I. THE ALBANY POLICE DEPARTMENT THROUGH 1994
II. THE EVOLUTION OF COMMUNITY POLICING IN ALBANY, continued ...
3. Reforming the APD, continued ...
5. Building Support in Outside Agencies, continued ...
6. Building Support in the Community
The Rise of Neighborhood Power in Albany, concluded ...
Rubin concedes that over time CANA may in fact have taken over aspects of the role of the committeeman, in the sense that residents often turn to him and other neighborhood leaders for help getting better city services. 54
But he insists that CANA did not make this goal its mission, and he suggests that its nonpartisan strategy helped it gain influence without inciting a political backlash.
“If you go through the [newspaper] clips of Albany, you’ll find various articles talking [about] how we took over the role of the ward leaders,” he explains.
“It may have happened, but that was not our goal."
"We were just doing our thing, and we weren’t concerned with what they were doing on their side.” 55
Finally, CANA also tended to potential fault lines inside the neighborhood movement itself.
Most simply, the organization tried to build camaraderie within the group by hosting events like its citywide “conventions,” which offered speakers, awards, workshops, and even political theater.
But CANA’s founders also tried to guard against the group’s potential for faction, which existed in any alliance between diverse neighborhoods.
For example, Rubin explains that he tried hard to discourage CANA from tackling potentially divisive issues like parking.
I live in the downtown section of the city.
We want a parking permit system.
The people uptown don’t want it, and they feel if we have it, it will push people who don’t have a permit into their neighborhoods.
And so when I was chairing CANA, I never brought this issue up.
I stepped down as the head of CANA after 20 years in 1996.
Subsequently the issue came again and CANA was discussing it.
And there was some big heavy arguments in CANA about that.
My policy was why bring it up and just get disunity in CANA?
Because CANA can’t take a stand if it’s that divided.
Just let the downtown neighborhood associations do their thing, and if the uptown wants to oppose it, fine, that’s their prerogative.
Indeed, CANA institutionalized this focus on non-controversial issues by requiring a two-thirds vote for most resolutions.
By 1998, CANA had grown to twenty-one members and played a significant part in city politics.
Its rise carved out an important new space for Albany residents to influence their government, and one that has played a central role in the APD’s community policing program: Without it, police would be left to the Committee system that had held sway in the 1970s and before.
To be sure, ward leaders and committeemen still help some residents articulate their views about police services. 56
But unlike in the earlier period, the ward leaders and the committeemen do not hold a monopoly on governmental influence, and NAs have become a vehicle for demands that the committee system historically excluded.
In part, the difference is simply scale, for while committeemen traditionally brought forth individual complaints, the NAs began to challenge service delivery for entire neighborhoods, and CANA actually began speaking out about citywide policies.
But the neighborhood movement also brought a change to the kind of input citizens had in government, for by challenging policies and entire patterns of service delivery, residents were expressing their views at a level that the committee system had traditionally stifled.
As one neighborhood leader put it in 1987: “Before there was a childlike relationship that said the party would take care of [citizens]."
"Now there’s a more adult relationship, that people can talk directly to their government.” 57
It is precisely this type of relationship that underlies institutions like the Community Police Council.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
HISTORY OF ALBANY POLICE
Re: HISTORY OF ALBANY POLICE
I. THE ALBANY POLICE DEPARTMENT THROUGH 1994
II. THE EVOLUTION OF COMMUNITY POLICING IN ALBANY, concluded ...
3. Reforming the APD, concluded ...
8. The Title I COPS Grants in Albany
Throughout the past four years of reform, the APD has pursued several federal policing grants to help advance its community policing efforts.
As a matter of philosophy, the department and the city have sought to go after any and all available funding opportunities.
For example, asked if the city has considered holding back on the COPS grants given concerns about phase-outs and matching requirements, Jennings responds that it did not.
“When I was at the conference of Mayors about a month and a half ago, there was a concern [in] some of these cities that had opted into this program [about] not having the monies there to continue with the police officers,” Jennings explains.
“But if you’re a good manager, and you know that it’s important . . . you’ll find that extra million or two million . . . that you’ve committed as a match to pick up the other side of it.”
In the same vein, Tuffey insists that he has no doubts that the city will be able to pick up the grant costs when they expire.
“That’s an issue down the road, there’s no question,” he explains of the phase-outs.
“But you know what?"
". . . I would rather hire them now and deal with them later because I’m not the budget director, so I don’t have to worry about that stuff down the road."
". . . Any grants we can have, we’ll ask for, absolutely.”
Given this philosophy, the department was not at all averse to the hiring grants that dominated the COPS offerings, and in fact it received a total of 28 officers (14 of them from a Police Hiring Supplement grant) and 14 civilians through the COPS programs to help advance community policing.
Grebert concedes that some might not think Albany needed any more hiring, for even at the end of Whalen’s downsizing spree the city had the highest ratio of sworn officers to city residents in the state.
“Obviously when I was in the department we needed it,” the now-retired Grebert says sardonically of the calls for more hiring.
“Manpower had gotten down to two hundred ninety eight, and we said, ‘Oh boy, we need more manpower to do this community policing thing.’"
"And at the same time COPS grants were becoming available."
"So we got a COPS grant and got the manpower up to about 320 and 340 for the last couple of years.”
The first round of hiring actually came from the PHS grant, which the Whalen administration had applied for but which did not arrive in city coffers until February of 1994.
The grant allowed Jennings to make good on part of his campaign promise to add 25 officers to the APD and bring its total to 345, and the department itself planned to use the new officers to staff its community outreach unit (or, more precisely, to backfill the senior officers from the patrol force who eventually bid for the community outreach jobs).
Later that year, the APD applied for its first formal COPS grant from the COPS AHEAD program, through which, as local officials understood it, the city would qualify for eight officers.
Jennings apparently hoped to use the money to pay for cadets he had recently hired to round out his campaign promise, telling a group of downtown businessmen that he had no plans to hire past 345. 58
By December, that plan seemed to city officials to be on course, as the city received a letter from the Department of Justice explaining that Albany had been “authorized to hire eight officers.” 59
But a few weeks later, Justice unequivocally told local officials that they could only spend their authorization if they used the money for new recruits, in effect telling the APD that it needed to expand its ranks even further.
Already facing unexpected budget troubles, the city withdrew its application and forfeited the money. 60
The APD hired no new officers for the next two years, and Jennings eventually revised the department’s authorized strength back down to 320.
The APD’s next hiring move came in December of 1996, when the city applied for a 14-officer COPS Universal Hiring grant and revisited the supplantation debate all over again.
This time, according to newspaper reports, the city planned to use the grant money to effectively extend its expiring PHS grant, funding a class of recruits that was slated to enter the academy in January in order to make up for two years worth of attrition. 61
The Justice Department, however, refused to accept this proposal, and the controversy spilled over into Albany’s Common Council, where one city Alderman exclaimed that losing the grant could put community policing in jeopardy. 62
Eventually Jennings and Tuffey conceded to the Justice Department’s position, agreeing to hire fourteen more officers on top of the January class to bring total department strength to 334.
As Tuffey explains it today, the grant was necessary for the department to keep community policing going.
“I need more people to do it,” he explains.
“If you want all these programs — and we didn’t have the overtime grant at the time [referring to a COPS MORE overtime grant, which had been awarded but apparently not spent] — you either pay overtime to do it or you suffer with losing patrol."
"We can’t afford to lose the patrol officers.”
In any case, one of the new slots was pegged to fund a full-time officer at the local high school.
On top of these straight hiring grants, Albany applied for two COPS MORE grants split between civilian hiring and overtime money. 63
The civilian hiring came in two phases, starting with a 1995 grant that paid for 5 clerical employees, and continuing with a 1996 grant that paid salaries for 7 booking clerks. 64
(In the 1996 grant, the department originally requested 10 positions to civilianize not just booking itself but also related jobs like fingerprinting. But the Justice department refused to fund those positions, which are still filled by sworn officers today.)
