Brutus VIII, continued ...
by Brutus
January 10, 1788
The power to raise armies, is indefinite and unlimited, and authorises the raising forces, as well in peace as in war.
Whether the clause which impowers the Congress to pass all laws which are proper and necessary, to carry this into execution, will not authorise them to impress men for the army, is a question well worthy consideration?
If the general legislature deem it for the general welfare to raise a body of troops, and they cannot be procured by voluntary enlistments, it seems evident, that it will be proper and necessary to effect it, that men be impressed from the militia to make up the deficiency.
These powers taken in connection, amount to this: that the general government have unlimitted authority and controul over all the wealth and all the force of the union.
The advocates for this scheme, would favor the world with a new discovery, if they would shew, what kind of freedom or independency is left to the state governments, when they cannot command any part of the property or of the force of the country, but at the will of the Congress.
It seems to me as absurd, as it would be to say, that I was free and independent, when I had conveyed all my property to another, and was tenant to will to him, and had beside, given an indenture of myself to serve him during life.
The power to keep up standing armies in time of peace, has been justly objected, to this system, as dangerous and improvident.
The advocates who have wrote in its favor, have some of them ridiculed the objection, as though it originated in the distempered brain of its opponents, and others have taken pains to shew, that it is a power that was proper to be granted to the rulers in this constitution.
That you may be enabled to form a just opinion on this subject, I shall first make some remarks, tending to prove, that this power ought to be restricted, and then animadvert on the arguments which have been adduced to justify it.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Brutus VIII, continued ...
by Brutus
January 10, 1788
I take it for granted, as an axiom in politic, that the people should never authorise their rulers to do any thing, which if done, would operate to their injury.
It seems equally clear, that in a case where a power, if given and exercised, will generally produce evil to the community, and seldom good — and which, experience has proved, has most frequently been exercised to the great injury, and very often to the total destruction of the government; in such a case, I say, this power, if given at all, should if possible be so restricted, as to prevent the ill effect of its operation.
Let us then enquire, whether standing armies in time of peace, would be ever beneficial to our country — or if in some extraordinary cases, they might be necessary; whether it is not true, that they have generally proved a scourge to a country, and destructive of their liberty.
I shall not take up much of your time in proving a point, in which the friends of liberty, in all countries, have so universally agreed.
The following extract from Mr. Pultney’s speech, delivered in the house of commons of Great-Britain, on a motion for reducing the army, is so full to the point, and so much better than any thing I can say, that I shall be excused for inserting it.
He says, “I have always been, and always shall be against a standing army of any kind; to me it is a terrible thing, whether under that of a parliamentary, or any other designation; a standing army is still a standing army by whatever name it is called; they are a body of men distinct from the body of the people; they are governed by different laws, and blind obedience, and an entire submission to the orders of their commanding officer, is their only principle; the nations around us, sir, are already enslaved, and have been enslaved by those very means; by means of their standing armies they have every one lost their liberties; it is indeed impossible that the liberties of the people in any country can be preserved where a numerous standing army is kept up."
"Shall we then take our measures from the example of our neighbours?"
"No, sir, on the contrary, from their misfortunes we ought to learn to avoid those rocks upon which they have split."
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Brutus
January 10, 1788
I take it for granted, as an axiom in politic, that the people should never authorise their rulers to do any thing, which if done, would operate to their injury.
It seems equally clear, that in a case where a power, if given and exercised, will generally produce evil to the community, and seldom good — and which, experience has proved, has most frequently been exercised to the great injury, and very often to the total destruction of the government; in such a case, I say, this power, if given at all, should if possible be so restricted, as to prevent the ill effect of its operation.
Let us then enquire, whether standing armies in time of peace, would be ever beneficial to our country — or if in some extraordinary cases, they might be necessary; whether it is not true, that they have generally proved a scourge to a country, and destructive of their liberty.
I shall not take up much of your time in proving a point, in which the friends of liberty, in all countries, have so universally agreed.
The following extract from Mr. Pultney’s speech, delivered in the house of commons of Great-Britain, on a motion for reducing the army, is so full to the point, and so much better than any thing I can say, that I shall be excused for inserting it.
He says, “I have always been, and always shall be against a standing army of any kind; to me it is a terrible thing, whether under that of a parliamentary, or any other designation; a standing army is still a standing army by whatever name it is called; they are a body of men distinct from the body of the people; they are governed by different laws, and blind obedience, and an entire submission to the orders of their commanding officer, is their only principle; the nations around us, sir, are already enslaved, and have been enslaved by those very means; by means of their standing armies they have every one lost their liberties; it is indeed impossible that the liberties of the people in any country can be preserved where a numerous standing army is kept up."
"Shall we then take our measures from the example of our neighbours?"
