Federal Farmer XVIII, continued ...
by Richard Henry Lee
January 25, 1788
The difficulties and dangers I have supposed, will result from so large a federal city, and federal districts, from the extension of the federal judicial powers, &c. are not, I conceive, merely possible, but probable.
I think, pernicious political consequences will follow from them, and from the federal city especially, for very obvious reasons, a few of which I will mention.
We must observe, that the citizens of a state will be subject to state as well as federal taxes, and the inhabitants of the federal city and districts, only to such taxes as congress may lay.
We are not to suppose all our people are attached to free government, and the principles of the common law, but that many thousands of them will prefer a city governed, not on republican principles.
This city, and the government of it, must indubitably take their tone from the characters of the men, who from the nature of its situation and institution, must collect there.
This city will not be established for productive labour, for mercantile, or mechanic industry; but for the residence of government, its officers and attendants.
If hereafter it should ever become a place of trade and industry, in the early periods of its existence, when its laws and government must receive their fixed tone, it must be a mere court, with its appendages, the executive, congress, the law courts, gentlemen of fortune and pleasure, with all the officers, attendants, suitors, expectants and dependants on the whole, however brilliant and honourable this collection may be, if we expect it will have any sincere attachments to simple and frugal republicanism, to that liberty and mild government, which is dear to the laborious part of a free people, we most assuredly deceive ourselves.
This early collection will draw to it men from all parts of the country, of a like political description: we see them looking towards the place already.
Such a city, or town, containing a hundred square miles, must soon be the great, the visible, and dazzling centre, the mistress of fashions, and the fountain of politics.
There may be a free or shackled press in this city, and the streams which may issue from it may overflow the country, and they will be poisonous or pure, as the fountain may be corrupt or not.
But not to dwell on a subject that must give pain to the virtuous friends of freedom, I will only add, can a free and enlightened people create a common head so extensive, so prone to corruption and slavery, as this city probably will be, when they have it in their power to form one pure and chaste, frugal and republican.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Federal Farmer XVIII, continued ...
by Richard Henry Lee
January 25, 1788
Under the confederation congress has no power whereby to govern its own officers and servants; a federal town, in which congress might have special jurisdiction, might be expedient; but under the new constitution, without a federal town, congress will have all necessary powers of course over its officers and servants; indeed it will have a complete system of powers to all the federal purposes mentioned in the constitution; so that the reason for a federal town under the confederation, will by no means exist under the constitution.
Even if a trial by jury should be admitted in the federal city, what man, with any state attachments or republican virtue about him, will submit to be tried by a jury of it.
I might observe more particularly upon several other parts of the constitution proposed; but it has been uniformly my object in examining a subject so extensive, and difficult in many parts to be illustrated, to avoid unimportant things, and not to dwell upon points not very material.
The rule for apportioning requisitions on the states, having some time since been agreed to by eleven states, I have viewed as settled.
The stipulation that congress, after twenty one years may prohibit the importation of slaves, is a point gained, if not so favourable as could be wished for.
As monopolies in trade perhaps, can in no case be useful, it might not be amiss to provide expressly against them.
I wish the power to reprieve and pardon was more cautiously lodged, and under some limitations.
I do not see why congress should be allowed to consent that a person may accept a present, office, or title of a foreign prince, &c.
As to the state governments, as well as the federal, are essential parts of the system, why should not the oath taken by the officers be expressly to support the whole?
As to debts due to and from the union, I think the constitution intends, on examining art. 4. sect. 8. and art. 6. that they shall stand on the same ground under the constitution as under the confederation.
In the article respecting amendments, it is stipulated that no state shall ever be deprived of its equal vote in the senate without its consent; and that alterations may be made by the consent of three-fourths of the states.
Stipulations to bind the majority of the people may serve one purpose, to prevent frequent motions for change; but these attempts to bind the majority, generally give occasion for breach of contract.
The states all agreed about seven years ago, that the confederation should remain unaltered, unless every state should agree to alterations: but we now see it agreed by the convention, and four states, that the old confederacy shall be destroyed, and a new one, of nine states, be erected, if nine only shall come in.
Had we agreed, that a majority should alter the confederation, a majority’s agreeing would have bound the rest: but now we must break the old league, unless all the state agree to alter, or not proceed with adopting the constitution.
Whether the adoption by nine states will not produce a nearly equal and dangerous division of the people for and against the constitution — whether the circumstances of the country were such as to justify the hazarding a probability of such a situation, I shall not undertake to determine.