In both cases, the department saw the civilianization money as a way to put more officers out on the streets and thereby increase community interaction.
In any case, department members report that the civilian hiring went relatively smoothly.
But they also report that it went more slowly than grant guidelines automatically allowed, and in both cases the department needed to get an extension even after taking shortcuts like designating some of the positions as non-competitive “community aides.”
“What the federal government doesn’t understand,” one department member explains, “is the fact that you’re awarded a grant like this, you have to got through . . . a civil service process."
". . . We had to write up the positions, we had to submit them to our civil service people."
"That’s why we changed [our timeline].”
The overtime portion of the COPS MORE money came as part of the 1995 grant application, which asked for a total of $124,000 for this purpose.
Initially part of the money was slated to fund officer participation in youth centers at the Albany Housing Authority, but when the AHA’s funding for the effort fell through, the APD received permission from the Department of Justice to reprogram the money for the more general overtime plan.
Designed primarily by Grebert, the overtime effort sought to use flexible funding to target foot patrol officers in temporary troublespots.
“It gives us so many opportunities to put people in problem areas,” Tuffey explains.
[For example,] with summer coming up we do these target patrols: We will take five police officers . . . and we’ll go down on the corner of Swan and Third.
And we’ll stop cars, we’ll look for drunks, we’ll look for drugs — we’ll do all these things.
. . . . Especially in the summertime with vacations — you know, everyone goes on vacation in the summer — I can’t afford to take some of the police cars from the patrol area just to do that.
But if I can do it on overtime, fine.
Moreover, Grebert felt that strategic use of overtime made more sense that new hiring.
“You’re using veteran, trained . . . officers rather than new kids on the block,” he explains.
“[Recruits] are essentially not of any value to you for two years after you hire them."
"It takes them that long to get up to speed."
"So the debate over do you want more cops or do you want to put more cops on overtime, I prefer the overtime."
"I think you’re getting a better product.”
Grebert distributed the money across several projects that he identified with input from others.
“We’d have meeting with the Sergeants, [and] I’d say, ‘Come on, fellows.'"
"'Tell me what problems you’re having that we can throw some of this money into,’” he explains.
For example, one of the MORE overtime projects put a special detail in a neighborhood that had suffered a rash of burglaries, another funded a “party car” that would take all calls about college parties on a night that University officials had heard would be especially busy, and yet another carried out a Jennings proposal for a truancy patrol (officers on this detail were assigned to patrol certain areas for school-aged youth during school hours, and they were expected to send any truants back to their high school).
A few proposed projects ran into trouble: For example, some of the money was used to target alcohol sales to minors, but that effort eventually fell victim to political pressure (or so some department members report).
In any case, once Grebert had selected specific projects, the department posted sheets in the division stations that allowed officers to sign themselves up for the special details.
The APD’s final Title I COPS grant came from a 1995 application for a Domestic Violence grant, which eventually funded a two-person civilian unit charged with helping victims navigate the sometimes-complicated criminal justice and service systems.
The project fed into a longstanding priority in the APD, which had adopted a mandatory arrest policy for domestic violence before many New York agencies, and in its application the department argued that the project would advance its problem-solving capabilities.
Most important, department members explain, is the opportunity that the unit’s civilian staff have to talk with domestic violence victims and explain to them what their options are — including the services offered by a local nonprofit called Equinox, which offers shelter space, counseling, and court advocacy, and which served as the APD’s partner agency for the grant.
The contacts with victims mostly come from the unit’s own direct calls to victims, which it identifies by reviewing police reports.
(New York State recently required all police agencies to fill out special reports for domestic violence cases, and these reports have made it easy to separate out domestic violence cases.)
But the civilian staff have also gone before department roll calls to get the word out to officers about their services, and by their presence in court they hope to become known to the judges and DAs.
In any case, the grant is scheduled to run out at the end of this year, and while the department does not yet have a plan for funding, city officials have begun searching for money from the state and the county. 65
TO BE CONTINUED ...
II. THE EVOLUTION OF COMMUNITY POLICING IN ALBANY, concluded ...
3. Reforming the APD, concluded ...
8. The Title I COPS Grants in Albany
Throughout the past four years of reform, the APD has pursued several federal policing grants to help advance its community policing efforts.
As a matter of philosophy, the department and the city have sought to go after any and all available funding opportunities.
For example, asked if the city has considered holding back on the COPS grants given concerns about phase-outs and matching requirements, Jennings responds that it did not.
“When I was at the conference of Mayors about a month and a half ago, there was a concern [in] some of these cities that had opted into this program [about] not having the monies there to continue with the police officers,” Jennings explains.
“But if you’re a good manager, and you know that it’s important . . . you’ll find that extra million or two million . . . that you’ve committed as a match to pick up the other side of it.”
In the same vein, Tuffey insists that he has no doubts that the city will be able to pick up the grant costs when they expire.
“That’s an issue down the road, there’s no question,” he explains of the phase-outs.
“But you know what?"
". . . I would rather hire them now and deal with them later because I’m not the budget director, so I don’t have to worry about that stuff down the road."
". . . Any grants we can have, we’ll ask for, absolutely.”
Given this philosophy, the department was not at all averse to the hiring grants that dominated the COPS offerings, and in fact it received a total of 28 officers (14 of them from a Police Hiring Supplement grant) and 14 civilians through the COPS programs to help advance community policing.
Grebert concedes that some might not think Albany needed any more hiring, for even at the end of Whalen’s downsizing spree the city had the highest ratio of sworn officers to city residents in the state.
“Obviously when I was in the department we needed it,” the now-retired Grebert says sardonically of the calls for more hiring.
“Manpower had gotten down to two hundred ninety eight, and we said, ‘Oh boy, we need more manpower to do this community policing thing.’"
"And at the same time COPS grants were becoming available."
"So we got a COPS grant and got the manpower up to about 320 and 340 for the last couple of years.”
The first round of hiring actually came from the PHS grant, which the Whalen administration had applied for but which did not arrive in city coffers until February of 1994.
The grant allowed Jennings to make good on part of his campaign promise to add 25 officers to the APD and bring its total to 345, and the department itself planned to use the new officers to staff its community outreach unit (or, more precisely, to backfill the senior officers from the patrol force who eventually bid for the community outreach jobs).
Later that year, the APD applied for its first formal COPS grant from the COPS AHEAD program, through which, as local officials understood it, the city would qualify for eight officers.
Jennings apparently hoped to use the money to pay for cadets he had recently hired to round out his campaign promise, telling a group of downtown businessmen that he had no plans to hire past 345. 58
By December, that plan seemed to city officials to be on course, as the city received a letter from the Department of Justice explaining that Albany had been “authorized to hire eight officers.” 59
But a few weeks later, Justice unequivocally told local officials that they could only spend their authorization if they used the money for new recruits, in effect telling the APD that it needed to expand its ranks even further.
Already facing unexpected budget troubles, the city withdrew its application and forfeited the money. 60
The APD hired no new officers for the next two years, and Jennings eventually revised the department’s authorized strength back down to 320.
The APD’s next hiring move came in December of 1996, when the city applied for a 14-officer COPS Universal Hiring grant and revisited the supplantation debate all over again.
This time, according to newspaper reports, the city planned to use the grant money to effectively extend its expiring PHS grant, funding a class of recruits that was slated to enter the academy in January in order to make up for two years worth of attrition. 61
The Justice Department, however, refused to accept this proposal, and the controversy spilled over into Albany’s Common Council, where one city Alderman exclaimed that losing the grant could put community policing in jeopardy. 62
Eventually Jennings and Tuffey conceded to the Justice Department’s position, agreeing to hire fourteen more officers on top of the January class to bring total department strength to 334.
As Tuffey explains it today, the grant was necessary for the department to keep community policing going.
“I need more people to do it,” he explains.
“If you want all these programs — and we didn’t have the overtime grant at the time [referring to a COPS MORE overtime grant, which had been awarded but apparently not spent] — you either pay overtime to do it or you suffer with losing patrol."
