Centinel IX, concluded ...
by Centinel & Samuel Bryan
January 08, 1788
To THE PEOPLE OF PENNSYLVANIA.
It is a fact that can be established, that during almost the whole of the time that the late convention of this state were assembled, the newspapers published in New—York, by Mr. Greenleaf, which contains the essays written there against the new government, such as the patriotic ones of Brutus, Cincinnatus, Cato, &c. sent as usual by the printer of that place, to the printers of this city, miscarried in their conveyance, which prevented the republication in this state of many of these pieces, and since that period great irregularity prevails; and I stand informed that the printers in New—York complain that the free and independent newspapers of this city do not come to hand; whilst on the contrary, we find the devoted vehicles of despotism pass uninterrupted.
I would ask what is the meaning of the new arrangement at the Post—Office, which abridges the circulation of newspapers at this momentous crisis, when our every concern is dependant upon a proper decision of the subject in discussion.
No trivial excuse will be admitted; the Centinel will, as from the first approach of despotism, warn his countrymen of the insidious and base stratagems that are practising to hoodwink them out of their liberties.
The more I consider the manoevres that are practising, the more am I alarmed —foreseeing that the juggle cannot long be concealed, and that the spirit of the people will not brook the imposition, they have guarded as they suppose against any danger arising from the opposition of the people, and rendered their struggles for liberty impotent and ridiculous.
What otherwise is the meaning of disarming the militia, for the purpose as it is said, of repairing their musquets at such a particular period?
Does not the timing of the measure determine the intention?
I was ever jealous of the select militia, consisting of infantry and troops of horse, instituted in this city and in some of the counties, without the sanction of law, and officered principally by the devoted instruments of the well born, although the illustrious patriotism of one of them, has not corresponded with the intention of appointing him.
Are not these corps provided to suppress the first efforts of freedom, and to check the spirit of the people until a regular and sufficiently powerful military force shall be embodied to rivet the chains of slavery on a deluded nation.
What confirms these apprehensions is the declaration of a certain Major, an active instrument in this business, and the echo of the principal conspirators, who has said, he should deem the cutting off of five thousand men, as a small sacrifice, a cheap purchase for the establishment of the new constitution.
Philadelphia, January 5, 1788.
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
The Connecticut Convention Ratifies: 128-40
January 09, 1788
Convention Proceedings and Debates’
The Convention got through with debating upon the Constitution by sections.
It was canvassed critically and fully.
Every objection was raised against it which the ingenuity and invention of its opposers could devise.
The writer of this account could wish to exhibit to public view, though he is sensible he could do it but imperfectly, the whole of the debates upon this interesting subject; but they would be so exceedingly prolix that he is obliged to give up any such attempt.
Suffice it to say that all the objections to the Constitution vanished before the learning and eloquence of a Johnson, the genuine good sense and discernment of a Sherman, and the Demosthenian energy of an Ellsworth.
After the Convention had finished debating upon the Constitution by sections, General Samuel H. Parsons, in order to bring up the subject for a general discussion, moved the grand question, “That this Convention do assent to, ratify and adopt the Constitution reported by the Convention of delegates in Philadelphia on the 17th day of September A. D. 1787 and referred to the determination of this Convention by an act of General Assembly in October last.”
This motion was seconded by General Jedidiah Huntington [Connecticut Courant, 14 January]
SAMUEL HUNTINGTON: Upon the general discussion of the subject, His Excellency Governor Samuel Huntington expressed himself nearly as follows.
Mr. President, I do not rise to detain this Convention for any length of time.
The subject has been so fully discussed that very little can be added to what has been already offered.
I have heard and attended with pleasure to what has been said upon this subject.
The importance of it merited a full and ample discussion.
It does not give me pain, but pleasure, to hear the sentiments of those gentlemen who differ from me.
It is not to be expected from human nature that we should all have the same opinion.
The best way to learn the nature and effects of different systems of government is not from theoretical dissertations, but from experience from what has actually taken place among mankind.
From this latter source of information, it is that mankind have obtained a more complete knowledge of the nature of government than they had in ages past.
It is an established truth that no nation can exist without a coercive power, a power to enforce the execution of its political regulations.
There is such a love of liberty implanted in the human breast that no nation ever willingly gave up its liberty.
If they lose this inestimable birthright of man, it is from a want not of will but of the proper means to support it.
If we look into history, we shall find that the common avenue through which tyranny has entered in, and enslaved nations who were once free, has been their not supporting government.
The great secret of preserving liberty is to lodge the supreme power so as to be well supported and not abused.
If this could only be effected, no nation would ever lose its liberty.
The history of mankind clearly shows that it is dangerous to entrust the supreme power in the hands of one man.
The same source of knowledge proves that it is not only inconvenient but dangerous to liberty for the people of a large community to attempt to exercise in person the supreme authority.
Hence arises the necessity that the people should act by their representatives; but this method, so necessary for the support of civil liberty, is an improvement of modern times.
Liberty however is not so well secured as it ought to be when the supreme power is lodged in one body of representatives.
There ought to be two branches of the legislature, that the one may be a check upon the other.
It is difficult for the people at large to know when the supreme power is verging towards abuse and to apply the proper remedy.
But if the government be properly balanced, it will possess a renovating principle by which it will be able to right itself.
The constitution of the British nation affords us great light upon the subject of government.
Learned men in other countries have admired it, but they thought it too finespun to prove beneficial in practice.
But a long trial has now shown its excellence; and the difficulties which that nation now experiences arise not from their constitution but from other circumstances.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
January 09, 1788
Convention Proceedings and Debates’
The Convention got through with debating upon the Constitution by sections.
It was canvassed critically and fully.
Every objection was raised against it which the ingenuity and invention of its opposers could devise.
The writer of this account could wish to exhibit to public view, though he is sensible he could do it but imperfectly, the whole of the debates upon this interesting subject; but they would be so exceedingly prolix that he is obliged to give up any such attempt.