"No, sir, on the contrary, from their misfortunes we ought to learn to avoid those rocks upon which they have split."
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Brutus VIII, concluded ...
by Brutus
January 10, 1788
“It signifies nothing to tell me that our army is commanded by such gentlemen as cannot be supposed to join in any measures for enslaving their country; it may be so; I have a very good opinion of many gentlemen now in the army; I believe they would not join in any such measures; but their lives are uncertain, nor can we be sure how long they will be kept in command, they may all be dismissed in a moment, and proper tools of power put in their room."
"Besides, sir, we know the passions of men, we know how dangerous it is to trust the best of men with too much power."
"Where was a braver army than that under Jul. Caesar?"
"Where was there ever an army that had served their country more faithfully?"
"That army was commanded generally by the best citizens of Rome, by men of great fortune and figure in their country, yet that army enslaved their country."
"The affections of the soldiers towards their country, the honor and integrity of the under officers, are not to be depended on."
"By the military law the administration of justice is so quick, and the punishment so severe, that neither the officer nor soldier dare dispute the orders of his supreme commander; he must not consult his own inclination."
"If an officer were commanded to pull his own father out of this house, he must do it; he dares not disobey; immediate death would be the sure consequence of the least grumbling: and if an officer were sent into the court of request, accompanied by a body of musketeers with screwed bayonets, and with orders to tell us what we ought to do, and how we were to vote: I know what would be the duty of this house; I know it would be our duty to order the officer to be hanged at the door of the lobby; but I doubt, sir, I doubt much, if such a spirit could be found in the house, or in any house of commons that will ever be in England."
“Sir, I talk not of imaginary things!"
"I talk of what has happened to an English house of commons, from an English army; not only from an English army, but an army that was raised by that very house of commons, an army that was paid by them, and an army that was commanded by generals appointed by them; therefore do not let us vainly imagine, that an army, raised and maintained by authority of parliament, will always be so submissive to them."
"If an army be so numerous as to have it in their power to overawe the parliament, they will be submissive as long as the parliament does nothing to disoblige their favourite general; but when that case happens, I am afraid, that in place of the parliament’s dismissing the army, the army will dismiss the parliament.”
If this great man’s reasoning be just, it follows, that keeping up a standing army, would be in the highest degree dangerous to the liberty and happiness of the community — and if so, the general government ought not to have authority to do it; for no government should be empowered to do that which if done, would tend to destroy public liberty.
by Brutus
January 10, 1788
“It signifies nothing to tell me that our army is commanded by such gentlemen as cannot be supposed to join in any measures for enslaving their country; it may be so; I have a very good opinion of many gentlemen now in the army; I believe they would not join in any such measures; but their lives are uncertain, nor can we be sure how long they will be kept in command, they may all be dismissed in a moment, and proper tools of power put in their room."
"Besides, sir, we know the passions of men, we know how dangerous it is to trust the best of men with too much power."
"Where was a braver army than that under Jul. Caesar?"
"Where was there ever an army that had served their country more faithfully?"
"That army was commanded generally by the best citizens of Rome, by men of great fortune and figure in their country, yet that army enslaved their country."
"The affections of the soldiers towards their country, the honor and integrity of the under officers, are not to be depended on."
"By the military law the administration of justice is so quick, and the punishment so severe, that neither the officer nor soldier dare dispute the orders of his supreme commander; he must not consult his own inclination."
"If an officer were commanded to pull his own father out of this house, he must do it; he dares not disobey; immediate death would be the sure consequence of the least grumbling: and if an officer were sent into the court of request, accompanied by a body of musketeers with screwed bayonets, and with orders to tell us what we ought to do, and how we were to vote: I know what would be the duty of this house; I know it would be our duty to order the officer to be hanged at the door of the lobby; but I doubt, sir, I doubt much, if such a spirit could be found in the house, or in any house of commons that will ever be in England."
“Sir, I talk not of imaginary things!"
"I talk of what has happened to an English house of commons, from an English army; not only from an English army, but an army that was raised by that very house of commons, an army that was paid by them, and an army that was commanded by generals appointed by them; therefore do not let us vainly imagine, that an army, raised and maintained by authority of parliament, will always be so submissive to them."
"If an army be so numerous as to have it in their power to overawe the parliament, they will be submissive as long as the parliament does nothing to disoblige their favourite general; but when that case happens, I am afraid, that in place of the parliament’s dismissing the army, the army will dismiss the parliament.”
If this great man’s reasoning be just, it follows, that keeping up a standing army, would be in the highest degree dangerous to the liberty and happiness of the community — and if so, the general government ought not to have authority to do it; for no government should be empowered to do that which if done, would tend to destroy public liberty.