"We can’t afford to lose the patrol officers.”
In any case, one of the new slots was pegged to fund a full-time officer at the local high school.
On top of these straight hiring grants, Albany applied for two COPS MORE grants split between civilian hiring and overtime money. 63
The civilian hiring came in two phases, starting with a 1995 grant that paid for 5 clerical employees, and continuing with a 1996 grant that paid salaries for 7 booking clerks. 64
(In the 1996 grant, the department originally requested 10 positions to civilianize not just booking itself but also related jobs like fingerprinting. But the Justice department refused to fund those positions, which are still filled by sworn officers today.)
In both cases, the department saw the civilianization money as a way to put more officers out on the streets and thereby increase community interaction.
In any case, department members report that the civilian hiring went relatively smoothly.
But they also report that it went more slowly than grant guidelines automatically allowed, and in both cases the department needed to get an extension even after taking shortcuts like designating some of the positions as non-competitive “community aides.”
“What the federal government doesn’t understand,” one department member explains, “is the fact that you’re awarded a grant like this, you have to got through . . . a civil service process."
". . . We had to write up the positions, we had to submit them to our civil service people."
"That’s why we changed [our timeline].”
The overtime portion of the COPS MORE money came as part of the 1995 grant application, which asked for a total of $124,000 for this purpose.
Initially part of the money was slated to fund officer participation in youth centers at the Albany Housing Authority, but when the AHA’s funding for the effort fell through, the APD received permission from the Department of Justice to reprogram the money for the more general overtime plan.
Designed primarily by Grebert, the overtime effort sought to use flexible funding to target foot patrol officers in temporary troublespots.
“It gives us so many opportunities to put people in problem areas,” Tuffey explains.
[For example,] with summer coming up we do these target patrols: We will take five police officers . . . and we’ll go down on the corner of Swan and Third.
And we’ll stop cars, we’ll look for drunks, we’ll look for drugs — we’ll do all these things.
. . . . Especially in the summertime with vacations — you know, everyone goes on vacation in the summer — I can’t afford to take some of the police cars from the patrol area just to do that.
But if I can do it on overtime, fine.
Moreover, Grebert felt that strategic use of overtime made more sense that new hiring.
“You’re using veteran, trained . . . officers rather than new kids on the block,” he explains.
“[Recruits] are essentially not of any value to you for two years after you hire them."
"It takes them that long to get up to speed."
"So the debate over do you want more cops or do you want to put more cops on overtime, I prefer the overtime."
"I think you’re getting a better product.”
Grebert distributed the money across several projects that he identified with input from others.
“We’d have meeting with the Sergeants, [and] I’d say, ‘Come on, fellows.'"
"'Tell me what problems you’re having that we can throw some of this money into,’” he explains.
For example, one of the MORE overtime projects put a special detail in a neighborhood that had suffered a rash of burglaries, another funded a “party car” that would take all calls about college parties on a night that University officials had heard would be especially busy, and yet another carried out a Jennings proposal for a truancy patrol (officers on this detail were assigned to patrol certain areas for school-aged youth during school hours, and they were expected to send any truants back to their high school).
A few proposed projects ran into trouble: For example, some of the money was used to target alcohol sales to minors, but that effort eventually fell victim to political pressure (or so some department members report).
In any case, once Grebert had selected specific projects, the department posted sheets in the division stations that allowed officers to sign themselves up for the special details.
The APD’s final Title I COPS grant came from a 1995 application for a Domestic Violence grant, which eventually funded a two-person civilian unit charged with helping victims navigate the sometimes-complicated criminal justice and service systems.
The project fed into a longstanding priority in the APD, which had adopted a mandatory arrest policy for domestic violence before many New York agencies, and in its application the department argued that the project would advance its problem-solving capabilities.
Most important, department members explain, is the opportunity that the unit’s civilian staff have to talk with domestic violence victims and explain to them what their options are — including the services offered by a local nonprofit called Equinox, which offers shelter space, counseling, and court advocacy, and which served as the APD’s partner agency for the grant.
The contacts with victims mostly come from the unit’s own direct calls to victims, which it identifies by reviewing police reports.
(New York State recently required all police agencies to fill out special reports for domestic violence cases, and these reports have made it easy to separate out domestic violence cases.)
But the civilian staff have also gone before department roll calls to get the word out to officers about their services, and by their presence in court they hope to become known to the judges and DAs.
In any case, the grant is scheduled to run out at the end of this year, and while the department does not yet have a plan for funding, city officials have begun searching for money from the state and the county. 65
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: HISTORY OF ALBANY POLICE
I. THE ALBANY POLICE DEPARTMENT THROUGH 1994
III. THE ALBANY POLICE DEPARTMENT TODAY
Albany’s community policing reforms are still making progress today, and indeed, the department is about to turn a major corner when it reorganizes around four decentralized police stations this year.
But for the sake of laying out where the Albany Police Department stands after four years of reform, it is worthwhile to briefly review and elaborate on the way it operates through the same lens we used to examine its past — focusing on its relationship to the environment, its operational and administrative systems, and its management style.
1. Relationship to the Environment
Since the onset of community policing, the APD’s outside relationships have changed in several ways.
One of the most obvious differences is in the political system, where the once-contentious relationship with Whalen has given way to a more friendly rapport with Jennings.
This is particularly true at the highest levels of management.
“I have an open door with the Mayor,” Tuffey maintains.
“We have a very good relationship, both personal and professional."
"And if I need something, he knows that when I go to him, it’s a worthwhile program and it’s going to benefit everybody.”
Indeed, some department members feel that the relationship is too close — sentiments that had their peak when Tuffey was first appointed as Chief.
Jennings insists that he does not micromanage the department, and Tuffey concurs that the mayor “doesn’t interfere if I let him know what’s going on.”
Nevertheless, other local observers disagree, with one going so far as to put it this way: “[The Chief] is very beholden to the Mayor."
"If the Mayor wants the guys on this side of the city to wear green shirts today, they’re going to do it.”
Indeed, many department members do believe that political leaders have great influence over the APD, and they feel that top management is more likely to respond to political interests than their own.
But they do not believe that is anything new in the city, and Jennings received the police union’s endorsement for re-election amidst his opponent’s support for a civilian review board.
The one area where political leaders have lost some influence in the APD — though this change is more a long-term trend than a community policing reform — is in the ward system, for today police seem more likely to handle local problems through neighborhood associations than committeemen.
Committeemen do still relay some citizen concerns to police.
But a few APD managers have started asking them to have citizens contact police directly, and the ward system is no longer the only conduit between citizens and their government: At the citywide level, the Community Police Council has begun offering some policy advice to the APD (though some APD managers do not quite view its role in that way, seeing it instead as another forum for citizens to raise neighborhood problems); and at the local level, most city neighborhoods now host active neighborhood associations, while several business districts also have business associations.
Both types of organization have contact at least with their community outreach officer.
On the other hand, other officers do not reportedly attend NA meetings very often, and community activists rarely attend the department’s own sector meetings to discuss neighborhood problems.
Moreover, a few NAs — particularly those in minority neighborhoods — are reportedly still critical of the APD, believing that officers are alternatively unresponsive and overbearing, and this position is shared by the local NAACP and a self-styled criminal justice watchdog group called the Center for Law and Justice (though both have also expressed support for the direction that the APD is going with community policing).
Finally, interagency collaboration has made some strides in Albany, notably in the area of code enforcement, and there largely because of citywide efforts to streamline and put more resources into the process.
(Most police, however, do not have a personal relationship with code enforcement employees, but they are satisfied with the paper system they use to refer potential code violations to other agencies.)
These efforts, as well as the remaining opportunities for new interagency efforts, have been extensively described above.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
III. THE ALBANY POLICE DEPARTMENT TODAY
Albany’s community policing reforms are still making progress today, and indeed, the department is about to turn a major corner when it reorganizes around four decentralized police stations this year.
