in question was held in Washington, D.C.
Reference at this hearing was made to the one conducted in Chicago.
Watkins came before the Committee with a carefully prepared statement.
He denied certain testimony of the previous witnesses and declared that he had never been a 'card-carrying member' of the Party.
He admitted that for the period 1942—1947 he 'cooperated with the Communist Party * * * participated in Communist activities * * * made contributions * * * attended caucuses at (his union's) convention at which Communist Party officials were present * * * (and) freely cooperated with the Communist Party * * *.'
This indicated that for a five-year period he, a union official, was cooperating closely with the Communist Party even permitting its officials to attend union caucuses.
For the last two years of this liaison the Party had publicly thrown off its cloak of a political party.
It was a reconstituted, militant group known to be dedicated to the overthrow of our Government by force and violence.
In this setting the Committee attempted to have Watkins identify 30 persons, most of whom were connected with labor unions in some way.
While one 'operated a beauty parlor' and another was 'a watchmaker,' they may well have been 'drops' or other functionaries in the program of cooperation between the union and the Party.
It is a non sequitur for the Court to say that since 'almost a quarter of the persons on the list are not labor people, the inference becomes strong that the subject before the Subcommittee was not defined in terms of Communism in labor.'
I submit that the opposite is true.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
78 Mr. Justice CLARK, dissenting, continued ...
88 A subpoena had issued for Watkins to appear at the Chicago hearings but he was not served.
After Watkins was served the hearing in question was held in Washington, D.C.
Reference at this hearing was made to the one conducted in Chicago.
Watkins came before the Committee with a carefully prepared statement.
He denied certain testimony of the previous witnesses and declared that he had never been a 'card-carrying member' of the Party.
He admitted that for the period 1942—1947 he 'cooperated with the Communist Party * * * participated in Communist activities * * * made contributions * * * attended caucuses at (his union's) convention at which Communist Party officials were present * * * (and) freely cooperated with the Communist Party * * *.'
This indicated that for a five-year period he, a union official, was cooperating closely with the Communist Party even permitting its officials to attend union caucuses.
For the last two years of this liaison the Party had publicly thrown off its cloak of a political party.
It was a reconstituted, militant group known to be dedicated to the overthrow of our Government by force and violence.
In this setting the Committee attempted to have Watkins identify 30 persons, most of whom were connected with labor unions in some way.
While one 'operated a beauty parlor' and another was 'a watchmaker,' they may well have been 'drops' or other functionaries in the program of cooperation between the union and the Party.
It is a non sequitur for the Court to say that since 'almost a quarter of the persons on the list are not labor people, the inference becomes strong that the subject before the Subcommittee was not defined in terms of Communism in labor.'
I submit that the opposite is true.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: WATKINS V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
John T. WATKINS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America, Supreme Court 354 U.S. 178, continued ...
78 Mr. Justice CLARK, dissenting, continued ...
IV.
89 I think the Committee here was acting entirely within its scope and that the purpose of its inquiry was set out with 'undisputable clarity.'
In the first place, the authorizing language of the Reorganization Act 11 Must be read as a whole, not dissected.
It authorized investigation into subversive activity, its extent, character, objects, and diffusion.
While the language might have been more explicit than using such words as 'un-American,' or phrases like 'principle of the form of government,' still these are fairly well understood terms.
We must construe them to give them meaning if we can.
Our cases indicate that rather than finding fault with the use of words or phrases, we are bound to presume that the action of the legislative body in granting authority to the Committee was with a legitimate object 'if (the action) is capable of being so construed.' (Emphasis added.) People ex rel. McDonald v. Keeler, 1885, 99 N.Y. 463, 487, 2 N.E. 615, 627, 628, as quoted and approved in McGrain v. Daugherty, supra, 273 U.S. at page 178, 47 S.Ct. at page 330, 71 L.Ed. 580.
Before we can deny the authority 'it must be obvious that' the Committee has 'exceeded the bounds of legislative power.' Tenney v. Brandhove, 1951, 341 U.S. 367, 378, 71 S.Ct. 783, 789, 95 L.Ed. 1019.
The fact that the Committee has often been attacked has caused close scrutiny of its acts by the House as a whole and the House has repeatedly given the Committee its approval.
'Power' and 'responsibility' have not been separated.
But the record in this case does not stop here.
It shows that at the hearings involving Watkins, the Chairman made statements explaining the functions of the Committee. 12
And, furthermore, Watkins' action at the hearing clearly reveals that he was well acquainted with the purpose of the hearing.
It was to investigate Communist infiltration into his union.
This certainly falls within the grant of authority from the Reorganization Act and the House has had ample opportunity to limit the investigative scope of the Committee if it feels that the Committee has exceeded its legitimate bounds.
90 The Court makes much of petitioner's claim of 'exposure for exposure's sake' and strikes at the purposes of the Committee through this catch phrase.
But we are bound to accept as the purpose of the Committee that stated in the Reorganization Act together with the statements of the Chairman at the hearings involved here.
Nothing was said of exposure.
The statements of a single Congressman cannot transform the real purpose of the Committee into something not authorized by the parent resolution. See United States v. Rumely, 1953, 345 U.S. 41, 73 S.Ct. 543, 97 L.Ed. 770; Sinclair v. United States, 1929, 279 U.S. 263, 290, 295, 49 S.Ct. 268, 272, 73 L.Ed. 692.
The Court indicates that the questions propounded were asked for exposure's sake and had no pertinency to the inquiry.
It appears to me that they were entirely pertinent to the announced purpose of the Committee's inquiry.
Undoubtedly Congress has the power to inquire into the subjects of communism and the Communist Party. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 1950, 339 U.S. 382, 70 S.Ct. 674, 94 L.Ed. 925.
As a corollary of the congressional power to inquire into such subject matter, the Congress, through its committees, can legitimately seek to identify individual members of the Party. Barsky v. United States, 1948, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 127, 167 F.2d 241, certiorari denied, 334 U.S. 843, 68 S.Ct. 1511, 92 L.Ed. 1767. See also Lawson v. United States, 1949, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 167, 170 171, 176 F.2d 49, 52—53, certiorari denied, 339 U.S. 934, 70 S.Ct. 663, 94 L.Ed. 1352; United States v. Josephson, 2 Cir., 1947, 165 F.2d 82, 90—92, certiorari denied, 333 U.S. 838, 68 S.Ct. 609, 92 L.Ed. 1122.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
78 Mr. Justice CLARK, dissenting, continued ...
IV.
89 I think the Committee here was acting entirely within its scope and that the purpose of its inquiry was set out with 'undisputable clarity.'
In the first place, the authorizing language of the Reorganization Act 11 Must be read as a whole, not dissected.
It authorized investigation into subversive activity, its extent, character, objects, and diffusion.
While the language might have been more explicit than using such words as 'un-American,' or phrases like 'principle of the form of government,' still these are fairly well understood terms.
We must construe them to give them meaning if we can.
Our cases indicate that rather than finding fault with the use of words or phrases, we are bound to presume that the action of the legislative body in granting authority to the Committee was with a legitimate object 'if (the action) is capable of being so construed.' (Emphasis added.) People ex rel. McDonald v. Keeler, 1885, 99 N.Y. 463, 487, 2 N.E. 615, 627, 628, as quoted and approved in McGrain v. Daugherty, supra, 273 U.S. at page 178, 47 S.Ct. at page 330, 71 L.Ed. 580.
Before we can deny the authority 'it must be obvious that' the Committee has 'exceeded the bounds of legislative power.' Tenney v. Brandhove, 1951, 341 U.S. 367, 378, 71 S.Ct. 783, 789, 95 L.Ed. 1019.
The fact that the Committee has often been attacked has caused close scrutiny of its acts by the House as a whole and the House has repeatedly given the Committee its approval.
'Power' and 'responsibility' have not been separated.
But the record in this case does not stop here.
It shows that at the hearings involving Watkins, the Chairman made statements explaining the functions of the Committee. 12
And, furthermore, Watkins' action at the hearing clearly reveals that he was well acquainted with the purpose of the hearing.
It was to investigate Communist infiltration into his union.
This certainly falls within the grant of authority from the Reorganization Act and the House has had ample opportunity to limit the investigative scope of the Committee if it feels that the Committee has exceeded its legitimate bounds.
90 The Court makes much of petitioner's claim of 'exposure for exposure's sake' and strikes at the purposes of the Committee through this catch phrase.
But we are bound to accept as the purpose of the Committee that stated in the Reorganization Act together with the statements of the Chairman at the hearings involved here.
Nothing was said of exposure.
