Federal Farmer 7
by Richard Henry Lee
December 31, 1787
Dear sir,
In viewing the various governments instituted by mankind, we see their whole force reducible to two principles — the important springs which alone move the machines, and give them their intended influence and controul, are force and persuasion: by the former men are compelled, by the latter they are drawn.
We denominate a government despotic or free, as the one or other principle prevails in it.
Perhaps it is not possible for a government to be so despotic, as not to operate persuasively on some of its subjects; nor is it, in the nature of things, I conceive, for a government to be so free, or so supported by voluntary consent, as never to want force to compel obedience to the laws.
In despotic governments one man, or a few men, independant of the people, generally make the laws, command obedience, and inforce it by the sword: one-fourth part of the people are armed, and obliged to endure the fatigues of soldiers, to oppress the others and keep them subject to the laws.
In free governments the people, or their representatives, make the laws; their execution is principally the effect of voluntary consent and aid; the people respect the magistrate, follow their private pursuits, and enjoy the fruits of their labour with very small deductions for the public use.
The body of the people must evidently prefer the latter species of government; and it can be only those few, who may be well paid for the part they take in enforcing despotism, that can, for a moment, prefer the former.
Our true object is to give full efficacy to one principle, to arm persuasion on every side, and to render force as little necessary as possible.
Persuasion is never dangerous not even in despotic governments; but military force, if often applied internally, can never fail to destroy the love and confidence, and break the spirits, of the people; and to render it totally impracticable and unnatural for him or them who govern, and yield to this force against the people, to hold their places by the peoples’ elections.
I repeat my observation, that the plan proposed will have a doubtful operation between the two principles; and whether it will preponderate towards persuasion or force is uncertain.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Federal Farmer 7, continued ...
by Richard Henry Lee
December 31, 1787
Government must exist.
If the persuasive principle be feeble, force is infallibly the next resort.
The moment the laws of congress shall be disregarded they must languish, and the whole system be convulsed — that moment we must have recourse to this next resort, and all freedom vanish.
It being impracticable for the people to assemble to make laws, they must elect legislators, and assign men to the different departments of the government.
In the representative branch we must expect chiefly to collect the confidence of the people, and in it to find almost entirely the force of persuasion.
In forming this branch, therefore, several important considerations must be attended to.
It must possess abilities to discern the situation of the people and of public affairs, a disposition to sympathize with the people, and a capacity and inclination to make laws congenial to their circumstances and condition: it must afford security against interested combinations, corruption and influence; it must possess the confidence, and have the voluntary support of the people.
I think these positions will not be controverted, nor the one I formerly advanced, that a fair and equal representation is that in which the interests, feelings, opinions and views of the people are collected, in such manner as they would be were the people all assembled.
Having made these general observations, I shall proceed to consider further my principal position, viz. that there is no substantial representation of the people provided for in a government, in which the most essential powers, even as to the internal police of the country, are proposed to be lodged; and to propose certain amendments as to the representative branch: 1st, That there ought to be an increase of the numbers of representatives: And, 2dly, That the elections of them ought to be better secured.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Richard Henry Lee
December 31, 1787
Government must exist.
If the persuasive principle be feeble, force is infallibly the next resort.
The moment the laws of congress shall be disregarded they must languish, and the whole system be convulsed — that moment we must have recourse to this next resort, and all freedom vanish.
It being impracticable for the people to assemble to make laws, they must elect legislators, and assign men to the different departments of the government.
In the representative branch we must expect chiefly to collect the confidence of the people, and in it to find almost entirely the force of persuasion.
In forming this branch, therefore, several important considerations must be attended to.
It must possess abilities to discern the situation of the people and of public affairs, a disposition to sympathize with the people, and a capacity and inclination to make laws congenial to their circumstances and condition: it must afford security against interested combinations, corruption and influence; it must possess the confidence, and have the voluntary support of the people.
I think these positions will not be controverted, nor the one I formerly advanced, that a fair and equal representation is that in which the interests, feelings, opinions and views of the people are collected, in such manner as they would be were the people all assembled.
Having made these general observations, I shall proceed to consider further my principal position, viz. that there is no substantial representation of the people provided for in a government, in which the most essential powers, even as to the internal police of the country, are proposed to be lodged; and to propose certain amendments as to the representative branch: 1st, That there ought to be an increase of the numbers of representatives: And, 2dly, That the elections of them ought to be better secured.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Federal Farmer 7, continued ...
by Richard Henry Lee
December 31, 1787
The representation is unsubstantial and ought to be increased.
In matters where there is much room for opinion, you will not expect me to establish my positions with mathematical certainty; you must only expect my observations to be candid, and such as are well founded in the mind of the writer.
I am in a field where doctors disagree; and as to genuine representation, though no feature in government can be more important, perhaps, no one has been less understood, and no one that has received so imperfect a consideration by political writers.
