A Federal Republican: A Review of the Constitution, continued ...
November 28, 1787
At such a time a system of government conceived in perfect wisdom, and adopted with deliberation, was not expected; and as soon as those common principles which supplied its defects, ceased to operate, the inconveniences which arose from them, were very sensibly felt.
Since that time the seeds of civil dissention have been gradually ripening, and political confusion hath pervaded the States.
Commerce hath been declining, our credit suffering, and our respectability, as a nation, hath almost vanished.
In such circumstances it was thought proper to collect the patriotic wisdom of the States for the purpose of amending the articles of confederation, which were found to be inadequate to the security of national prosperity and happiness; and of making such additions to supreme power, as our situation testified, were wanted.
Necessity, therefore, gave birth to the Convention, and the glaring defects of the late system of confederation, were the objects of its amendment.
But was it a total subversion of the confederation, that was intended by Congress or expected by the people?
Any one tolerably acquainted with human nature, can easily discern, that people involved in difficulty, would embrace any change, even if it were evidently and designedly for the worse.
But this circumstance ought not to preclude examination.
Did we experience any disadvantage from every part of the present confederation?
And why alter that which experience itself hath taught us to be good?
Was it not expected that some necessary additions to the powers of Congress, together with a few alterations of a smaller nature would constitute the whole of their business?
To frame a Constitution entirely new therefore was out of their province.
This is not offered as an argument against the Constitution itself, but it would certainly have been wisdom to have reserved that which was known to be good, and to have amended that only which was found defective from experience.
But notwithstanding that, if the proposed constitution can be made [to] appear to be excellent in itself, and properly adapted to secure inviolably the rights and privileges of the people; it is the part of every honest man to wish its establishment.
But that upon examination it will be found to be otherwise, I am fully persuaded.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
A Federal Republican: A Review of the Constitution, continued ...
November 28, 1787
We shall proceed to offer some sentiments on the Constitution proposed for the acceptance of the United States.
In doing this, we shall endeavour to state most of the objections which have been made, and collect their force into one point of view.
It may be proper to take some notice of an opinion that has been offered to the public.
It is said by some, that after having delegated the best and wisest men in our country for the purpose of framing a Constitution for the United States, it would be only presumption to offer any objections to it.
This doctrine holds up to view an excess of humility.
Any errors which we may imagine to exist in the Constitution, we are to resolve into our own incapacity to fathom them.
It is true that we ought to rely much upon the wisdom of those patriots who composed the late Convention; but surely the people for whom they acted have an undoubted right to offer such objections as they may suppose to exist, and that for the purpose of having them accurately solved by more enlightened understandings.
It is the part of the doubtful to enquire, and of the wise to answer and instruct.
It is from this principle, and this only, that I now offer my thoughts on the subject.
Besides the nature and importance of the thing shew the propriety of impartial discussion.
If it be true also, that no public deliberative assembly, however wise, is perfectly uninfluenced by secular interest; but that all are in some degree subject to those temporary relapses from prudence, which passion occasions, we may very naturally suppose that some parts of this Constitution are tinctured with correspondent partiality and weakness.
Nature is seldom over-awed by wisdom, and she often times draws her own picture in opposition to the constraint of education.
We may without derogating from the characters of the members of Convention, expect to find defects in the Constitution which they have framed; and if the scrutiny of the public eye, viewing it in an infinite variety of lights can discern them, the motives must be dishonorable that prevent the communication of them.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
November 28, 1787
We shall proceed to offer some sentiments on the Constitution proposed for the acceptance of the United States.
In doing this, we shall endeavour to state most of the objections which have been made, and collect their force into one point of view.
It may be proper to take some notice of an opinion that has been offered to the public.
It is said by some, that after having delegated the best and wisest men in our country for the purpose of framing a Constitution for the United States, it would be only presumption to offer any objections to it.
This doctrine holds up to view an excess of humility.
Any errors which we may imagine to exist in the Constitution, we are to resolve into our own incapacity to fathom them.
It is true that we ought to rely much upon the wisdom of those patriots who composed the late Convention; but surely the people for whom they acted have an undoubted right to offer such objections as they may suppose to exist, and that for the purpose of having them accurately solved by more enlightened understandings.
It is the part of the doubtful to enquire, and of the wise to answer and instruct.