The statements of a single Congressman cannot transform the real purpose of the Committee into something not authorized by the parent resolution. See United States v. Rumely, 1953, 345 U.S. 41, 73 S.Ct. 543, 97 L.Ed. 770; Sinclair v. United States, 1929, 279 U.S. 263, 290, 295, 49 S.Ct. 268, 272, 73 L.Ed. 692.
The Court indicates that the questions propounded were asked for exposure's sake and had no pertinency to the inquiry.
It appears to me that they were entirely pertinent to the announced purpose of the Committee's inquiry.
Undoubtedly Congress has the power to inquire into the subjects of communism and the Communist Party. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 1950, 339 U.S. 382, 70 S.Ct. 674, 94 L.Ed. 925.
As a corollary of the congressional power to inquire into such subject matter, the Congress, through its committees, can legitimately seek to identify individual members of the Party. Barsky v. United States, 1948, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 127, 167 F.2d 241, certiorari denied, 334 U.S. 843, 68 S.Ct. 1511, 92 L.Ed. 1767. See also Lawson v. United States, 1949, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 167, 170 171, 176 F.2d 49, 52—53, certiorari denied, 339 U.S. 934, 70 S.Ct. 663, 94 L.Ed. 1352; United States v. Josephson, 2 Cir., 1947, 165 F.2d 82, 90—92, certiorari denied, 333 U.S. 838, 68 S.Ct. 609, 92 L.Ed. 1122.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: WATKINS V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
John T. WATKINS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America, Supreme Court 354 U.S. 178, continued ...
78 Mr. Justice CLARK, dissenting, continued ...
91 The pertinency of the questions is highlighted by the need for the Congress to know the extent of infiltration of communism in labor unions.
This technique of infiltration was that used in bringing the downfall of countries formerly free but now still remaining behind the Iron Curtain.
The Douds case illustrates that the Party is not an ordinary political party and has not been at least since 1945.
Association with its officials is not an ordinary association.
Nor does it matter that the questions related to the past.
Influences of past associations often linger on as was clearly shown in the instance of the witness Matusow and others.
The techniques used in the infiltration which admittedly existed here might well be used again in the future.
If the parties about whom Watkins was interrogated were Communists and collaborated with him, as a prior witness indicated, an entirely new area of investigation might have been opened up.
Watkins' silence prevented the Committee from learning this information which could have been vital to its future investigation.
The Committee was likewise entitled to elicit testimony showing the truth or falsity of the prior testimony of the witnesses who had involved Watkins and the union with collaboration with the Party.
If the testimony was untrue a false picture of the relationship between the union and the Party leaders would have resulted.
For these reasons there were ample indications of the pertinency of the questions.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
78 Mr. Justice CLARK, dissenting, continued ...
91 The pertinency of the questions is highlighted by the need for the Congress to know the extent of infiltration of communism in labor unions.
This technique of infiltration was that used in bringing the downfall of countries formerly free but now still remaining behind the Iron Curtain.
The Douds case illustrates that the Party is not an ordinary political party and has not been at least since 1945.
Association with its officials is not an ordinary association.
Nor does it matter that the questions related to the past.
Influences of past associations often linger on as was clearly shown in the instance of the witness Matusow and others.
The techniques used in the infiltration which admittedly existed here might well be used again in the future.
If the parties about whom Watkins was interrogated were Communists and collaborated with him, as a prior witness indicated, an entirely new area of investigation might have been opened up.
Watkins' silence prevented the Committee from learning this information which could have been vital to its future investigation.
The Committee was likewise entitled to elicit testimony showing the truth or falsity of the prior testimony of the witnesses who had involved Watkins and the union with collaboration with the Party.
If the testimony was untrue a false picture of the relationship between the union and the Party leaders would have resulted.
For these reasons there were ample indications of the pertinency of the questions.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: WATKINS V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
John T. WATKINS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America, Supreme Court 354 U.S. 178, continued ...
78 Mr. Justice CLARK, dissenting, continued ...
V.
92 The Court condemns the long-established and long-recognized committee system of inquiry of the House because it raises serious questions concerning the protection it affords to constitutional rights.
It concludes that compelling a witness to reveal his 'beliefs, expressions or associations' impinges upon First Amendment rights.
The system of inquiry, it says, must 'insure that the Congress does not unjustifiably encroach upon an individual's right to privacy nor abridge his liberty of speech, press, religion or assembly.'
In effect the Court honors Watkins' claim of a 'right to silence' which brings all inquiries, as we know, to a 'dead end.'
I do not see how any First Amendment rights were endangered here.
There is nothing in the First Amendment that provides the guarantees Watkins claims.
That Amendment was designed to prevent attempts by law to curtail freedom of speech. Whitney v. People of State of California, 1927, 274 U.S. 357, 375, 47 S.Ct. 641, 648, 71 L.Ed. 1095.
It forbids Congress from making any law 'abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.'
It guarantees Watkins' right to join any organization and make any speech that does not have an intent to incite to crime. Dennis v. United States, 1951, 341 U.S. 494, 71 S.Ct. 857, 95 L.Ed. 1137.
But Watkins was asked whether he knew named individuals and whether they were Communists.
He refused to answer on the ground that his rights were being abridged.
What he was actually seeking to do was to protect his former associates, not himself, from embarrassment.
He had already admitted his own involvement.
He sought to vindicate the rights, if any, of his associates.
It is settled that one cannot invoke the constitutional rights of another. Tileston v. Ullman, 1943, 318 U.S. 44, 46, 63 S.Ct. 493, 494, 87 L.Ed. 603.
93 As already indicated, even if Watkins' associates were on the stand they could not decline to disclose their Communist connections on First Amendment grounds.
While there may be no restraint by the Government of one's beliefs, the right of free belief has never been extended to include the withholding of knowledge of past events or transactions.
There is no general privilege of silence.
The First Amendment does not make speech or silence permissible to a person in such measure as he chooses.
Watkins has here exercised his own choice as to when he talks, what questions he answers, and when he remains silent.
A witness is not given such a choice by the Amendment.
Remote and indirect disadvantages such as 'public stigma, scorn and obloquy' may be related to the First Amendment, but they are not enough to block investigation.
The Congress has recognized this since 1862 when it first adopted the contempt section, R.S. § 103, as amended, 2 U.S.C. § 193, 2 U.S.C.A. § 193, declaring that no witness before a congressional committee may refuse to testify 'upon the ground that his testimony to such fact or his production of such paper may tend to disgrace him or otherwise render him infamous.' See also McGrain v. Daugherty, supra, 273 U.S. at pages 179, 180, 47 S.Ct. at page 330, 71 L.Ed. 580; United States v. Josephson, 2 Cir., 1947, 165 F.2d 82, 89, certiorari denied, 333 U.S. 838, 68 S.Ct. 609, 92 L.Ed. 1122. See also Report on Congressional Investigations, Assn. of the Bar of the City of New York, 1948, 3—4.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
78 Mr. Justice CLARK, dissenting, continued ...
V.
92 The Court condemns the long-established and long-recognized committee system of inquiry of the House because it raises serious questions concerning the protection it affords to constitutional rights.
It concludes that compelling a witness to reveal his 'beliefs, expressions or associations' impinges upon First Amendment rights.
The system of inquiry, it says, must 'insure that the Congress does not unjustifiably encroach upon an individual's right to privacy nor abridge his liberty of speech, press, religion or assembly.'
In effect the Court honors Watkins' claim of a 'right to silence' which brings all inquiries, as we know, to a 'dead end.'
I do not see how any First Amendment rights were endangered here.
There is nothing in the First Amendment that provides the guarantees Watkins claims.
That Amendment was designed to prevent attempts by law to curtail freedom of speech. Whitney v. People of State of California, 1927, 274 U.S. 357, 375, 47 S.Ct. 641, 648, 71 L.Ed. 1095.
It forbids Congress from making any law 'abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.'
It guarantees Watkins' right to join any organization and make any speech that does not have an intent to incite to crime. Dennis v. United States, 1951, 341 U.S. 494, 71 S.Ct. 857, 95 L.Ed. 1137.
But Watkins was asked whether he knew named individuals and whether they were Communists.
He refused to answer on the ground that his rights were being abridged.
What he was actually seeking to do was to protect his former associates, not himself, from embarrassment.
He had already admitted his own involvement.
He sought to vindicate the rights, if any, of his associates.
It is settled that one cannot invoke the constitutional rights of another. Tileston v. Ullman, 1943, 318 U.S. 44, 46, 63 S.Ct. 493, 494, 87 L.Ed. 603.