The ephori in Sparta, and the tribunes in Rome, were but the shadow; the representation in Great-Britain is unequal and insecure.
In America we have done more in establishing this important branch on its true principles, than, perhaps, all the world besides: yet even here, I conceive, that very great improvements in representation may be made.
In fixing this branch, the situation of the people must be surveyed, and the number of representatives and forms of election apportioned to that situation.
When we find a numerous people settled in a fertile and extensive country, possessing equality, and few or none of them oppressed with riches or wants, it ought to be the anxious care of the constitution and laws, to arrest them from national depravity, and to preserve them in their happy condition.
A virtuous people make just laws, and good laws tend to preserve unchanged a virtuous people.
A virtuous and happy people by laws uncongenial to their characters, may easily be gradually changed into servile and depraved creatures.
Where the people, or their representatives, make the laws, it is probable they will generally be fitted to the national character and circumstances, unless the representation be partial, and the imperfect substitute of the people.
However, the people may be electors, if the representation be so formed as to give one or more of the natural classes of men in the society an undue ascendency over the others, it is imperfect; the former will gradually become masters, and the latter slaves.
It is the first of all among the political balances, to preserve in its proper station each of these classes.
We talk of balances in the legislature, and among the departments of government; we ought to carry them to the body of the people.
Since I advanced the idea of balancing the several orders of men in a community, in forming a genuine representation, and seen that idea considered as chemerical, I have been sensibly struck with a sentence in the marquis Beccaria’s treatise: this sentence was quoted by congress in 1774, and is as follows: “In every society there is an effort continually tending to confer on one part the height of power and happiness, and to reduce the others to the extreme of weakness and misery; the intent of good laws is to oppose this effort, and to diffuse their influence universally and equally.”
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Richard Henry Lee
December 31, 1787
The representation is unsubstantial and ought to be increased.
In matters where there is much room for opinion, you will not expect me to establish my positions with mathematical certainty; you must only expect my observations to be candid, and such as are well founded in the mind of the writer.
I am in a field where doctors disagree; and as to genuine representation, though no feature in government can be more important, perhaps, no one has been less understood, and no one that has received so imperfect a consideration by political writers.
The ephori in Sparta, and the tribunes in Rome, were but the shadow; the representation in Great-Britain is unequal and insecure.
In America we have done more in establishing this important branch on its true principles, than, perhaps, all the world besides: yet even here, I conceive, that very great improvements in representation may be made.
In fixing this branch, the situation of the people must be surveyed, and the number of representatives and forms of election apportioned to that situation.
When we find a numerous people settled in a fertile and extensive country, possessing equality, and few or none of them oppressed with riches or wants, it ought to be the anxious care of the constitution and laws, to arrest them from national depravity, and to preserve them in their happy condition.
A virtuous people make just laws, and good laws tend to preserve unchanged a virtuous people.
A virtuous and happy people by laws uncongenial to their characters, may easily be gradually changed into servile and depraved creatures.
Where the people, or their representatives, make the laws, it is probable they will generally be fitted to the national character and circumstances, unless the representation be partial, and the imperfect substitute of the people.
However, the people may be electors, if the representation be so formed as to give one or more of the natural classes of men in the society an undue ascendency over the others, it is imperfect; the former will gradually become masters, and the latter slaves.
It is the first of all among the political balances, to preserve in its proper station each of these classes.
We talk of balances in the legislature, and among the departments of government; we ought to carry them to the body of the people.
Since I advanced the idea of balancing the several orders of men in a community, in forming a genuine representation, and seen that idea considered as chemerical, I have been sensibly struck with a sentence in the marquis Beccaria’s treatise: this sentence was quoted by congress in 1774, and is as follows: “In every society there is an effort continually tending to confer on one part the height of power and happiness, and to reduce the others to the extreme of weakness and misery; the intent of good laws is to oppose this effort, and to diffuse their influence universally and equally.”
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Federal Farmer 7, continued ...
by Richard Henry Lee
December 31, 1787
Add to this Montesquieu’s opinion, that “in a free state every man, who is supposed to be a free agent, ought to be concerned in his own government: therefore, the legislative should reside in the whole body of the people, or their representatives.”
It is extremely clear that these writers had in view the several orders of men in society, which we call aristocratical, democratical, merchantile, mechanic, &c. and perceived the efforts they are constantly, from interested and ambitious views, disposed to make to elevate themselves and oppress others.
Each order must have a share in the business of legislation actually and efficiently.
It is deceiving a people to tell them they are electors, and can chuse their legislators, if they cannot, in the nature of things, chuse men from among themselves, and genuinely like themselves.
I wish you to take another idea along with you; we are not only to balance these natural efforts, but we are also to guard against accidental combinations; combinations founded in the connections of offices and private interests, both evils which are increased in proportion as the number of men, among which the elected must be, are decreased.