It is from this principle, and this only, that I now offer my thoughts on the subject.
Besides the nature and importance of the thing shew the propriety of impartial discussion.
If it be true also, that no public deliberative assembly, however wise, is perfectly uninfluenced by secular interest; but that all are in some degree subject to those temporary relapses from prudence, which passion occasions, we may very naturally suppose that some parts of this Constitution are tinctured with correspondent partiality and weakness.
Nature is seldom over-awed by wisdom, and she often times draws her own picture in opposition to the constraint of education.
We may without derogating from the characters of the members of Convention, expect to find defects in the Constitution which they have framed; and if the scrutiny of the public eye, viewing it in an infinite variety of lights can discern them, the motives must be dishonorable that prevent the communication of them.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
A Federal Republican: A Review of the Constitution, continued ...
November 28, 1787
On this subject much hath been published.
Most of those pieces, however, which are said to be in favour of the Constitution, are only penegyrics, or those parts which are good, and to which no objections have been made.
Mr. Wilson’s speech does not come under this description.
It was composed in a masterly manner with strength and judgment.
In it he has endeavoured to obviate some objections that have been offered to the public.
It may be that the force of his arguments is not fully felt; but I think it will appear to any one whose understanding is not immediately refined, that the writer who stiles himself the Democratic Federalist is more than equal to him.
The Centinel has ably proposed many objections which have not been yet satisfactorily refuted.
Probably some of them exist beyond contradiction.
The author of a pamphlet, stiled, Remarks on the Address of the Sixteen Members of the Assembly of Pennsylvania, has indeed touched upon many objections, and then dismissed them.
His whole performance is coloured with the ridiculous.
He is no doubt a friend to Shaftsbury’s position, and feels that it is easier to laugh than to reason.
There is another pamphlet written by a citizen of America in favour of the Constitution.
The author of this deserves much for his style and plausibility of expression.
He has made many excellent and wise remarks upon the Constitution.
He has instituted a comparison between it and that of Rome and England.
He points out several defects in the system of policy amongst the old Romans and modern Britons, and shews with some judgment the superior excellence of the proposed Constitution in its correspondent parts.
But this is by no means proving that there are no errors in it.
Some objections he has indeed partially considered, but the chief of the piece, which is good in itself, consists in encomiums on those parts which are unexceptionable.
His mode of comparison is not just.
Wealth and extent of territory have an immediate relation to government.
The manners and customs of the people are closely connected with their government.
Experience testifies that the manners and habits of the people in their several graduations to refinement have ever controlled their policy.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
November 28, 1787
On this subject much hath been published.
Most of those pieces, however, which are said to be in favour of the Constitution, are only penegyrics, or those parts which are good, and to which no objections have been made.
Mr. Wilson’s speech does not come under this description.
It was composed in a masterly manner with strength and judgment.
In it he has endeavoured to obviate some objections that have been offered to the public.
It may be that the force of his arguments is not fully felt; but I think it will appear to any one whose understanding is not immediately refined, that the writer who stiles himself the Democratic Federalist is more than equal to him.
The Centinel has ably proposed many objections which have not been yet satisfactorily refuted.
Probably some of them exist beyond contradiction.
The author of a pamphlet, stiled, Remarks on the Address of the Sixteen Members of the Assembly of Pennsylvania, has indeed touched upon many objections, and then dismissed them.
His whole performance is coloured with the ridiculous.
He is no doubt a friend to Shaftsbury’s position, and feels that it is easier to laugh than to reason.
There is another pamphlet written by a citizen of America in favour of the Constitution.
The author of this deserves much for his style and plausibility of expression.
He has made many excellent and wise remarks upon the Constitution.
He has instituted a comparison between it and that of Rome and England.
He points out several defects in the system of policy amongst the old Romans and modern Britons, and shews with some judgment the superior excellence of the proposed Constitution in its correspondent parts.
But this is by no means proving that there are no errors in it.
Some objections he has indeed partially considered, but the chief of the piece, which is good in itself, consists in encomiums on those parts which are unexceptionable.
His mode of comparison is not just.
Wealth and extent of territory have an immediate relation to government.
The manners and customs of the people are closely connected with their government.