But for the sake of laying out where the Albany Police Department stands after four years of reform, it is worthwhile to briefly review and elaborate on the way it operates through the same lens we used to examine its past — focusing on its relationship to the environment, its operational and administrative systems, and its management style.
1. Relationship to the Environment
Since the onset of community policing, the APD’s outside relationships have changed in several ways.
One of the most obvious differences is in the political system, where the once-contentious relationship with Whalen has given way to a more friendly rapport with Jennings.
This is particularly true at the highest levels of management.
“I have an open door with the Mayor,” Tuffey maintains.
“We have a very good relationship, both personal and professional."
"And if I need something, he knows that when I go to him, it’s a worthwhile program and it’s going to benefit everybody.”
Indeed, some department members feel that the relationship is too close — sentiments that had their peak when Tuffey was first appointed as Chief.
Jennings insists that he does not micromanage the department, and Tuffey concurs that the mayor “doesn’t interfere if I let him know what’s going on.”
Nevertheless, other local observers disagree, with one going so far as to put it this way: “[The Chief] is very beholden to the Mayor."
"If the Mayor wants the guys on this side of the city to wear green shirts today, they’re going to do it.”
Indeed, many department members do believe that political leaders have great influence over the APD, and they feel that top management is more likely to respond to political interests than their own.
But they do not believe that is anything new in the city, and Jennings received the police union’s endorsement for re-election amidst his opponent’s support for a civilian review board.
The one area where political leaders have lost some influence in the APD — though this change is more a long-term trend than a community policing reform — is in the ward system, for today police seem more likely to handle local problems through neighborhood associations than committeemen.
Committeemen do still relay some citizen concerns to police.
But a few APD managers have started asking them to have citizens contact police directly, and the ward system is no longer the only conduit between citizens and their government: At the citywide level, the Community Police Council has begun offering some policy advice to the APD (though some APD managers do not quite view its role in that way, seeing it instead as another forum for citizens to raise neighborhood problems); and at the local level, most city neighborhoods now host active neighborhood associations, while several business districts also have business associations.
Both types of organization have contact at least with their community outreach officer.
On the other hand, other officers do not reportedly attend NA meetings very often, and community activists rarely attend the department’s own sector meetings to discuss neighborhood problems.
Moreover, a few NAs — particularly those in minority neighborhoods — are reportedly still critical of the APD, believing that officers are alternatively unresponsive and overbearing, and this position is shared by the local NAACP and a self-styled criminal justice watchdog group called the Center for Law and Justice (though both have also expressed support for the direction that the APD is going with community policing).
Finally, interagency collaboration has made some strides in Albany, notably in the area of code enforcement, and there largely because of citywide efforts to streamline and put more resources into the process.
(Most police, however, do not have a personal relationship with code enforcement employees, but they are satisfied with the paper system they use to refer potential code violations to other agencies.)
These efforts, as well as the remaining opportunities for new interagency efforts, have been extensively described above.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: HISTORY OF ALBANY POLICE
I. THE ALBANY POLICE DEPARTMENT THROUGH 1994
III. THE ALBANY POLICE DEPARTMENT TODAY, continued ...
2. Operations
As already described in detail, the APD’s community policing efforts have sought to reorganize and refocus the attention of the patrol force in several ways.
Organizationally, most of the patrol force and even parts of the detective division now revolve around six-geographically defined sectors within which officers have quasi-permanent assignments.
Substantively, officers have a new mandate to handle neighborhood problems proactively, and especially to enforce the low-level quality of life offenses that had previously been neglected in Albany.
Many department members suggest that a large proportion of the patrol force has not fully accepted these new duties yet, and there are few examples of “problem-solving” in the city that do not focus directly on arresting or citing specific offenders.
But the APD has always expected it would take at least a generation to gain complete acceptance of community policing, and in any case, special units like the 18-officer community outreach unit and the 5-officer directed patrol unit are reportedly more invested in community policing concepts — particularly the newfound emphasis on quality of life offenses.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
III. THE ALBANY POLICE DEPARTMENT TODAY, continued ...
2. Operations
As already described in detail, the APD’s community policing efforts have sought to reorganize and refocus the attention of the patrol force in several ways.
Organizationally, most of the patrol force and even parts of the detective division now revolve around six-geographically defined sectors within which officers have quasi-permanent assignments.
Substantively, officers have a new mandate to handle neighborhood problems proactively, and especially to enforce the low-level quality of life offenses that had previously been neglected in Albany.
Many department members suggest that a large proportion of the patrol force has not fully accepted these new duties yet, and there are few examples of “problem-solving” in the city that do not focus directly on arresting or citing specific offenders.
But the APD has always expected it would take at least a generation to gain complete acceptance of community policing, and in any case, special units like the 18-officer community outreach unit and the 5-officer directed patrol unit are reportedly more invested in community policing concepts — particularly the newfound emphasis on quality of life offenses.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: HISTORY OF ALBANY POLICE
I. THE ALBANY POLICE DEPARTMENT THROUGH 1994
III. THE ALBANY POLICE DEPARTMENT TODAY, continued ...
3. Administrative Systems
The APD’s recent reforms have not involved many modifications to departmental administrative systems.
There are a few exceptions: For example, the department has tried to improve its internal affairs system by making it more accessible to citizens and by creating a new system for handling less serious complaints, which are now collected centrally but handed to supervisors for investigation.
(In the past these complaints were given to internal affairs, but many felt that it did not have the time to investigate them thoroughly.)
But many administrative systems have remained the same over the past four years.
For example, the department has made no major changes to its centralized budgeting, despite a general trend towards “decentralization”; and it has also made few changes to its recruitment, hiring, and training (though in-service training, which has always been programmed year-by-year, has evolved somewhat). 66
Finally, although the city has begun talking with other County police agencies about sharing information, internal information systems are still fairly rudimentary — patrol officers do not have mobile data terminals in their cars, and few department members report using crime analysis to identify or monitor neighborhood problems.
In this sense, administrative reform has not been a key component of community policing in Albany, which has focused most of its attention on the street.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
III. THE ALBANY POLICE DEPARTMENT TODAY, continued ...
3. Administrative Systems
The APD’s recent reforms have not involved many modifications to departmental administrative systems.
There are a few exceptions: For example, the department has tried to improve its internal affairs system by making it more accessible to citizens and by creating a new system for handling less serious complaints, which are now collected centrally but handed to supervisors for investigation.
(In the past these complaints were given to internal affairs, but many felt that it did not have the time to investigate them thoroughly.)
But many administrative systems have remained the same over the past four years.
For example, the department has made no major changes to its centralized budgeting, despite a general trend towards “decentralization”; and it has also made few changes to its recruitment, hiring, and training (though in-service training, which has always been programmed year-by-year, has evolved somewhat). 66
Finally, although the city has begun talking with other County police agencies about sharing information, internal information systems are still fairly rudimentary — patrol officers do not have mobile data terminals in their cars, and few department members report using crime analysis to identify or monitor neighborhood problems.
In this sense, administrative reform has not been a key component of community policing in Albany, which has focused most of its attention on the street.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: HISTORY OF ALBANY POLICE
I. THE ALBANY POLICE DEPARTMENT THROUGH 1994
III. THE ALBANY POLICE DEPARTMENT TODAY, continued ...
4. Management
Management has undergone more substantial changes in Albany, especially at its upper levels.
The department is still, like many police agencies, a mix of centralized and decentralized authority, and recent reforms have furthered both.
On the one hand, community policing — and particularly the sector plan and the upcoming four-station plan — have put more stock in department supervisors and Lieutenants.
Under today’s sector system, Sergeants in particular have great responsibility, for it is largely through their leadership of the zone meetings that the department identifies neighborhood problems for officers to focus on; and they are increasingly expected to help officers get the problem-solving resources they need (such as contacts with other agencies or help from other units).
Officers, moreover, have a new mandate to exercise discretion in choosing problems to focus on and crafting appropriate solutions — for example, they have been empowered to make contacts with other city agencies on their own.
On the other hand, the APD’s command staff reorganization has clearly consolidated authority in the highest reaches of management.