To set this matter in a proper point of view, we must form some general ideas and descriptions of the different classes of men, as they may be divided by occupations and politically: the first class is the aristocratical.
There are three kinds of aristocracy spoken of in this country — the first is a constitutional one, which does not exist in the United States in our common acceptation of the word.
Montesquieu, it is true, observes, that where a part of the persons in a society, for want of property, age, or moral character, are excluded any share in the government, the others, who alone are the constitutional electors and elected, form this aristocracy; this according to him, exists in each of the United States, where a considerable number of persons, as all convicted of crimes, under age, or not possessed of certain property, are excluded any share in the government; the second is an aristocratic faction, a junto of unprincipled men, often distinguished for their wealth or abilities, who combine together and make their object their private interests and aggrandizement; the existence of this description is merely accidental, but particularly to be guarded against.
The third is the natural aristocracy; this term we use to designate a respectable order of men, the line between whom and the natural democracy is in some degree arbitrary; we may place men on one side of this line, which others may place on the other, and in all disputes between the few and the many, a considerable number are wavering and uncertain themselves on which side they are, or ought to be.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Richard Henry Lee
December 31, 1787
Add to this Montesquieu’s opinion, that “in a free state every man, who is supposed to be a free agent, ought to be concerned in his own government: therefore, the legislative should reside in the whole body of the people, or their representatives.”
It is extremely clear that these writers had in view the several orders of men in society, which we call aristocratical, democratical, merchantile, mechanic, &c. and perceived the efforts they are constantly, from interested and ambitious views, disposed to make to elevate themselves and oppress others.
Each order must have a share in the business of legislation actually and efficiently.
It is deceiving a people to tell them they are electors, and can chuse their legislators, if they cannot, in the nature of things, chuse men from among themselves, and genuinely like themselves.
I wish you to take another idea along with you; we are not only to balance these natural efforts, but we are also to guard against accidental combinations; combinations founded in the connections of offices and private interests, both evils which are increased in proportion as the number of men, among which the elected must be, are decreased.
To set this matter in a proper point of view, we must form some general ideas and descriptions of the different classes of men, as they may be divided by occupations and politically: the first class is the aristocratical.
There are three kinds of aristocracy spoken of in this country — the first is a constitutional one, which does not exist in the United States in our common acceptation of the word.
Montesquieu, it is true, observes, that where a part of the persons in a society, for want of property, age, or moral character, are excluded any share in the government, the others, who alone are the constitutional electors and elected, form this aristocracy; this according to him, exists in each of the United States, where a considerable number of persons, as all convicted of crimes, under age, or not possessed of certain property, are excluded any share in the government; the second is an aristocratic faction, a junto of unprincipled men, often distinguished for their wealth or abilities, who combine together and make their object their private interests and aggrandizement; the existence of this description is merely accidental, but particularly to be guarded against.
The third is the natural aristocracy; this term we use to designate a respectable order of men, the line between whom and the natural democracy is in some degree arbitrary; we may place men on one side of this line, which others may place on the other, and in all disputes between the few and the many, a considerable number are wavering and uncertain themselves on which side they are, or ought to be.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Federal Farmer 7, continued ...
by Richard Henry Lee
December 31, 1787
In my idea of our natural aristocracy in the United States, I include about four or five thousand men; and among these I reckon those who have been placed in the offices of governors, of members of Congress, and state senators generally, in the principal officers of Congress, of the army and militia, the superior judges, the most eminent professional men, &c. and men of large property — the other persons and orders in the community form the natural democracy; this includes in general the yeomanry, the subordinate officers, civil and military, the fishermen, mechanics and traders, many of the merchants and professional men.
It is easy to perceive that men of these two classes, the aristocratical, and democratical, with views equally honest, have sentiments widely different, especially respecting public and private expences, salaries, taxes, &c.
Men of the first class associate more extensively, have a high sense of honor, possess abilities, ambition, and general knowledge: men of the second class are not so much used to combining great objects; they possess less ambition, and a larger share of honesty: their dependence is principally on middling and small estates, industrious pursuits, and hard labour, while that of the former is principally on the emoluments of large estates, and of the chief offices of government.
Not only the efforts of these two great parties are to be balanced, but other interests and parties also, which do not always oppress each other merely for want of power, and for fear of the consequences; though they, in fact, mutually depend on each other; yet such are their general views, that the merchants alone would never fail to make laws favourable to themselves and oppressive to the farmers, &c. the farmers alone would act on like principles; the former would tax the land, the latter the trade.
The manufacturers are often disposed to contend for monopolies, buyers make every exertion to lower prices, and sellers to raise them; men who live by fees and salaries endeavour to raise them, and the part of the people who pay them, endeavour to lower them; the public creditors to augment the taxes, and the people at large to lessen them.