Suffice it to say that all the objections to the Constitution vanished before the learning and eloquence of a Johnson, the genuine good sense and discernment of a Sherman, and the Demosthenian energy of an Ellsworth.
After the Convention had finished debating upon the Constitution by sections, General Samuel H. Parsons, in order to bring up the subject for a general discussion, moved the grand question, “That this Convention do assent to, ratify and adopt the Constitution reported by the Convention of delegates in Philadelphia on the 17th day of September A. D. 1787 and referred to the determination of this Convention by an act of General Assembly in October last.”
This motion was seconded by General Jedidiah Huntington [Connecticut Courant, 14 January]
SAMUEL HUNTINGTON: Upon the general discussion of the subject, His Excellency Governor Samuel Huntington expressed himself nearly as follows.
Mr. President, I do not rise to detain this Convention for any length of time.
The subject has been so fully discussed that very little can be added to what has been already offered.
I have heard and attended with pleasure to what has been said upon this subject.
The importance of it merited a full and ample discussion.
It does not give me pain, but pleasure, to hear the sentiments of those gentlemen who differ from me.
It is not to be expected from human nature that we should all have the same opinion.
The best way to learn the nature and effects of different systems of government is not from theoretical dissertations, but from experience from what has actually taken place among mankind.
From this latter source of information, it is that mankind have obtained a more complete knowledge of the nature of government than they had in ages past.
It is an established truth that no nation can exist without a coercive power, a power to enforce the execution of its political regulations.
There is such a love of liberty implanted in the human breast that no nation ever willingly gave up its liberty.
If they lose this inestimable birthright of man, it is from a want not of will but of the proper means to support it.
If we look into history, we shall find that the common avenue through which tyranny has entered in, and enslaved nations who were once free, has been their not supporting government.
The great secret of preserving liberty is to lodge the supreme power so as to be well supported and not abused.
If this could only be effected, no nation would ever lose its liberty.
The history of mankind clearly shows that it is dangerous to entrust the supreme power in the hands of one man.
The same source of knowledge proves that it is not only inconvenient but dangerous to liberty for the people of a large community to attempt to exercise in person the supreme authority.
Hence arises the necessity that the people should act by their representatives; but this method, so necessary for the support of civil liberty, is an improvement of modern times.
Liberty however is not so well secured as it ought to be when the supreme power is lodged in one body of representatives.
There ought to be two branches of the legislature, that the one may be a check upon the other.
It is difficult for the people at large to know when the supreme power is verging towards abuse and to apply the proper remedy.
But if the government be properly balanced, it will possess a renovating principle by which it will be able to right itself.
The constitution of the British nation affords us great light upon the subject of government.
Learned men in other countries have admired it, but they thought it too finespun to prove beneficial in practice.
But a long trial has now shown its excellence; and the difficulties which that nation now experiences arise not from their constitution but from other circumstances.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
The Connecticut Convention Ratifies: 128-40, continued ...
January 09, 1788
SAMUEL HUNTINGTON:, concluded ...
The Author of Nature has given to mankind a certain degree of insight into futurity.
As far as we can see a probability that certain events will happen, so far we do well to provide and guard.
But we may attempt to go too far; it is in vain to think of providing against every possible contingency.
The happiness of civil society depends not merely upon their constitution of government but upon a variety of circumstances.
One constitution may suit one particular nation exceedingly well; when a different one would suit another nation in different circumstances.
Even among the American states there is such a difference in sentiments, habits, and customs that a government which would be very suitable for one might not be agreeable to another.
I am fully of opinion that the great council of the Union must have a controlling power with respect to matters of national concern.
There is at present an extreme want of power in the national government; and it is my opinion that this Constitution does not give too much.
As to the subject of representation, at first view it appears small; but upon the whole, the purposes of the Union could not be so well answered by a greater number.
It is impracticable to have the numbers of the representation as great, and the times of electing as frequent, as they are in our state governments.
Nor is this necessary for the security of liberty.
It is sufficient if the choice of Representatives be so frequent that they must depend upon the people, and that an inseparable connection be kept up between the electors and elected.
The state governments, I think, will not be endangered by the powers vested by this Constitution in the general government.
While I have attended in Congress, I have observed that the members were quite as strenuous advocates for the rights of their respective states as for those of the Union.
I doubt not but this will continue to be the case, and hence I infer that the general government will not have the disposition to encroach upon the states.
But still the people themselves must be the chief support of liberty.
While the great body of the freeholders are acquainted with the duties which they owe to their God, to themselves, and to men, they will remain free.
But if ignorance and depravity should prevail, they will inevitably lead to slavery and ruin.
Upon the whole view of this Constitution, I am in favor of it and think it bids fair to promote our national prosperity.
This is a new event in the history of mankind.
Heretofore, most governments have been formed by tyrants and imposed on mankind by force.
Never before did a people, in time of peace and tranquility, meet together by their representatives and, with calm deliberation, frame for themselves a system of government.
This noble attempt does honor to our country.
While I express my sentiments in favor of this Constitution, I candidly believe that the gentlemen who oppose it are actuated by principles of regard to the public welfare.
If we will exercise mutual candor for each other, and sincerely endeavor to maintain our liberties, we may long continue to be a free and happy people. [Connecticut Courant, 14 January]
TO BE CONTINUED ...
January 09, 1788
SAMUEL HUNTINGTON:, concluded ...
The Author of Nature has given to mankind a certain degree of insight into futurity.
As far as we can see a probability that certain events will happen, so far we do well to provide and guard.
But we may attempt to go too far; it is in vain to think of providing against every possible contingency.
The happiness of civil society depends not merely upon their constitution of government but upon a variety of circumstances.
One constitution may suit one particular nation exceedingly well; when a different one would suit another nation in different circumstances.
Even among the American states there is such a difference in sentiments, habits, and customs that a government which would be very suitable for one might not be agreeable to another.
I am fully of opinion that the great council of the Union must have a controlling power with respect to matters of national concern.
There is at present an extreme want of power in the national government; and it is my opinion that this Constitution does not give too much.
As to the subject of representation, at first view it appears small; but upon the whole, the purposes of the Union could not be so well answered by a greater number.