The new watch Commander positions are the clearest example of growing centralization in the APD, for these managers have final say over all major decisions during their watch.
But the new Assistant Chief positions, and the filling of the once-vacant Deputy Chief’s job, were also explicitly designed to consolidate authority in the Chief’s office over the various department divisions that had once had freer reign.
This, of course, is not necessarily to criticize the APD, but simply to characterize its changes accurately — though it is also important to note that some APD members feel excluded from major departmental decisions.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
III. THE ALBANY POLICE DEPARTMENT TODAY, continued ...
4. Management
Management has undergone more substantial changes in Albany, especially at its upper levels.
The department is still, like many police agencies, a mix of centralized and decentralized authority, and recent reforms have furthered both.
On the one hand, community policing — and particularly the sector plan and the upcoming four-station plan — have put more stock in department supervisors and Lieutenants.
Under today’s sector system, Sergeants in particular have great responsibility, for it is largely through their leadership of the zone meetings that the department identifies neighborhood problems for officers to focus on; and they are increasingly expected to help officers get the problem-solving resources they need (such as contacts with other agencies or help from other units).
Officers, moreover, have a new mandate to exercise discretion in choosing problems to focus on and crafting appropriate solutions — for example, they have been empowered to make contacts with other city agencies on their own.
On the other hand, the APD’s command staff reorganization has clearly consolidated authority in the highest reaches of management.
The new watch Commander positions are the clearest example of growing centralization in the APD, for these managers have final say over all major decisions during their watch.
But the new Assistant Chief positions, and the filling of the once-vacant Deputy Chief’s job, were also explicitly designed to consolidate authority in the Chief’s office over the various department divisions that had once had freer reign.
This, of course, is not necessarily to criticize the APD, but simply to characterize its changes accurately — though it is also important to note that some APD members feel excluded from major departmental decisions.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: HISTORY OF ALBANY POLICE
I. THE ALBANY POLICE DEPARTMENT THROUGH 1994
FOOTNOTES
1 The Democratic organization in Albany has been chronicled in many places, among them William Kennedy. O Albany! Improbable City of Political Wizards, Fearless Ethnics, Spectacular Aristocrats, Splendid Nobodies, and Underrated Scoundrels (New York: Viking, 1983); Frank S. Robinson. Machine Politics: A Study of Albany’s O’Connells (Transaction Books: New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1977); Paul Grondahl. Mayor Erastus Corning: Albany Icon, Albany Enigma (Albany: Washington Park Press, 1997); Kate Gurnett. “Albany Democrats: 75 Years of Power,” Albany Times-Union, December 8, 1996, p. A-1. For specific reference to Albany police in the 1960s, see James Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1968), pp. 237-43.
2 Barely two months ago, the Albany County Democratic Committee reinforced this norm with a rebuke to erstwhile Mayoral candidate Jack McEneny (who had challenged incumbent and party favorite Jerry Jennings) by declining to endorse his re-election bid for the state assembly. “It’s no secret there’s a lot of discontent with McEneny for having run that primary against Jennings,” Committee Chairman Leonard Weiss told a reporter. “If you’re not loyal, it doesn’t matter how smart you are, or how experienced you are, or how rich you are. What good are you if you’re not loyal to a party? Party loyalty is the first requisite.” Lara Jakes. “Party Panel Declines to Endorse McEneny,” Albany Times-Union, May 5, 1998, p. B-1.
3 Deborah Gesensway. “Neighborhood Groups Carry Clout Quietly,” Albany Times-Union, December 6, 1987 , p. C-1. Harold Rubin, perhaps the central figure in the neighborhood association movement, suggests that Corning was not exactly antagonistic to the neighborhood associations, but he concedes that the Mayor was not enthusiastic about them. “Corning himself would address neighborhood associations,” Rubin remembers. “He didn’t oppose it or anything like that. But he didn’t view it as an asset—let’s put it that way. He viewed it like Castor Oil: You had to swallow it, but he wasn’t too supportive of it.”
4 Josh Barbanel, “The Loyalist Who Was Groomed to Lead Albany,” The New York Times, June 2, 1983, p. B-2.
5 Grondahl, Mayor Erastus Corning, p. 289.
6 Moreover, the APD has apparently not had a very high profile in the police professional community. To be sure, the department has for some time sent some managers and detectives to outside training and conferences (it spent $9,000 on such expenses in 1991, and by 1993 it was budgeting $15,000 for such expenses). But national practices did not necessarily take root in the city, which had a strong tradition of local control. For example, one APD supervisor reports earning a reprimand from the Deputy Chief for counseling an officer using the method he had recently learned in a state training school—through an interoffice memo addressed to the Chief. In Albany, the Deputy Chief explained to the young supervisor, things were done more informally.
7 There are even those who allege that the Democrats influenced jury lists, pointing to a 1960s study that found disproportionate representation of city residents, Democrats, and party workers on both trial and grand juries. See Robinson, Machine Politics, ch. 14.
8 Robinson, Machine Politics, ch. 14; Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior, pp. 167 ff.
9 Richard Wexler. “Foot Patrol, ‘Outreach Offices’ Slated for Arbor Hill, South End,” Albany Times-Union, August 2, 1991, p. B-1.
10 Richard Wexler. “Critic Says Police Ignored Public’s Role,” Albany Times-Union, August 3, 1991, p. B-2; The Chief expressed similar sentiments in Wexler, “Foot Patrol, ‘Outreach Offices’ Slated for Arbor Hill, South End.” Dale was himself Albany’s first black Chief.
11 Jay Jochnowitz. “Community Policing Helps Residents Feel Safe,” Albany Times-Union, July 12, 1992, p. C-1.
12 On Jennings’s support among Corning loyalists (including a few who jokingly branded themselves as the “Corning Government in Exile”), see Carole DeMare. “Democratic Party Traditionalists Are Thrilled by Jennings’ Victory,” Albany Times-Union, September 19, 1993, p. C-3; Jay Jochnowitz, “Jennings Declares He’ll Run,” Albany Times-Union, May 27, 1993, p. B-1; and Jay Jochnowitz, “Jennings Watches His Options Flourish,” Albany Times-Union, March 15, 1992, p. A-1, which also discusses Jennings’s support among disaffected ward leaders, as well as early rumblings that Jennings would oppose Whalen. (Together with his confrontational stance as alderman, this early opposition likely garnered him support among those who disliked Whalen’s reforms.)
13 Off the record, one union member also suggested that an endorsement ran the risk of alienating the other candidate, who might ultimately end up as their boss. Jay Jochnowitz, “Police Decide against Endorsement,” Albany Times-Union, July 16, 1993, p. B-6.
14 The issue had also been placed on the agenda by a Whalen-initiated think tank called the Albany Civic Forum, which in late 1992 had been charged with identifying ways to improve the city’s quality of life. The Forum set up a public safety panel to focus on police, and union president James Tuffey joined then-Lieutenant Robert Grebert in discussing community policing with that panel. The panel formally endorsed community policing in December of 1993, making a few suggestions and cautions about the subject in its final report.
15 Jay Jochnowitz. “Jennings Has Plan for Cops,” Albany Times-Union, August 12, 1993, p. B-1.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
FOOTNOTES
1 The Democratic organization in Albany has been chronicled in many places, among them William Kennedy. O Albany! Improbable City of Political Wizards, Fearless Ethnics, Spectacular Aristocrats, Splendid Nobodies, and Underrated Scoundrels (New York: Viking, 1983); Frank S. Robinson. Machine Politics: A Study of Albany’s O’Connells (Transaction Books: New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1977); Paul Grondahl. Mayor Erastus Corning: Albany Icon, Albany Enigma (Albany: Washington Park Press, 1997); Kate Gurnett. “Albany Democrats: 75 Years of Power,” Albany Times-Union, December 8, 1996, p. A-1. For specific reference to Albany police in the 1960s, see James Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1968), pp. 237-43.