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Federal Farmer 11
January 10, 1788
Introduction
Originally published by the New York Journal in November 1787, the “Letters from the Federal Farmer” was the first series of critiques levied against the proposed Constitution written by the pseudonymous “Federal Farmer.”
In this reading, the Federal Farmer (see Federal Farmer No. 7) details the merits of having an explicit “rotation of office” mechanism in the federal government.
The Articles of Confederation required that after representatives served a certain number of terms, they had to leave office for a defined period of time.
Rotation was therefore slightly different from the notion of term limits, which permanently banned representatives from serving beyond a specific length of time.
In support of rotation, the Federal Farmer offers a specific understanding of the dependence between representatives and their constituents that served as a critical distinction between the Federalists’ and Anti-Federalists’ notions of representation.
Representatives, he argued, should constantly feel and be reminded of their dependence on voters, that their power comes from their constituents.
Although some argued that legislators might be hindered in their work by too great a dependence upon the will of their constituents, the Federal Farmer believed this was a fear unlikely to be realized.
Dependence, as the Federal Farmer understood it, would encourage citizens to be watchful over their representatives and would produce a more informed and engaged citizenry.
—Joseph Postell
Source: Empire and Nation: Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania (John Dickinson). Letters from the Federal Farmer (Richard Henry Lee), ed. Forrest McDonald (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund 1999).
TO BE CONTINUED ...
January 10, 1788
Introduction
Originally published by the New York Journal in November 1787, the “Letters from the Federal Farmer” was the first series of critiques levied against the proposed Constitution written by the pseudonymous “Federal Farmer.”
In this reading, the Federal Farmer (see Federal Farmer No. 7) details the merits of having an explicit “rotation of office” mechanism in the federal government.
The Articles of Confederation required that after representatives served a certain number of terms, they had to leave office for a defined period of time.
Rotation was therefore slightly different from the notion of term limits, which permanently banned representatives from serving beyond a specific length of time.
In support of rotation, the Federal Farmer offers a specific understanding of the dependence between representatives and their constituents that served as a critical distinction between the Federalists’ and Anti-Federalists’ notions of representation.
Representatives, he argued, should constantly feel and be reminded of their dependence on voters, that their power comes from their constituents.
Although some argued that legislators might be hindered in their work by too great a dependence upon the will of their constituents, the Federal Farmer believed this was a fear unlikely to be realized.
Dependence, as the Federal Farmer understood it, would encourage citizens to be watchful over their representatives and would produce a more informed and engaged citizenry.
—Joseph Postell
Source: Empire and Nation: Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania (John Dickinson). Letters from the Federal Farmer (Richard Henry Lee), ed. Forrest McDonald (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund 1999).
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Federal Farmer 11, continued ...
January 10, 1788
When the confederation was formed, it was considered essentially necessary that the members of Congress should at any time be recalled by their respective states,[1] when the states should see fit, and others be sent in their room [sic].
I do not think it less necessary that this principle should be extended to the members of Congress under the new Constitution, and especially to the senators.
I have had occasion several times to observe, that let us form a federal Constitution as extensively, and on the best principles in our power, we must, after all, trust a vast deal to a few men, who, far removed from their constituents, will administer the federal government; there is but little danger these men will feel too great a degree of dependence: the necessary and important object to be attended to, is to make them feel dependent enough.
Men elected for several years, several hundred miles distant from their states, possessed of very extensive powers, and the means of paying themselves, will not, probably, be oppressed with a sense of dependence and responsibility.
The senators will represent sovereignties[2], which generally have, and always ought to retain, the power of recalling their agents[3]; the principle of responsibility is strongly felt in men who are liable to be recalled and censured for their misconduct; and, if we may judge from experience, the latter [the states] will not abuse the power of recalling their members; to possess it, will, at least be a valuable check.
It is in the nature of all delegated power, that the constituents should retain the right to judge concerning the conduct of their representatives; they must exercise the power, and their decision itself, their approving or disapproving that conduct implies a right, a power to continue in office, or to remove from it.
But whenever the substitute acts under a constitution, then it becomes necessary that the power of recalling him be expressed.
The reasons for lodging a power to recall are stronger, as they respect the senate, than as they respect the [House of] Representatives; the latter will be more frequently elected, and changed of course, and being chosen by the people at large, it would be more difficult for the people than for the legislatures to take the necessary measures for recalling: but even the people, if the powers will be more beneficial to them than injurious, ought to possess it.
The people are not apt to wrong a man who is steady and true to their interests; they may for a while be misled by party representations, and leave a good man out of office unheard; but every recall supposes a deliberate decision, and a fair hearing; and no man who believes his conduct proper, and the result of honest views, will be the less useful in his public character, on account of the examination his actions may be liable to; and a man conscious of the contrary conduct, ought clearly to be restrained by the apprehensions of a trial.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
January 10, 1788
When the confederation was formed, it was considered essentially necessary that the members of Congress should at any time be recalled by their respective states,[1] when the states should see fit, and others be sent in their room [sic].