93 As already indicated, even if Watkins' associates were on the stand they could not decline to disclose their Communist connections on First Amendment grounds.
While there may be no restraint by the Government of one's beliefs, the right of free belief has never been extended to include the withholding of knowledge of past events or transactions.
There is no general privilege of silence.
The First Amendment does not make speech or silence permissible to a person in such measure as he chooses.
Watkins has here exercised his own choice as to when he talks, what questions he answers, and when he remains silent.
A witness is not given such a choice by the Amendment.
Remote and indirect disadvantages such as 'public stigma, scorn and obloquy' may be related to the First Amendment, but they are not enough to block investigation.
The Congress has recognized this since 1862 when it first adopted the contempt section, R.S. § 103, as amended, 2 U.S.C. § 193, 2 U.S.C.A. § 193, declaring that no witness before a congressional committee may refuse to testify 'upon the ground that his testimony to such fact or his production of such paper may tend to disgrace him or otherwise render him infamous.' See also McGrain v. Daugherty, supra, 273 U.S. at pages 179, 180, 47 S.Ct. at page 330, 71 L.Ed. 580; United States v. Josephson, 2 Cir., 1947, 165 F.2d 82, 89, certiorari denied, 333 U.S. 838, 68 S.Ct. 609, 92 L.Ed. 1122. See also Report on Congressional Investigations, Assn. of the Bar of the City of New York, 1948, 3—4.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: WATKINS V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
John T. WATKINS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America, Supreme Court 354 U.S. 178, continued ...
78 Mr. Justice CLARK, dissenting, concluded ...
V.
94 We do not have in this case unauthorized, arbitrary, or unreasonable inquiries and disclosures with respect to a witness' personal and private affairs so ably and properly denounced in the Sinclair case, supra, 279 U.S. at pages 291, 292, 49 S.Ct. at page 271, 73 L.Ed. 692.
This inquiry is far different from the cases relied upon by the Court.
There is no analogy to the case of Richard Thompson 13 involving the sermons of clergymen.
It is not Floyd's 14 case involving criticism of the royal family.
There is no resemblance to John Wilkes' struggle for a seat in Parliament.
It is not Briggs 15 where the prosecutor sought to develop the national origin of policemen.
It is not Kilbourn 16 involving a private real estate pool.
Nor is it Quinn, 17 Emspak, 18 or Bart, 19 involving the Fifth Amendment.
It is not Rumely 20 involving the interpretation of a lobbying statute.
Nor is this 'a new kind of congressional inquiry unknown in prior periods of American history * * * (i.e.) a broad scale intrusion into the lives and affairs of private citizens.'
As I see it only the setting is different.
It involves new faces and new issues brought about by new situations which the Congress feels it is necessary to control in the public interest.
The difficulties of getting information are identical if not greater.
Like authority to that always used by the Congress is employed here and in the same manner so far as congressional procedures are concerned.
We should afford to Congress the presumption that it takes every precaution possible to avoid unnecessary damage to reputations.
Some committees have codes of procedure, and others use the executive hearing technique to this end.
The record in this case shows no conduct on the part of the Un-American Activities Committee that justifies condemnation.
That there may have been such occasions is not for us to consider here.
Nor should we permit its past transgressions, if any, to lead to the rigid restraint of all congressional committees.
To carry on its heavy responsibility the compulsion of truth that does not incriminate is not only necessary to the Congress but is permitted within the limits of the Constitution.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
78 Mr. Justice CLARK, dissenting, concluded ...
V.
94 We do not have in this case unauthorized, arbitrary, or unreasonable inquiries and disclosures with respect to a witness' personal and private affairs so ably and properly denounced in the Sinclair case, supra, 279 U.S. at pages 291, 292, 49 S.Ct. at page 271, 73 L.Ed. 692.
This inquiry is far different from the cases relied upon by the Court.
There is no analogy to the case of Richard Thompson 13 involving the sermons of clergymen.
It is not Floyd's 14 case involving criticism of the royal family.
There is no resemblance to John Wilkes' struggle for a seat in Parliament.
It is not Briggs 15 where the prosecutor sought to develop the national origin of policemen.
It is not Kilbourn 16 involving a private real estate pool.
Nor is it Quinn, 17 Emspak, 18 or Bart, 19 involving the Fifth Amendment.
It is not Rumely 20 involving the interpretation of a lobbying statute.
Nor is this 'a new kind of congressional inquiry unknown in prior periods of American history * * * (i.e.) a broad scale intrusion into the lives and affairs of private citizens.'
As I see it only the setting is different.
It involves new faces and new issues brought about by new situations which the Congress feels it is necessary to control in the public interest.
The difficulties of getting information are identical if not greater.
Like authority to that always used by the Congress is employed here and in the same manner so far as congressional procedures are concerned.
We should afford to Congress the presumption that it takes every precaution possible to avoid unnecessary damage to reputations.
Some committees have codes of procedure, and others use the executive hearing technique to this end.
The record in this case shows no conduct on the part of the Un-American Activities Committee that justifies condemnation.
That there may have been such occasions is not for us to consider here.
Nor should we permit its past transgressions, if any, to lead to the rigid restraint of all congressional committees.
To carry on its heavy responsibility the compulsion of truth that does not incriminate is not only necessary to the Congress but is permitted within the limits of the Constitution.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: WATKINS V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
John T. WATKINS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America, Supreme Court 354 U.S. 178, continued ...
1 R. 153—163; Hearings before the House of Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities on Communist Activities in the Chicago Area—Part 1, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 3737—3752.
2 R. 135—149; Hearings before the House of Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities on Investigation of Communist Activities in the Chicago Area—Part 2, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 4243 4260.
3 R. 75; Hearings, supra, note 2, Part 3, at 4268.
4 Brief for Respondent, pp. 59—60.
5 R. 85—86; Hearings, supra, note 2, Part 3, at 4275.
6 There were nine citations of contempt voted at the same time. Petitioner's case was the second to be acted upon. There was no debate other than a statement by Representative Javits on a proposal to consolidate the legislative bodies investigating subversion. 100 Cong.Rec. 6382—6386. The resolution to prosecute petitioner passed by a voice vote.
There was lengthier discussion and a recorded vote on the first case considered by the House. Id., at 6375—6382. In none of the cases was there any debate on the merits of the witnesses' conduct. Id., at 6375—6401.
7 The counts of the indictment were patterned from the sequence of the questioning by the Committee. Petitioner was asked separately about six persons, and these are the basis of the first six counts. The last count comprises the omnibus question that gave a list of twenty-five names for petitioner to identify. With two exceptions, the questions asked for knowledge of past membership in the Communist Party. The context of the interrogation indicates that the Committee's concern was with such past conduct. Petitioner agreed to and did disclose his knowledge of those he believed to be present members.
8 'Now, we don't claim on behalf of the Government that there is any right to expose for the purposes of exposure. And I don't know that Congress has ever claimed any such right. But we do say, in the same breath, that there is a right to inform the public at the same time you inform the Congress.'
9 Coke, Fourth Institute, 15.
10 H.Comm.J. (1688—1693) 227; Jay v. Topham, 12 How.St.Tr. 822.
11 Proceedings against Richard Thompson, 8 How.St.Tr. 2; Wittke, The History of English Parliamentary Privilege, 50.
12 'Floyd, for uttering a few contemptible expressions, was degraded from his gentility, and to be held an infamous person; his testimony not to be received; to ride from the Fleet to Cheapside on horseback, without a saddle, with his face to the horse's tail, and the tail in his hand, and then to stand two hours in the pillory, and to be branded in the forehead with the letter K; to ride four days afterwards in the same manner to Westminster, and then to stand two hours more in the pillory, with words on a paper in his hat showing his offence; to be whipped at the cart's tail from the Fleet to Westminster Hall; to pay a fine of 5000l.; and to be a prisoner in Newgate during his life.' 1 DeLolme, The Rise and Progress of the English Constitution, 348.
13 H.L.J. (1620—1628) 110—111, 113, 116, 124, 125, 127, 132, 133—134, 183; Wittke, 76—77. See also Kelke, Constitutional Law and Cases, 155—156.
14 H.L.J. (1675—1681) 54—55.
15 Wittke, 122—123. With all his knavery, Wilkes was long a hero with certain persecuted groups in England. Here, streets and other public places have been named for him and his writings.
16 H.Comm.J. (1835) 533, 564—565, 571, 575.
17 Finer, Congressional Investigations: The British System, 18 U. of Chi.L.Rev. 521, 554—561; Smelser, Legislative Investigations: Safeguards for Witnesses: The Problem in Historical Perspective, 29 Notre Dame Law. 163, 167; Clokie & Robinson, Royal Commissions of Inquiry.