2 Barely two months ago, the Albany County Democratic Committee reinforced this norm with a rebuke to erstwhile Mayoral candidate Jack McEneny (who had challenged incumbent and party favorite Jerry Jennings) by declining to endorse his re-election bid for the state assembly. “It’s no secret there’s a lot of discontent with McEneny for having run that primary against Jennings,” Committee Chairman Leonard Weiss told a reporter. “If you’re not loyal, it doesn’t matter how smart you are, or how experienced you are, or how rich you are. What good are you if you’re not loyal to a party? Party loyalty is the first requisite.” Lara Jakes. “Party Panel Declines to Endorse McEneny,” Albany Times-Union, May 5, 1998, p. B-1.
3 Deborah Gesensway. “Neighborhood Groups Carry Clout Quietly,” Albany Times-Union, December 6, 1987 , p. C-1. Harold Rubin, perhaps the central figure in the neighborhood association movement, suggests that Corning was not exactly antagonistic to the neighborhood associations, but he concedes that the Mayor was not enthusiastic about them. “Corning himself would address neighborhood associations,” Rubin remembers. “He didn’t oppose it or anything like that. But he didn’t view it as an asset—let’s put it that way. He viewed it like Castor Oil: You had to swallow it, but he wasn’t too supportive of it.”
4 Josh Barbanel, “The Loyalist Who Was Groomed to Lead Albany,” The New York Times, June 2, 1983, p. B-2.
5 Grondahl, Mayor Erastus Corning, p. 289.
6 Moreover, the APD has apparently not had a very high profile in the police professional community. To be sure, the department has for some time sent some managers and detectives to outside training and conferences (it spent $9,000 on such expenses in 1991, and by 1993 it was budgeting $15,000 for such expenses). But national practices did not necessarily take root in the city, which had a strong tradition of local control. For example, one APD supervisor reports earning a reprimand from the Deputy Chief for counseling an officer using the method he had recently learned in a state training school—through an interoffice memo addressed to the Chief. In Albany, the Deputy Chief explained to the young supervisor, things were done more informally.
7 There are even those who allege that the Democrats influenced jury lists, pointing to a 1960s study that found disproportionate representation of city residents, Democrats, and party workers on both trial and grand juries. See Robinson, Machine Politics, ch. 14.
8 Robinson, Machine Politics, ch. 14; Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior, pp. 167 ff.
9 Richard Wexler. “Foot Patrol, ‘Outreach Offices’ Slated for Arbor Hill, South End,” Albany Times-Union, August 2, 1991, p. B-1.
10 Richard Wexler. “Critic Says Police Ignored Public’s Role,” Albany Times-Union, August 3, 1991, p. B-2; The Chief expressed similar sentiments in Wexler, “Foot Patrol, ‘Outreach Offices’ Slated for Arbor Hill, South End.” Dale was himself Albany’s first black Chief.
11 Jay Jochnowitz. “Community Policing Helps Residents Feel Safe,” Albany Times-Union, July 12, 1992, p. C-1.
12 On Jennings’s support among Corning loyalists (including a few who jokingly branded themselves as the “Corning Government in Exile”), see Carole DeMare. “Democratic Party Traditionalists Are Thrilled by Jennings’ Victory,” Albany Times-Union, September 19, 1993, p. C-3; Jay Jochnowitz, “Jennings Declares He’ll Run,” Albany Times-Union, May 27, 1993, p. B-1; and Jay Jochnowitz, “Jennings Watches His Options Flourish,” Albany Times-Union, March 15, 1992, p. A-1, which also discusses Jennings’s support among disaffected ward leaders, as well as early rumblings that Jennings would oppose Whalen. (Together with his confrontational stance as alderman, this early opposition likely garnered him support among those who disliked Whalen’s reforms.)
13 Off the record, one union member also suggested that an endorsement ran the risk of alienating the other candidate, who might ultimately end up as their boss. Jay Jochnowitz, “Police Decide against Endorsement,” Albany Times-Union, July 16, 1993, p. B-6.
14 The issue had also been placed on the agenda by a Whalen-initiated think tank called the Albany Civic Forum, which in late 1992 had been charged with identifying ways to improve the city’s quality of life. The Forum set up a public safety panel to focus on police, and union president James Tuffey joined then-Lieutenant Robert Grebert in discussing community policing with that panel. The panel formally endorsed community policing in December of 1993, making a few suggestions and cautions about the subject in its final report.
15 Jay Jochnowitz. “Jennings Has Plan for Cops,” Albany Times-Union, August 12, 1993, p. B-1.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: HISTORY OF ALBANY POLICE
I. THE ALBANY POLICE DEPARTMENT THROUGH 1994
FOOTNOTES, continued ...
16 Michael KcKeon. “Jennings Picks Detective as Deputy Chief,” Albany Times-Union, January 8, 1994, p. B-1.
17 The reference is to James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling. “Police and Neighborhood Safety: Broken Windows,” The Atlantic Monthly, March, 1982, pp. 29-38, which argues that when left unchecked, low-level “disorder” problems like aggressive panhandling can escalate to create more serious crime problems.
18 Cf. academic discussions of the tensions between planning and politics. Alan Altshuler. The City Planning Process. Edward Banfield and Martin Meyerson. Politics, Planning, and the Public Interest.
19 Sarah Metzgar. “Foot Patrol Returns to Albany,” Albany Times-Union, November 27, 1994, p. A-1. Other department members report that calls for service and past community requests were also taken into consideration in drawing the zone maps.
20 A later effort, in which the department sought to use Local Law Enforcement Block Grant money to start a major offender task force, collapsed because of the seniority issue: “What we were going to try to do with the block grant money [to] grab more pro-active cops and say, ‘Give us ten names of everyone who is going to cause the most trouble next summer in your neighborhood. And get on their case, see what we can do,’” Grebert explains. But the union would not approve of the proposal to select only those officers that management deemed “proactive,” insisting that the positions needed to be chosen by seniority. Without the discretion it felt it needed to make the program work, management abandoned the task force.
21 Joe Mahoney. “Dale Resigns as Chief of Albany Police; Fight Feared over Successor,” Albany Times-Union, February 16, 1995, p. A-1.
22 Mahoney, “Dale Resigns as Chief of Albany Police.”
23 Joe Mahoney. “Tuffey’s the Choice for Albany Police Chief,” Albany Times-Union, February 25, 1995, p. A-1.
24 At the time Tuffey told a reported essentially the same thing: “I am 1,000 percent loyal to the Mayor, both as a friend and as the Mayor,” Tuffey insisted. “Because when I’m sworn in, I will be working for him. In my opinion, if you work for somebody, you work for them. I will do nothing to embarrass him, nor will I let anyone else do anything to embarrass him.” Jochnowitz, “Hands-On Role Suits Tuffey.”
25 Jay Jochnowitz. “Don’t Look for the Union Label,” Albany Times-Union, March 8, 1995, p. B-1. During the ceremony that swore him in, Tuffey further said: “Let’s forget about the past. Forget about all the negatives and concentrate on the positives,” Joe Mahoney. “A Call for Unity,” Albany Times-Union, March 17, 1995, p. B-1.
26 “Dinner April 28 for Chief Tuffey,” Albany Times-Union, April 18, 1995, p. B-3.
27 Jochnowitz, “Hands-On Role Suits Tuffey,” Albany Times-Union, March 9, 1995, p. A-1.
28 Jennings, for example, explained the need for non-unionized command staff positions by telling a newspaper reporter that “you can’t be answerable to two masters.” Jay Jochnowitz. “Just a Brief Fling for Jennings, Cops,” Albany Times-Union, July 21, 1995, p. B-5.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
FOOTNOTES, continued ...
16 Michael KcKeon. “Jennings Picks Detective as Deputy Chief,” Albany Times-Union, January 8, 1994, p. B-1.
17 The reference is to James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling. “Police and Neighborhood Safety: Broken Windows,” The Atlantic Monthly, March, 1982, pp. 29-38, which argues that when left unchecked, low-level “disorder” problems like aggressive panhandling can escalate to create more serious crime problems.