I do not think it less necessary that this principle should be extended to the members of Congress under the new Constitution, and especially to the senators.
I have had occasion several times to observe, that let us form a federal Constitution as extensively, and on the best principles in our power, we must, after all, trust a vast deal to a few men, who, far removed from their constituents, will administer the federal government; there is but little danger these men will feel too great a degree of dependence: the necessary and important object to be attended to, is to make them feel dependent enough.
Men elected for several years, several hundred miles distant from their states, possessed of very extensive powers, and the means of paying themselves, will not, probably, be oppressed with a sense of dependence and responsibility.
The senators will represent sovereignties[2], which generally have, and always ought to retain, the power of recalling their agents[3]; the principle of responsibility is strongly felt in men who are liable to be recalled and censured for their misconduct; and, if we may judge from experience, the latter [the states] will not abuse the power of recalling their members; to possess it, will, at least be a valuable check.
It is in the nature of all delegated power, that the constituents should retain the right to judge concerning the conduct of their representatives; they must exercise the power, and their decision itself, their approving or disapproving that conduct implies a right, a power to continue in office, or to remove from it.
But whenever the substitute acts under a constitution, then it becomes necessary that the power of recalling him be expressed.
The reasons for lodging a power to recall are stronger, as they respect the senate, than as they respect the [House of] Representatives; the latter will be more frequently elected, and changed of course, and being chosen by the people at large, it would be more difficult for the people than for the legislatures to take the necessary measures for recalling: but even the people, if the powers will be more beneficial to them than injurious, ought to possess it.
The people are not apt to wrong a man who is steady and true to their interests; they may for a while be misled by party representations, and leave a good man out of office unheard; but every recall supposes a deliberate decision, and a fair hearing; and no man who believes his conduct proper, and the result of honest views, will be the less useful in his public character, on account of the examination his actions may be liable to; and a man conscious of the contrary conduct, ought clearly to be restrained by the apprehensions of a trial.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Federal Farmer 11, continued ...
January 10, 1788
I repeat it, it is interested combinations and factions we are particularly to guard against in the federal government, and all the rational means that can be put into the hands of the people to prevent them, ought to be provided and furnished for them.
Where there is a power to recall, trusty centinels among the people,[4] or in the state legislatures, will have a fair opportunity to become useful.
If the members in Congress from the states join in such combinations, or favor them, or pursue a pernicious line of conduct, the most attentive among the people, or in the state legislatures, may formally charge them before their constituents: the very apprehensions of such constitutional charges may prevent many of the evils mentioned, and the recalling the members of a single state, a single senator, or representative, may often prevent many more; nor do I, at present, discover any danger in such proceedings, as every man who shall move for a recall will put his reputation at stake, to show he has reasonable grounds for his motion; and it is not probable such motions will be made unless there be good apparent grounds for succeeding; nor can the charge or motion be anything more than the attack of an individual or individuals, unless a majority of the constituents shall see cause to go into the inquiry.
Further, the circumstance of such a power being lodged in the constituents, will tend continually to keep up their watchfulness, as well as the attention and dependence of the federal senators and representatives.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
January 10, 1788
I repeat it, it is interested combinations and factions we are particularly to guard against in the federal government, and all the rational means that can be put into the hands of the people to prevent them, ought to be provided and furnished for them.
Where there is a power to recall, trusty centinels among the people,[4] or in the state legislatures, will have a fair opportunity to become useful.
If the members in Congress from the states join in such combinations, or favor them, or pursue a pernicious line of conduct, the most attentive among the people, or in the state legislatures, may formally charge them before their constituents: the very apprehensions of such constitutional charges may prevent many of the evils mentioned, and the recalling the members of a single state, a single senator, or representative, may often prevent many more; nor do I, at present, discover any danger in such proceedings, as every man who shall move for a recall will put his reputation at stake, to show he has reasonable grounds for his motion; and it is not probable such motions will be made unless there be good apparent grounds for succeeding; nor can the charge or motion be anything more than the attack of an individual or individuals, unless a majority of the constituents shall see cause to go into the inquiry.
Further, the circumstance of such a power being lodged in the constituents, will tend continually to keep up their watchfulness, as well as the attention and dependence of the federal senators and representatives.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Federal Farmer 11, continued ...
January 10, 1788
By the confederation it is provided, that no delegate shall serve more than three years in any term of six years,[5] and thus, by the forms of the government, a rotation of members is produced: a like principle has been adopted in some of the state governments, and also in some ancient and modern republics.