Experience testifies that the manners and habits of the people in their several graduations to refinement have ever controlled their policy.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
A Federal Republican: A Review of the Constitution, continued ...
November 28, 1787
The excellent Montesquieu himself observes, that “the manners and customs of the people have an intimate connection with their laws.”
In a comparison therefore, all these things ought to be considered.
The same system of policy that might have been excellent in the government of antiquity, would not probably do at the present day.
The question which should be agitated is not whether the proposed constitution be better or worse than those that have from time to time existed; but whether it be in every respect adapted to secure our liberty and happiness at the present stage of the world.
There is one circumstance in the sitting of the late Convention, which bears upon its face the colour of suspicion.
It adds one to the many examples of the truth of the common adage (which is founded in a propensity of human nature) that all who have power are fond of executing it.
They have power to control the manner of their convening, and they did it indeed in a very suspicious way.
They excluded themselves as it were from the view of the public, and an injunction of secrecy was imposed on the members.
This might have been done to blunt the natural jealousy of the people; but it was depriving them of a guard to their liberties, which they should ever possess.
Whatever were their intentions in shutting out their proceedings from the public ear, it carried in it a suspicious appearance.
But this is a matter small in itself, and for the honor and respect which we profess to entertain for the members of Convention, we are bound to believe that their motives in this particular were honorable, decent and wise.
In reviewing the proposed Constitution, the first thing that strikes us is the division of the legislative authority into two branches.
I think that after mature deliberation, this will be acknowledged to be prudent and wise.
Yet what some writers have observed upon it is not perfectly true.
They have deduced their advantages from improper positions.
In the division of the legislative power, bad bills will probably be passed, but more good ones will be opposed.
In forming a just nexus imperii, this ought always to take place.
It is better that many good bills should be destroyed than that a single bad one should be permitted to pass.
Were it not for this circumstance, there would be little advantage.
For although the passion of the one might sometimes be controlled by the coolness of the other; yet the passion of the latter might sometimes counteract the wisdom of the former.
Experience however shows it to be wise to divide the legislative power between two distinct bodies.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
November 28, 1787
The excellent Montesquieu himself observes, that “the manners and customs of the people have an intimate connection with their laws.”
In a comparison therefore, all these things ought to be considered.
The same system of policy that might have been excellent in the government of antiquity, would not probably do at the present day.
The question which should be agitated is not whether the proposed constitution be better or worse than those that have from time to time existed; but whether it be in every respect adapted to secure our liberty and happiness at the present stage of the world.
There is one circumstance in the sitting of the late Convention, which bears upon its face the colour of suspicion.
It adds one to the many examples of the truth of the common adage (which is founded in a propensity of human nature) that all who have power are fond of executing it.
They have power to control the manner of their convening, and they did it indeed in a very suspicious way.
They excluded themselves as it were from the view of the public, and an injunction of secrecy was imposed on the members.
This might have been done to blunt the natural jealousy of the people; but it was depriving them of a guard to their liberties, which they should ever possess.
Whatever were their intentions in shutting out their proceedings from the public ear, it carried in it a suspicious appearance.
But this is a matter small in itself, and for the honor and respect which we profess to entertain for the members of Convention, we are bound to believe that their motives in this particular were honorable, decent and wise.
In reviewing the proposed Constitution, the first thing that strikes us is the division of the legislative authority into two branches.
I think that after mature deliberation, this will be acknowledged to be prudent and wise.
Yet what some writers have observed upon it is not perfectly true.
They have deduced their advantages from improper positions.
In the division of the legislative power, bad bills will probably be passed, but more good ones will be opposed.
In forming a just nexus imperii, this ought always to take place.
It is better that many good bills should be destroyed than that a single bad one should be permitted to pass.
Were it not for this circumstance, there would be little advantage.
For although the passion of the one might sometimes be controlled by the coolness of the other; yet the passion of the latter might sometimes counteract the wisdom of the former.
Experience however shows it to be wise to divide the legislative power between two distinct bodies.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
A Federal Republican: A Review of the Constitution, continued ...
November 28, 1787
The next thing that presents itself to view, is the representation of the states.
In the second section of the first article it is said, that representations and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states, which may be included in this union according to their respective members, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other persons.
The actual enumeration shall be made within three years after the first meeting of the Congress of the United States; and within every subsequent term of ten years in such a manner as they shall by law direct.