18 Finer, 559; Smelser, 167; Clokie & Robinson, 186—187.
19 See Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 Harv.L.Rev. 153, 168—191; Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt, 74 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 691, 719—725.
20 The first case to reach this Court was Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 5 L.Ed. 242, which upheld the power of the House of Representatives to reprimand a person for attempting to bribe a member of the House.
21 On December 31, 1827, the House Committee on Manufacturers was given the task of inquiring into the effect that the proposed upward revision in the tariff schedules would have upon domestic manufacturers. The power of the House to authorize a fact-finding inquiry in aid of legislation was seriously challenged. After full debate the investigation was authorized by a vote of 102 to 88. 4 Cong.Deb. 889.
22 The subject matter of the select committee was '* * * the late invasion and seizure of the armory and arsenal of the United States at Harper's Ferry, in Virginia, by a band of armed men * * *. And that said committee (shall) report whether any and what legislation may, in their opinion, be necessary, on the part of the United States, for the future preservation of the peace of the country, or for the safety of the public property; and that said committee (shall) have power to send for persons and papers.' Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 141 (1859).
23 60 Stat. 828—829. All standing committees in the Senate were invested with the power of compulsory process. 60 Stat. 830 831. During the 83d Congress, two other standing committees in the House of Representatives, the Appropriations and Government Operations Committees, possessed that power. 99 Cong.Rec. 16—19.
24 The first court that was called upon to review the constitutional validity of a legislative inquiry was the New York Court of Common Pleas. The case arose out of the inquiry by the Common Council of New York into the conduct of the Police Department in 1855. Judge Charles Patrick Daly upheld the investigative power as implicit in the functions of a legislature, but ruled that the examination of witnesses must be confined to the subject under investigation. Applying this standard, he ruled that questions directed to the national origin of policemen were improper under the investigators' authorizing resolution. Briggs v. Mackeller, N.Y.Common Pleas, 1855, 2 Abb.Prac. 30.
25 In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 17 S.Ct. 677, 41 L.Ed. 1154 (upheld conviction under R.S. § 102, forerunner of 2 U.S.C. § 192, 2 U.S.C.A. § 192, for refusal to answer questions in inquiry into charges of corruption among certain Senators with respect to pending bill on sugar tariff); cf. Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 37 S.Ct. 448, 61 L.Ed. 881.
26 Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, 55 S.Ct. 375, 79 L.Ed. 802 (upheld power of Senate to punish as a contempt the action of a witness in allowing the destruction and removal of papers subject to the subpoena of a Senate committee; held that enactment of 2 U.S.C. § 192, 2 U.S.C.A. § 192 did not impair contempt power of Houses of Congress).
27 The first reported case in which the claim of the privilege against self-incrimination was allowed in a congressional inquiry proceeding was United States v. Yukio Abe, D.C., 95 F.Supp. 991. Prior thereto, several state courts had held that legislative investigations were subject to the witness' privilege not to accuse himself under state constitutions. Emery's Case, 107 Mass. 172, decided in 1871 is the earliest. See also Ex parte Johnson, 187 S.C. 1, 196 S.E. 164, 118 A.L.R. 591.
28 E.g., Excerpts from Hearings before the House of Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities — Regarding Investigation of Communist Activities in Connection with the Atom Bomb, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 5; N.Y. Herald Tribune, Sept. 6, 1948, p. 3, col. 6—7.
29 Appropriateness of the privilege has been upheld without question in many cases arising out of congressional inquiry. See, e.g., Starkovich v. United States, 9 Cir., 231 F.2d 411; Aiuppa v. United States, 6 Cir., 201 F.2d 287; United States v. Costello, 2 Cir., 198 F.2d 200; Marcello v. United States, 5 Cir., 196 F.2d 437; United States v. DiCarlo, D.C., 102 F.Supp. 597; United States v. Licavoli, D.C., 102 F.Supp. 607; United States v. Cohen, D.C., 101 F.Supp. 906; United States v. Jaffe, D.C. 98 F.Supp. 191; United States v. Fitzpatrick, D.C., 96 F.Supp. 491; United States v. Raley, D.C., 96 F.Supp. 495; United States v. Yukio Abe, D.C., 95 F.Supp. 991.
30 The first reported decision, made in 1947, grew out of the inquiry of the Un-American Activities Committee into certain organizations suspected of subversive actions. Subpoenas duces tecum had been issued calling for the correspondence and other records of these organizations. Refusals to comply were followed by prosecutions under 2 U.S.C. § 192, 2 U.S.C.A. § 192. The District Court denied motions to dismiss the indictments in United States v. Bryan, D.C., 72 F.Supp. 58. The decision with respect to the First Amendment was affirmed in Barsky v. United States, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 127, 167 F.2d 241.
31 See United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 43—44, 73 S.Ct. 543, 544, 545, 97 L.Ed. 770; Lawson v. United States, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 167, 176 F.2d 49, 51—52; Barsky v. United States, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 127, 167 F.2d 241, 244—250; United States v. Josephson, 2 Cir., 165 F.2d 82, 90—92.
32 In a report to the House, the Committee declared: 'While Congress does not have the power to deny to citizens the right to believe in, teach, or advocate, communism, fascism, and nazism, it does have the right to focus the spotlight of publicity upon their activities. * * *' H.R.Rep. No. 2, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 13. A year later, the Committee reported that '* * * investigation to inform the American people * * * is the real purpose of the House Committee.' H.R.Rep. No. 1476, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 1—2.
A pamphlet issued by the Committee in 1951 stated that: 'Exposure in a systematic way began with the formation of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, May 26, 1938.' The Committee believed itself commanded '* * * to expose people and organizations attempting to destroy this country. That is still its job and to that job it sticks.' 100 Things You Should Know About Communism, H.R.Doc. No. 136, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 19, 67.
In its annual reports, the Committee has devoted a large part of its information to a public listing of names along with a summary of their activities. '* * * (T)he committee feels that the Congress and the American people will have a much clearer and fuller picture of the success and scope of communism in the United States by having set forth the names and, where possible, the positions occupied by individuals who have been identified as Communists, or former Communists, during the past year.' H.R.Rep. No. 2516, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6—7.
33 We are not concerned with the power of the Congress to inquire into and publicize corruption, maladministration or inefficiency in agencies of the Government. That was the only kind of activity described by Woodrow Wilson in Congressional Government when he wrote: 'The informing function of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative function.' Id., at 303. From the earliest times in its history, the Congress has assiduously performed an 'informing function' of this nature. See Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 Harv.L.Rev. 153, 168—194.
34 Compare the treatment of this point in Barenblatt v. United States, 100 U.S.App.D.C. —-, 240 F.2d 875, 880—881; Morford v. United States, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 172, 176 F.2d 54, 58; Eisler v. United States, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 315, 170 F.2d 273, 278—279; United States v. Josephson, 2 Cir., 165 F.2d 82, 89; and United States v. Kamin, D.C., 136 F.Supp. 791, 800—801.
35 H.Res. 282, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 83 Cong.Rec. 7568, 7586.
36 H.Res. 5, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 91 Cong.Rec. 10, 15.
37 H.Res. 5, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 99 Cong.Rec. 18, 24.
38 For contrasting views, see Morford v. United States, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 172, 176 F.2d 54, 57—58, and Barsky v. United States, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 127, 167 F.2d 241, 247—248.
39 The language of the resolution was obviously taken from the Dickstein resolution, which established the McCormack Committee in 1934 to study Nazi and other propaganda sent into the United States from foreign countries. H.Res. 198, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 78 Cong.Rec. 4934, 4949.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
1 R. 153—163; Hearings before the House of Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities on Communist Activities in the Chicago Area—Part 1, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 3737—3752.
2 R. 135—149; Hearings before the House of Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities on Investigation of Communist Activities in the Chicago Area—Part 2, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 4243 4260.
3 R. 75; Hearings, supra, note 2, Part 3, at 4268.
4 Brief for Respondent, pp. 59—60.
5 R. 85—86; Hearings, supra, note 2, Part 3, at 4275.
6 There were nine citations of contempt voted at the same time. Petitioner's case was the second to be acted upon. There was no debate other than a statement by Representative Javits on a proposal to consolidate the legislative bodies investigating subversion. 100 Cong.Rec. 6382—6386. The resolution to prosecute petitioner passed by a voice vote.