Thus, in every period of society, and in all the transactions of men, we see parties verifying the observation made by the Marquis; and those classes which have not their centinels in the government, in proportion to what they have to gain or lose, must infallibly be ruined.
Efforts among parties are not merely confined to property; they contend for rank and distinctions; all their passions in turn are enlisted in political controversies.
Men, elevated in society, are often disgusted with the changeableness of the democracy, and the latter are often agitated with the passions of jealousy and envy: the yeomanry possess a large share of property and strength, are nervous and firm in their opinions and habits — the mechanics of towns are ardent and changeable, honest and credulous, they are inconsiderable for numbers, weight and strength, not always sufficiently stable for the supporting free governments; the fishing interest partakes partly of the strength and stability of the landed, and partly of the changeableness of the mechanic interest.
As to merchants and traders, they are our agents in almost all money transactions; give activity to government, and possess a considerable share of influence in it.
It has been observed by an able writer, that frugal industrious merchants are generally advocates for liberty.
It is an observation, I believe, well founded, that the schools produce but few advocates for republican forms of government; gentlemen of the law, divinity, physic, &c. probably form about a fourth part of the people; yet their political influence, perhaps, is equal to that of all the other descriptions of men; if we may judge from the appointments to Congress, the legal characters will often, in a small representation, be the majority; but the more the representatives are encreased, the more of the farmers, merchants, &c. will be found to be brought into the government.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Richard Henry Lee
December 31, 1787
In my idea of our natural aristocracy in the United States, I include about four or five thousand men; and among these I reckon those who have been placed in the offices of governors, of members of Congress, and state senators generally, in the principal officers of Congress, of the army and militia, the superior judges, the most eminent professional men, &c. and men of large property — the other persons and orders in the community form the natural democracy; this includes in general the yeomanry, the subordinate officers, civil and military, the fishermen, mechanics and traders, many of the merchants and professional men.
It is easy to perceive that men of these two classes, the aristocratical, and democratical, with views equally honest, have sentiments widely different, especially respecting public and private expences, salaries, taxes, &c.
Men of the first class associate more extensively, have a high sense of honor, possess abilities, ambition, and general knowledge: men of the second class are not so much used to combining great objects; they possess less ambition, and a larger share of honesty: their dependence is principally on middling and small estates, industrious pursuits, and hard labour, while that of the former is principally on the emoluments of large estates, and of the chief offices of government.
Not only the efforts of these two great parties are to be balanced, but other interests and parties also, which do not always oppress each other merely for want of power, and for fear of the consequences; though they, in fact, mutually depend on each other; yet such are their general views, that the merchants alone would never fail to make laws favourable to themselves and oppressive to the farmers, &c. the farmers alone would act on like principles; the former would tax the land, the latter the trade.
The manufacturers are often disposed to contend for monopolies, buyers make every exertion to lower prices, and sellers to raise them; men who live by fees and salaries endeavour to raise them, and the part of the people who pay them, endeavour to lower them; the public creditors to augment the taxes, and the people at large to lessen them.
Thus, in every period of society, and in all the transactions of men, we see parties verifying the observation made by the Marquis; and those classes which have not their centinels in the government, in proportion to what they have to gain or lose, must infallibly be ruined.
Efforts among parties are not merely confined to property; they contend for rank and distinctions; all their passions in turn are enlisted in political controversies.
Men, elevated in society, are often disgusted with the changeableness of the democracy, and the latter are often agitated with the passions of jealousy and envy: the yeomanry possess a large share of property and strength, are nervous and firm in their opinions and habits — the mechanics of towns are ardent and changeable, honest and credulous, they are inconsiderable for numbers, weight and strength, not always sufficiently stable for the supporting free governments; the fishing interest partakes partly of the strength and stability of the landed, and partly of the changeableness of the mechanic interest.
As to merchants and traders, they are our agents in almost all money transactions; give activity to government, and possess a considerable share of influence in it.
It has been observed by an able writer, that frugal industrious merchants are generally advocates for liberty.
It is an observation, I believe, well founded, that the schools produce but few advocates for republican forms of government; gentlemen of the law, divinity, physic, &c. probably form about a fourth part of the people; yet their political influence, perhaps, is equal to that of all the other descriptions of men; if we may judge from the appointments to Congress, the legal characters will often, in a small representation, be the majority; but the more the representatives are encreased, the more of the farmers, merchants, &c. will be found to be brought into the government.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Federal Farmer 7, continued ...
by Richard Henry Lee
December 31, 1787
These general observations will enable you to discern what I intend by different classes, and the general scope of my ideas, when I contend for uniting and balancing their interests, feelings, opinions, and views in the legislature; we may not only so unite and balance these as to prevent a change in the government by the gradual exaltation of one part to the depression of others, but we may derive many other advantages from the combination and full representation; a small representation can never be well informed as to the circumstances of the people, the members of it must be too far removed from the people, in general, to sympathize with them, and too few to communicate with them: a representation must be extremely imperfect where the representatives are not circumstanced to make the proper communications to their constituents, and where the constituents in turn cannot, with tolerable convenience, make known their wants, circumstances, and opinions, to their representatives; where there is but one representative to 30,000, or 40,000 inhabitants, it appears to me, he can only mix, and be acquainted with a few respectable characters among his constituents, even double the federal representation, and then there must be a very great distance between the representatives and the people in general represented.