The number of representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand; but each state shall have at least one representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the state of New-Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New-York six, New-Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North-Carolina five, South-Carolina five, and Georgia three.
Here it is evident the representation is too scanty.
There is a certain corrective balance to be preserved, not only between different houses, but also between the members that compose the same house.
This is often times of very great use.
It tends to keep alive a spirit of more accurate discussion.
But with such a paucity of members, this advantage can never be experienced.
Besides what thirty thousand men would be willing to have one man represent them.
It borders indeed upon injustice.
Among thirty thousand people there must of necessity be a variety of classes, each having distinct and separate concerns, to which some respect would most certainly be due.
Among such a number of men there will naturally be so many different ratios of interest to which their feelings are alive, and with which their happiness is intimately connected, that they should by all means be regarded.
It would indeed be frivolous to attend to the most minute circumstantial divisions of interest; but in such a number as thirty thousands there must be divisions of a larger and more important nature, which are entitled to respect.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
November 28, 1787
The next thing that presents itself to view, is the representation of the states.
In the second section of the first article it is said, that representations and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states, which may be included in this union according to their respective members, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other persons.
The actual enumeration shall be made within three years after the first meeting of the Congress of the United States; and within every subsequent term of ten years in such a manner as they shall by law direct.
The number of representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand; but each state shall have at least one representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the state of New-Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New-York six, New-Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North-Carolina five, South-Carolina five, and Georgia three.
Here it is evident the representation is too scanty.
There is a certain corrective balance to be preserved, not only between different houses, but also between the members that compose the same house.
This is often times of very great use.
It tends to keep alive a spirit of more accurate discussion.
But with such a paucity of members, this advantage can never be experienced.
Besides what thirty thousand men would be willing to have one man represent them.
It borders indeed upon injustice.
Among thirty thousand people there must of necessity be a variety of classes, each having distinct and separate concerns, to which some respect would most certainly be due.
Among such a number of men there will naturally be so many different ratios of interest to which their feelings are alive, and with which their happiness is intimately connected, that they should by all means be regarded.
It would indeed be frivolous to attend to the most minute circumstantial divisions of interest; but in such a number as thirty thousands there must be divisions of a larger and more important nature, which are entitled to respect.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
A Federal Republican: A Review of the Constitution, continued ...
November 28, 1787
But in the clause before-mentioned, there is a more material error; an error which essentially effects the rights of some states.
It is the inequality of representation in the lower house.
This particular has not yet been agitated.
In forming a confederation of independent republican states, it hath always been esteemed a fundamental law, that each state should have an equal representation.
In forming the present confederation of the United States, this point was warmly urged by several learned gentlemen, and carried in Congress.
Here is a change of which the citizens of the United States, who are less governed by principles of private interest, than those of true and impartial justice should beware.
The articles of the present confederation in this particular, are much more near akin to justice.
They are not so highly coloured with lawful oppression.
In the fifth article it is said, that, “in determining questions of the United-States in Congress assembled, each state shall have one vote.”
This is founded in reason, and its propriety is evinced by experience, from both of which it is very easy to prove, that representation among seperate independent states should be equal.
What is oftentimes observed upon this subject has very little meaning or force.
What, shall one state that is wealthier than another, that exceeds it in extent of territory, and has a far greater interest in national decisions, have no more weight in them?
Shall (for instance) the state of Delaware or Rhode-Island have an equal voice with that of Virginia or Massachusetts?
Here is an apparent, though a very superficial difficulty.
The superior weight of large states does not, and ought not to consist in a greater number of representatives.
There is an unavoidable influence arising from circumstances, which of itself forms the superiority.
It is evident that a larger and richer state must of necessity have its influence over a smaller in a due proportion.
But the establishing a superiority by law in the inequality of representatives among the states, is a kind of a constitutional reduction to slavery.
Its superior influence exists in nature, and therefore it is unnecessary, and indeed abusive to establish it by law.
The representation of separate independent states is exactly similar to the votes of individuals.
Rich citizens, who have large and valuable possessions are much more effected by public decisions than those of little or no fortune.
Yet is a rich citizen entitled to a greater number of votes than one who is poor?
No, because in the very nature of things he is known to influence many poor men.