Whether this exclusion of a man for a given period, after he shall have served a given time, ought to be ingrafted into a constitution or not, is a question, the proper decision materially depends upon the leading features of the government: some governments are so formed as to produce a sufficient fluctuation and change of members of course, in the ordinary course of elections, proper numbers of new members are, from time to time, brought into the legislature, and a proportionate number of old ones go out, mix, and become diffused among the people.
This is the case with all numerous representative legislatures, the members of which are frequently elected, and constantly within the view of their constituents.
This is the case with our state governments, and in them a constitutional rotation is unimportant.
But in a government consisting of but a few members, elected for long periods, and far removed from the observation of the people, but few changes in the ordinary course of elections take place among the members; they become in some measure a fixed body, and often inattentive to the public good, callous, selfish, and the fountain of corruption.
To prevent these evils, and to force a principle of pure animation into the federal government, which will be formed much in this last manner mentioned, and to produce attention, activity, and a diffusion of knowledge in the community, we ought to establish among others the principle of rotation.
Even good men in office, in time, imperceptibly lose sight of the people, and gradually fall into measures prejudicial to them.
It is only a rotation among the members of the federal legislature I shall contend for: judges and officers at the heads of the judicial and executive departments, are in a very different situation, their offices and duties require the information and studies of many years for performing them in a manner advantageous to the people.
These judges and officers must apply their whole time to the detail business of their offices, and depend on them for their support: then they always act under masters or superiors, and may be removed from office for misconduct; they pursue a certain round of executive business: their offices must be in all societies confined to a few men, because but few can become qualified to fill them: and were they, by annual appointments, open to the people at large, they are offices of such a nature as to be of no service to them; they must leave these offices in the possession of the few individuals qualified to fill them, or have them badly filled.
In the judicial and executive departments also, the body of the people possess a large share of power and influence, as jurors and subordinate officers, among whom there are many and frequent rotations.
But in every free country the legislatures are all on a level, and Legislation becomes partial whenever, in practice, it rests for any considerable time in a few hands.
It is the true republican principle to diffuse the power of making the laws among the people, and so to modify the forms of the government as to draw in turn the well informed of every class into the legislature.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
January 10, 1788
By the confederation it is provided, that no delegate shall serve more than three years in any term of six years,[5] and thus, by the forms of the government, a rotation of members is produced: a like principle has been adopted in some of the state governments, and also in some ancient and modern republics.
Whether this exclusion of a man for a given period, after he shall have served a given time, ought to be ingrafted into a constitution or not, is a question, the proper decision materially depends upon the leading features of the government: some governments are so formed as to produce a sufficient fluctuation and change of members of course, in the ordinary course of elections, proper numbers of new members are, from time to time, brought into the legislature, and a proportionate number of old ones go out, mix, and become diffused among the people.
This is the case with all numerous representative legislatures, the members of which are frequently elected, and constantly within the view of their constituents.
This is the case with our state governments, and in them a constitutional rotation is unimportant.
But in a government consisting of but a few members, elected for long periods, and far removed from the observation of the people, but few changes in the ordinary course of elections take place among the members; they become in some measure a fixed body, and often inattentive to the public good, callous, selfish, and the fountain of corruption.
To prevent these evils, and to force a principle of pure animation into the federal government, which will be formed much in this last manner mentioned, and to produce attention, activity, and a diffusion of knowledge in the community, we ought to establish among others the principle of rotation.
Even good men in office, in time, imperceptibly lose sight of the people, and gradually fall into measures prejudicial to them.
It is only a rotation among the members of the federal legislature I shall contend for: judges and officers at the heads of the judicial and executive departments, are in a very different situation, their offices and duties require the information and studies of many years for performing them in a manner advantageous to the people.
These judges and officers must apply their whole time to the detail business of their offices, and depend on them for their support: then they always act under masters or superiors, and may be removed from office for misconduct; they pursue a certain round of executive business: their offices must be in all societies confined to a few men, because but few can become qualified to fill them: and were they, by annual appointments, open to the people at large, they are offices of such a nature as to be of no service to them; they must leave these offices in the possession of the few individuals qualified to fill them, or have them badly filled.
In the judicial and executive departments also, the body of the people possess a large share of power and influence, as jurors and subordinate officers, among whom there are many and frequent rotations.
But in every free country the legislatures are all on a level, and Legislation becomes partial whenever, in practice, it rests for any considerable time in a few hands.
It is the true republican principle to diffuse the power of making the laws among the people, and so to modify the forms of the government as to draw in turn the well informed of every class into the legislature.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Federal Farmer 11, continued ...
January 10, 1788
To determine the propriety or impropriety of this rotation, we must take the inconveniences as well as the advantages attending it into view: on the one hand, by this rotation, we may sometimes exclude good men from being elected.