It is impracticable to have the numbers of the representation as great, and the times of electing as frequent, as they are in our state governments.
Nor is this necessary for the security of liberty.
It is sufficient if the choice of Representatives be so frequent that they must depend upon the people, and that an inseparable connection be kept up between the electors and elected.
The state governments, I think, will not be endangered by the powers vested by this Constitution in the general government.
While I have attended in Congress, I have observed that the members were quite as strenuous advocates for the rights of their respective states as for those of the Union.
I doubt not but this will continue to be the case, and hence I infer that the general government will not have the disposition to encroach upon the states.
But still the people themselves must be the chief support of liberty.
While the great body of the freeholders are acquainted with the duties which they owe to their God, to themselves, and to men, they will remain free.
But if ignorance and depravity should prevail, they will inevitably lead to slavery and ruin.
Upon the whole view of this Constitution, I am in favor of it and think it bids fair to promote our national prosperity.
This is a new event in the history of mankind.
Heretofore, most governments have been formed by tyrants and imposed on mankind by force.
Never before did a people, in time of peace and tranquility, meet together by their representatives and, with calm deliberation, frame for themselves a system of government.
This noble attempt does honor to our country.
While I express my sentiments in favor of this Constitution, I candidly believe that the gentlemen who oppose it are actuated by principles of regard to the public welfare.
If we will exercise mutual candor for each other, and sincerely endeavor to maintain our liberties, we may long continue to be a free and happy people. [Connecticut Courant, 14 January]
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
The Connecticut Convention Ratifies: 128-40, continued ...
January 09, 1788
OLIVER WOLCOTT: Mr. President, I do not expect to throw any new light upon a subject which has been so fully discussed.
Yet I cannot content myself without giving my opinion more explicitly than by a silent vote.
It is generally agreed that the present Confederation is inadequate to the exigencies of our national affairs.
We must therefore adopt this plan of government or some other, or risk the consequences of disunion.
As the present Articles of Confederation are inadequate, we ought to consider whether this Constitution be as good as can be agreed on by so many different states or whether it be a dangerous system; whether it secures the liberties of the people or whether its tendency be unfavorable to the rights of a free people.
I have given it all the consideration in my power.
I have a considerable time since made up my mind upon it; and I think it my duty to give my voice in favor of adopting it.
It is founded upon the election of the people.
If it varies from the former system, or if it is to be altered hereafter, it must be with the consent of the people.
This is all the security in favor of liberty which can be expected.
Mankind may become corrupt and give up the cause of freedom, but I believe that love of liberty which prevails among the people of this country will prevent such a direful calamity.
This Constitution effectually secures the states in their several rights.
It must secure them for its own sake, for they are the pillars which uphold the general system.
The Senate, a constituent branch of the general legislature without whose assent no public act can be made, are appointed by the states and will secure the rights of the several states.
The other branch of the legislature, the Representatives, are to be elected by the people at large.
They will therefore be the guardians of the rights of the great body of the citizens.
So well guarded is this Constitution throughout that it seems impossible that the rights either of the states or of the people should be destroyed.
I do not see the necessity of such a test as some gentlemen wish for.
The Constitution enjoins an oath upon all the officers of the United States.
This is a direct appeal to that God who is the Avenger of Perjury.
Such an appeal to Him is a full acknowledgment of His being and providence.
An acknowledgment of these great truths is all that the gentlemen contend for.
For myself, I should be content either with or without that clause in the Constitution which excludes test laws.
Knowledge and liberty are so prevalent in this country that I do not believe that the United States would ever be disposed to establish one religious sect and lay all others under legal disabilities.
But as we know not what may take place hereafter, and any such test would be exceedingly injurious to the rights of free citizens, I cannot think it altogether superfluous to add a clause which secures us from the possibility of such oppression.
I shall only add that I give my assent to this Constitution and am happy to see the states in a fair way to adopt a system which will protect their rights and promote their welfare.
[Connecticut Courant, 14 January]
TO BE CONTINUED ...
January 09, 1788
OLIVER WOLCOTT: Mr. President, I do not expect to throw any new light upon a subject which has been so fully discussed.
Yet I cannot content myself without giving my opinion more explicitly than by a silent vote.
It is generally agreed that the present Confederation is inadequate to the exigencies of our national affairs.
We must therefore adopt this plan of government or some other, or risk the consequences of disunion.
As the present Articles of Confederation are inadequate, we ought to consider whether this Constitution be as good as can be agreed on by so many different states or whether it be a dangerous system; whether it secures the liberties of the people or whether its tendency be unfavorable to the rights of a free people.
I have given it all the consideration in my power.
I have a considerable time since made up my mind upon it; and I think it my duty to give my voice in favor of adopting it.
It is founded upon the election of the people.
If it varies from the former system, or if it is to be altered hereafter, it must be with the consent of the people.
This is all the security in favor of liberty which can be expected.
Mankind may become corrupt and give up the cause of freedom, but I believe that love of liberty which prevails among the people of this country will prevent such a direful calamity.
This Constitution effectually secures the states in their several rights.
It must secure them for its own sake, for they are the pillars which uphold the general system.
The Senate, a constituent branch of the general legislature without whose assent no public act can be made, are appointed by the states and will secure the rights of the several states.
The other branch of the legislature, the Representatives, are to be elected by the people at large.
They will therefore be the guardians of the rights of the great body of the citizens.
So well guarded is this Constitution throughout that it seems impossible that the rights either of the states or of the people should be destroyed.
I do not see the necessity of such a test as some gentlemen wish for.
The Constitution enjoins an oath upon all the officers of the United States.
This is a direct appeal to that God who is the Avenger of Perjury.
Such an appeal to Him is a full acknowledgment of His being and providence.
An acknowledgment of these great truths is all that the gentlemen contend for.
For myself, I should be content either with or without that clause in the Constitution which excludes test laws.
Knowledge and liberty are so prevalent in this country that I do not believe that the United States would ever be disposed to establish one religious sect and lay all others under legal disabilities.