Influence will generally be in proportion to abilities and wealth.
The same principle may be applied to states with equal propriety.
The larger and wealthier have a necessary and unavoidable influence over the smaller and less wealthy.
Examples to verify this assertion are numerous, and among the number there is one the more striking from its bearing so great a resemblance to the American states.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
November 28, 1787
But in the clause before-mentioned, there is a more material error; an error which essentially effects the rights of some states.
It is the inequality of representation in the lower house.
This particular has not yet been agitated.
In forming a confederation of independent republican states, it hath always been esteemed a fundamental law, that each state should have an equal representation.
In forming the present confederation of the United States, this point was warmly urged by several learned gentlemen, and carried in Congress.
Here is a change of which the citizens of the United States, who are less governed by principles of private interest, than those of true and impartial justice should beware.
The articles of the present confederation in this particular, are much more near akin to justice.
They are not so highly coloured with lawful oppression.
In the fifth article it is said, that, “in determining questions of the United-States in Congress assembled, each state shall have one vote.”
This is founded in reason, and its propriety is evinced by experience, from both of which it is very easy to prove, that representation among seperate independent states should be equal.
What is oftentimes observed upon this subject has very little meaning or force.
What, shall one state that is wealthier than another, that exceeds it in extent of territory, and has a far greater interest in national decisions, have no more weight in them?
Shall (for instance) the state of Delaware or Rhode-Island have an equal voice with that of Virginia or Massachusetts?
Here is an apparent, though a very superficial difficulty.
The superior weight of large states does not, and ought not to consist in a greater number of representatives.
There is an unavoidable influence arising from circumstances, which of itself forms the superiority.
It is evident that a larger and richer state must of necessity have its influence over a smaller in a due proportion.
But the establishing a superiority by law in the inequality of representatives among the states, is a kind of a constitutional reduction to slavery.
Its superior influence exists in nature, and therefore it is unnecessary, and indeed abusive to establish it by law.
The representation of separate independent states is exactly similar to the votes of individuals.
Rich citizens, who have large and valuable possessions are much more effected by public decisions than those of little or no fortune.
Yet is a rich citizen entitled to a greater number of votes than one who is poor?
No, because in the very nature of things he is known to influence many poor men.
Influence will generally be in proportion to abilities and wealth.
The same principle may be applied to states with equal propriety.
The larger and wealthier have a necessary and unavoidable influence over the smaller and less wealthy.
Examples to verify this assertion are numerous, and among the number there is one the more striking from its bearing so great a resemblance to the American states.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
A Federal Republican: A Review of the Constitution, continued ...
November 28, 1787
The United Netherlands, or States of Holland, form a glaring example.
Every state in the union has an equal voice, and yet is it not evident that Holland is as superior in influence as she is in wealth and extent?
This arises from the nature of the thing.
Although an equal voice is decreed by the constitution to each state, yet that of Holland has swallowed up the wealth, the power, and even the name.
Many more instances might be adduced, but the general system of things teaches us the propriety of admitting each state to an equal representation.
It is said, however, that the small states will eagerly adopt the constitution proposed by the Convention.
This I am inclined to doubt, but taking it for granted we can easily account for it.
Their present situation is so bad, and their importance so inconsiderable, that of two evils they would willingly chuse that which is apparently the least.
But let them have time to discuss and consider the matter, and recollect the probable perpetuity of it, and they will not so hastily embrace it.
There are many reasons why small states would rather adopt this constitution, than run the risque of having none at all.
In the former case, their importance would at least be nominal, in the latter it would dwindle away to nothing.
It may be urged that the danger arising from the inequality of representation in the lower house, is sufficiently guarded against by the equality in the senate.
Be that as it may, the thing is essentially wrong in itself.
There is a mutual dependence between the two houses, and each has its proportion of influence.
No circumstance can alter the intrinsic injustice of the thing.
The more such inequality takes place, the more direct is the avenue to tyranny.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
November 28, 1787
The United Netherlands, or States of Holland, form a glaring example.
Every state in the union has an equal voice, and yet is it not evident that Holland is as superior in influence as she is in wealth and extent?
This arises from the nature of the thing.
Although an equal voice is decreed by the constitution to each state, yet that of Holland has swallowed up the wealth, the power, and even the name.