On the proposed plan, the state of Delaware, the city of Philadelphia, the state of Rhode Island, the province of Maine, the county of Suffolk in Massachusetts, will have one representative each; there can be but little personal knowledge, or but few communications, between him and the people at large of either of those districts.
It has been observed, that mixing only with the respectable men, he will get the best information and ideas from them; he will also receive impressions favourable to their purposes particularly.
Many plausible shifts have been made to divert the mind from dwelling on this defective representation, these I shall consider in another place.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Richard Henry Lee
December 31, 1787
These general observations will enable you to discern what I intend by different classes, and the general scope of my ideas, when I contend for uniting and balancing their interests, feelings, opinions, and views in the legislature; we may not only so unite and balance these as to prevent a change in the government by the gradual exaltation of one part to the depression of others, but we may derive many other advantages from the combination and full representation; a small representation can never be well informed as to the circumstances of the people, the members of it must be too far removed from the people, in general, to sympathize with them, and too few to communicate with them: a representation must be extremely imperfect where the representatives are not circumstanced to make the proper communications to their constituents, and where the constituents in turn cannot, with tolerable convenience, make known their wants, circumstances, and opinions, to their representatives; where there is but one representative to 30,000, or 40,000 inhabitants, it appears to me, he can only mix, and be acquainted with a few respectable characters among his constituents, even double the federal representation, and then there must be a very great distance between the representatives and the people in general represented.
On the proposed plan, the state of Delaware, the city of Philadelphia, the state of Rhode Island, the province of Maine, the county of Suffolk in Massachusetts, will have one representative each; there can be but little personal knowledge, or but few communications, between him and the people at large of either of those districts.
It has been observed, that mixing only with the respectable men, he will get the best information and ideas from them; he will also receive impressions favourable to their purposes particularly.
Many plausible shifts have been made to divert the mind from dwelling on this defective representation, these I shall consider in another place.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
Federal Farmer 7, concluded ...
by Richard Henry Lee
December 31, 1787
Could we get over all our difficulties respecting a balance of interests and party efforts, to raise some and oppress others, the want of sympathy, information and intercourse between the representatives and the people, an insuperable difficulty will still remain, I mean the constant liability of a small number of representatives to private combinations; the tyranny of the one, or the licentiousness of the multitude, are, in my mind, but small evils, compared with the factions of the few.
It is a consideration well worth pursuing, how far this house of representatives will be liable to be formed into private juntos, how far influenced by expectations of appointments and offices, how far liable to be managed by the president and senate, and how far the people will have confidence in them.
To obviate difficulties on this head, as well as objections to the representative branch, generally, several observations have been made — these I will now examine, and if they shall appear to be unfounded, the objections must stand unanswered.
That the people are the electors, must elect good men, and attend to the administration.
It is said that the members of Congress, at stated periods, must return home, and that they must be subject to the laws they may make, and to a share of the burdens they may impose.
That the people possess the strong arm to overawe their rulers, and the best checks in their national character against the abuses of power, that the supreme power will remain in them.
That the state governments will form a part of, and a balance in the system.
That Congress will have only a few national objects to attend to, and the state governments many and local ones.
That the new Congress will be more numerous than the present, and that any numerous body is unwieldy and mobbish.
That the states only are represented in the present Congress, and that the people will require a representation in the new one; that in fifty or an hundred years the representation will be numerous.
That congress will have no temptation to do wrong; and that no system to enslave the people is practicable.
That as long as the people are free they will preserve free governments; and that when they shall become tired of freedom, arbitrary government must take place.
These observations I shall examine in the course of my letters; and, I think, not only shew that they are not well founded, but point out the fallacy of some of them; and shew, that others do not very well comport with the dignified and manly sentiments of a free and enlightened people.
by Richard Henry Lee
December 31, 1787
Could we get over all our difficulties respecting a balance of interests and party efforts, to raise some and oppress others, the want of sympathy, information and intercourse between the representatives and the people, an insuperable difficulty will still remain, I mean the constant liability of a small number of representatives to private combinations; the tyranny of the one, or the licentiousness of the multitude, are, in my mind, but small evils, compared with the factions of the few.
It is a consideration well worth pursuing, how far this house of representatives will be liable to be formed into private juntos, how far influenced by expectations of appointments and offices, how far liable to be managed by the president and senate, and how far the people will have confidence in them.