But as we know not what may take place hereafter, and any such test would be exceedingly injurious to the rights of free citizens, I cannot think it altogether superfluous to add a clause which secures us from the possibility of such oppression.
I shall only add that I give my assent to this Constitution and am happy to see the states in a fair way to adopt a system which will protect their rights and promote their welfare.
[Connecticut Courant, 14 January]
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
The Connecticut Convention Ratifies: 128-40, continued ...
January 09, 1788
RICHARD LAW: Mr. President.
The important subject before us has been examined so particularly that I do not expect to add anything new.
As we have been a long time poring upon the defective parts of this Constitution, I think it will not be amiss to pay some attention to its excellencies.
There is one clause in it which provides a remedy for whatever defects it may have.
The clause to which I refer is that which provides that whenever two-thirds of Congress, or a convention to be called at the instance of two-thirds of the states, shall propose amendments and they be agreed to by three-fourths of the states, such amendments shall be valid as part of the Constitution.
This is an easy and peaceable way of amending any parts of the Constitution which may be found inconvenient in practice.
As this is a most important question, as it concerns not only present but future generations, we ought to consider it upon its real merits without suffering our minds to be misled by examples of other nations whose circumstances are very different from ours.
Some have been led into a mistake by comparing a part of this Constitution with that of Great Britain.
But this is very different from theirs.
Our President is not a king, nor is our Senate a House of Lords.
They do not claim an independent hereditary authority.
But the whole is elective; all are dependent upon the people.
The President, the Senate, the Representatives are all creatures of the people.
Therefore, the people will be secure from oppression, though I admit that, if our President and Senate possessed an independent hereditary authority, the democratical branch would be too weak for the others.
Some suppose that the general government, which extends over the whole, will annihilate the state governments.
But we ought to consider that this general government rests upon the state governments for its support.
It is like a vast and magnificent bridge built upon thirteen strong and stately pillars.
Now the rulers, those who occupy the bridge, cannot be so beside themselves as to knock away the pillars which support the whole fabric.
But some say a free government like this has not energy enough to pervade a country of such vast extent.
We are not satisfied with this assertion; we want to try [the] experiment.
A free system of government now presents itself for our acceptance.
We shall be wanting to ourselves if, instead of adopting it, we wait for the arm of tyranny to impose upon us a system of despotism.
The finger of Providence is evidently to be seen in the political affairs of this country.
The old Articles of Confederation were once the best that we should have been willing to adopt.
We have been led on by imperceptible degrees to see that they are defective; and now, if it be the design of Providence to make us a great and happy people, I believe, that He who turns the hearts of the children of men, as the rivers of water are turned, will induce the people of the United States to accept of a Constitution which is so well calculated to promote their national welfare.
[Connecticut Courant, 14 January]
TO BE CONTINUED ...
January 09, 1788
RICHARD LAW: Mr. President.
The important subject before us has been examined so particularly that I do not expect to add anything new.
As we have been a long time poring upon the defective parts of this Constitution, I think it will not be amiss to pay some attention to its excellencies.
There is one clause in it which provides a remedy for whatever defects it may have.
The clause to which I refer is that which provides that whenever two-thirds of Congress, or a convention to be called at the instance of two-thirds of the states, shall propose amendments and they be agreed to by three-fourths of the states, such amendments shall be valid as part of the Constitution.
This is an easy and peaceable way of amending any parts of the Constitution which may be found inconvenient in practice.
As this is a most important question, as it concerns not only present but future generations, we ought to consider it upon its real merits without suffering our minds to be misled by examples of other nations whose circumstances are very different from ours.
Some have been led into a mistake by comparing a part of this Constitution with that of Great Britain.
But this is very different from theirs.
Our President is not a king, nor is our Senate a House of Lords.
They do not claim an independent hereditary authority.
But the whole is elective; all are dependent upon the people.
The President, the Senate, the Representatives are all creatures of the people.
Therefore, the people will be secure from oppression, though I admit that, if our President and Senate possessed an independent hereditary authority, the democratical branch would be too weak for the others.
Some suppose that the general government, which extends over the whole, will annihilate the state governments.
But we ought to consider that this general government rests upon the state governments for its support.
It is like a vast and magnificent bridge built upon thirteen strong and stately pillars.
Now the rulers, those who occupy the bridge, cannot be so beside themselves as to knock away the pillars which support the whole fabric.
But some say a free government like this has not energy enough to pervade a country of such vast extent.
We are not satisfied with this assertion; we want to try [the] experiment.
A free system of government now presents itself for our acceptance.
We shall be wanting to ourselves if, instead of adopting it, we wait for the arm of tyranny to impose upon us a system of despotism.
The finger of Providence is evidently to be seen in the political affairs of this country.
The old Articles of Confederation were once the best that we should have been willing to adopt.
We have been led on by imperceptible degrees to see that they are defective; and now, if it be the design of Providence to make us a great and happy people, I believe, that He who turns the hearts of the children of men, as the rivers of water are turned, will induce the people of the United States to accept of a Constitution which is so well calculated to promote their national welfare.
[Connecticut Courant, 14 January]
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
The Connecticut Convention Ratifies: 128-40, concluded ...
January 09, 1788
Several other gentlemen likewise offered their sentiments upon this important question; and after everything which any member had to offer upon the subject had been heard with that candor and attention which was becoming in an assembly convened to decide upon the fate of an empire, the question was put upon the motion of General Samuel H. Parsons; upon which the yeas and nays being called for, were as follows. [Connecticut Courant, 14 January]
[At this point the Connecticut Courant contains the names of the delegates voting for and against ratification and the Form of Ratification. For the votes of the delegates, see the Convention Roster, VI above.]
The time was busily employed, with great attention, in examination and scrutiny, with various particular strictures interspersed with more general dissertations on the distinct and relative parts of the interesting theme and probable operation, when applied to practice and actual experiment, until the next Wednesday evening; when the great question being generally called for, was formally proposed, and explicitly answered, by yea and nay, as appears by the foregoing roll, and the following authenticated Ratification or exemplification, viz.