Many more instances might be adduced, but the general system of things teaches us the propriety of admitting each state to an equal representation.
It is said, however, that the small states will eagerly adopt the constitution proposed by the Convention.
This I am inclined to doubt, but taking it for granted we can easily account for it.
Their present situation is so bad, and their importance so inconsiderable, that of two evils they would willingly chuse that which is apparently the least.
But let them have time to discuss and consider the matter, and recollect the probable perpetuity of it, and they will not so hastily embrace it.
There are many reasons why small states would rather adopt this constitution, than run the risque of having none at all.
In the former case, their importance would at least be nominal, in the latter it would dwindle away to nothing.
It may be urged that the danger arising from the inequality of representation in the lower house, is sufficiently guarded against by the equality in the senate.
Be that as it may, the thing is essentially wrong in itself.
There is a mutual dependence between the two houses, and each has its proportion of influence.
No circumstance can alter the intrinsic injustice of the thing.
The more such inequality takes place, the more direct is the avenue to tyranny.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
A Federal Republican: A Review of the Constitution, continued ...
November 28, 1787
The other grand defect in the foregoing clause, we shall defer for the present, and treat it in the sequel.
In the third section of the first article it is said, that “the senate of the United States shall be composed of two senators from each state, chosen by the legislature thereof for six years.”
Then follows a mode of division amongst them into three classes, of which the first is to resign its place at the expiration of the second year, the second the fourth year and the third the sixth year.
This may in itself be an excellent thing, and well adapted to preserve a proper degree of experiental wisdom in the senate at all times.
That class which retains its seat for six years, will in many respects have a superiority.
This being the case, the manner of determining the classes should have been stated; otherwise the jealousy of the states may rouse the animosity of party division to such a pitch as to endanger the springs of government.
If a proper mode of dividing were pointed out, the division itself might be of great use.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
November 28, 1787
The other grand defect in the foregoing clause, we shall defer for the present, and treat it in the sequel.
In the third section of the first article it is said, that “the senate of the United States shall be composed of two senators from each state, chosen by the legislature thereof for six years.”
Then follows a mode of division amongst them into three classes, of which the first is to resign its place at the expiration of the second year, the second the fourth year and the third the sixth year.
This may in itself be an excellent thing, and well adapted to preserve a proper degree of experiental wisdom in the senate at all times.
That class which retains its seat for six years, will in many respects have a superiority.
This being the case, the manner of determining the classes should have been stated; otherwise the jealousy of the states may rouse the animosity of party division to such a pitch as to endanger the springs of government.
If a proper mode of dividing were pointed out, the division itself might be of great use.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
A Federal Republican: A Review of the Constitution, continued ...
November 28, 1787
The fourth section of the first article says, that “the times, places and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time make or alter such regulations except as to the place of chusing senators.”
Here the mode of expression seems to be designedly ambiguous.
It carries in it, however, a controlling power to be vested in Congress over the states in those matters that don’t at all concern the nation at large.
The power is limited - “except as to the place of chusing senators.”
This I suppose was excepted because the senators are to be chosen by the legislature of each state.
Indeed it would be an odd affair to have the legislatures of the several states collected together for the purpose of chusing senators in any place that Congress should appoint.
But why is not the same provision made in the case of representatives?
They are to be chosen by the people at large in each state but is it an easier matter to draw the body of the people in any state into one place than their legislative body only?
There may be some hidden propriety in this distinction, which it requires political vision very much refined to discern.
I could wish to see it clearly pointed out.
This refers, however, only to place — but what is meant by the manner of holding elections?
If we are to understand by it the mode of electing, to give Congress power to controul it is infringing upon one of those privileges upon which freedom itself is suspended.
The manner of electing is clearly pointed out by the excellent Montesquieu, and he considers it as a fundamental law in every republican state.
While the people of the several states, who are alone concerned in it, have the free exercise of their will, they will adhere to this law; but to oblige them to resign it to a power whom it very little interests, is almost to oblige them to sell their birth right.
A writer upon this subject, who signs himself an American Citizen considers this matter very strangely; he supposes it to be a guard against the possibility of obstinacy in any state — as in the case of Rhode-Island.
This then is designed for a political antidote, in case of refusal in any one state to elect at all.