On the other hand, we guard against those pernicious connections, which usually grow up among men left to continue long periods in office, we increase the number of those who make the laws and return to their constituents; and thereby spread information, and preserve a spirit of activity and investigation among the people: hence a balance of interests and exertions are preserved, and the ruinous measures of factions rendered more impracticable.
I would not urge the principle of rotation, if I believed the consequence would be an uninformed federal legislature; but I have no apprehension of this in this enlightened country.
The members of Congress, at any one time, must be but very few, compared with the respectable well informed men in the United States; and I have no idea there will be any want of such men for members of Congress, though by a principle of rotation the Constitution should exclude from being elected for two years those federal legislators, who may have served the four years immediately preceding, or any four years in the six preceding years.
If we may judge from experience and fair calculations, this principle will never operate to exclude at any one period a fifteenth part, even of those men who have been members of Congress.
Though no man can sit in Congress, by the confederation, more than three years in any term of six years, yet not more than three, four, or five men in any one state, have been made ineligible at any one period; and if a good man happen to be excluded by this rotation, it is only for a short time.
All things considered, the inconveniencies of the principle must be very inconsiderable compared with the many advantages of it.
It will generally be expedient for a man who has served four years in Congress to return home, mix with the people, and reside some time with them: this will tend to reinstate him in the interests, feelings, and views similar to theirs, and thereby confirm in him the essential qualifications of a legislator.
Even in point of information, it may be observed, the useful information of legislators is not acquired merely in studies in offices, and in meeting to make laws from day to day; they must learn the actual situation of the people, by being among them, and when they have made laws, return home, and observe how they operate.
Thus occasionally to be among the people, is not only necessary to prevent or banish the callous habits and self-interested views of office in legislators, but to afford them necessary information, and to render them useful: another valuable end is answered by it, sympathy, and the means of communication between them and their constituents, is substantially promoted; so that on every principle legislators, at certain periods, ought to live among their constituents.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
January 10, 1788
To determine the propriety or impropriety of this rotation, we must take the inconveniences as well as the advantages attending it into view: on the one hand, by this rotation, we may sometimes exclude good men from being elected.
On the other hand, we guard against those pernicious connections, which usually grow up among men left to continue long periods in office, we increase the number of those who make the laws and return to their constituents; and thereby spread information, and preserve a spirit of activity and investigation among the people: hence a balance of interests and exertions are preserved, and the ruinous measures of factions rendered more impracticable.
I would not urge the principle of rotation, if I believed the consequence would be an uninformed federal legislature; but I have no apprehension of this in this enlightened country.
The members of Congress, at any one time, must be but very few, compared with the respectable well informed men in the United States; and I have no idea there will be any want of such men for members of Congress, though by a principle of rotation the Constitution should exclude from being elected for two years those federal legislators, who may have served the four years immediately preceding, or any four years in the six preceding years.
If we may judge from experience and fair calculations, this principle will never operate to exclude at any one period a fifteenth part, even of those men who have been members of Congress.
Though no man can sit in Congress, by the confederation, more than three years in any term of six years, yet not more than three, four, or five men in any one state, have been made ineligible at any one period; and if a good man happen to be excluded by this rotation, it is only for a short time.
All things considered, the inconveniencies of the principle must be very inconsiderable compared with the many advantages of it.
It will generally be expedient for a man who has served four years in Congress to return home, mix with the people, and reside some time with them: this will tend to reinstate him in the interests, feelings, and views similar to theirs, and thereby confirm in him the essential qualifications of a legislator.
Even in point of information, it may be observed, the useful information of legislators is not acquired merely in studies in offices, and in meeting to make laws from day to day; they must learn the actual situation of the people, by being among them, and when they have made laws, return home, and observe how they operate.
Thus occasionally to be among the people, is not only necessary to prevent or banish the callous habits and self-interested views of office in legislators, but to afford them necessary information, and to render them useful: another valuable end is answered by it, sympathy, and the means of communication between them and their constituents, is substantially promoted; so that on every principle legislators, at certain periods, ought to live among their constituents.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Federal Farmer 11, concluded ...
January 10, 1788
Some men of science[6] are undoubtedly necessary in every legislature; but the knowledge, generally, necessary for men who make laws, is a knowledge of the common concerns, and particular circumstances of the people.
In a republican government seats in the legislature are highly honorable; I believe but few do, and surely none ought to consider them as places of profit and permanent support.
Were the people always properly attentive, they would, at proper periods, call their law makers home, by sending others in their room: but this is not often the case, and therefore, in making constitutions, when the people are attentive, they ought cautiously to provide for those benefits, those advantageous changes in the administration of their affairs, which they are often apt to be inattentive to in practice.