[Form of Ratification]
The foregoing Ratification being engrossed, duplicates on parchments were subscribed and certified accordingly, the one to be transmitted to Congress and the other lodged in the office of the secretary of this state. [Weekly Monitor, 14 January]
The Connecticut Form of Ratification, 9 January
In the Name of the People of the State of Connecticut.
We the Delegates of the People of sd. State in general Convention assembled, pursuant to an Act of the Legislature in October last, Have assented to and ratified, and by these presents do assent to, ratify and adopt the Constitution, reported by the Convention of Delegates in Philadelphia, on the 17th day of September AD. 1787.
For the United States of America.
Done in Convention this 9th. day of January AD. 1788.
In witness whereof we have hereunto set our hands.
Matthew Griswold President:, Jereh Wadsworth, Jesse Root, Isaac Lee, Selah Heart, Zebulon Peck jur, Elisha Pitkin, Erastus Wolcott, John Watson, John Treadwell, William Judd, Joseph Mosely, Wait Goodrich, John Curtiss, Asa Barns, Stephen Mix Mitchell, John Chester, Oliv Ellsworth, Roger Newberry, Roger Sherman, Pierpont Edwards, Samuel Beach, Daniel Holbrook, John Holbrook, Gideon Buckingham, Lewis Mallet Jr. ,Joseph Hopkins, John Welton, Richd Law, Amasa Learned, Saml. Huntington, Jed Huntington, Isaac Huntington, Robert Robbins, Danll Foot, Eli Hyde, Joseph Woodbridge, Stephen Billings, Andrew Lee, William Noyes, Joshua Raymond Junr., Jerh. Halsey, Wheeler Coit, Charles Phelps, Nathaniel Miner, Jonathan Sturges, Thaddeus Burr, Elisha Whittelsey, Joseph Moss White, Amos Mead, Jabez Fitch, Nehemiah Beardsley, James Potter, John Chandler, John Beach, Hezh. Rogers, Leml. Sanford, William Heron, Philip Burr Bradley, Nathan Dauchy, James Davenport, John Davenport Junr, Wm. Saml. Johnson, Elisha Mills, Elipht Dyer, Jeda: Elderkin, Simeon Smith, Hendrick Dow, Seth Paine, Asa Witter, Moses Cleaveland, Samson Howe, Willm Danielson, Wm. Williams, James Bradford, Joshua Dunlop, Daniel Learned, Moses Campbell, Benjamin Dow, Oliver Wolcott, Jedidiah Strong, Moses Hawley, Charles Burrall, Nathan Hale, Daniel Miles, Asaph Hall, Isaac Burnham, John Wilder, Mark Prindle, Jedidiah Hubbel, Aaron Austin, Samuel Canfield, Daniel Everitt, Hez: Fitch, Joshua Porter, Benjn Hinman, Epaphras Sheldon, Eleazer Curtiss, John Whittlesey, Danl Nathl Brinsmade, Thomas Fenn, David Smith, Robert McCune, Daniel Sherman, Samuel Orton, Asher Miller, Saml H. Parsons, Ebenr White, Hezh Goodrich, Dyar Throop, Jabez Chapman, Cornelius Higgins, Hezekiah Brainerd, Theophilus Morgan, Hezh. Lane, William Hart, Saml. Shipman, Jeremiah West, Samuel Chapman, Ichabod Warner, Samuel Carver, Jeremiah Ripley, Ephraim Root, John Phelps, Isaac Foot, Abijah Sessions, Caleb Holt, Seth Crocker
State of Connecticut, ss. Hartford January ninth Anno Domini one thousand, seven hundred and eighty eight.
The foregoing Ratification was agreed to, and signed as above, by one hundred and twenty eight, and dissented to by forty Delegates in Convention, which is a Majority of eighty eight.
Certified by Matthew Griswold President.
Teste Jedidiah Strong Secretary
January 09, 1788
Several other gentlemen likewise offered their sentiments upon this important question; and after everything which any member had to offer upon the subject had been heard with that candor and attention which was becoming in an assembly convened to decide upon the fate of an empire, the question was put upon the motion of General Samuel H. Parsons; upon which the yeas and nays being called for, were as follows. [Connecticut Courant, 14 January]
[At this point the Connecticut Courant contains the names of the delegates voting for and against ratification and the Form of Ratification. For the votes of the delegates, see the Convention Roster, VI above.]
The time was busily employed, with great attention, in examination and scrutiny, with various particular strictures interspersed with more general dissertations on the distinct and relative parts of the interesting theme and probable operation, when applied to practice and actual experiment, until the next Wednesday evening; when the great question being generally called for, was formally proposed, and explicitly answered, by yea and nay, as appears by the foregoing roll, and the following authenticated Ratification or exemplification, viz.
[Form of Ratification]
The foregoing Ratification being engrossed, duplicates on parchments were subscribed and certified accordingly, the one to be transmitted to Congress and the other lodged in the office of the secretary of this state. [Weekly Monitor, 14 January]
The Connecticut Form of Ratification, 9 January
In the Name of the People of the State of Connecticut.
We the Delegates of the People of sd. State in general Convention assembled, pursuant to an Act of the Legislature in October last, Have assented to and ratified, and by these presents do assent to, ratify and adopt the Constitution, reported by the Convention of Delegates in Philadelphia, on the 17th day of September AD. 1787.
For the United States of America.
Done in Convention this 9th. day of January AD. 1788.
In witness whereof we have hereunto set our hands.