18 Cf. academic discussions of the tensions between planning and politics. Alan Altshuler. The City Planning Process. Edward Banfield and Martin Meyerson. Politics, Planning, and the Public Interest.
19 Sarah Metzgar. “Foot Patrol Returns to Albany,” Albany Times-Union, November 27, 1994, p. A-1. Other department members report that calls for service and past community requests were also taken into consideration in drawing the zone maps.
20 A later effort, in which the department sought to use Local Law Enforcement Block Grant money to start a major offender task force, collapsed because of the seniority issue: “What we were going to try to do with the block grant money [to] grab more pro-active cops and say, ‘Give us ten names of everyone who is going to cause the most trouble next summer in your neighborhood. And get on their case, see what we can do,’” Grebert explains. But the union would not approve of the proposal to select only those officers that management deemed “proactive,” insisting that the positions needed to be chosen by seniority. Without the discretion it felt it needed to make the program work, management abandoned the task force.
21 Joe Mahoney. “Dale Resigns as Chief of Albany Police; Fight Feared over Successor,” Albany Times-Union, February 16, 1995, p. A-1.
22 Mahoney, “Dale Resigns as Chief of Albany Police.”
23 Joe Mahoney. “Tuffey’s the Choice for Albany Police Chief,” Albany Times-Union, February 25, 1995, p. A-1.
24 At the time Tuffey told a reported essentially the same thing: “I am 1,000 percent loyal to the Mayor, both as a friend and as the Mayor,” Tuffey insisted. “Because when I’m sworn in, I will be working for him. In my opinion, if you work for somebody, you work for them. I will do nothing to embarrass him, nor will I let anyone else do anything to embarrass him.” Jochnowitz, “Hands-On Role Suits Tuffey.”
25 Jay Jochnowitz. “Don’t Look for the Union Label,” Albany Times-Union, March 8, 1995, p. B-1. During the ceremony that swore him in, Tuffey further said: “Let’s forget about the past. Forget about all the negatives and concentrate on the positives,” Joe Mahoney. “A Call for Unity,” Albany Times-Union, March 17, 1995, p. B-1.
26 “Dinner April 28 for Chief Tuffey,” Albany Times-Union, April 18, 1995, p. B-3.
27 Jochnowitz, “Hands-On Role Suits Tuffey,” Albany Times-Union, March 9, 1995, p. A-1.
28 Jennings, for example, explained the need for non-unionized command staff positions by telling a newspaper reporter that “you can’t be answerable to two masters.” Jay Jochnowitz. “Just a Brief Fling for Jennings, Cops,” Albany Times-Union, July 21, 1995, p. B-5.
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: HISTORY OF ALBANY POLICE
I. THE ALBANY POLICE DEPARTMENT THROUGH 1994
FOOTNOTES, continued ...
29 Another participant in the planning sessions simply did not believe that the reform would have this effect. “We felt that what was needed was an overall manager to manage that de-centralization. [We would still] put the proper responsibilities in those various precincts, . . or the ownership as we talked about in community policing. But within those precincts, there are multiple functions that need to occur. And it was the functions that we were finding problems with, to have people work cohesively together. And that’s where the overall manager came in—not to detract from the de-centralization.”
30 Jay Jochnowitz. “Just a Brief Fling for Jennings, Cops,” Albany Times-Union, July 21, 1995, p. B-5.
31 Some department members also speculate that top management silenced union objections by handing out promotions to top union officials.
32 Lara Jakes, “Politics and Police Don’t Mix for Ex-Deputy Chief,” Albany Times-Union, February 1, 1998, p. D-1. See also Lara Jakes. “Police Hierarchy Shake-Up Continues,” Albany Times-Union, February 11, 1998, p. B-1; Lara Jakes, “Police Put Best Face on Change of Guard,” Albany Times-Union, February 14, 1998, p. A-1.
33 Jakes, “Politics and Police Don’t Mix.”
34 One announcement of the entire community policing effort, written by Times-Union reporter Sarah Metzgar, was titled simply “It’s Official: Albany Foot Cops Are Ready to Patrol City Streets,” Albany Times-Union, December 1, 1994, p. B-4.
35 The department has further plans to take advantages of new technologies for training (such as video training and computerized training) that allow for more scheduling flexibility.
36 Grebert does point to the importance of anecdotes and some ad hoc indicators in gauging the progress of reform. For example, he argues that one indicator of community policing’s acceptance is the presence of volunteers for the zone officer positions: “When you post an opening in one of these teams where a much busier sectors you just see tons of volunteers for it,” he explains. “A beat officer would move one and you’d fill his beat—tons of applicants for the position.” And with investigations, Grebert argues that it became clear when detectives became invested in community policing: “They’d get a big case in, and it would take them away from their team and you’d begin to hear things like, ‘Wait a minute. I’ve got these cases working in my neighborhood that I’ve got to deal with’ . . . You began to see the sense that they were buying into identifying with the neighborhoods.”
37 “Back on the Beat,” Albany Times-Union, November 28, 1994, p. A-8.
38 Jay Jochnowitz. “Arbor Hill Police Unit to Re-Open,” Albany Times-Union, March 28, 1996, p. B-1.
39 Jay Jochnowitz. “Dissent on Substation Dissolves in Unanimity,” Albany Times-Union, October 22, 1996, p. B-1. Morris apparently made this statement after reluctantly voting for the plan. See also Jay Jochnowitz. “Aldermen Hold Key to Arbor Hill Station,” Albany Times-Union, October 19, 1996, p. B-1; Jay Jochnowitz, “Arbor Hill Station Hits Roadblock,” Albany Times-Union, October 8, 1996, p. B-5.
40 Jochnowitz, “Aldermen Hold Key to Arbor Hill Station.”
TO BE CONTINUED ...
FOOTNOTES, continued ...
29 Another participant in the planning sessions simply did not believe that the reform would have this effect. “We felt that what was needed was an overall manager to manage that de-centralization. [We would still] put the proper responsibilities in those various precincts, . . or the ownership as we talked about in community policing. But within those precincts, there are multiple functions that need to occur. And it was the functions that we were finding problems with, to have people work cohesively together. And that’s where the overall manager came in—not to detract from the de-centralization.”
30 Jay Jochnowitz. “Just a Brief Fling for Jennings, Cops,” Albany Times-Union, July 21, 1995, p. B-5.
31 Some department members also speculate that top management silenced union objections by handing out promotions to top union officials.
32 Lara Jakes, “Politics and Police Don’t Mix for Ex-Deputy Chief,” Albany Times-Union, February 1, 1998, p. D-1. See also Lara Jakes. “Police Hierarchy Shake-Up Continues,” Albany Times-Union, February 11, 1998, p. B-1; Lara Jakes, “Police Put Best Face on Change of Guard,” Albany Times-Union, February 14, 1998, p. A-1.
33 Jakes, “Politics and Police Don’t Mix.”
34 One announcement of the entire community policing effort, written by Times-Union reporter Sarah Metzgar, was titled simply “It’s Official: Albany Foot Cops Are Ready to Patrol City Streets,” Albany Times-Union, December 1, 1994, p. B-4.
35 The department has further plans to take advantages of new technologies for training (such as video training and computerized training) that allow for more scheduling flexibility.
36 Grebert does point to the importance of anecdotes and some ad hoc indicators in gauging the progress of reform. For example, he argues that one indicator of community policing’s acceptance is the presence of volunteers for the zone officer positions: “When you post an opening in one of these teams where a much busier sectors you just see tons of volunteers for it,” he explains. “A beat officer would move one and you’d fill his beat—tons of applicants for the position.” And with investigations, Grebert argues that it became clear when detectives became invested in community policing: “They’d get a big case in, and it would take them away from their team and you’d begin to hear things like, ‘Wait a minute. I’ve got these cases working in my neighborhood that I’ve got to deal with’ . . . You began to see the sense that they were buying into identifying with the neighborhoods.”
37 “Back on the Beat,” Albany Times-Union, November 28, 1994, p. A-8.