To obviate difficulties on this head, as well as objections to the representative branch, generally, several observations have been made — these I will now examine, and if they shall appear to be unfounded, the objections must stand unanswered.
That the people are the electors, must elect good men, and attend to the administration.
It is said that the members of Congress, at stated periods, must return home, and that they must be subject to the laws they may make, and to a share of the burdens they may impose.
That the people possess the strong arm to overawe their rulers, and the best checks in their national character against the abuses of power, that the supreme power will remain in them.
That the state governments will form a part of, and a balance in the system.
That Congress will have only a few national objects to attend to, and the state governments many and local ones.
That the new Congress will be more numerous than the present, and that any numerous body is unwieldy and mobbish.
That the states only are represented in the present Congress, and that the people will require a representation in the new one; that in fifty or an hundred years the representation will be numerous.
That congress will have no temptation to do wrong; and that no system to enslave the people is practicable.
That as long as the people are free they will preserve free governments; and that when they shall become tired of freedom, arbitrary government must take place.
These observations I shall examine in the course of my letters; and, I think, not only shew that they are not well founded, but point out the fallacy of some of them; and shew, that others do not very well comport with the dignified and manly sentiments of a free and enlightened people.
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
America Essay
by Noah Webster
December 31, 1787
To the DISSENTING MEMBERS of the late Convention of Pennsylvania
Gentlemen, Your long and elaborate publication, assigning the reasons for your refusing to subscribe the ratification of the NEW FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, has made its appearance in the public papers, and, I flatter myself, will be read throughout the United States.
It will feed the flame of opposition among the weak, the wicked, the designing, and the factious; but it will make many new converts to the proposed Government, and furnish the old friends of it with new weapons of defence.
The very attempt to excite uneasiness and disturbance in a State, about a measure legally and constitutionally adopted, for a long and ample discussion in a Convention of the people’s Delegates, marks a disposition, beyond all conception, obstinate, base, and politically wicked.
But obstinacy is the leading trait in your public characters, and, as it serves to give consistency to your actions, even in error, it cannot fail to procure you that share of respect which is paid to the firmness of Satan and his fellow apostates, who, after their expulsion from Heaven, had too much pride to repent and ask for a re-admission.
My address to you will not be so lengthy as your publication; your arguments are few, although’ your harangue is long and insidious.
You begin with telling the world, that no defect was discovered in the present confederation, till after the war.
Why did you not publish the truth?
You know, Gentlemen, that during six years of the war, we had no Confederation at all.
You know that the war commenced in April, 1775, and that we had no Confederation till March, 1781.
You know (for some of you are men of abilities and reading) or ought to know, a principle of fear, in time of war, operates more powerfully in binding together the States which have a common interest, than all the parchment compacts on earth.
Could we, then, discover the defects of our present Confederation, with two years’ experience only, and an enemy in our country?
You know we could not.
I will not undertake to detect the falsehood of every assertion, or the fallacy of all your reasoning on each article.
In the most of them the public will anticipate any thing I could say, and confute your arguments as fast as they read them.
But I must tell you, Gentlemen, that your reasoning against the New Constitution resembles that of Mr. Hume on miracles.
You begin with some gratis dicta, which are denied; you assume premises which are totally false, and then reason on them with great address.
Your whole reasoning, and that of all the opposers of the Federal Government, is built on this false principle, that the Federal Legislature will be a body distinct from and independent of the people.
Unless your opposition is grounded on that principle, it stands on nothing; and on any other supposition, your arguments are but declamatory nonsense.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Noah Webster
December 31, 1787
To the DISSENTING MEMBERS of the late Convention of Pennsylvania
Gentlemen, Your long and elaborate publication, assigning the reasons for your refusing to subscribe the ratification of the NEW FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, has made its appearance in the public papers, and, I flatter myself, will be read throughout the United States.
It will feed the flame of opposition among the weak, the wicked, the designing, and the factious; but it will make many new converts to the proposed Government, and furnish the old friends of it with new weapons of defence.
The very attempt to excite uneasiness and disturbance in a State, about a measure legally and constitutionally adopted, for a long and ample discussion in a Convention of the people’s Delegates, marks a disposition, beyond all conception, obstinate, base, and politically wicked.
But obstinacy is the leading trait in your public characters, and, as it serves to give consistency to your actions, even in error, it cannot fail to procure you that share of respect which is paid to the firmness of Satan and his fellow apostates, who, after their expulsion from Heaven, had too much pride to repent and ask for a re-admission.
My address to you will not be so lengthy as your publication; your arguments are few, although’ your harangue is long and insidious.
You begin with telling the world, that no defect was discovered in the present confederation, till after the war.
Why did you not publish the truth?
You know, Gentlemen, that during six years of the war, we had no Confederation at all.
You know that the war commenced in April, 1775, and that we had no Confederation till March, 1781.