Matthew Griswold President:, Jereh Wadsworth, Jesse Root, Isaac Lee, Selah Heart, Zebulon Peck jur, Elisha Pitkin, Erastus Wolcott, John Watson, John Treadwell, William Judd, Joseph Mosely, Wait Goodrich, John Curtiss, Asa Barns, Stephen Mix Mitchell, John Chester, Oliv Ellsworth, Roger Newberry, Roger Sherman, Pierpont Edwards, Samuel Beach, Daniel Holbrook, John Holbrook, Gideon Buckingham, Lewis Mallet Jr. ,Joseph Hopkins, John Welton, Richd Law, Amasa Learned, Saml. Huntington, Jed Huntington, Isaac Huntington, Robert Robbins, Danll Foot, Eli Hyde, Joseph Woodbridge, Stephen Billings, Andrew Lee, William Noyes, Joshua Raymond Junr., Jerh. Halsey, Wheeler Coit, Charles Phelps, Nathaniel Miner, Jonathan Sturges, Thaddeus Burr, Elisha Whittelsey, Joseph Moss White, Amos Mead, Jabez Fitch, Nehemiah Beardsley, James Potter, John Chandler, John Beach, Hezh. Rogers, Leml. Sanford, William Heron, Philip Burr Bradley, Nathan Dauchy, James Davenport, John Davenport Junr, Wm. Saml. Johnson, Elisha Mills, Elipht Dyer, Jeda: Elderkin, Simeon Smith, Hendrick Dow, Seth Paine, Asa Witter, Moses Cleaveland, Samson Howe, Willm Danielson, Wm. Williams, James Bradford, Joshua Dunlop, Daniel Learned, Moses Campbell, Benjamin Dow, Oliver Wolcott, Jedidiah Strong, Moses Hawley, Charles Burrall, Nathan Hale, Daniel Miles, Asaph Hall, Isaac Burnham, John Wilder, Mark Prindle, Jedidiah Hubbel, Aaron Austin, Samuel Canfield, Daniel Everitt, Hez: Fitch, Joshua Porter, Benjn Hinman, Epaphras Sheldon, Eleazer Curtiss, John Whittlesey, Danl Nathl Brinsmade, Thomas Fenn, David Smith, Robert McCune, Daniel Sherman, Samuel Orton, Asher Miller, Saml H. Parsons, Ebenr White, Hezh Goodrich, Dyar Throop, Jabez Chapman, Cornelius Higgins, Hezekiah Brainerd, Theophilus Morgan, Hezh. Lane, William Hart, Saml. Shipman, Jeremiah West, Samuel Chapman, Ichabod Warner, Samuel Carver, Jeremiah Ripley, Ephraim Root, John Phelps, Isaac Foot, Abijah Sessions, Caleb Holt, Seth Crocker
State of Connecticut, ss. Hartford January ninth Anno Domini one thousand, seven hundred and eighty eight.
The foregoing Ratification was agreed to, and signed as above, by one hundred and twenty eight, and dissented to by forty Delegates in Convention, which is a Majority of eighty eight.
Certified by Matthew Griswold President.
Teste Jedidiah Strong Secretary
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Letter to James Madison
by George Washington
January 10, 1788
My dear Sir:
I stand indebted to you for your favors of the 20th. and 26th. Ulto. and I believe for that of the 14th. also, and their enclosures.
It does not appear to me, that there is any certain criterion in this State, by which a decided judgment can be formed, as to the opinion which is entertained by the mass of its citizens with respect to the new Constitution.
My belief on this occasion is, that whenever the matter is brought to a final decision, that not only a majority, but a large one, will be found in its favor.
That the opposition should have gained strength, among the members of the Assembly at Richmond, admitting the fact, is not to be wondered at when it is considered that the powerful adversaries to the Constitution are all assembled at that place, acting conjunctly, with the promulgated sentiments of Col. R— H— L— as auxiliary.
It is said however, and I believe it may be depended upon, that the latter, (tho’ he may retain his sentiments) has withdrawn, or means to withdraw his opposition; because as he has expressed himself, or as others have done it for him, he finds himself in bad company; such as with M— Sm— th &c,&c.
His brother, Francis L. Lee on whose judgment the family place much reliance, is decidedly in favor of the new form, under a conviction that it is the best that can be obtained, and because it promises energy, stability, and that security which is, or ought to be, the wish of every good Citizen of the Union.
How far the determination of the question before the debating club (of which I made mention in a former letter) may be considered as auspicious of the final decision of the Convention, I shall not prognosticate; but in this club, the question it seems, was determined by a very large majority in favor of the Constitution; but of all arguments which may be used at this time, none will be so forcible, I expect, as that nine States have acceded to it.
And if the unanimity, or majorities in those which are to follow, are as great as in those which have acted, the power of those arguments will be irrisistable.
The Governor has given his reasons to the Publick for with holding his Signature to the Constitution.
A copy of them I send you.
Our Assembly has been long in Session, employed chiefly (according to my information) in rectifying the mistakes of the last, and committing others for emendations at the next.
Yet “who so wise as we are” We are held in painful suspence with respect to European Intelligence.
Peace or War, by the last accts. are equally balanced a grain added to either scale will give it the preponderancy.
I have no regular corrispondt. in Massachusetts; otherwise, as the occasional subject of a letter I should have had no objection to the communication of my sentiments on the proposed Government as they are unequivocal and decided.
With the greatest esteem etc.
P. S. I have this momt. been informed, that the Assembly of No Carolina have postponed the meeting of the Convention of that State until July; this seems evidently calculated to take the Tone from Virginia.
by George Washington
January 10, 1788
My dear Sir:
I stand indebted to you for your favors of the 20th. and 26th. Ulto. and I believe for that of the 14th. also, and their enclosures.
It does not appear to me, that there is any certain criterion in this State, by which a decided judgment can be formed, as to the opinion which is entertained by the mass of its citizens with respect to the new Constitution.
My belief on this occasion is, that whenever the matter is brought to a final decision, that not only a majority, but a large one, will be found in its favor.
That the opposition should have gained strength, among the members of the Assembly at Richmond, admitting the fact, is not to be wondered at when it is considered that the powerful adversaries to the Constitution are all assembled at that place, acting conjunctly, with the promulgated sentiments of Col. R— H— L— as auxiliary.
It is said however, and I believe it may be depended upon, that the latter, (tho’ he may retain his sentiments) has withdrawn, or means to withdraw his opposition; because as he has expressed himself, or as others have done it for him, he finds himself in bad company; such as with M— Sm— th &c,&c.