38 Jay Jochnowitz. “Arbor Hill Police Unit to Re-Open,” Albany Times-Union, March 28, 1996, p. B-1.
39 Jay Jochnowitz. “Dissent on Substation Dissolves in Unanimity,” Albany Times-Union, October 22, 1996, p. B-1. Morris apparently made this statement after reluctantly voting for the plan. See also Jay Jochnowitz. “Aldermen Hold Key to Arbor Hill Station,” Albany Times-Union, October 19, 1996, p. B-1; Jay Jochnowitz, “Arbor Hill Station Hits Roadblock,” Albany Times-Union, October 8, 1996, p. B-5.
40 Jochnowitz, “Aldermen Hold Key to Arbor Hill Station.”
TO BE CONTINUED ...
Re: HISTORY OF ALBANY POLICE
I. THE ALBANY POLICE DEPARTMENT THROUGH 1994
FOOTNOTES, continued ...
41 The station recently opened.
42 James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling. “Police and Neighborhood Safety: Broken Windows,” The Atlantic Monthly, March, 1982, pp. 29-38
43 Cf. George Kelling and Catherine Coles. Fixing Broken Windows. New York: Free Press, 1997.
44 Tuffey also uses this logic to explain his resistance to call diversion schemes, explained in more detail below. He explains: “Mrs. Jones gets her bicycle stolen from her garage, and you call it in. I take a report on the phone, click. What’s going to happen to that report? It will get filed. The police officer working that area, are they going to know about that stolen bike? What if Harvey Smith who just committed a murder three doors away and we don’t know about the murder yet, walked down the street and stole that bicycle? He’s going to ride away on the bicycle into the sunset. I don’t even know about that murder but I do know Mrs. Jones saw a bicycle going down the street. If I never take that report, I never show up, I don’t know what’s going on in that area.”
45 To be sure, some APD officers seem to see quality-of-life as an important issue in its own right, regardless of its link to serious crime. One explains: “I really believe you [should] take care of the small things: The open container on the corner; the group of kids with their boom boxes . . . ; the skateboarders, if they’re an annoyance and you’re getting calls from the community over this . . . You don’t tolerate that. You don’t tolerate people putting their trash out two days early in the summertime. Unacceptable. . . . That’s not chicken stuff. If you’re trying to go to sleep and you can’t sleep because some person is outside with a loud stereo, and it’s rattling your windows, you have the right to a night’s sleep even if you’re living in the city.”
46 One statistic tends to support the police priorities explanation rather than 911: In 1995—the first full year of both 911 and the new community policing program— arrests climbed by 20%, while calls answered climbed only 3%. (Part I crimes fell by 9% over this period.) A third possible explanation is the growth in the patrol force, but filings per sworn officer rose by 20% from 1993 to 1997.
47 Jay Jochnowitz. “Panel to Help Jennings Choose City Judge,” Albany Times-Union, November 10, 1994, p. B-4.
48 Jay Jochnowitz. “Jennings to Merge Traffic, Engineering, and DPW Services,” Albany Times-Union, June 14, 1995, p. B-4.
49 Sarah Metzgar. “Albany to Deploy an Army to Fight Building Code Violations,” Albany Times-Union, December 13, 1994, p. B-1. Jennings simultaneously proposed to give police some power to enforce building and housing codes, but this proposal got a cooler reception, with some arguing that the work would divert police from more important duties. The proposal has recently re-emerged in the city.
50 Jay Jochnowitz. “Building Inspection by Firefighters Endorsed in Albany,” Albany Times-Union, July 27, 1994, p. B-3. A few city officials worried about potential ethical conflicts, since many firefighters worked as building contractors on the side. But the Fire Chief promised that he would guard against the potential for corruption, explaining that firefighters would not be allowed to solicit business. “They won’t be able to say, ‘You have an electrical problem. Here’s my card,” the Chief told a newspaper reporter at the time. See Metzgar, “Albany to Deploy an Army.”
51 Jay Jochnowitz. “Fire Union Criticizes Double Duties,” Albany Times-Union, February 21, 1997, p. B-1.
52 Jay Jochnowitz. “Landlords Fight City Hall over Code Violations,” Albany Times-Union, May 8, 1995, p. B-1; Jay Jochnowitz. “Mayor’s Code Enforcement Plan Hits Snag,” Albany Times-Union, September 8, 1995, p. B-12; Jochnowitz, “Fire Union Criticizes Double Duties.”
TO BE CONTINUED ...
FOOTNOTES, continued ...
41 The station recently opened.
42 James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling. “Police and Neighborhood Safety: Broken Windows,” The Atlantic Monthly, March, 1982, pp. 29-38
43 Cf. George Kelling and Catherine Coles. Fixing Broken Windows. New York: Free Press, 1997.
44 Tuffey also uses this logic to explain his resistance to call diversion schemes, explained in more detail below. He explains: “Mrs. Jones gets her bicycle stolen from her garage, and you call it in. I take a report on the phone, click. What’s going to happen to that report? It will get filed. The police officer working that area, are they going to know about that stolen bike? What if Harvey Smith who just committed a murder three doors away and we don’t know about the murder yet, walked down the street and stole that bicycle? He’s going to ride away on the bicycle into the sunset. I don’t even know about that murder but I do know Mrs. Jones saw a bicycle going down the street. If I never take that report, I never show up, I don’t know what’s going on in that area.”
45 To be sure, some APD officers seem to see quality-of-life as an important issue in its own right, regardless of its link to serious crime. One explains: “I really believe you [should] take care of the small things: The open container on the corner; the group of kids with their boom boxes . . . ; the skateboarders, if they’re an annoyance and you’re getting calls from the community over this . . . You don’t tolerate that. You don’t tolerate people putting their trash out two days early in the summertime. Unacceptable. . . . That’s not chicken stuff. If you’re trying to go to sleep and you can’t sleep because some person is outside with a loud stereo, and it’s rattling your windows, you have the right to a night’s sleep even if you’re living in the city.”
46 One statistic tends to support the police priorities explanation rather than 911: In 1995—the first full year of both 911 and the new community policing program— arrests climbed by 20%, while calls answered climbed only 3%. (Part I crimes fell by 9% over this period.) A third possible explanation is the growth in the patrol force, but filings per sworn officer rose by 20% from 1993 to 1997.
47 Jay Jochnowitz. “Panel to Help Jennings Choose City Judge,” Albany Times-Union, November 10, 1994, p. B-4.
48 Jay Jochnowitz. “Jennings to Merge Traffic, Engineering, and DPW Services,” Albany Times-Union, June 14, 1995, p. B-4.
49 Sarah Metzgar. “Albany to Deploy an Army to Fight Building Code Violations,” Albany Times-Union, December 13, 1994, p. B-1. Jennings simultaneously proposed to give police some power to enforce building and housing codes, but this proposal got a cooler reception, with some arguing that the work would divert police from more important duties. The proposal has recently re-emerged in the city.
50 Jay Jochnowitz. “Building Inspection by Firefighters Endorsed in Albany,” Albany Times-Union, July 27, 1994, p. B-3. A few city officials worried about potential ethical conflicts, since many firefighters worked as building contractors on the side. But the Fire Chief promised that he would guard against the potential for corruption, explaining that firefighters would not be allowed to solicit business. “They won’t be able to say, ‘You have an electrical problem. Here’s my card,” the Chief told a newspaper reporter at the time. See Metzgar, “Albany to Deploy an Army.”
51 Jay Jochnowitz. “Fire Union Criticizes Double Duties,” Albany Times-Union, February 21, 1997, p. B-1.
52 Jay Jochnowitz. “Landlords Fight City Hall over Code Violations,” Albany Times-Union, May 8, 1995, p. B-1; Jay Jochnowitz. “Mayor’s Code Enforcement Plan Hits Snag,” Albany Times-Union, September 8, 1995, p. B-12; Jochnowitz, “Fire Union Criticizes Double Duties.”
TO BE CONTINUED ...