On the whole, to guard against the evils, and to secure the advantages I have mentioned, with the greatest degree of certainty, we ought clearly, in my opinion, to increase the federal representation, to secure elections on proper principles, to establish a right to recall members, and a rotation among them.
FOOTNOTES
1. See Articles of Confederation: Article 5 Section 1.
2. That is, states.
3. To “recall” a representative is to replace him in the middle of the term for which he has been elected or appointed.
4. The Federal Farmer uses the term “centinel” or sentinel to mean a vigilant guard who protects the people.
5. See Articles of Confederation: Article 5 Section 2.
6. The Federal Farmer is using the term “science” as a stand-in for expertise; that is, he means professional politicians.
January 10, 1788
Some men of science[6] are undoubtedly necessary in every legislature; but the knowledge, generally, necessary for men who make laws, is a knowledge of the common concerns, and particular circumstances of the people.
In a republican government seats in the legislature are highly honorable; I believe but few do, and surely none ought to consider them as places of profit and permanent support.
Were the people always properly attentive, they would, at proper periods, call their law makers home, by sending others in their room: but this is not often the case, and therefore, in making constitutions, when the people are attentive, they ought cautiously to provide for those benefits, those advantageous changes in the administration of their affairs, which they are often apt to be inattentive to in practice.
On the whole, to guard against the evils, and to secure the advantages I have mentioned, with the greatest degree of certainty, we ought clearly, in my opinion, to increase the federal representation, to secure elections on proper principles, to establish a right to recall members, and a rotation among them.
FOOTNOTES
1. See Articles of Confederation: Article 5 Section 1.
2. That is, states.
3. To “recall” a representative is to replace him in the middle of the term for which he has been elected or appointed.
4. The Federal Farmer uses the term “centinel” or sentinel to mean a vigilant guard who protects the people.
5. See Articles of Confederation: Article 5 Section 2.
6. The Federal Farmer is using the term “science” as a stand-in for expertise; that is, he means professional politicians.
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Federal Farmer 12
by Richard Henry Lee
January 11, 1788
Dear sir,
I shall now add a few observations respecting the organization of the senate, the manner of appointing it, and its powers.
The senate is an assembly of 26 members, two from each state, though the senators are apportioned on the federal plan, they will vote individually; they represent the states, as bodies politic, sovereign to certain purposes; the states being sovereign and independent, are all considered equal, each with the other in the senate.
In this we are governed solely by the ideal equalities of sovereignties; the federal and state governments forming one whole, and the state governments an essential part, which ought always to be kept distinctly in view, and preserved.
I feel more disposed, on reflection, to acquiesce in making them the basis of the senate, and thereby to make it the interest and duty of the senators to preserve distinct, and to perpetuate the respective sovereignties they shall represent.
As to the appointments of senators, I have already observed, that they must be appointed by the legislatures, by concurrent acts, and each branch have an equal share of power, as I do not see any probability of amendments, if advisable, in these points, I shall not dwell upon them.
The senate, as a legislative branch, is not large, but as an executive branch quite too numerous.
It is not to be presumed that we can form a genuine senatorial branch in the United States, a real representation of the aristocracy and balance in the legislature, any more than we can form a genuine representation of the people.
Could we separate the aristocratical and democratical interests; compose the senate of the former, and the house of assembly of the latter, they are too unequal in the United States to produce a balance.
Form them on pure principles, and leave each to be supported by its real weight and connections, the senate would be feeble, and the house powerful.
I say, on pure principles; because I make a distinction between a senate that derives its weight and influence from a pure source, its numbers and wisdom, its extensive property, its extensive and permanent connections; and a senate composed of a few men, possessing small property, small and unstable connections, that derives its weight and influence from a corrupt or pernicious source; that is, merely from the power given it by the constitution and laws, to dispose of the public offices, and the annexed emoluments, and by those means to interest officers, and the hungry expectants of offices, in support of its measures.
I wish the proposed senate may not partake too much of the latter description.
To produce a balance and checks, the constitution proposes two branches in the legislature; but they are so formed, that the members of both must generally be the same kind of men — men having similar interests and views, feelings and connections — men of the same grade in society, and who associate on all occasions (probably, if there by any difference, the senators will be the most democratic.)
Senators and representatives thus circumstanced, as men, though convened in two rooms, to make laws, must be governed generally by the same motives and views, and therefore pursue the same system of politics; the partitions between the two branches will be merely those of the building in which they sit: there will not be found in them any of those genuine balances and checks, among the real different interests, and efforts of the several classes of men in the community we aim at; nor can any such balances and checks be formed in the present condition of the United States in any considerable degree of perfection: but to give them the greatest degree of perfection practicable, we ought to make the senate respectable as to numbers, the qualifications of the electors and of the elected; to increase the numbers of the representatives, and so to model the elections of them, as always to draw a majority of them substantially from the body of the people.