His brother, Francis L. Lee on whose judgment the family place much reliance, is decidedly in favor of the new form, under a conviction that it is the best that can be obtained, and because it promises energy, stability, and that security which is, or ought to be, the wish of every good Citizen of the Union.
How far the determination of the question before the debating club (of which I made mention in a former letter) may be considered as auspicious of the final decision of the Convention, I shall not prognosticate; but in this club, the question it seems, was determined by a very large majority in favor of the Constitution; but of all arguments which may be used at this time, none will be so forcible, I expect, as that nine States have acceded to it.
And if the unanimity, or majorities in those which are to follow, are as great as in those which have acted, the power of those arguments will be irrisistable.
The Governor has given his reasons to the Publick for with holding his Signature to the Constitution.
A copy of them I send you.
Our Assembly has been long in Session, employed chiefly (according to my information) in rectifying the mistakes of the last, and committing others for emendations at the next.
Yet “who so wise as we are” We are held in painful suspence with respect to European Intelligence.
Peace or War, by the last accts. are equally balanced a grain added to either scale will give it the preponderancy.
I have no regular corrispondt. in Massachusetts; otherwise, as the occasional subject of a letter I should have had no objection to the communication of my sentiments on the proposed Government as they are unequivocal and decided.
With the greatest esteem etc.
P. S. I have this momt. been informed, that the Assembly of No Carolina have postponed the meeting of the Convention of that State until July; this seems evidently calculated to take the Tone from Virginia.
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Philadelphiensis VII
January 10, 1788
Common sense said, that, in case America became an independent nation, neutrality would be a safer convoy than a man of war.
Probably Mr. Paine thought so, when he wrote; but if he did he thought wrong.
For the position ought to be reversed.
A man of war is a safer convoy than neutrality; or at least, without a naval convoy there is no safety in neutrality.
If America is to be a commercial neutral power, she ought to have some naval strength to intitle her to the appellation.
We all know that the armed neutrality of the northern European powers injured the trade of Britain more, during the late war, than the combined fleets of her open enemies.
If a war should now commence between Britain and France or any of the nations who have possessions in America; can America remain a neutral power, or join in an armed neutrality for the protection of her commerce?
No.
Neutral she may be, and neutral she must be, and nothing else; and as for her being called a power it is a mere solecism, as long as she has no navy.
Her trade may be destroyed with impunity; her seamen taken to man the fleets of her enemies, without the possibility of redress; and her government insulted and her cities laid in ashes by her enemies ships riding triumphant in her rivers and harbours, without being able to help herself, or retaliate.
But however necessary a fleet may be for the protection of our seamen, commerce, and national honor, it is pretty plain, that as long as the proposed government would exist, (if ever it should be established) we must do without one.
That government must at least for some years be administred by a standing army.
Nothing short of despotism can reduce the disaffected part of the people to submit to it, who are the friends to liberty and the rights of human nature.
Those who say that its enemies are a few insignificant individuals, talk something like the British ministry at the commencement of the war, who represented the American discontents, as a parcel of cowardly paltroons, whom they would soon bring to obedience, by a handful of military; but a short time convinced them of their mistake.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
January 10, 1788
Common sense said, that, in case America became an independent nation, neutrality would be a safer convoy than a man of war.
Probably Mr. Paine thought so, when he wrote; but if he did he thought wrong.
For the position ought to be reversed.
A man of war is a safer convoy than neutrality; or at least, without a naval convoy there is no safety in neutrality.
If America is to be a commercial neutral power, she ought to have some naval strength to intitle her to the appellation.
We all know that the armed neutrality of the northern European powers injured the trade of Britain more, during the late war, than the combined fleets of her open enemies.
If a war should now commence between Britain and France or any of the nations who have possessions in America; can America remain a neutral power, or join in an armed neutrality for the protection of her commerce?
No.
Neutral she may be, and neutral she must be, and nothing else; and as for her being called a power it is a mere solecism, as long as she has no navy.
Her trade may be destroyed with impunity; her seamen taken to man the fleets of her enemies, without the possibility of redress; and her government insulted and her cities laid in ashes by her enemies ships riding triumphant in her rivers and harbours, without being able to help herself, or retaliate.
But however necessary a fleet may be for the protection of our seamen, commerce, and national honor, it is pretty plain, that as long as the proposed government would exist, (if ever it should be established) we must do without one.
That government must at least for some years be administred by a standing army.
Nothing short of despotism can reduce the disaffected part of the people to submit to it, who are the friends to liberty and the rights of human nature.
Those who say that its enemies are a few insignificant individuals, talk something like the British ministry at the commencement of the war, who represented the American discontents, as a parcel of cowardly paltroons, whom they would soon bring to obedience, by a handful of military; but a short time convinced them of their mistake.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Philadelphiensis VII, concluded ...
January 10, 1788
As the spirit of the new constitution admits of a standing army, and the opposition absolutely must be crushed by strength, every nerve of power must be strained, and every way and means of collecting money devised, for raising an efficient army for this purpose, in the first instance.
This is a system of procedure that the despots must pursue, if they have any hopes of success.
Either moderation or delay would effectually defeat them.
I question whether all the hard money, that the well born can procure at this juncture, will be sufficient to support their government and army for six months; without expending a single shilling on building a federal navy.
The greater part of that junto are extremely poor; and have their hopes of agrandizement on the new government; now if a part of the people refuse to pay taxes to that government, as they certainly will, how will they provide for the national debt; how will these poor gentlemen make their fortunes; how will they pay their standing army, to whom they owe their existence; a few interogatives of this sort must shew clearly, that a single ship of war will never be built while this great government is in operation.
It is generally said, that the present distresses of America are in consequence of the want of the states delegating sufficient powers to congress: This is right in part, for the powers of congress were certainly too limitted to promote the general good of the union; but little power as that body had, they have not managed it well; indeed if they had had any more and the number of members so small, we would have had a tyrannical aristocracy established long ago; and the country involved in more misery.