There was lengthier discussion and a recorded vote on the first case considered by the House. Id., at 6375—6382. In none of the cases was there any debate on the merits of the witnesses' conduct. Id., at 6375—6401.
7 The counts of the indictment were patterned from the sequence of the questioning by the Committee. Petitioner was asked separately about six persons, and these are the basis of the first six counts. The last count comprises the omnibus question that gave a list of twenty-five names for petitioner to identify. With two exceptions, the questions asked for knowledge of past membership in the Communist Party. The context of the interrogation indicates that the Committee's concern was with such past conduct. Petitioner agreed to and did disclose his knowledge of those he believed to be present members.
8 'Now, we don't claim on behalf of the Government that there is any right to expose for the purposes of exposure. And I don't know that Congress has ever claimed any such right. But we do say, in the same breath, that there is a right to inform the public at the same time you inform the Congress.'
9 Coke, Fourth Institute, 15.
10 H.Comm.J. (1688—1693) 227; Jay v. Topham, 12 How.St.Tr. 822.
11 Proceedings against Richard Thompson, 8 How.St.Tr. 2; Wittke, The History of English Parliamentary Privilege, 50.
12 'Floyd, for uttering a few contemptible expressions, was degraded from his gentility, and to be held an infamous person; his testimony not to be received; to ride from the Fleet to Cheapside on horseback, without a saddle, with his face to the horse's tail, and the tail in his hand, and then to stand two hours in the pillory, and to be branded in the forehead with the letter K; to ride four days afterwards in the same manner to Westminster, and then to stand two hours more in the pillory, with words on a paper in his hat showing his offence; to be whipped at the cart's tail from the Fleet to Westminster Hall; to pay a fine of 5000l.; and to be a prisoner in Newgate during his life.' 1 DeLolme, The Rise and Progress of the English Constitution, 348.
13 H.L.J. (1620—1628) 110—111, 113, 116, 124, 125, 127, 132, 133—134, 183; Wittke, 76—77. See also Kelke, Constitutional Law and Cases, 155—156.
14 H.L.J. (1675—1681) 54—55.
15 Wittke, 122—123. With all his knavery, Wilkes was long a hero with certain persecuted groups in England. Here, streets and other public places have been named for him and his writings.
16 H.Comm.J. (1835) 533, 564—565, 571, 575.
17 Finer, Congressional Investigations: The British System, 18 U. of Chi.L.Rev. 521, 554—561; Smelser, Legislative Investigations: Safeguards for Witnesses: The Problem in Historical Perspective, 29 Notre Dame Law. 163, 167; Clokie & Robinson, Royal Commissions of Inquiry.
18 Finer, 559; Smelser, 167; Clokie & Robinson, 186—187.
19 See Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 Harv.L.Rev. 153, 168—191; Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt, 74 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 691, 719—725.
20 The first case to reach this Court was Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 5 L.Ed. 242, which upheld the power of the House of Representatives to reprimand a person for attempting to bribe a member of the House.
21 On December 31, 1827, the House Committee on Manufacturers was given the task of inquiring into the effect that the proposed upward revision in the tariff schedules would have upon domestic manufacturers. The power of the House to authorize a fact-finding inquiry in aid of legislation was seriously challenged. After full debate the investigation was authorized by a vote of 102 to 88. 4 Cong.Deb. 889.
22 The subject matter of the select committee was '* * * the late invasion and seizure of the armory and arsenal of the United States at Harper's Ferry, in Virginia, by a band of armed men * * *. And that said committee (shall) report whether any and what legislation may, in their opinion, be necessary, on the part of the United States, for the future preservation of the peace of the country, or for the safety of the public property; and that said committee (shall) have power to send for persons and papers.' Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 141 (1859).
23 60 Stat. 828—829. All standing committees in the Senate were invested with the power of compulsory process. 60 Stat. 830 831. During the 83d Congress, two other standing committees in the House of Representatives, the Appropriations and Government Operations Committees, possessed that power. 99 Cong.Rec. 16—19.
24 The first court that was called upon to review the constitutional validity of a legislative inquiry was the New York Court of Common Pleas. The case arose out of the inquiry by the Common Council of New York into the conduct of the Police Department in 1855. Judge Charles Patrick Daly upheld the investigative power as implicit in the functions of a legislature, but ruled that the examination of witnesses must be confined to the subject under investigation. Applying this standard, he ruled that questions directed to the national origin of policemen were improper under the investigators' authorizing resolution. Briggs v. Mackeller, N.Y.Common Pleas, 1855, 2 Abb.Prac. 30.
25 In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 17 S.Ct. 677, 41 L.Ed. 1154 (upheld conviction under R.S. § 102, forerunner of 2 U.S.C. § 192, 2 U.S.C.A. § 192, for refusal to answer questions in inquiry into charges of corruption among certain Senators with respect to pending bill on sugar tariff); cf. Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 37 S.Ct. 448, 61 L.Ed. 881.
26 Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, 55 S.Ct. 375, 79 L.Ed. 802 (upheld power of Senate to punish as a contempt the action of a witness in allowing the destruction and removal of papers subject to the subpoena of a Senate committee; held that enactment of 2 U.S.C. § 192, 2 U.S.C.A. § 192 did not impair contempt power of Houses of Congress).
27 The first reported case in which the claim of the privilege against self-incrimination was allowed in a congressional inquiry proceeding was United States v. Yukio Abe, D.C., 95 F.Supp. 991. Prior thereto, several state courts had held that legislative investigations were subject to the witness' privilege not to accuse himself under state constitutions. Emery's Case, 107 Mass. 172, decided in 1871 is the earliest. See also Ex parte Johnson, 187 S.C. 1, 196 S.E. 164, 118 A.L.R. 591.
28 E.g., Excerpts from Hearings before the House of Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities — Regarding Investigation of Communist Activities in Connection with the Atom Bomb, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 5; N.Y. Herald Tribune, Sept. 6, 1948, p. 3, col. 6—7.
29 Appropriateness of the privilege has been upheld without question in many cases arising out of congressional inquiry. See, e.g., Starkovich v. United States, 9 Cir., 231 F.2d 411; Aiuppa v. United States, 6 Cir., 201 F.2d 287; United States v. Costello, 2 Cir., 198 F.2d 200; Marcello v. United States, 5 Cir., 196 F.2d 437; United States v. DiCarlo, D.C., 102 F.Supp. 597; United States v. Licavoli, D.C., 102 F.Supp. 607; United States v. Cohen, D.C., 101 F.Supp. 906; United States v. Jaffe, D.C. 98 F.Supp. 191; United States v. Fitzpatrick, D.C., 96 F.Supp. 491; United States v. Raley, D.C., 96 F.Supp. 495; United States v. Yukio Abe, D.C., 95 F.Supp. 991.
30 The first reported decision, made in 1947, grew out of the inquiry of the Un-American Activities Committee into certain organizations suspected of subversive actions. Subpoenas duces tecum had been issued calling for the correspondence and other records of these organizations. Refusals to comply were followed by prosecutions under 2 U.S.C. § 192, 2 U.S.C.A. § 192. The District Court denied motions to dismiss the indictments in United States v. Bryan, D.C., 72 F.Supp. 58. The decision with respect to the First Amendment was affirmed in Barsky v. United States, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 127, 167 F.2d 241.
31 See United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 43—44, 73 S.Ct. 543, 544, 545, 97 L.Ed. 770; Lawson v. United States, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 167, 176 F.2d 49, 51—52; Barsky v. United States, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 127, 167 F.2d 241, 244—250; United States v. Josephson, 2 Cir., 165 F.2d 82, 90—92.
32 In a report to the House, the Committee declared: 'While Congress does not have the power to deny to citizens the right to believe in, teach, or advocate, communism, fascism, and nazism, it does have the right to focus the spotlight of publicity upon their activities. * * *' H.R.Rep. No. 2, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 13. A year later, the Committee reported that '* * * investigation to inform the American people * * * is the real purpose of the House Committee.' H.R.Rep. No. 1476, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 1—2.
A pamphlet issued by the Committee in 1951 stated that: 'Exposure in a systematic way began with the formation of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, May 26, 1938.' The Committee believed itself commanded '* * * to expose people and organizations attempting to destroy this country. That is still its job and to that job it sticks.' 100 Things You Should Know About Communism, H.R.Doc. No. 136, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 19, 67.
In its annual reports, the Committee has devoted a large part of its information to a public listing of names along with a summary of their activities. '* * * (T)he committee feels that the Congress and the American people will have a much clearer and fuller picture of the success and scope of communism in the United States by having set forth the names and, where possible, the positions occupied by individuals who have been identified as Communists, or former Communists, during the past year.' H.R.Rep. No. 2516, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6—7.