I shall leave it to be determined hereafter, whether nine states, under a new federal compact, can claim the benefits of any treaties made with a confederation of thirteen, under a distinct compact and form of existence — whether the new confederacy can recover debts due to the old confederacy, or the arrears of taxes due from the states excluded.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Richard Henry Lee
January 25, 1788
Under the confederation congress has no power whereby to govern its own officers and servants; a federal town, in which congress might have special jurisdiction, might be expedient; but under the new constitution, without a federal town, congress will have all necessary powers of course over its officers and servants; indeed it will have a complete system of powers to all the federal purposes mentioned in the constitution; so that the reason for a federal town under the confederation, will by no means exist under the constitution.
Even if a trial by jury should be admitted in the federal city, what man, with any state attachments or republican virtue about him, will submit to be tried by a jury of it.
I might observe more particularly upon several other parts of the constitution proposed; but it has been uniformly my object in examining a subject so extensive, and difficult in many parts to be illustrated, to avoid unimportant things, and not to dwell upon points not very material.
The rule for apportioning requisitions on the states, having some time since been agreed to by eleven states, I have viewed as settled.
The stipulation that congress, after twenty one years may prohibit the importation of slaves, is a point gained, if not so favourable as could be wished for.
As monopolies in trade perhaps, can in no case be useful, it might not be amiss to provide expressly against them.
I wish the power to reprieve and pardon was more cautiously lodged, and under some limitations.
I do not see why congress should be allowed to consent that a person may accept a present, office, or title of a foreign prince, &c.
As to the state governments, as well as the federal, are essential parts of the system, why should not the oath taken by the officers be expressly to support the whole?
As to debts due to and from the union, I think the constitution intends, on examining art. 4. sect. 8. and art. 6. that they shall stand on the same ground under the constitution as under the confederation.
In the article respecting amendments, it is stipulated that no state shall ever be deprived of its equal vote in the senate without its consent; and that alterations may be made by the consent of three-fourths of the states.
Stipulations to bind the majority of the people may serve one purpose, to prevent frequent motions for change; but these attempts to bind the majority, generally give occasion for breach of contract.
The states all agreed about seven years ago, that the confederation should remain unaltered, unless every state should agree to alterations: but we now see it agreed by the convention, and four states, that the old confederacy shall be destroyed, and a new one, of nine states, be erected, if nine only shall come in.
Had we agreed, that a majority should alter the confederation, a majority’s agreeing would have bound the rest: but now we must break the old league, unless all the state agree to alter, or not proceed with adopting the constitution.
Whether the adoption by nine states will not produce a nearly equal and dangerous division of the people for and against the constitution — whether the circumstances of the country were such as to justify the hazarding a probability of such a situation, I shall not undertake to determine.
I shall leave it to be determined hereafter, whether nine states, under a new federal compact, can claim the benefits of any treaties made with a confederation of thirteen, under a distinct compact and form of existence — whether the new confederacy can recover debts due to the old confederacy, or the arrears of taxes due from the states excluded.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Federal Farmer XVIII, concluded ...
by Richard Henry Lee
January 25, 1788
It has been well observed, that our country is extensive, and has no external enemies to press the parts together: that, therefore, their union must depend on strong internal ties.
I differ with the gentlemen who make these observations only in this, they hold the ties ought to be strengthened by a considerable degree of internal consolidation; and my object is to form them and strengthen them, on pure federal principles.
Whatever may be the fate of many valuable and necessary amendments in the constitution proposed, the ample discussion and respectable opposition it will receive, will have a good effect — they will operate to produce a mild and prudent administration, and to put the wheels of the whole system in motion on proper principles — they will evince, that true republican principles and attachments are still alive and formidable in this country.
These, in view, I believe, even men quite disposed to make a bad use of the system, will long hesitate before they will resolve to do it.
A majority from a view of our situation, and influenced by many considerations, may acquiese in the adoption of this constitution; but, it is evident, that a very great majority of the people of the United States think it, in many parts, an unnecessary and unadviseable departure from true republican and federal principles.
by Richard Henry Lee
January 25, 1788
It has been well observed, that our country is extensive, and has no external enemies to press the parts together: that, therefore, their union must depend on strong internal ties.
I differ with the gentlemen who make these observations only in this, they hold the ties ought to be strengthened by a considerable degree of internal consolidation; and my object is to form them and strengthen them, on pure federal principles.
Whatever may be the fate of many valuable and necessary amendments in the constitution proposed, the ample discussion and respectable opposition it will receive, will have a good effect — they will operate to produce a mild and prudent administration, and to put the wheels of the whole system in motion on proper principles — they will evince, that true republican principles and attachments are still alive and formidable in this country.
These, in view, I believe, even men quite disposed to make a bad use of the system, will long hesitate before they will resolve to do it.
A majority from a view of our situation, and influenced by many considerations, may acquiese in the adoption of this constitution; but, it is evident, that a very great majority of the people of the United States think it, in many parts, an unnecessary and unadviseable departure from true republican and federal principles.