That body never attempted to build a navy; but, on the contrary, to complete our disgrace, sold the only ship of war we had, the Alliance frigate, for a mere song: They have found money however, to pay their well born ambassadors at the different European courts, and squandered away money on guilded swords, presents to Baron — –, &c. &c. &c. and they have even had credit to negociate loans lately;’ but not a farthing could be spared to employ our poor mechanics to build a few frigates, by which a thousand honest families might have been saved from starving, and prevented from emigrating from the country, and our commerce and national respectability preserved.
This is a specimen of the plan of our new system of government.
When the present peddling and limited congress have taken such arbitrary steps, so diametrically opposite to the interest of the public good, what may we not expect from the friends of the new constitution?
The poor working–man is not to be thought of, except his work will add to the character and dignity of the lordling nobility.
January 10, 1788
As the spirit of the new constitution admits of a standing army, and the opposition absolutely must be crushed by strength, every nerve of power must be strained, and every way and means of collecting money devised, for raising an efficient army for this purpose, in the first instance.
This is a system of procedure that the despots must pursue, if they have any hopes of success.
Either moderation or delay would effectually defeat them.
I question whether all the hard money, that the well born can procure at this juncture, will be sufficient to support their government and army for six months; without expending a single shilling on building a federal navy.
The greater part of that junto are extremely poor; and have their hopes of agrandizement on the new government; now if a part of the people refuse to pay taxes to that government, as they certainly will, how will they provide for the national debt; how will these poor gentlemen make their fortunes; how will they pay their standing army, to whom they owe their existence; a few interogatives of this sort must shew clearly, that a single ship of war will never be built while this great government is in operation.
It is generally said, that the present distresses of America are in consequence of the want of the states delegating sufficient powers to congress: This is right in part, for the powers of congress were certainly too limitted to promote the general good of the union; but little power as that body had, they have not managed it well; indeed if they had had any more and the number of members so small, we would have had a tyrannical aristocracy established long ago; and the country involved in more misery.
That body never attempted to build a navy; but, on the contrary, to complete our disgrace, sold the only ship of war we had, the Alliance frigate, for a mere song: They have found money however, to pay their well born ambassadors at the different European courts, and squandered away money on guilded swords, presents to Baron — –, &c. &c. &c. and they have even had credit to negociate loans lately;’ but not a farthing could be spared to employ our poor mechanics to build a few frigates, by which a thousand honest families might have been saved from starving, and prevented from emigrating from the country, and our commerce and national respectability preserved.
This is a specimen of the plan of our new system of government.
When the present peddling and limited congress have taken such arbitrary steps, so diametrically opposite to the interest of the public good, what may we not expect from the friends of the new constitution?
The poor working–man is not to be thought of, except his work will add to the character and dignity of the lordling nobility.
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Brutus VIII
by Brutus
January 10, 1788
The next powers vested by this constitution in the general government, which we shall consider, are those, which authorise them to “borrow money on the credit of the United States, and to raise and support armies.”
I take these two together and connect them with the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, because their extent, and the danger that will arise from the exercise of these powers, cannot be fully understood, unless they are viewed in relation to each other.
The power to borrow money is general and unlimited, and the clause so often before referred to, authorises the passing any laws proper and necessary to carry this into execution.
Under this authority, the Congress may mortgage any or all the revenues of the union, as a fund to loan money upon, and it is probably, in this way, they may borrow of foreign nations, a principal sum, the interest of which will be equal to the annual revenues of the country.
By this means, they may create a national debt, so large, as to exceed the ability of the country ever to sink.
I can scarcely contemplate a greater calamity that could befal this country, than to be loaded with a debt exceeding their ability ever to discharge.
If this be a just remark, it is unwise and improvident to vest in the general government a power to borrow at discretion, without any limitation or restriction.
It may possibly happen that the safety and welfare of the country may require, that money be borrowed, and it is proper when such a necessity arises that the power should be exercised by the general government.
But it certainly ought never to be exercised, but on the most urgent occasions, and then we should not borrow of foreigners if we could possibly avoid it.
The constitution should therefore have so restricted, the exercise of this power as to have rendered it very difficult for the government to practise it.
The present confederation requires the assent of nine states to exercise this, and a number of the other important powers of the confederacy — and it would certainly have been a wise provision in this constitution, to have made it necessary that two thirds of the members should assent to borrowing money — when the necessity was indispensable, this assent would always be given, and in no other cause ought it to be.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Brutus
January 10, 1788
The next powers vested by this constitution in the general government, which we shall consider, are those, which authorise them to “borrow money on the credit of the United States, and to raise and support armies.”
I take these two together and connect them with the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, because their extent, and the danger that will arise from the exercise of these powers, cannot be fully understood, unless they are viewed in relation to each other.
The power to borrow money is general and unlimited, and the clause so often before referred to, authorises the passing any laws proper and necessary to carry this into execution.
Under this authority, the Congress may mortgage any or all the revenues of the union, as a fund to loan money upon, and it is probably, in this way, they may borrow of foreign nations, a principal sum, the interest of which will be equal to the annual revenues of the country.
By this means, they may create a national debt, so large, as to exceed the ability of the country ever to sink.
I can scarcely contemplate a greater calamity that could befal this country, than to be loaded with a debt exceeding their ability ever to discharge.
If this be a just remark, it is unwise and improvident to vest in the general government a power to borrow at discretion, without any limitation or restriction.
It may possibly happen that the safety and welfare of the country may require, that money be borrowed, and it is proper when such a necessity arises that the power should be exercised by the general government.
But it certainly ought never to be exercised, but on the most urgent occasions, and then we should not borrow of foreigners if we could possibly avoid it.
The constitution should therefore have so restricted, the exercise of this power as to have rendered it very difficult for the government to practise it.
The present confederation requires the assent of nine states to exercise this, and a number of the other important powers of the confederacy — and it would certainly have been a wise provision in this constitution, to have made it necessary that two thirds of the members should assent to borrowing money — when the necessity was indispensable, this assent would always be given, and in no other cause ought it to be.
TO BE CONTINUED ...