33 We are not concerned with the power of the Congress to inquire into and publicize corruption, maladministration or inefficiency in agencies of the Government. That was the only kind of activity described by Woodrow Wilson in Congressional Government when he wrote: 'The informing function of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative function.' Id., at 303. From the earliest times in its history, the Congress has assiduously performed an 'informing function' of this nature. See Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 Harv.L.Rev. 153, 168—194.
34 Compare the treatment of this point in Barenblatt v. United States, 100 U.S.App.D.C. —-, 240 F.2d 875, 880—881; Morford v. United States, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 172, 176 F.2d 54, 58; Eisler v. United States, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 315, 170 F.2d 273, 278—279; United States v. Josephson, 2 Cir., 165 F.2d 82, 89; and United States v. Kamin, D.C., 136 F.Supp. 791, 800—801.
35 H.Res. 282, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 83 Cong.Rec. 7568, 7586.
36 H.Res. 5, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 91 Cong.Rec. 10, 15.
37 H.Res. 5, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 99 Cong.Rec. 18, 24.
38 For contrasting views, see Morford v. United States, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 172, 176 F.2d 54, 57—58, and Barsky v. United States, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 127, 167 F.2d 241, 247—248.
39 The language of the resolution was obviously taken from the Dickstein resolution, which established the McCormack Committee in 1934 to study Nazi and other propaganda sent into the United States from foreign countries. H.Res. 198, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 78 Cong.Rec. 4934, 4949.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: WATKINS V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
John T. WATKINS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America, Supreme Court 354 U.S. 178, continued ...
40 In 1947, Judge Charles E. Clark, now Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, wrote about the Committee: 'Suffice it to say here that its range of activity has covered all varieties of organizations, including the American Civil Liberties Union, the C.I.O., the National Catholic Welfare Conference, the Farmer-Labor party, the Federal Theatre Project, consumers' organizations, various publications from the magazine 'Time' to the 'Daily Worker,' and varying forms and types of industry, of which the recent investigation of the movie industry is fresh in the public mind.' 'While it has avoided specific definition of what it is seeking, it has repeatedly inquired as to membership in the Communist party and in other organizations which it regards as communist controlled or affected.' United States v. Josephson, 2 Cir., 165 F.2d 82, 95 (dissent). See also the dissenting opinion of Judge Henry W. Edgerton, now Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in Barsky v. United States, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 127, at page 143, 167 F.2d 241, at page 257.
41 H.Res. 26, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 84 Cong.Rec. 1098, 1127 1128; H.Res. 321, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 86 Cong.Rec. 572, 604—605; H.Res. 90, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 87 Cong.Rec. 886, 899; H.Res. 420, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 88 Cong.Rec. 2282, 2297; H.Res. 65, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 89 Cong.Rec. 795, 809—810.
42 91 Cong.Rec. 10, 15.
43 60 Stat. 812, 828.
44 H.Res. 5, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 93 Cong.Rec. 38; H.Res. 5, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 95 Cong.Rec. 10; H.Res. 7, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 97 Cong.Rec. 17, 19; H.Res. 5, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 99 Cong.Rec. 15; H.Res. 5, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 101 Cong.Rec. 11.
45 This statute was passed in 1857 as a direct result of an incident which caused the Congress to feel that it needed more severe sanctions to compel disclosures than were available in the historical procedure of summoning the recalcitrant witness before the bar of either House of Congress and ordering him held in custody until he agreed to testify. Such imprisonment is valid only so long as the House remains in session. See Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 231, 5 L.Ed. 242; Eberling, Congressional Investigations, 180—184. The immediate cause for adoption of the statute was an accusation by one J. W. Simonton, a newspaperman, that certain unnamed Congressmen were soliciting bribes on a matter pending before the legislature. Simonton was cited before the House of Representatives and refused to divulge the names of those implicated. In the course of that episode, the forerunner of 2 U.S.C. § 192, 2 U.S.C.A. § 192 was passed in order '* * * to inflict a greater punishment than the committee believe the House possesses the power to inflict.' Cong.Globe, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 405. See also id., 403—413, 426—433, 434—445. Thereafter, having been in custody more than two weeks, Simonton testified to the satisfaction of the committee and was discharged. 3 Hinds' Precedents § 1669.
46 United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 74 S.Ct. 808, 98 L.Ed. 989; United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, 73 S.Ct. 189, 97 L.Ed. 200; Winters v. People of State of New York, 333 U.S. 507, 68 S.Ct. 665, 92 L.Ed. 840; Musser v. State of Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 68 S.Ct. 397, 92 L.Ed. 562; Lanzetta v. State of New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 S.Ct. 618, 83 L.Ed. 888.
47 United States v. Orman, 3 Cir., 207 F.2d 148; Bowers v. United States, 92 U.S.App.D.C. 79, 202 F.2d 447; United States v. Kamin, D.C., 135 F.Supp. 382, Id., 136 F.Supp. 791.
48 United States v. Josephson, 2 Cir., 165 F.2d 82, 88.
49 'The committee will be in order. I should like to make an opening statement regarding our work here in the city of Chicago. The Congress of the United States, realizing that there are individuals and elements in this country whose aim it is to subvert our constitutional form of government, has established the House Committee on Un-American Activities. In establishing this committee, the Congress has directed that we must investigate and hold hearings, either by the full committee or by a subcommittee, to ascertain the extent and success of subversive activities directed against these United States. 'On the basis of these investigations and hearings, the Committee on Un-American Activities reports its findings to the Congress and makes recommendations from these investigations and hearings for new legislation. As a result of this committee's investigations and hearings, the Internal Security Act of 1950 was enacted (50 U.S.C.A. § 781 et seq.) 'Over the past fifteen years this committee has been in existence, both as a special and permanent committee, it has made forty-seven recommendations to the Congress to insure proper security against subversion. I am proud to be able to state that of these forty-seven recommendations, all but eight have been acted upon in one way or another. Among these recommendations which the Congress has not acted upon are those which provide that witnesses appearing before congressional committees be granted immunity from prosecution on the information they furnish. 'The committee has also recommended that evidence secured from confidential devices be admissible in cases involving the national security. The executive branch of Government has now also asked the Congress for such legislation. A study is now being made of various bills dealing with this matter. 'The Congress has also referred to the House Committee on Un-American Activities a bill which would amend the National Security Act of 1950. This bill, if enacted into law, would provide that the Subversive Activities Control Board should, after suitable hearings and procedures, be empowered to find if certain labor organizations are in fact Communist-controlled action groups. Following this action, such labor groups would not have available the use of the National Labor Relations Board as they now have under the provisions of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq.). 'During the first session of this 83rd Congress, the House Un-American Activities Committee has held hearings in Los Angeles and San Francisco, California; Albany and New York City, New York; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Columbus, Ohio. We are here in Chicago, Illinois, realizing that this is the center of the great midwestern area of the United States. 'It cannot be said that subversive infiltration has had a greater nor a lesser success in infiltrating this important area. The hearings today are the culmination of an investigation that has been conducted by the committee's competent staff and is a part of the committee's intention for holding hearings in various parts of the country. 'The committee has found that by conducting its investigations and holding hearings in various parts of the country, it has been able to secure a fuller and more comprehensive picture of subversive efforts throughout our nation. Every witness who has been subpoenaed to appear before the committee here in Chicago, as in all hearings conducted by this committee, are (sic) known to possess information which will assist the committee in performing its directed function to the Congress of the United States.' (R. 43—44; Hearing, supra, note 2, Part 1, at 4165—4166).
50 The Committee convened in executive session on January 22, 1953, and adopted the following resolution: 'Be It Resolved, that the Chairman shall have authority from time to time to appoint subcommittees composed of one or more members of the Committee on Un-American Activities for the purpose of performing any and all acts which the Committee as a whole is authorized to do.' (R. 91.)
TO BE CONTINUED ...
40 In 1947, Judge Charles E. Clark, now Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, wrote about the Committee: 'Suffice it to say here that its range of activity has covered all varieties of organizations, including the American Civil Liberties Union, the C.I.O., the National Catholic Welfare Conference, the Farmer-Labor party, the Federal Theatre Project, consumers' organizations, various publications from the magazine 'Time' to the 'Daily Worker,' and varying forms and types of industry, of which the recent investigation of the movie industry is fresh in the public mind.' 'While it has avoided specific definition of what it is seeking, it has repeatedly inquired as to membership in the Communist party and in other organizations which it regards as communist controlled or affected.' United States v. Josephson, 2 Cir., 165 F.2d 82, 95 (dissent). See also the dissenting opinion of Judge Henry W. Edgerton, now Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in Barsky v. United States, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 127, at page 143, 167 F.2d 241, at page 257.