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
To Thomas Cockey Deye
by Luther Martin
January 27, 1788
The Genuine Information, delivered to the Legislature of the State of Maryland, relative to the Proceedings of the General Convention, held at Philadelphia, in 1787, by Luther Martin, Esq., Attorney-General of Maryland, and one of the Delegates in the said Convention.
To the Hon. Thomas Cockey Deye, Speaker of the House of Delegates of Maryland.
Sir, I flatter myself the subject of this letter will be a sufficient apology for thus publicly addressing it to you, and, through you, to the other members of the House of Delegates.
It cannot have escaped your or their recollection, that, when called upon, as the servant of a free state, to render an account of those transactions in which I had a share, in consequence of the trust reposed in me by that state, among other things, I informed them, “that, some time in July, the Hon. Mr. Yates and Mr. Lansing, of New York, left the Convention; that they had uniformly opposed the system, and that, I believe, despairing of getting a proper one brought forward, or of rendering any real service, they returned no more.”
You cannot, sir, have forgotten — for the incident was too remarkable not to have made some impression — that, upon my giving this information, the zeal of one of my honorable colleagues, in favor of a system which I thought it my duty to oppose, impelled him to interrupt me, and, in a manner which I am confident his zeal alone prevented him from being convinced was not the most delicate, to insinuate, pretty strongly, that the statement which I had given of the conduct of those gentlemen, and their motives for not returning, was not candid.
Those honorable members have officially given information on this subject, by a joint letter to his excellency, Governor Clinton.
Indulge me, sir, in giving an extract from it, that it may stand contrasted in the same page with the information I gave, and may convict me of the want of candor of which I was charged, if the charge was just: if it will not do that, then let it silence my accusers.
“Thus circumstanced, under these impressions, to have hesitated would have been to be culpable."
"We therefore gave the principles of the Constitution, which has received the sanction of a majority of the Convention, our decided and unreserved dissent."
"We were not present at the completion of the new Constitution; but, before we left the Convention, its principles were so well established as to convince us that no alteration was to be expected to conform it to our ideas of expediency and safety."
"A persuasion that our further attendance would be fruitless and unavailing, rendered us less solicitous to return.”
by Luther Martin
January 27, 1788
The Genuine Information, delivered to the Legislature of the State of Maryland, relative to the Proceedings of the General Convention, held at Philadelphia, in 1787, by Luther Martin, Esq., Attorney-General of Maryland, and one of the Delegates in the said Convention.
To the Hon. Thomas Cockey Deye, Speaker of the House of Delegates of Maryland.
Sir, I flatter myself the subject of this letter will be a sufficient apology for thus publicly addressing it to you, and, through you, to the other members of the House of Delegates.
It cannot have escaped your or their recollection, that, when called upon, as the servant of a free state, to render an account of those transactions in which I had a share, in consequence of the trust reposed in me by that state, among other things, I informed them, “that, some time in July, the Hon. Mr. Yates and Mr. Lansing, of New York, left the Convention; that they had uniformly opposed the system, and that, I believe, despairing of getting a proper one brought forward, or of rendering any real service, they returned no more.”
You cannot, sir, have forgotten — for the incident was too remarkable not to have made some impression — that, upon my giving this information, the zeal of one of my honorable colleagues, in favor of a system which I thought it my duty to oppose, impelled him to interrupt me, and, in a manner which I am confident his zeal alone prevented him from being convinced was not the most delicate, to insinuate, pretty strongly, that the statement which I had given of the conduct of those gentlemen, and their motives for not returning, was not candid.
Those honorable members have officially given information on this subject, by a joint letter to his excellency, Governor Clinton.
Indulge me, sir, in giving an extract from it, that it may stand contrasted in the same page with the information I gave, and may convict me of the want of candor of which I was charged, if the charge was just: if it will not do that, then let it silence my accusers.
“Thus circumstanced, under these impressions, to have hesitated would have been to be culpable."
"We therefore gave the principles of the Constitution, which has received the sanction of a majority of the Convention, our decided and unreserved dissent."
"We were not present at the completion of the new Constitution; but, before we left the Convention, its principles were so well established as to convince us that no alteration was to be expected to conform it to our ideas of expediency and safety."
"A persuasion that our further attendance would be fruitless and unavailing, rendered us less solicitous to return.”
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Genuine Information IX
by Luther Martin
January 29, 1788
Mr. MARTIN’S Information to the House of Assembly, continued.
The second article, relates to the executive — his mode of election — his powers — and the length of time he should continue in office.
On these subjects, there was a great diversity of sentiment.
Many of the members were desirous that the president should be elected for seven years, and not to be eligible a second time — others proposed that he should not be absolutely ineligible, but that he should not be capable of being chosen a second time, until the expiration of a certain number of years.
The supporter of the above propositions, went upon the idea that the best security for liberty was a limited duration and a rotation of office in the chief executive department.