You know (for some of you are men of abilities and reading) or ought to know, a principle of fear, in time of war, operates more powerfully in binding together the States which have a common interest, than all the parchment compacts on earth.
Could we, then, discover the defects of our present Confederation, with two years’ experience only, and an enemy in our country?
You know we could not.
I will not undertake to detect the falsehood of every assertion, or the fallacy of all your reasoning on each article.
In the most of them the public will anticipate any thing I could say, and confute your arguments as fast as they read them.
But I must tell you, Gentlemen, that your reasoning against the New Constitution resembles that of Mr. Hume on miracles.
You begin with some gratis dicta, which are denied; you assume premises which are totally false, and then reason on them with great address.
Your whole reasoning, and that of all the opposers of the Federal Government, is built on this false principle, that the Federal Legislature will be a body distinct from and independent of the people.
Unless your opposition is grounded on that principle, it stands on nothing; and on any other supposition, your arguments are but declamatory nonsense.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
America Essay, continued ...
by Noah Webster
December 31, 1787
But the principle is false.
The Congress, under the proposed Constitution, will have the same interest as the people — they are a part of the people — their interest is inseparable from that of the people; and this union of interest will eternally remain, while the right of election shall continue in the people.
Over this right Congress will have no control: the time and manner of exercising that right are very wisely vested in Congress, otherwise a delinquent State might embarrass the measures of the Union.
The safety of the public requires that the Federal body should prevent any particular delinquency; but the right of election is above their control: it must remain in the people, and be exercised once in two, four or six years.
A body thus organized, with thirteen Legislatures watching their measures, and several millions of jealous eyes inspecting their conduct, would not be apt to betray their constituents.
Yet this is not the best ground of safety.
The first and almost only principle that governs men, is interest.
Love of our country is a powerful auxiliary motive to patriotic actions; but rarely or never operates against interest.
The only requisite to secure liberty, is to connect the interest of the Governors with that of the governed.
Blend these interests — make them inseparable — and both are safe from voluntary invasion.
How shall this union be formed?
This question is answered.
The union is formed by the equal principles on which the people of these States hold their property and their rights.
But how shall this union of interests be perpetuated?
The answer is easy — bar all perpetuities of estates — prevent any exclusive rights — preserve all preferment dependent on the choice of the people — suffer no power to exist independent of the people or their Representatives.
While there exists no power in a State, which is independent on the will of the electors, the rights of the people are secure.
The only barrier against tyranny, that is necessary in any State, is the election of Legislators by the yeomanry of that State.
Preserve that, and every privilege is safe.
The Legislators thus chosen to represent the people, should have all the power that the people would have, were they assembled in one body to deliberate upon public measures.
The distinction between the powers of the people and of their Representatives in the Legislature, is as absurd in theory, as it proved pernicious in practice.
A distinction, which has already countenanced and supported one rebellion in America; has prevented many good measures; had produced many bad; has created animosities in many States, and embarrassments in all.
It has taught the people a lesson, which, if they continue to practice, will bring laws into contempt, and frequently mark our country with blood.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Noah Webster
December 31, 1787
But the principle is false.
The Congress, under the proposed Constitution, will have the same interest as the people — they are a part of the people — their interest is inseparable from that of the people; and this union of interest will eternally remain, while the right of election shall continue in the people.
Over this right Congress will have no control: the time and manner of exercising that right are very wisely vested in Congress, otherwise a delinquent State might embarrass the measures of the Union.
The safety of the public requires that the Federal body should prevent any particular delinquency; but the right of election is above their control: it must remain in the people, and be exercised once in two, four or six years.
A body thus organized, with thirteen Legislatures watching their measures, and several millions of jealous eyes inspecting their conduct, would not be apt to betray their constituents.
Yet this is not the best ground of safety.
The first and almost only principle that governs men, is interest.
Love of our country is a powerful auxiliary motive to patriotic actions; but rarely or never operates against interest.
The only requisite to secure liberty, is to connect the interest of the Governors with that of the governed.
Blend these interests — make them inseparable — and both are safe from voluntary invasion.
How shall this union be formed?
This question is answered.
The union is formed by the equal principles on which the people of these States hold their property and their rights.
But how shall this union of interests be perpetuated?
The answer is easy — bar all perpetuities of estates — prevent any exclusive rights — preserve all preferment dependent on the choice of the people — suffer no power to exist independent of the people or their Representatives.
While there exists no power in a State, which is independent on the will of the electors, the rights of the people are secure.
The only barrier against tyranny, that is necessary in any State, is the election of Legislators by the yeomanry of that State.
Preserve that, and every privilege is safe.
The Legislators thus chosen to represent the people, should have all the power that the people would have, were they assembled in one body to deliberate upon public measures.
The distinction between the powers of the people and of their Representatives in the Legislature, is as absurd in theory, as it proved pernicious in practice.