41 H.Res. 26, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 84 Cong.Rec. 1098, 1127 1128; H.Res. 321, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 86 Cong.Rec. 572, 604—605; H.Res. 90, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 87 Cong.Rec. 886, 899; H.Res. 420, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 88 Cong.Rec. 2282, 2297; H.Res. 65, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 89 Cong.Rec. 795, 809—810.
42 91 Cong.Rec. 10, 15.
43 60 Stat. 812, 828.
44 H.Res. 5, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 93 Cong.Rec. 38; H.Res. 5, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 95 Cong.Rec. 10; H.Res. 7, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 97 Cong.Rec. 17, 19; H.Res. 5, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 99 Cong.Rec. 15; H.Res. 5, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 101 Cong.Rec. 11.
45 This statute was passed in 1857 as a direct result of an incident which caused the Congress to feel that it needed more severe sanctions to compel disclosures than were available in the historical procedure of summoning the recalcitrant witness before the bar of either House of Congress and ordering him held in custody until he agreed to testify. Such imprisonment is valid only so long as the House remains in session. See Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 231, 5 L.Ed. 242; Eberling, Congressional Investigations, 180—184. The immediate cause for adoption of the statute was an accusation by one J. W. Simonton, a newspaperman, that certain unnamed Congressmen were soliciting bribes on a matter pending before the legislature. Simonton was cited before the House of Representatives and refused to divulge the names of those implicated. In the course of that episode, the forerunner of 2 U.S.C. § 192, 2 U.S.C.A. § 192 was passed in order '* * * to inflict a greater punishment than the committee believe the House possesses the power to inflict.' Cong.Globe, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 405. See also id., 403—413, 426—433, 434—445. Thereafter, having been in custody more than two weeks, Simonton testified to the satisfaction of the committee and was discharged. 3 Hinds' Precedents § 1669.
46 United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 74 S.Ct. 808, 98 L.Ed. 989; United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, 73 S.Ct. 189, 97 L.Ed. 200; Winters v. People of State of New York, 333 U.S. 507, 68 S.Ct. 665, 92 L.Ed. 840; Musser v. State of Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 68 S.Ct. 397, 92 L.Ed. 562; Lanzetta v. State of New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 S.Ct. 618, 83 L.Ed. 888.
47 United States v. Orman, 3 Cir., 207 F.2d 148; Bowers v. United States, 92 U.S.App.D.C. 79, 202 F.2d 447; United States v. Kamin, D.C., 135 F.Supp. 382, Id., 136 F.Supp. 791.
48 United States v. Josephson, 2 Cir., 165 F.2d 82, 88.
49 'The committee will be in order. I should like to make an opening statement regarding our work here in the city of Chicago. The Congress of the United States, realizing that there are individuals and elements in this country whose aim it is to subvert our constitutional form of government, has established the House Committee on Un-American Activities. In establishing this committee, the Congress has directed that we must investigate and hold hearings, either by the full committee or by a subcommittee, to ascertain the extent and success of subversive activities directed against these United States. 'On the basis of these investigations and hearings, the Committee on Un-American Activities reports its findings to the Congress and makes recommendations from these investigations and hearings for new legislation. As a result of this committee's investigations and hearings, the Internal Security Act of 1950 was enacted (50 U.S.C.A. § 781 et seq.) 'Over the past fifteen years this committee has been in existence, both as a special and permanent committee, it has made forty-seven recommendations to the Congress to insure proper security against subversion. I am proud to be able to state that of these forty-seven recommendations, all but eight have been acted upon in one way or another. Among these recommendations which the Congress has not acted upon are those which provide that witnesses appearing before congressional committees be granted immunity from prosecution on the information they furnish. 'The committee has also recommended that evidence secured from confidential devices be admissible in cases involving the national security. The executive branch of Government has now also asked the Congress for such legislation. A study is now being made of various bills dealing with this matter. 'The Congress has also referred to the House Committee on Un-American Activities a bill which would amend the National Security Act of 1950. This bill, if enacted into law, would provide that the Subversive Activities Control Board should, after suitable hearings and procedures, be empowered to find if certain labor organizations are in fact Communist-controlled action groups. Following this action, such labor groups would not have available the use of the National Labor Relations Board as they now have under the provisions of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq.). 'During the first session of this 83rd Congress, the House Un-American Activities Committee has held hearings in Los Angeles and San Francisco, California; Albany and New York City, New York; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Columbus, Ohio. We are here in Chicago, Illinois, realizing that this is the center of the great midwestern area of the United States. 'It cannot be said that subversive infiltration has had a greater nor a lesser success in infiltrating this important area. The hearings today are the culmination of an investigation that has been conducted by the committee's competent staff and is a part of the committee's intention for holding hearings in various parts of the country. 'The committee has found that by conducting its investigations and holding hearings in various parts of the country, it has been able to secure a fuller and more comprehensive picture of subversive efforts throughout our nation. Every witness who has been subpoenaed to appear before the committee here in Chicago, as in all hearings conducted by this committee, are (sic) known to possess information which will assist the committee in performing its directed function to the Congress of the United States.' (R. 43—44; Hearing, supra, note 2, Part 1, at 4165—4166).
50 The Committee convened in executive session on January 22, 1953, and adopted the following resolution: 'Be It Resolved, that the Chairman shall have authority from time to time to appoint subcommittees composed of one or more members of the Committee on Un-American Activities for the purpose of performing any and all acts which the Committee as a whole is authorized to do.' (R. 91.)
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: WATKINS V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
John T. WATKINS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America, Supreme Court 354 U.S. 178, concluded ...
1 United States v. Rumely, 1953, 345 U.S. 41, 73 S.Ct. 543, 97 L.Ed. 770; Sinclair v. United States, 1929, 279 U.S. 263, 49 S.Ct. 268, 73 L.Ed. 692; Reed v. County Commissioners, 1928, 277 U.S. 376, 48 S.Ct. 531, 72 L.Ed. 924; McGrain v. Daugherty, 1927, 273 U.S. 135, 47 S.Ct. 319, 71 L.Ed. 580; Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 Harv.L.Rev. 153 (1926).
2 Symposium on Congressional Investigations, 18 U. of Chi.L.Rev. 421, Finer, The British System, 521, 532, 554, 561 (1951).
3 The Committee originated in 1938 under H.Res. 282, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 83 Cong.Rec. 7568, and was patterned after a resolution of 1934 authorizing the investigation of Nazi propaganda. H.Res. 198, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 78 Cong.Rec. 4934. The resolution read much the same as the present authority of the Committee which is quoted below. By a succession of House Resolutions (H.Res. 26, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 84 Cong.Rec. 1098; H.Res. 321, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 86 Cong.Rec. 572; H.Res. 90, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 87 Cong.Rec. 886; H.Res. 420, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 88 Cong.Rec. 2282; H.Res. 65, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 89 Cong.Rec. 795) the Committee continued in existence until in 1945, by amendment of the House Rules, it was made a standing committee. 91 Cong.Rec. 10, 15. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 retained it as one of the standing committees and provided: 'All proposed legislation, messages, petitions, memorials, and other matters relating to the subjects listed under the standing committees named below shall be referred to such committees, respectively: * * * '(q) * * * (2) The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee, is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (i) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (ii) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (iii) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation.' 60 Stat. 823, 828. The Committee is authorized to sit and act at any time, anywhere in the United States and to require the attendance of witnesses and the production of books and papers. A resolution of the Eighty-third Congress adopted the Rules of the previous Congresses as amended by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. H.Res. 5, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 99 Cong.Rec. 15, 16, 18, 24.
4 60 Stat. 815, 824.
5 60 Stat. 817, 826.
6 60 Stat. 815, 824.
7 S.Res. 202, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., in pertinent part provides: 'authorized and directed to make a full and complete study and investigation of whether organized crime utilizes the facilities of interstate commerce or otherwise operates in interstate commerce in furtherance of any transactions which are in violation of the law of the United States or of the State in which the transactions occur, and, if so, the manner and extent to which, and the identity of the persons, firms, or corporations by which such utilization is being made, what facilities are being used, and whether or not organized crime utilizes such interstate facilities or otherwise operates in interstate commerce for the development of corrupting influences in violation of law of the United States or the laws of any State: Provided, however, That nothing contained herein shall authorize (1) the recommendation of any change in the laws of the several States relative to gambling, or (2) any possible interference with the rights of the several States to prohibit, legalize, or in any way regulate gambling within their borders.'