There was a party who attempted to have the president appointed during good behaviour, without any limitation as to time, and not being able to succeed in that attempt, they then endeavoured to have him re—eligible without any restraint.
It was objected that the choice of a president to continue in office during good behaviour, would be at once rendering our system an elective monarchy — and, that if the president was to be re—eligible without any interval of disqualification, it would amount nearly to the same thing, since with the powers that the president is to enjoy, and the interest and influence with which they will be attended, he will be almost absolutely certain of being re—elected from time to time, as long as he lives.
As the propositions were reported by the committee of the whole house, the president was to he chosen for seven years, and not to be eligible at any time after.
In the same manner the proposition was agreed to in convention, and so was it reported by the committee of detail, although a variety of attempts were made to alter that part of the system by those who were of a contrary opinion, in which they repeatedly failed; but, Sir, by never losing sight of their object, and choosing a proper time for their purpose, they succeeded at length in obtaining the alteration, which was not made until within the last twelve days before the convention adjourned.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Luther Martin
January 29, 1788
Mr. MARTIN’S Information to the House of Assembly, continued.
The second article, relates to the executive — his mode of election — his powers — and the length of time he should continue in office.
On these subjects, there was a great diversity of sentiment.
Many of the members were desirous that the president should be elected for seven years, and not to be eligible a second time — others proposed that he should not be absolutely ineligible, but that he should not be capable of being chosen a second time, until the expiration of a certain number of years.
The supporter of the above propositions, went upon the idea that the best security for liberty was a limited duration and a rotation of office in the chief executive department.
There was a party who attempted to have the president appointed during good behaviour, without any limitation as to time, and not being able to succeed in that attempt, they then endeavoured to have him re—eligible without any restraint.
It was objected that the choice of a president to continue in office during good behaviour, would be at once rendering our system an elective monarchy — and, that if the president was to be re—eligible without any interval of disqualification, it would amount nearly to the same thing, since with the powers that the president is to enjoy, and the interest and influence with which they will be attended, he will be almost absolutely certain of being re—elected from time to time, as long as he lives.
As the propositions were reported by the committee of the whole house, the president was to he chosen for seven years, and not to be eligible at any time after.
In the same manner the proposition was agreed to in convention, and so was it reported by the committee of detail, although a variety of attempts were made to alter that part of the system by those who were of a contrary opinion, in which they repeatedly failed; but, Sir, by never losing sight of their object, and choosing a proper time for their purpose, they succeeded at length in obtaining the alteration, which was not made until within the last twelve days before the convention adjourned.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Genuine Information IX, continued ...
by Luther Martin
January 29, 1788
Mr. MARTIN’S Information to the House of Assembly, continued.
As the propositions were agreed to by the committee of the whole house, the president was to be appointed by the national legislature, and as it was reported by the committee of detail, the choice was to be made by ballot in such a manner, that the States should have an equal voice in the appointment of this officer, as they, of right, ought to have; but those who wished as far as possible to establish a national instead of a federal government, made repeated attempts to have the president chosen by the people at large; on this the sense of the convention was taken, I think not less than three times while I was there, and as often rejected; but within the last fortnight of their session, they obtained the alteration in the manner it now stands, by which the large States have a very undue influence in the appointment of the president.
There is no case where the States will have an equal voice in the appointment of the president, except where two persons shall have each an equal number of votes, and those a majority of the whole number of electors, a case very unlikely to happen, or where no person has a majority of the votes; in these instances the house of representatives are to choose by ballot, each State having an equal voice, but they are confined in the last instance to the five who have the greatest number of votes, which gives the largest States a very unequal chance of having the president chose under their nomination.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Luther Martin
January 29, 1788
Mr. MARTIN’S Information to the House of Assembly, continued.
As the propositions were agreed to by the committee of the whole house, the president was to be appointed by the national legislature, and as it was reported by the committee of detail, the choice was to be made by ballot in such a manner, that the States should have an equal voice in the appointment of this officer, as they, of right, ought to have; but those who wished as far as possible to establish a national instead of a federal government, made repeated attempts to have the president chosen by the people at large; on this the sense of the convention was taken, I think not less than three times while I was there, and as often rejected; but within the last fortnight of their session, they obtained the alteration in the manner it now stands, by which the large States have a very undue influence in the appointment of the president.
There is no case where the States will have an equal voice in the appointment of the president, except where two persons shall have each an equal number of votes, and those a majority of the whole number of electors, a case very unlikely to happen, or where no person has a majority of the votes; in these instances the house of representatives are to choose by ballot, each State having an equal voice, but they are confined in the last instance to the five who have the greatest number of votes, which gives the largest States a very unequal chance of having the president chose under their nomination.
TO BE CONTINUED ...