But this is a very absurd supposition — for it is very evident that where there is no election, there can be neither time, place nor manner of holding it.
The clause in the constitution takes for granted some election, but his construction supposes none at all.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
November 28, 1787
The fourth section of the first article says, that “the times, places and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time make or alter such regulations except as to the place of chusing senators.”
Here the mode of expression seems to be designedly ambiguous.
It carries in it, however, a controlling power to be vested in Congress over the states in those matters that don’t at all concern the nation at large.
The power is limited - “except as to the place of chusing senators.”
This I suppose was excepted because the senators are to be chosen by the legislature of each state.
Indeed it would be an odd affair to have the legislatures of the several states collected together for the purpose of chusing senators in any place that Congress should appoint.
But why is not the same provision made in the case of representatives?
They are to be chosen by the people at large in each state but is it an easier matter to draw the body of the people in any state into one place than their legislative body only?
There may be some hidden propriety in this distinction, which it requires political vision very much refined to discern.
I could wish to see it clearly pointed out.
This refers, however, only to place — but what is meant by the manner of holding elections?
If we are to understand by it the mode of electing, to give Congress power to controul it is infringing upon one of those privileges upon which freedom itself is suspended.
The manner of electing is clearly pointed out by the excellent Montesquieu, and he considers it as a fundamental law in every republican state.
While the people of the several states, who are alone concerned in it, have the free exercise of their will, they will adhere to this law; but to oblige them to resign it to a power whom it very little interests, is almost to oblige them to sell their birth right.
A writer upon this subject, who signs himself an American Citizen considers this matter very strangely; he supposes it to be a guard against the possibility of obstinacy in any state — as in the case of Rhode-Island.
This then is designed for a political antidote, in case of refusal in any one state to elect at all.
But this is a very absurd supposition — for it is very evident that where there is no election, there can be neither time, place nor manner of holding it.
The clause in the constitution takes for granted some election, but his construction supposes none at all.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
A Federal Republican: A Review of the Constitution, continued ...
November 28, 1787
The eighth section of the first article appears upon consideration to be big with unnecessary danger.
It seems to reduce humanity to too great a test.
It bloats Congress with too much power, and leaves them without a guard to prevent the eruptions of human depravity.
The very first clause contains every species of power that they could possibly be vested with.
In it power is given them “to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay debts, and to provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”
This power may, if exerted in its extent, reduce the several states to poverty and nothing.
We would willingly pay a compliment to human nature by supposing the best, if experience did not rise up against us.
The wisdom of many nations hath induced them to enlarge voluntarily the powers of their rulers; but we have no instances of such self-denial in governors as hath led them to restrain their own power and abridge their own authority.
It was wisdom in this country to appoint a convention for the purpose of enlarging the powers of Congress; but it will be superior wisdom to give them no more power than is sufficient.
Our situation taught us the necessity of enlarging the powers of Congress for certain national purposes, where the deficiency was experienced.
Had these and these only been added, experience itself would have been an advocate for the measure.
But in the proposed constitution there is an extent of power in Congress, of which I fear neither theory nor practice will evince the propriety or advantage.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
November 28, 1787
The eighth section of the first article appears upon consideration to be big with unnecessary danger.
It seems to reduce humanity to too great a test.
It bloats Congress with too much power, and leaves them without a guard to prevent the eruptions of human depravity.
The very first clause contains every species of power that they could possibly be vested with.
In it power is given them “to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay debts, and to provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”
This power may, if exerted in its extent, reduce the several states to poverty and nothing.
We would willingly pay a compliment to human nature by supposing the best, if experience did not rise up against us.
The wisdom of many nations hath induced them to enlarge voluntarily the powers of their rulers; but we have no instances of such self-denial in governors as hath led them to restrain their own power and abridge their own authority.
It was wisdom in this country to appoint a convention for the purpose of enlarging the powers of Congress; but it will be superior wisdom to give them no more power than is sufficient.
Our situation taught us the necessity of enlarging the powers of Congress for certain national purposes, where the deficiency was experienced.
Had these and these only been added, experience itself would have been an advocate for the measure.
But in the proposed constitution there is an extent of power in Congress, of which I fear neither theory nor practice will evince the propriety or advantage.
TO BE CONTINUED ...