8 H.Res. 298, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., in pertinent part provides: 'authorized and directed to conduct a study and investigation of (1) all lobbying activities intended to influence, encourage, promote, or retard legislation; and (2) all activities of agencies of the Federal Government intended to influence, encourage, promote, or retard legislation.'
9 H.Res. 596, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., in pertinent part provides: 'authorized and directed to conduct a full and complete investigation and study (1) to determine the extent to which current literature — books, magazines, and comic books — containing immoral, obscene, or otherwise offense matter, or placing improper emphasis on crime, violence, and corruption, are being made available to the people of the United States through the United States mails and otherwise; and (2) to determine the adequacy of existing law to prevent the publication and distribution of books containing immoral, offensive, and other undersirable matter.'
10 S.Res. 74, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., in pertinent part provides: 'authorized and directed to conduct an investigation and study of the extent to which criminal or other improper practices or activities are, or have been, engaged in in the field of labor-management relations or in groups or organizations of employees or employers to the detriment of the interests of the public, employers or employees, and to determine whether any changes are required in the laws of the United States in order to protect such interests against the occurrence of such practices or activities.'
11 See note 3, supra.
12 See ante, 77 S.Ct. 1199. See also the statement by Congressman Velde, Chairman of the Committee on Un-American Activities, April 29, 1954, at Washington, D.C., where Mr. Velde stated, inter alia: 'This committee is set up by the House of Representatives to investigate subversion and su bversive propaganda and to report to the House of Representatives for the purpose of remedial legislation.' 'The House of Representatives has by a very clear majority, a very large majority, directed us to engage in that type of work, and so we do, as a committee of the House of Representatives, have the authority, the jurisdiction, to ask you concerning your activities in the Communist Party, concerning your knowledge of any other persons who are members of the Communist Party or who have been members of the Communist Party, and so, Mr. Watkins, you are directed to answer the question propounded to you by counsel.'
13 Proceedings against Richard Thompson, 8 How.St.Tr. 2 (1680).
14 See 1 De Lolme, The Rise and Progress of the English Constitution, 1838, at 347—348.
15 Briggs v. MacKellar, N.Y.Common Pleas, 1855, 2 Abb.Prac. 30, 65.
16 Kilbourn v. Thompson, 1881, 103 U.S. 168, 26 S.Ct. 377.
17 Quinn v. United States, 1955, 349 U.S. 155, 75 S.Ct. 668, 99 L.Ed. 964.
18 Emspak v. United States, 1955, 349 U.S. 190, 75 S.Ct. 687, 99 L.Ed. 997.
19 Bart v. United States, 1955, 349 U.S. 219, 75 S.Ct. 712, 99 L.Ed. 1016.
20 United States v. Rumely, 1953, 345 U.S. 41, 73 S.Ct. 543, 97 L.Ed. 770.
https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/354/178
1 United States v. Rumely, 1953, 345 U.S. 41, 73 S.Ct. 543, 97 L.Ed. 770; Sinclair v. United States, 1929, 279 U.S. 263, 49 S.Ct. 268, 73 L.Ed. 692; Reed v. County Commissioners, 1928, 277 U.S. 376, 48 S.Ct. 531, 72 L.Ed. 924; McGrain v. Daugherty, 1927, 273 U.S. 135, 47 S.Ct. 319, 71 L.Ed. 580; Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 Harv.L.Rev. 153 (1926).
2 Symposium on Congressional Investigations, 18 U. of Chi.L.Rev. 421, Finer, The British System, 521, 532, 554, 561 (1951).
3 The Committee originated in 1938 under H.Res. 282, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 83 Cong.Rec. 7568, and was patterned after a resolution of 1934 authorizing the investigation of Nazi propaganda. H.Res. 198, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 78 Cong.Rec. 4934. The resolution read much the same as the present authority of the Committee which is quoted below. By a succession of House Resolutions (H.Res. 26, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 84 Cong.Rec. 1098; H.Res. 321, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 86 Cong.Rec. 572; H.Res. 90, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 87 Cong.Rec. 886; H.Res. 420, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 88 Cong.Rec. 2282; H.Res. 65, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 89 Cong.Rec. 795) the Committee continued in existence until in 1945, by amendment of the House Rules, it was made a standing committee. 91 Cong.Rec. 10, 15. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 retained it as one of the standing committees and provided: 'All proposed legislation, messages, petitions, memorials, and other matters relating to the subjects listed under the standing committees named below shall be referred to such committees, respectively: * * * '(q) * * * (2) The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee, is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (i) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (ii) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (iii) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation.' 60 Stat. 823, 828. The Committee is authorized to sit and act at any time, anywhere in the United States and to require the attendance of witnesses and the production of books and papers. A resolution of the Eighty-third Congress adopted the Rules of the previous Congresses as amended by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. H.Res. 5, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 99 Cong.Rec. 15, 16, 18, 24.
4 60 Stat. 815, 824.
5 60 Stat. 817, 826.
6 60 Stat. 815, 824.
7 S.Res. 202, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., in pertinent part provides: 'authorized and directed to make a full and complete study and investigation of whether organized crime utilizes the facilities of interstate commerce or otherwise operates in interstate commerce in furtherance of any transactions which are in violation of the law of the United States or of the State in which the transactions occur, and, if so, the manner and extent to which, and the identity of the persons, firms, or corporations by which such utilization is being made, what facilities are being used, and whether or not organized crime utilizes such interstate facilities or otherwise operates in interstate commerce for the development of corrupting influences in violation of law of the United States or the laws of any State: Provided, however, That nothing contained herein shall authorize (1) the recommendation of any change in the laws of the several States relative to gambling, or (2) any possible interference with the rights of the several States to prohibit, legalize, or in any way regulate gambling within their borders.'
8 H.Res. 298, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., in pertinent part provides: 'authorized and directed to conduct a study and investigation of (1) all lobbying activities intended to influence, encourage, promote, or retard legislation; and (2) all activities of agencies of the Federal Government intended to influence, encourage, promote, or retard legislation.'
9 H.Res. 596, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., in pertinent part provides: 'authorized and directed to conduct a full and complete investigation and study (1) to determine the extent to which current literature — books, magazines, and comic books — containing immoral, obscene, or otherwise offense matter, or placing improper emphasis on crime, violence, and corruption, are being made available to the people of the United States through the United States mails and otherwise; and (2) to determine the adequacy of existing law to prevent the publication and distribution of books containing immoral, offensive, and other undersirable matter.'
10 S.Res. 74, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., in pertinent part provides: 'authorized and directed to conduct an investigation and study of the extent to which criminal or other improper practices or activities are, or have been, engaged in in the field of labor-management relations or in groups or organizations of employees or employers to the detriment of the interests of the public, employers or employees, and to determine whether any changes are required in the laws of the United States in order to protect such interests against the occurrence of such practices or activities.'
11 See note 3, supra.
12 See ante, 77 S.Ct. 1199. See also the statement by Congressman Velde, Chairman of the Committee on Un-American Activities, April 29, 1954, at Washington, D.C., where Mr. Velde stated, inter alia: 'This committee is set up by the House of Representatives to investigate subversion and su bversive propaganda and to report to the House of Representatives for the purpose of remedial legislation.' 'The House of Representatives has by a very clear majority, a very large majority, directed us to engage in that type of work, and so we do, as a committee of the House of Representatives, have the authority, the jurisdiction, to ask you concerning your activities in the Communist Party, concerning your knowledge of any other persons who are members of the Communist Party or who have been members of the Communist Party, and so, Mr. Watkins, you are directed to answer the question propounded to you by counsel.'
13 Proceedings against Richard Thompson, 8 How.St.Tr. 2 (1680).
14 See 1 De Lolme, The Rise and Progress of the English Constitution, 1838, at 347—348.
15 Briggs v. MacKellar, N.Y.Common Pleas, 1855, 2 Abb.Prac. 30, 65.
16 Kilbourn v. Thompson, 1881, 103 U.S. 168, 26 S.Ct. 377.
17 Quinn v. United States, 1955, 349 U.S. 155, 75 S.Ct. 668, 99 L.Ed. 964.
18 Emspak v. United States, 1955, 349 U.S. 190, 75 S.Ct. 687, 99 L.Ed. 997.
19 Bart v. United States, 1955, 349 U.S. 219, 75 S.Ct. 712, 99 L.Ed. 1016.
20 United States v. Rumely, 1953, 345 U.S. 41, 73 S.Ct. 543, 97 L.Ed. 770.
https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/354/178