A distinction, which has already countenanced and supported one rebellion in America; has prevented many good measures; had produced many bad; has created animosities in many States, and embarrassments in all.
It has taught the people a lesson, which, if they continue to practice, will bring laws into contempt, and frequently mark our country with blood.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA
America Essay, continued ...
by Noah Webster
December 31, 1787
You object, Gentlemen, to the powers bested in Congress.
Permit me, to ask you, where will you limit their powers?
What bounds will you prescribe?
You will reply, we will reserve certain rights which we deem invaluable, and restrain our rulers from abridging them.
But, Gentlemen, let me ask you, how will you define these rights?
Would you say, the liberty of the Press shall not be restrained?
Well, what is this liberty of the Press?
Is it an unlimited licence to publish any thing and every thing with impunity?
If so, the Author, and Printer of any treatise, however obscene and blasphemous, will be screened from punishment.
You know, Gentlemen, that there are books extant, so shockingly and infamously obscene and so daringly blasphemous, that no society on earth, would be vindicable in suffering the publishers to pass unpunished.
You certainly know that such cases have happened, and may happen again — nay, you know that they are probable.
Would not that indefinite expression, the liberty of the Press, extend to the justification of every possible publication?
Yes, Gentlemen, you know, that under such a general licence, a man who should publish a treatise to prove his maker a knave, must be screened from legal punishment.
I shudder at the thought!
But the truth must not be concealed.
The Constitutions of several States guarantee that very licence.
But if you attempt to define the liberty of the Press, and ascertain what cases shall fall within that privilege, during the course of centuries, where will you begin?
Or rather, where will you end?
Here, Gentlemen, you will be puzzled.
Some publications certainly may be a breach of civil law: You will not have the effrontery to deny a truth so obvious and intuitively evident.
Admit that principle; and unless you can define precisely the cases, which are, and are not a breach of law, you have no right to say, the liberty of the Press shall not be restrained; for such a license would warrant any breach of law.
Rather than hazard such an abuse of privilege, is it not better to leave the right altogether with your rulers and your posterity?
No attempts have ever been made by a Legislative body in America, to abridge that privilege; and in this free enlightened country, no attempts could succeed, unless the public should be convinced that an abuse of it would warrant the restriction.
Should this ever be the case, you have no right to say, that a future Legislature, or that posterity shall not abridge the privilege, or punish its abuses.
The very attempt to establish a permanent, unalterable Constitution, is an act of consummate arrogance.
It is a presumption that we have all possible wisdom — that we can foresee all possible circumstances — and judge for future generations, better than they can for themselves.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
by Noah Webster
December 31, 1787
You object, Gentlemen, to the powers bested in Congress.
Permit me, to ask you, where will you limit their powers?
What bounds will you prescribe?
You will reply, we will reserve certain rights which we deem invaluable, and restrain our rulers from abridging them.
But, Gentlemen, let me ask you, how will you define these rights?
Would you say, the liberty of the Press shall not be restrained?
Well, what is this liberty of the Press?
Is it an unlimited licence to publish any thing and every thing with impunity?
If so, the Author, and Printer of any treatise, however obscene and blasphemous, will be screened from punishment.
You know, Gentlemen, that there are books extant, so shockingly and infamously obscene and so daringly blasphemous, that no society on earth, would be vindicable in suffering the publishers to pass unpunished.
You certainly know that such cases have happened, and may happen again — nay, you know that they are probable.
Would not that indefinite expression, the liberty of the Press, extend to the justification of every possible publication?
Yes, Gentlemen, you know, that under such a general licence, a man who should publish a treatise to prove his maker a knave, must be screened from legal punishment.
I shudder at the thought!
But the truth must not be concealed.
The Constitutions of several States guarantee that very licence.
But if you attempt to define the liberty of the Press, and ascertain what cases shall fall within that privilege, during the course of centuries, where will you begin?
Or rather, where will you end?
Here, Gentlemen, you will be puzzled.
Some publications certainly may be a breach of civil law: You will not have the effrontery to deny a truth so obvious and intuitively evident.
Admit that principle; and unless you can define precisely the cases, which are, and are not a breach of law, you have no right to say, the liberty of the Press shall not be restrained; for such a license would warrant any breach of law.
Rather than hazard such an abuse of privilege, is it not better to leave the right altogether with your rulers and your posterity?
No attempts have ever been made by a Legislative body in America, to abridge that privilege; and in this free enlightened country, no attempts could succeed, unless the public should be convinced that an abuse of it would warrant the restriction.
Should this ever be the case, you have no right to say, that a future Legislature, or that posterity shall not abridge the privilege, or punish its abuses.
The very attempt to establish a permanent, unalterable Constitution, is an act of consummate arrogance.
It is a presumption that we have all possible wisdom — that we can foresee all possible circumstances — and judge for future generations, better than they can for themselves.
TO BE CONTINUED ...