Though I conclude the senators and representatives will not form in the legislature those balances and checks which correspond with the actual state of the people; yet I approve of two branches, because we may notwithstanding derive several advantages from them.
The senate, from the mode of its appointment, will probably be influenced to support the state governments, and, from its periods of service will produce stability in legislation, while frequent elections may take place in the other branch.
There is generally a degree of competition between two assemblies even composed of the same kind of men; and by this, and by means of every law’s passing a revision in the second branch, caution, coolness, and deliberation are produced in the business of making laws.
By means of a democratic branch we may particularly secure personal liberty; and by means of a senatorial branch we may particularly protect property.
By the division, the house becomes the proper body to impeach all officers for misconduct in office, and the senate the proper court to try them; and in a country where limited powers must be lodged in the first magistrate, the senate, perhaps, may be the most proper body to be found to have a negative upon him in making treaties, and in managing foreign affairs.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Richard Henry Lee
January 11, 1788
Dear sir,
I shall now add a few observations respecting the organization of the senate, the manner of appointing it, and its powers.
The senate is an assembly of 26 members, two from each state, though the senators are apportioned on the federal plan, they will vote individually; they represent the states, as bodies politic, sovereign to certain purposes; the states being sovereign and independent, are all considered equal, each with the other in the senate.
In this we are governed solely by the ideal equalities of sovereignties; the federal and state governments forming one whole, and the state governments an essential part, which ought always to be kept distinctly in view, and preserved.
I feel more disposed, on reflection, to acquiesce in making them the basis of the senate, and thereby to make it the interest and duty of the senators to preserve distinct, and to perpetuate the respective sovereignties they shall represent.
As to the appointments of senators, I have already observed, that they must be appointed by the legislatures, by concurrent acts, and each branch have an equal share of power, as I do not see any probability of amendments, if advisable, in these points, I shall not dwell upon them.
The senate, as a legislative branch, is not large, but as an executive branch quite too numerous.
It is not to be presumed that we can form a genuine senatorial branch in the United States, a real representation of the aristocracy and balance in the legislature, any more than we can form a genuine representation of the people.
Could we separate the aristocratical and democratical interests; compose the senate of the former, and the house of assembly of the latter, they are too unequal in the United States to produce a balance.
Form them on pure principles, and leave each to be supported by its real weight and connections, the senate would be feeble, and the house powerful.
I say, on pure principles; because I make a distinction between a senate that derives its weight and influence from a pure source, its numbers and wisdom, its extensive property, its extensive and permanent connections; and a senate composed of a few men, possessing small property, small and unstable connections, that derives its weight and influence from a corrupt or pernicious source; that is, merely from the power given it by the constitution and laws, to dispose of the public offices, and the annexed emoluments, and by those means to interest officers, and the hungry expectants of offices, in support of its measures.
I wish the proposed senate may not partake too much of the latter description.
To produce a balance and checks, the constitution proposes two branches in the legislature; but they are so formed, that the members of both must generally be the same kind of men — men having similar interests and views, feelings and connections — men of the same grade in society, and who associate on all occasions (probably, if there by any difference, the senators will be the most democratic.)
Senators and representatives thus circumstanced, as men, though convened in two rooms, to make laws, must be governed generally by the same motives and views, and therefore pursue the same system of politics; the partitions between the two branches will be merely those of the building in which they sit: there will not be found in them any of those genuine balances and checks, among the real different interests, and efforts of the several classes of men in the community we aim at; nor can any such balances and checks be formed in the present condition of the United States in any considerable degree of perfection: but to give them the greatest degree of perfection practicable, we ought to make the senate respectable as to numbers, the qualifications of the electors and of the elected; to increase the numbers of the representatives, and so to model the elections of them, as always to draw a majority of them substantially from the body of the people.
Though I conclude the senators and representatives will not form in the legislature those balances and checks which correspond with the actual state of the people; yet I approve of two branches, because we may notwithstanding derive several advantages from them.
The senate, from the mode of its appointment, will probably be influenced to support the state governments, and, from its periods of service will produce stability in legislation, while frequent elections may take place in the other branch.
There is generally a degree of competition between two assemblies even composed of the same kind of men; and by this, and by means of every law’s passing a revision in the second branch, caution, coolness, and deliberation are produced in the business of making laws.
By means of a democratic branch we may particularly secure personal liberty; and by means of a senatorial branch we may particularly protect property.
By the division, the house becomes the proper body to impeach all officers for misconduct in office, and the senate the proper court to try them; and in a country where limited powers must be lodged in the first magistrate, the senate, perhaps, may be the most proper body to be found to have a negative upon him in making treaties, and in managing foreign affairs.
TO BE CONTINUED ...